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ABSTRACT
This dissertation follows the theme of negation, negativity, and “practices of negation”, 
through a selection of writings on art in the post-war period, and, in particular, from the 
1960s to the present. Although the term negation is widely used, most prominently with 
lespect to the histories and analyses of art-historical categories like avant-gardism, neo­
avant-gardism, modernism, and postmodernism, very little attention has been paid to the 
concept itself, 01 to its role within art-historical methodology. The main art-theoretical 
texts which I select for examination are characterised by a suspicion o f figures of 
identity, plenitude, or affirmation. I explore the borderlands between dialectical and 
nihilistic methodologies which these suspicions seem to provoke, and I argue that the 
attention to negativity has a particular importance for considerations!of art because of its 
implications for the question of representation.
Chapter 1 outlines the key accounts on avant-gardism and modernism, and looks at the
impact of the Left Hegelian tradition on recent art theory. I argue that the claims that
negativity has become compromised or ineffectual, lead, in fact, to a reassertion of
negativity. The second section of this chapter tracks some of the methodological
implications through a case study of the writings of T.J. Clark, and develops the
question o f negation as a fundamental problem of representation. Chapter 2 analyses the
writings o f the Italian architectural theorists/historians Manfredo Tafuri and Massimo
Cacciari. These authors elaborate their arguments from German critical theory, and their
attention to negativity is tracked into an account of “completed nihilism”. Chapter 3
starts from the association - advanced, in particular, by writers associated with the
journal October - made between modernism/postmodernism and the rhetorical figures of
symbol/allegory. I argue that allegorical negativity is not straightforwardly disjunctive,
and, by reading it as a degenerative dialectic, the argument returns to representational 
debates.
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1INTRODUCTION
To many people, it seems obvious now, and did so when this project commenced in 
1990, that concepts like the avant-garde and modernism had becom e severely  
compromised, and, more particularly, that their often cited “practices of negation” had 
been rendered redundant by the transformations in post-war society - transformations 
which included factors like expansion of the art market (particularly in the United States 
and in Germany), changes in the nature of capital accumulation, and the conviction that 
the “shock of the new” had become the “tradition of the new”, l As we look back from 
the far side of postmodernism - a debate still raging in 1990, but itself somewhat 
outmoded in 1996 - such questions of avant-gardist negation, however much disputed 
and contended, seem to have settled in the dust and to hover on the verge of the arcane. 
My point here is stronger than the long-habitual claims that resistance has become 
appropriable, indeed marketable, by capitalist society (late capitalist, post-industrial, 
post-Fordist, post-etc...). We seem to be presented with an inversion of Walter 
Benjamin’s reclamations of the past for the present, the traces of the long-gone for now­
time, and instead face the prospect of the just-gone receeding rapidly into the far past. 
This prospect makes Benjamin’s point the more forceful rather than redundant, and we
1. See, for example, Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic o f Late Capitalism, 
Verso, 1991, p.49 (the original essay, of the same title, appeared in New Left Review 146, July/August
1984. pp.53-92). The notion of the “tradition of the new” can be found in Harold Rosenberg, “The 
Tradition of the New" (1962), The Tradition o f the New , Paladin, 1970, pp.23-26: “the famous ‘modern 
break with tradition' has lasted long enough to have produced its own tradition. Exactly one hundred 
years have passed since Baudelaire invited iugitives lrom the loo-small world of memory to come aboard 
for his voyage in search of the new”, ibid., p.23. The idea of “shock” in modernity is deep-seated, and 
has been most popularised by Walter Benjamin in Charles Baudelaire. A Lyric Poet in the Era o f High 
Capitalism, Verso, 1983, and “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), 
Illuminations, Fontana, 1973, pp.219-53. Benjamin draws on: Sigmund Freud’s “theory of shock”, 
“ Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1914). Sigmund Freud. On Metapsychology: the Theory o f 
Psychoanalysis, Penguin, 1984, pp.269-338, especially p.303; Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and 
Mental Lilc (1903), On Individuality and Social Forms, The University of Chicago Press, 1981, 
pp.324-39. The phiase shock ol the new became the title of the television series and book on the 
avant-garde by Robert Hughes, The Shock o f the New: Art and the Century o f Change, Thames & 
Hudson, 1980.
2might require such interventions into our own yesterday.2 As much as the modernisms 
it initially sought to challenge, today postmodernism has been championed, attacked, 
categorised, analysed, marketed and curated - note the category o f “early 
postmodernism” which has recently found its way into print.3 Not so long ago, people 
didn’t know postmodernism was coming. This thesis concentrates on the not so long 
ago, before the whole matter seemed done and dusted, and before the narratival telos 
had become an idee fixe.
Even so, the concept of negation does not present itself for interrogation with any less
difficulty, but rather with more, as tends to be the case when the argument is still open.
What the object of my thesis actually is remains a significant problem. The concept of
negation is most explicitly, and infamously, associated with what has been termed the
“negative avant-gardes”: Futurism and Dada, with their self-consciously provocative
statements, manifestos, exhibitions and cabarets.4 Marinetti called for revolt and “the
destructive gesture” of war. Among the targets for the act of negation were “museums,
libraries, academies o f every kind... moralism, feminism, every opportunistic or
utilitarian cowardice”.5
Come on! set fire to the library shelves! Turn aside the canals to flood the 
museums!... Take up your pickaxes, your axes and hammers and wreck, wreck 
the venerable cities, pitilessly!6
Among the more abhorrent aspects of this urge to, and ecstasy in, destruction one often
2. The “material bases’ for this surge into the future are frequently commented on, and there has 
been much attention to the effects of new technologies. Nevertheless, such escalations and retractions of 
temporality may be more a matter of the mind-sets of critical theory. One must beware of getting canied 
away with these effects, be suspicious of the energetic effusings, and wonder to what extent critical 
theory finds itself replicating or exacerbating the phenomena that it describes and analyses.
3. Paul A. Bove, Early Postmodernism: Foundational Essays, Duke University Press, 1995
4. The terms “negative” and “positive” avant-gardes come from Renato Poggioli, Theory o f the 
Avant-Garde, Harvard University Press, 1968. Eckart Von Sydow saw Decadence as a “culture of 
negation” (cited p.76), and Andre Gide described Dada as “a negating operation” (cited p.63).
5. Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, “The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism” (1909), in Art in 
Theory 1900-1990. An Anthology o f Changing Ideas, eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood. Blackwell 
1992, p. 147.
6. Ibid. , p. 148.
finds some absurd and comical images: “Oh, the joy of seeing the glorious old canvases 
bobbing adrift on those waters, discoloured and shredded!...”.7 One year later, 
Boccioni, working these principles into the question of modern painting, declared 
Futurism against “all forms of imitation”, “the nude in painting”, and urged its 
supporters - after all these were dangerous times - to stand firm against both “flat” and 
“bituminous tints”.8 A few years later, and with a fair bit of pitiless wrecking well in 
progress, Hugo Ball announced Dada as “a harlequinade made of nothingness”; 9 and 
Tristan Tzara wrote: “Let each man proclaim: there is a great negative work of 
desti'uction to be accomplished”. 10 Included in Tzara’s list of phenomena to be negated 
are: the family, “comfortable compromise and good manners”, logic, social hierarchy 
and values, memory, archaeology, prophets, and the future. 11 Hiilsenbeck, adopting 
explicitly Nietzschean phraseology, wrote:
... to be a Dadaist means to let oneself be thrown by things, to oppose all 
sedimentation; to sit in a chair for a single moment is to risk one’s life.... you 
say yes to a life that strives upwards by negation. Affirmation - negation: the 
gigantic hocuspocus of existence fires the nerves of the true Dadaist.... Blast the 
aesthetic-ethical attitude! Blast the bloodless abstraction of expresssionism! Blast 
the literary hollowheads and their theories for improving the world! For 
Dadaism in word and image, for all the Dadaist things that go on in the world! 
To be against this manifesto is to be a Dadaist! 12
Such statements against convention and tradition - and with all their internal
contradictions - are the loci classici of avant-gardist practices of negation. Yet Tzara, just
to make it difficult to pin down Dada, declared: “I am against action; for continuous
contradiction, for affirmation too, I am neither for nor against and I do not explain
because I hate common sense”.13
3
By the same token it is not difficult to identify practices o f negation for the so-called
7. Ibid., p. 148.
8. Umberto Boccioni et al., “Futurist Painting: Technical Manifesto” (1910), in ibid.. p. 152.
9. Hugo Ball, “Dada Fragments” (1916-7), in ibid., p.246.
10. Tristan Tzara, “Dada Manifesto 1918” (1918), in ibid., p.252.
11. Ibid., p.253.
12. Richard Hiilsenbeck, “First Dada Manifesto” (1918-20), in ibid., p.255.
13. Tzara, op. cit., p. 249.
positive”, or “constructive”, avant-gardes like de Stijl or ConsU'uctivism: their rejection 
of pictorial aits and the turn to photography or design; Mayakovsky’s meditations in Pro 
Eto on, and his distress in, the difficulty of negating his own pre-revolutionary I. 
Neither were negatory gestures and tactics unknown outside, and often in opposition to, 
the avant-garde - we can find them, for example, in Proletkult’s attempt to destroy all 
the art of the bourgeois and aristocratic past. Neither is it difficult to chart negation 
through modernist art in general: the avoidance of local colour by the Fauves, the 
dissecting of traditional pictorial space by the Cubists, the subverting o f academic 
conventions, the deliberate display o f incompetence; or what T.J. Clark called the 
“refusal to signify” of Manet’s Olympia; even the apparent succession of “isms”, each 
rejecting and defining itself against its predecessor, can be presented as a chain of 
negations.14 Negation is further celebrated - sometimes through the invocation of 
Satanic positions - through the works of Baudelaire and the Comte de Lautreamont 
(Isidore Ducasse), authors who themselves become subjects of fascination for the avant- 
garde of the early 2 0 c .15 Taken in these ways negativity can be seen to be thoroughly 
embedded in the modern tradition of art and culture. There are different modalities and 
variable stakes, but it is easy to see why the term “negation” (even when it is absent) has 
come to indicate the defining feature of modern artistic activity, and why it figures so 
prominently in the literature on modern art. Negation remains an issue in post-war art 
practice - whether in the writing of Ad Reinhardt, in Gustav Metzger’s manifestos, for 
example; or maybe it would be better to say not that it “remains” but that it is self­
4
14. See T.J. Clark, “Preliminaries to a Possible Treatment of ‘Olympia’”, Screen, vol.21, no.l, 
pp.18-41.TJ. Clark, “Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art”, Pollock and After. The Critical Debate, ed. 
Francis Frascina, Harper & Row, 1985, pp.47-63 (originally in Critical Inquiry, September 1982, 
vol.9, no.l, pp. 139-156). The list of practices of negation is given by Clark’s footnote. His points are 
summarised and commented on by Terry Atkinson, “Disaffirmation and Negation”, MUTE 1, Galleri 
Prag, Copenhagen, 1988, p.9.
15. Charles Baudelaire, "Les Fleurs du Mai” (1861), Baudelaire. The Complete Verse, Anvil Press, 
1986; Comte de Lautreamont, "Chants de Maldoror” (c. 1870), Maldoror and Poems, Penguin, 1978. To 
this list we might add Joris-Karl Huysmans, Against Nature (1884), Penguin, 1959. Huysmans is 
probably more concerned with ennui with, and denigration of, nature, and an emphasis on artifice.
5consciously reworked or rearticulated as a practice.16
* * *
However, the question addressed by this thesis focuses not so much on the nature of 
these senses of negation as claimed by avant-gardists or modernists. It focuses more on 
the role of negation in the modes of interpretation or theorisation of the avant-garde and 
modernism - and of neo-avant-gardism and postmodernism - by later historians and 
critics, particularly in the post-war period. Theories of the avant-garde and the 
modernism/postmodernism debate provide some key sites for encountering the question 
of negativity, and the avant-garde, etc., frequently provides the veh icle  for that 
question. This needs to be specified further, for I do not mean, to take one example 
already touched on, to pursue an extended analysis o f Clark’s phrase “refusal to 
signify” in so far as it pertains to the object of his study (Manet). In this instance, it is 
easy to distinguish between the mid-19c. historical object and the interpreting subject in 
the late 20c., but the matter is far more messy.
It has always been difficult to explain what a thesis on the concept of negation and its 
role in art’s histories and theories might be about. Attempts to clarify the matter with 
some specific examples fail to speak of the issue at hand, somehow skirting it and 
veering off in another direction. At one level this difficulty is odd, for - as indicated 
above - once you start looking, negation crops up everywhere, operating as part of a
16. See, for example, Ad Reinhardt, “On Negation”, Art-as-Art. The Selecect Writings o f Ad 
Reinhardt, ed. Barbara Rose, University of California Press, 1991; Gustav Metzger, “Auto-Destructive 
Art” (1959), Theories and Documents o f Contemporary Art. A Soucebook o f Artists' Writings, eds. 
Kritine Stiles and Peter Selz, University of California Press, 1996, p.401. Yve-Alain Bois claims that 
Reinhardt’s work does not refuse to signify, but signifies refusal, and that “His negations are affirmative 
statements... ‘the intellectual power of asserting “not"”’. See Yve-Alain Bois, “The Limits of Almost”, 
Ad Reinhardt, Rizzoli, 1991, p . l l .  This account plays with Clark’s account of Manet’s Olympia 
(“Preliminaries to a Possible Treatment of ‘Olympia’”, op. cit.). See also. Nacy Spector, “Negativity, 
Purity, and the Clearness of Ambiguity. Ad Reinhardt, Joseph Kosulh. and Felix Gonzalez-Torres”, Art 
and Design, vol.9. no. 1/2, January-February 1994, pp.6-11.
routine language of art history and analysis, thrown around in conference discussions 
and in texts. It figures, sometimes by implication, in almost any discussion of “ends”, 
“voids” and “nothingness”, discussions which have themselves been writ large across 
the landscape of post-war art writing. 17 Moreover, negation clearly irritates some 
people, whether as an implicit bugbear in an anti-theoretical polemic (see, for example, 
Robert Storr versus Yve -Alain Bois over the question of Robert Ryman),l8 or as the 
explicit target in a theoretically inspired thesis (Andrew Benjamin versus the via negativa 
over the question of just about everything).'9 To play with our terms a little: when 
something is being negated, then you can be pretty sure that it exists, albeit by means of 
a negative definition. But this truism slips into some difficult areas when we recall that 
the “something” in question is already negation. The brute question becomes: what is it? 
what is this negation? Answers are not easy to find.
The difficulty, I believe, is due to the nature of my “object”. The substantial problem for 
defining my object comes with that object being a theoretical/philosophical concept, and, 
moreover, with that concept being negation. I have already remarked on negation’s 
ubiquity and yet simultaneous absence from direct enquiry: many use it, but few know 
what they mean. This apparent paradoxical quality seems to accompany the concept of 
negation: negation as a category seems, for instance, to be everywhere and nowhere, 
and to be completely plural in potential meaning and totally loaded with particular 
significance. Logically, the meaning of any practice of negation depends on what is 
being negated in the first place and, as Charles Harrison observes, the term is
6
17. “Negation" is a key theme in accounts of the work of Gerhard Richter. See, for example, Peter 
Osborne, “Painting Negation: Gerhard Richter's Negatives”, October 62, Fall 1992, pp. 103-113; 
Gertrud Koch, “The Open Secret. Gerhard Richter and the Surfaces of Modernity”, in Jean-Philippe 
Antoine, Gertrud Koch, Luc Lang, Gerhard Richter, Editions Dis Voir, 1995, pp.9-27. Koch, 
concluding her essay, refers to a quotation from Gottfried Boehm: “Negation is at the basis of all 
pictorial appearance” (cited p.27).
18. Robert Storr, “Simple Gifts”, Robert Ryman, Tate Gallery Publications, 1993; Yve-Alain 
Bois, “Ryman's Tact” (1981), Painting as Model, MIT, 1990, pp.215-226.
19. Andrew Benjamin, Object. Painting, Academy Editions, 1994.
“ p r o m is c u o u s ” .20 Its meaning or locus is potentially limitless. Yet at the same time it is 
utterly limited and tied to the object of its denial. This limited quality has frequently been 
seen as a major drawback of “practices of negation”: they don’t seem to have a “life of 
their own”, or to provide any sustaining force, and even if they succeed in their negating 
they seem to take themselves down with what they denied. At best they seem to provide 
a catalyst for escape, but in themselves, as Laura Mulvey points out, they cannot escape 
their defining ground.21 What Mulvey has in mind are practices of negation of a radical 
or critical kind: cultural politics, art practice with serious political intentions (and there 
are, of course, more strictly political variations of this argument). In addition, negation 
seems to be heavily loaded and suggestive by way o f both its intellectual heritage 
(especially Hegelianism and Marxism) and what Harrison refers to as its susceptibility 
to investment with “moral purpose”.22 Negation’s weight in cultural debate is, 
therefore, of a peculiarly double nature - both highly specific (at least in its invocation) 
and highly charged on the one hand, and, on the other, loose and fluid, and even, on 
occasions, empty.
There might, then, be something fundamentally wrong with any attempt to “fix” 
negation as a set of definable “practices”, and this is the danger with the formulation of 
my title and central concept. Negation - like its most famous representative, the Devil - 
is a shifting and sometimes submerged category. But while we might see the particular 
pitch of negation as used in any one instance as an entirely movable feast, it is, I 
believe, an abdication of thinking to let the matter constantly dissolve into the extremes 
of infinite plurality or contingent specificity - extremes which may sound rather grand, 
but which allow us to say nothing much at all. These far reaches are, I think, 
inescapable gravitational forces, but a discussion of negation which is argued as a
20. Charles Harrison, Essays on Art & Language, Basil Blackwell, 1991, p.232.
21. Laura Mulvey, “Changes: Thoughts on Myth, Narrative and Historical Experience”, History 
Workshop Journal, no.23, 1987, pp.3-19.
22. Harrison, op. cit., p.232.
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8formal logic misses its very “life” and force; so, pace  Harrison, I would argue that its 
charge of “moral purpose” is precisely where we must look. For all its infinite variety of 
determinations, negation does seem repeatedly to suggest the same type of concerns; 
and for all its particular, finite or local, determinations, there seems to be a constant 
pitch into wider social questions (sometimes with an underlying ontological resonance). 
History, social life, politics, the politics of the everyday, etc., are already charged into 
the arena o f negativity - as, so to speak, its life-blood. It is the questions of reification 
and political change - and, by implication, the question of resistance and emancipation - 
into which negation seems to be constantly orchestrated.
In fact, the shifting and duplicitous character attributed to the Devil is not so far from all 
this. Lucifer is explicitly associated with negation and Lucifer’s fall from grace is the 
key narrative of negation’s origin. “I am the Spirit of Eternal Negation”, Goethe has 
Mephistopheles say, while the Lord, despite Mephisto’s provocations, only affirms: “I 
have no hate for creatures of your kind”.23 The interpretations of the Faust myth are 
swollen with plays on the question of negation, or what sense one is to make of “/c/i bin 
der Geist, der stets verneint7” or Mephistopheles’ “riddle” of self-identity as “A part of 
that force which, always willing evil, always produces good”.24 The question touches 
on the insurmountable aporia at the heart of theological accounts of the origin of evil.25 
Christian theology became caught in trying to answer why the self-sufficient Absolute
23. J.W. von Goethe, The Collected Works. Vol.2. Faust 1 and 2, Princeton University Press, 
1994. line 1338, and line 337.
24. Ibid., line 1335-6; cf. “Ein Teil von jener Kraft, Die stets das Bose will und stets das Gute 
schafft”. Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Faust. Der Tragodie Erste Teil, Philipp Reclam jun.GmbH & Co., 
1986. For some interesting accounts of the Faust myth see: Georg Lukacs, Goethe and His Age (c. 
1930-40, first published 1947), Merlin, 1979; Theodor W. Adorno, “On the Final Scene of Faust" 
(1959), Notes to Literature. V o l.l, Columbia University Press, 1991, pp. 11-120; Franco Moretti, 
Modern Epic. The World-System from Goethe to Garcia Marquez, Verso, 1996.
25. See Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (written in the early 1920s, first 
published 1928), Verso, 1985; Lesek Kolakowski, Main Currents o f Marxism. Its Origins Growth and 
Dissolution. Vol.l. The Founders, (1978), Oxford University Press, 1981; Giorgio Agamben, 
Language and Death: The Place o f Negativity, University of Minnesota Press, 1991; Massimo Cacciari, 
The Necessary Angel (1984), State University of New York Press, 1994.
needed, or allowed, evil and die degradation of Being in the Fall: did God encompass 
negativity as part of His creation, or did negativity exist outside this (in which case, 
what about God’s overarching presence?) For some God creates both good and evil, for 
others evil is the absence of God’s goodness and evil has no reality in itself. The 
contradiction in the idea of the Absolute Creator forced answers which contantly trod the 
borders of heresy, tipping over into Gnosticism and Manichaeism.26 Thomas Mann 
provides an entertaining account of the variety of positions in his Dr. Faustus, where 
Adrian Leverkiihn attends a number of lectures on the question, with each professor 
arguing for a different account of evil.27 The terms of arguments on the origin and 
nature o f evil move in similar ways to the previous discussion of negation itself: 
Christan theology tended on the one hand to treat evil as a necessary part of the cosmos, 
an approach which, as Kolakowski notes in his discussion of the origin of the dialectic, 
relativised evil to the point of non-existence; or, on the other hand, treated evil as 
originating in “the corruption of the will that disobeys the divine commands”. 28 The 
latter tends to be associated with man’s Fall, but Massimo Cacciari argues that the matter 
is most focused on the story of the Fall of Lucifer and the rebel angels, because angels 
raise the fundamental problem of representation.29
A classic treatment o f the tale of Lucifer is Milton’s Paradise Lost.^>° From a modern 
perspective it is impossible not to sympathise with Lucifer, who wants nothing more 
than a modest degree of self-determination. Indeed, he wants freedom for a very 
particular purpose: to give his love to God by his own volition - hardly the stuff of 
rebellion, but, it seems, regarded by God as the thin end of the wedge, and, in fact, the
26. See, for example, Agamben, op. cit.; and Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion. The Message o f 
the Alien God and the Beginnings o f Christianity, Beacon Press, 1963.
27. Thomas Mann, Dr. Faustus. The Life O f The German Composer Adrian Leverkiihn As Told 
By A Friend (1947), Penguin, 1968.
28. Kolakowski, op. cit., p.22.
29. Cacciari, op. cit.
30. John Milton, Paradise L ost, in Complete English Poems o f Education, Areopagitica (1674), 
Everyman, 1993, pp. 144-441.
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very root of sin. God’s position in this seems to be totally autocratic and unreasonable. 
This I'eading runs counter to Milton’s intent, for he was not sympathetic to the rebel 
angels, although, as William Blake was to comment in the light o f M ilton’s political 
radicalism, Milton “was of the D evil’s party without knowing it”.31 Blake’s comment 
again points to the association of left politics with negation.32 Where Milton describes 
the degeneration of Lucifer’s beautiful features, Blake, for his part, shows the Angel of 
Light as beautiful and heroic. As the theme of light suggests, negation and Lucifer are 
also associated with knowledge. The tale of Lucifer’s Fall contains all the appropriate 
philosophical and political elements: alienation, the division of subject and object, 
identity/non-identity, the question of knowledge, the scope for criticism and self- 
reflexivity, the desire for emancipation and the freedom of action, judgement and ethics. 
The angel/devil provides the motive force of narratives from replays o f the Faust myth 
to Pasolini’s Theorem.
% * *
This thesis works across materials from art history, art or cultural theory, aesthetics, 
philosophy and critical theory, although it works across none of them exhaustively. The 
range o f materials is extensive and traverses limited aspects of Anglo-American and 
Italian art history with (largely) German theory and philosophy: the work of Greenberg 
and Tafuri, to name two, offers a considerable density of material for art historical 
work; matters under address range across painting, architecture, photography and 
literature; it is possible to write on the role of negation in just one book of Hegel’s, and 
there is now an industry of literature to read on Adorno and Benjamin. W.J.T. Mitchell 
has remarked on the “jack of all trades” status of such multidisciplinary work, a sort of
10
31. Blake cited in A.L. Morton, The English Utopia, Lawrence & Wishart. 1978. p.89.
32. The concepts of Left and Right seem to have derived from the sides of God on which, 
respectively, the Archangels Lucifer and Michael originally sat.
confinement to amateurism that haunts anyone who ventures out o f the academy’s 
division of la b o u r .  33 These remarks cut close to the bone; nevertheless, I remain most 
impressed and influenced by the work of intellectuals - whatever the attendant 
weaknesses - who can think across such academic divisions, across the division of 
general and particular, and who can charge their observations and analyses with politics. 
It could be said that this taste chose my object, or I could argue the matter the other way, 
and note that my object - negation - is a category which itself tends to break disciplinary 
boundaries, or even the bounds of the academic, and which necessarily (and always 
already) dissolves the neat categories that many academics would prefer to remain fixed 
(even when they claim a theoretical preference for a lack of fixity).
There is a lot that will be left out or treated rather cursorily. Some of these are matters 
that are controversial or that have been core debates in the humanities over recent years, 
and I have tried, where possible and relevant, to indicate some of the scope of the debate 
in footnotes. However, I wanted to be neither overrun nor overwhelmed by the surface 
of humanities-based polemical and theoretical b a t t l e s , 34 and nor did 1 want to relive 
some standard presentations of post-war cultural/intellectual history - such as the 
assumed passage from Marxism to post-Marxism. Not becoming embroiled in these 
(and many other) debates is a necessary weakness - but, I hope, also a strength - of this 
thesis.
Initially, I was annoyed by the shallow, and often false, senses in which art history 
used philosophical concepts, and by the atrophied caricatures o f certain modes of 
thinking resorted to by the “new art history”. One motivation for looking further at more
11
33. W.J.T. Mitchell, “Interdisciplinarity and Visual Culture”, The Art Bulletin, vol. LXXVII, 
no.4, December 1995, pp.540-544.
34. This includes intellectual formations such as poststructuralism and psycholanalytic-based 
accounts, but also what are, for some, less current and fashionable debates such as formalism and 
realism.
philosophical texts was that I was already distrustful of the versions of them that I found 
on offer. However, I didn’t want the thesis to degenerate into an expose of art writers’ 
inadequate philosophical grasps - to show, for example, that art historian X  has not 
used philosopher Y ’s concept accurately. Nor do I wish to operate “like all good 
revolutionists” who, as Harold Rosenberg put it, try to improve their success in 
pursuing speculative butterflies “by perfecting the instrument” of capture and weaving 
“a net with smaller holes”.35 The role of philosophy here has to be treated with caution: 
philosophical concepts become figures (often shifting ones) in art history, so one can 
miss the point by Hying to judge the art historical usage with recourse to philosophical 
exactitude.
Rosenberg was being ironic about this “revolutionary event in Aesthetics”, in a tone that 
echoed Marx’s comments about Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians and their 
revolution “in the realm of pure thought”.36 However, this conjunction of the figure of 
revolution and art/aesthetics is a powerful one. Perry Anderson has criticised the 
tendency of 20c. “Western Marxism” to drift from active politics into rarefied aesthetic- 
philosophical contemplation.37 This same drift also witnesses an insistently social and 
political loading to aesthetic categories - producing the paradox of more politics where 
there is less .38 Indeed the heritage of German Idealism - with its terrain which crosses 
aesthetics, culture and political questions - probably explains the constant transmutations 
of values in any discussions of negation, and it should not be suprising that negation as 
a working concept is central to all these tendencies, nor that it has a particulary vivid life
35. These are Rosenberg's comments on Susanne Lunger’s Feeling and Form , in the essay “Virtual 
Revolution”, The Tradition of the New, op. cit., p.56.
36. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology. Critique o f  Modern German 
Philosophy According to its Representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer andStirner, and o f German Socialism 
According to ils  Various Prophets (1845-6). in Kart Marx Frederick Engels. Collected Works. Vol.5. 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1976, pp.23-539. Quotation from p.27.
37. Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, New Left Books, 1976.
38. With reference to a very different context, cf. Yve-Alain Bois’ remark on American politics 
being everywhere except in politics. Yve-Alain Bois, “Introduction: Resisting Blackmail”, Painting as 
Model, MIT, 1990, p.xx.
12
in the debates of idealism and materialism. Thus negation, while undoubtedly having an 
applicability in any area of discussion, has a particularly important life in the writings on 
art, but one which goes beyond artistic questions while simultaneously being confined 
to them.
Broadly, we might say that the emphasis in this thesis is at a crossing of, on the one 
hand, art history and theory, and, on the other, philosophy or critical theory. How to 
work the relation of these materials becomes a significant problem, for the generality of 
a philosophy of art seems to be contradicted by the particularity of the empirical work of 
history. Historically, the discipline of art history has both these modes at its heart, 
indeed, one is meant to choose between the sweeps of a philosophy of history or the 
particularities of philology.3^  I confess to liking both, or rather, I like the problem that 
is suggested by their interrelation, a problem that has been well articulated by T.J. 
Clark, and which will be discussed later. This question of the general and the particular 
is recurring one in my thesis. I have already written it into my description of negation’s 
doubleness earlier, but the matter is immanent to the question of negativity itself. In 
H egel’s account of Sense-Certainty and “the ‘This’” in the Phenomenology o f  Spirit, 
one is unable to express particularity - “ this tree”, for example - without the generality of 
language and every other possible “this tree”.40 Hegel argues that what presents itself as 
immediate, as the truest and richest kind of knowledge - sense-certainty - is, in fact 
mediated, and “ is through negation”: what was once “This”, “Here”, and “Now”, is 
now “not-This”, “not-Here” and “n o t-N o w ”.4i This example is returned to again and
13
39. Michael Podro’s reference to the “critical historians of art” is useful; as is, in a slightly 
different register. Clark's admiration for Riegl, Dvorak, and early Panofsky. Sec Michael Podro, The 
Critical Historians o f Art, Yale University Press, 1992, and T.J. Clark, “The conditions of artistic 
creation”, Times Literary Supplement, 24th May 1974, pp.561-2.
40. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology o f Spirit (1807). Oxford University Press, 1977 (this is 
the A.V. Miller translation).
41. “ 'H ere' is, e.g.. the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its 
opposite: 'No tree is here, but a house instead'. 'Here' itself does not vanish; on the contrary, it abides 
constant in the vanishing of the house, the tree, etc., and is indifferently house or tree" (ibid., pp.60-1).
again in the texts researched, and it has been commented that the same question - the 
question of deictic language or what Jakobson called “shifters” - has provided one of the 
most abiding problems for linguistics.42 The concept of movement has provided another 
recurring problem for philosophy, and can also be seen as involving the concept of 
negation.43 In other words, next to negation’s more colourful faces - all the devilish 
goings-on - there would seem to be some rather intractable problems.
This brief discussion may give some sense of how easy it would be to write a thesis that 
rarely touched its home discipline of art history, or the danger o f slipping into a 
discussion of the general and the particular in the general - in a way that has no ground. 
I have aimed to work my theoretical issues out of my materials and tried to avoid 
allowing the thesis to turn into an exercise of spot-the-sources, as though this somehow 
exhausts or resolves the issue. Such “sources” - and Hegel is a key one, even if by way 
of denial - are cues to developing answers; they are means not ends, allowing further 
twists in the problem. I have tried to work into the question of negativity in the accounts 
of art, and to decribe some of the range of its operation. Much of my working “into the 
question of negativity” by working “out of the material” has, given the nature o f my 
material, relied on close reading. As I have used this, it is again a way of interrogating 
the materials, and not a mode of “close reading” which privileges the rhetorical over the 
real. My position here is that the work must cross the often dichotomised division of the 
real and representation, must recognise that what it deals with are representations 
(textual or philosophical), but that these representations may be attempts to gain a 
conceptual grasp of the real. I am particularly interested in the debates which, rather than 
dismiss, actually address, this problem, even if that means circling in the difficulty; 1 am 
bored with “the critique of representation” as it has tended to be discussed - from my
14
42. See Agamben, op. cit., pp.23-5.
43. See Paul de Man, “The Epistemology of Metaphor”, Critical Inquiry, vol.5, no .l. Autumn 
1978, p. 17, for a discussion of the tautologies involved in the attempts to define "motion”.
perspective, this is too often a critique which based itself on a much reduced and 
caricatured understanding of its target.
This working into by working out o f  also points to another issue. It is a commonplace 
of anti-theoretical statements to say that the interpreter has imposed her theoretical 
framework on the object of study; and it is a commonplace o f the pro-theoretical 
accounts to reveal the anti-theorist as simply unconscious, or wilfully forgetful, of their 
own theoretical framework, to show them as “naturalisers” of partisan accounts, as 
“ideologists” in the more modern sense of the term. 44 My account pushes in explicitly 
theoretical directions. But while the anti-theorist sees the historian-theorist as 
externalising their ideas onto the object of study, my account puts more emphasis on the 
opposite movement, and locates how the historian may internalise aspects attributed to 
the object of study. This will be a recurring theme, and I have found the transpositions 
that take place here particularly fascinating.
Most of the writers whose work has become central to this thesis share a suspicion of 
what might be termed “easy” positions - and all are regarded as “difficult”. A consistent 
theme is an opposition to figures of identity, immediacy and plenitude, although the 
authors themselves vary in how far they push this. Accordingly, whatever presents 
itself as the richest form of knowledge and experience will be regarded sceptically, or as 
the face of oppressive power. Under the scrutiny o f the most rigourously negative of 
these writers, even simple popular pleasures can be rendered near-fascistic. “Do you 
ever come except to criticize? Is nothing ever right for you on earth?”, the Lord asks 
Mephistopheles, indicating the grounds of the charge o f pessimism that will be so 
frequently encountered through this thesis.45 For the most part (de Man is the glaring
44. Anti-theorists claim, then, that the historian/theorist externalises their account onto the object; 
my argument is about the former’s internalisation, and more the movements of intenalisation/ 
externalisation.
45. Goethe, Faust, op. cit., “Prologue in Heaven" (lines 294-5).
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exception), these writers and thinkers are of the Left, but their rejection of what they 
might regard as false identities is often as much directed at other representatives of the 
Left as at the ruling culture. In particular, this has not enamoured them to supporters of 
the official parties of the Comintern, or to leftists with a bent to populism.
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* * *
The three chapters which follow have different takes on negation in relation to art 
theory. Chapter 1 - “The Pain of the Unattainable Beyond” - operates as an extended 
introduction, running across some familiar debates in post-war, and primarily post- 
19608, debates: theories of the avant-garde and modernism, neo-avant-gardism and 
postmodernism, the “ends” of art, etc. This chapter focuses on the Left Hegelian 
tradition: the emphasis on the negative is explored, and the writing of Adorno is 
particularly central for understanding the key theme of reification and resistance. The 
final part of the chapter includes a case study of the use of the idea of “practices of 
negation” in the writings of T.J. Clark. Chapter 2 - “Looking the Negative in the Face” - 
continues to work across material on the question of the avant-garde and modernism, 
but takes a further step into negativity’s logic - and into the idea of negative thought - by 
way of working through the accounts of Italian architectural theorists Manfredo Tafuri 
and Massimo Cacciari. Here the framework is counter-Hegelian in intent, drawing on a 
strange mixture of workerist politics and the philosophies of Arnold Schopenhauer and 
Friedrich Nietzsche. Chapter 3 - “Absolute Dialectical Unrest, or, the Dizziness of a 
Perpetually Self-Engendered Disorder” - starts from the analogy o f postmodern art 
practice and allegorical disjunction made by writers such as Craig Owens and Douglas 
Crimp. By exploring the symbol/allegory opposition - primarily through the writing of 
Walter Benjamin and Paul de Man - this chapter addresses how negation seeps into a 
more fundamental analytical principle.
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Any reader familiar with Hegel’s Phenom enology will recognise the tone of these 
chapter titles.46 There is a perversity on my part in giving a Hegelian framing to what, 
in some cases, are non-Hegelian projects. I may need to explain this further. The idea of 
dialectics has fascinated me for a long time, not as a formal “method”, but - and this 
description is very inadequate, although much preferable to any “recipe” of triads - as a 
thought process, a way of moving, twisting and turning. Stuff such as this was, in 
academia, the height of unfashionablity; although I have never found the arguments 
convincing.47 I found something of the same passion for dialectical modes of thought in 
an article by T.J. Clark,48 although - encountering this rather belatedly, some 15 years 
after its publication, and on the far-side of the impact on the humanities of sub- 
Althusserian accounts - 1 have been haunted by the notion of working with “dead dogs”. 
Clark’s complaint against the “caricature of Hegel” rang true, although I have interpreted 
this through Sartre’s claim that attacks on the dialectic are, in fact, directed at Marx, and 
not Hegel.49 Dead dogs, it seems, are confined to cardboard cut-out status, but, as 
Fredric Jameson notes, “Hegel translates the static categories of knowledge into 
profoundly historical and temporary phenomena in movement”.50 Clark, similarly, 
points to the Hegelian “love and labour of the particular”, just as Walter Benjamin 
advocates pursuing the “life of the detail”.51
46. The references come, respectively, from The Phenomenology o f Spirit, op. cit.. p. 131, p. 19, 
pp. 124-5.
47. Peter Dews’ comments about poststructuralism seem pertinent when he argues that its thought 
“lacks any sense of the interdependence of identity and non-identity.... [ItJ takes the repressive self­
enclosure of consciousness to be definitive of subjectivity as such, with the consequence that 
‘emancipation’ can only take the form of breaking open of the coercive unity of the subject in order to 
release the diffuseness and heterogeneity of the repressed.... [This, though] is only achieved through a 
return to a more primitive form of totalizing coercion... the triumph of a unifying process at the pre- 
subjective level.” (Peter Dews, The Logics of Disintegration. Post-structuralist Thought and the Claims 
o f Critical Theory, Verso, 1987. pp.230-1).
48. Clark, "The conditions of artistic creation”, op. cit.
49. Sartre notes that such attacks concern “the refusal of praxis”. Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a 
Method (1960), Vintage Books, 1968, p .16.
50. Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House o f Language. A Critical Account o f Structuralism and 
Russian Formalism, Princeton University Press. 1972, p. 175.
51. Clark, “The condition of artistic creation”, op. cit., p.561; Walter Benjamin, The Origin o f 
German Tragic Drama (1928), Verso, 1985, p .182.
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Dialetics in a narrow sense, however, does not exhaust the objects of study which also 
cover nihilism and deconstruction (in the de Manian form). In fact, I have focused on 
authors whose position vis-a-vis “dialectics” - however we might define it - might be 
controversial. Whether Adorno, Clark, Tafuri, Cacciari, de Man, or Benjamin are, 
strictly, dialectical thinkers is not my main concern. Dialectical thinking seems to be 
something on which people have “positions”, and these positions tend to operate as a 
priori-, and judgements as to whether this or that writer is a dialectical thinker seem to be 
reached in similar fashion, as a pre-existing and external position. Apart from some 
formal philosophical texts, there seem to be few who bother to delve into it. For the 
moment, I want to let this question - whether we can even call these thinkers 
“dialectical” - ride, in order that the question can be explored rather than asserted from 
the outset. Dealing with negation , however, while it plays into these matters, always 
threatens to dissolve the dialectic itself, and to lose the movement to which Jameson 
alludes. What is being explored is a strange hinterland beyond  a more orthodox and 
tempered dialectic and between a “negative dialectic” - for some this is a contradiction in 
terms - and nihilism. This thesis approaches this dangerous land of dissolution.
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Chapter 1 
THE PAIN OF THE UNATTAINABLE BEYOND
It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe 
that with this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. The bourgeois 
viewpoint has never advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this 
romantic viewpoint, and therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate 
antithesis up to its blessed end.
(Karl Marx)*
It is in the debates on the avant-garde and modernism that negation has been explicitly 
called into question. It may be as well, then, to start with this seeming crisis of 
negation, for the view of the avant-garde - and, in particular, the post-war “neo-avant- 
garde” - as “socially reconciled” is very common. Abigail Solomon-Godeau deals with 
this question in relation to the European avant-gardes in the inter-war period, charting 
how “armed vision” became “disarmed”, or how “weapon” became “style”. In 
particular, she has an eye on the increasing application of “radical formalism” in 
photographic practices to the realm of advertising, a social reconciliation which is 
symbolised by the move to Chicago of artists like M oholy-Nagy.2 Benjamin Buchloh, 
addressing the camera work of the Soviet avant-garde, locates the moment of 
reconciliation in the move “from faktura to factography”, with, in other words, the rise 
of propaganda and Stalinist s u p p r e s s i o n .3 Both of these essays have to be situated
1. Karl Marx, Grundrisse. Foundations o f the Critique o f Political Economy (Rough Draft) 
(1857/8) Penguin, 1973, p. 162.
2. See Abigail Solomon-Godeau, “The Armed Vision Disarmed: Radical Formalism from 
Weapon to Style”, Photography at the Dock: Essays on Photographic History, Institutions, and 
Practices, University of Minnesota Press. 1991, pp.52-84 (originally published in Afterimage. vol.l 1, 
110.6, January 1983). She sees a second aspect to radical formalism’s death in Stalinist suppression, and 
notes that the German avant-garde’s appropriation of Russian techniques as the first phase of the 
depoliticisation of radical formalism.
3. See Benjamin Buchloh, “From Faktura to Factography”, October 30, 1984, pp.82-119. Cf. 
Ute Eskildsen, “Photography and the Neue Sachlichkeit Movement”, Germany: the New Photography 
1927-33, ed. David Mellor, Arts Council of Great Britain, 1978, pp. 101-112: Herbert Molderings, 
“Urbanism and Technological Utopianism. Thoughts on the Photography of Neue Sachlichkeit and the
within a questioning of US-based modernism or formalism A Solomon-Godeau’s terms, 
for instance, note how American formalism emphasised continuity in contrast to the 
ruptures and breaks o f formalism in its radical mode. A similar theme emerges in an 
essay by Yve-Alain Bois, although his concern is more with the art theorists and critics 
than the practices. Bois compares European with American formalism, identifying 
tensions and life in the former, but noting their loss in the latter. Here Panofsky 
functions as Moholy-Nagy does for Solomon-Godeau; his passage across the Atlantic is 
seen to be accompanied by a loss of dialectical complexity in his work and an increasing 
codification of his approach to the analysis of art. T.J. Clark makes the same point in 
his 1974 essay, specifically wielding the terms “renunciation” and “negation” as 
qualities lost in the later work of Panofsky.5 In this paragraph, then, we have already 
covered a range of grounds for something which might be called negation: from an 
initial discussion concerning the avant-garde’s reconciliation, depoliticisation or 
disarming, we have ended up in debates on method and the dialectic.
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Bauhaus”, ibid., pp.87-94; Klaus Honnef, "The Dilemma of the Avant-Garde: the New Photography of 
the 1920s”, Photography in Russia 1840-1940, ed. David Elliott, Ars Nicolai, 1992, pp.73-78.
4. Some of the canonical essays can be found in the anthology Pollock and After. The Critical 
Debate, ed. Francis Frascina, Harper & Row, 1985. The status of photography became particularly 
important in these challenges, as can be seen by the work published in journals such as Afterimage and 
October in the United States. See, for example, Allan Sekula, "Dismantling Modernism, Reinventing 
Documentary (Notes on the Politics of Representation” (1978), Photography Against the Grain. Essays 
and Photo Works, 1973-1983, The Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 1984, pp.53- 
75; Martha Rosier, “in, around, and afterthoughts (on documentary photography” (1981), The Contest 
o f Meaning: Critical Histories o f Photography, ed. Richard Bolton, MIT, 1989, pp.303-340. Also see, 
for example, Rosalind Krauss, The Originality o f the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, MIT, 
1986 - especially “Sculpture in the Expanded Field” (1978), pp.276-90, "Photography's Discursive 
Spaces” (1982), pp. 131-50, and “The Originality of the Avant-Garde” (1981), pp. 151-70. In Britain, the 
journals Screen and, from 1979 Block, provided a particular focus for debates. See, for example, Victor 
Burgin, “Modernism in the Work of Art" (1976), The End o f Art Theory. Criticism and Postmodernity, 
Macmillan, 1986, pp.1-28, and "The End of Art Theory”, pp.140-204; Mary Kelly, "Re-viewing 
Modernist Criticism”, Screen, vol.22, no.3, 1981, pp.41-62; The Open University’s third level course, 
A315, "Modern Art and Modernism: Manet to Pollock" (1982); the anthology Modernism. Criticism. 
Realism. Alternative Contexts for Art, eds. Charles Harrison and Fred Orton, Harper & Row, 1984.
5. See T.J. Clark, "The conditions of artistic creation”, op. cit., p.561; Yve-Alain Bois, 
“Introduction: Resisting Blackmail”, Painting as M odel, MIT, 1990, pp. xi-xxx. Also cf. Christopher
S. Wood, “Introduction”, to Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form , Zone, 1991, pp.7-24. 
Wood is more circumspect, and also notes a similar closing down on problems in German academia.
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What Harold Rosenberg refers to, in the early ’70s, as “vanguardism as an idea” is 
specifically a rhetoric of negation which, as Hans Magnus Enzensberger had noted a 
decade earlier, had become the “coin of the realm”. 6 Rosenberg argues that the avant- 
garde had become socially reconciled, merely living out its “myth of rebellion” in a 
“demilitarized zone” or “buffer area” between a growing mass culture and its own avant- 
gardist past.7 From the mid-/late ’70s the question of the “neo-avant-garde” started to be
6. See Harold Rosenberg, “D.M.Z. Vanguardism”, The De-Definition o f Art, University of 
Chicago Press. 1972, p.218; and Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “The aporias of the avant-garde” (1962), 
The Consciousness Industry. On Literature, Politics and the Media, The Seabury Press, 1974, p.31. We 
might also compare Enzensberger’s comment: "The figure of speech preserves what its users have 
forgotten; analysis merely brings to light what presuppositions it drags along. The concept of the avant- 
garde is, like the word itself, a composite” (p.22). Rosenberg, commenting pace Renato Poggioli, 
notes:
Though the social and psychological negations essential to the formation of vanguards are no 
longer operative, vanguardism as an idea exerts a greater force in the creation and dissemination 
of art than ever before. It regulates the sponsorship of artists and inodes of art by museums, 
galleries, international exhibitions, critics, and collectors; it stimulates the feverish search by 
young artists for new materials and extreme gestures; it determines the attention paid to works 
in the popular press. (Rosenburg, “D.M.Z. Vanguardism”, pp.218-9).
In the aesthetic D.M.Z., all art is avant-garde, and all avant-gardisms, the ideas, attitudes, and 
tastes of a century of experiments and revolts, have been blended into a single tradition. 
(p.219).
Andreas Huyssen also notes how the contemporary art of ’60s and '70s, particularly that which gained 
the tag “neo-avant-garde”, formed a sort of marketable counterpart to the surge of international 
exhibitions on the work of the historical avant-garde. See Andreas Huyssen, “The Search for Tradition: 
Avant-Garde and Postmodernism in the 1970s”. New German Critique 22, Winter 1981, p.23. This has 
become commonplace of criticism, often appearing right at the heart of the formations it criticises. See, 
for example, Jeffrey Deitch, "The Art Industry”, Metropolis, International Art Exhibition Berlin 1991 
(held at the Martin Gropius Bau, 20 April - 21 July 1991), eds. Christos M. Joachimides and Norman 
Rosenthal, Rizzoli, NY. 1991, pp39-45.
7. Rosenberg, "D.M.Z. Vanguardism”, op. cit., p.217. Enzensberger, who is critical of the avant- 
garde per se, notes that the avant-garde’s rhetoric of revolution and rebellion amounted to thin or stupid 
categories of “freedom” (Enzensberger, op. cit., p.30). Although he disputes the argument that 
contemporary avant-gardism has been "delivered" to charlatans, he believes that the post-war avant-garde 
is specifically characterised by "bad faith”; by a tendency to evade responsibility for its own gestures, 
immunising such gestures as mere “experiments” (p.40); and by a subsumption into the “consciousness 
industry”. “Every avant-garde of today spells repetition, deception, or self-deception.... Conspiring in 
the name of the arts is only possible where they are being suppressed. An avant-garde that suffers itself 
to be furthered by (he state has forfeited its rights” (p.40). Peter Burger, with specifically Sartrean 
overtones, also refers to bad faith in response to a suggestion that contemporary artists might, by 
working with the “surface of marketability” of commodity aesthetics, be engaged in a strategy of 
rebellion. See Isabelle Graw, “Interview with Peter Burger”, Flash Art 144, January/February 1989, 
p.65. See also Peter Burger, Theory o f the Avant-Garde (1974, revised 1980), University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984. Burger sees post-war art as lacking a radical impulse, and as having become an empty shell 
of its former self. Its “gesture of protest... becomes inauthentic” (p.53), he argues, “an instrument of 
emancipation... becomes one of subjection”; and all that results is “commodity aesthetics” (p.54): “the 
neo-avant-garde institutionalizes the avant-garde as art and thus negates genuinely avant-gardist 
intentions.... Neo-avant-gardiste art is autonomous in the full sense of the term, which means that it
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displaced by, or to overlap with, the question of “postmodernism”^ The emphasis
shifts from the idea of a depoliticised avant-garde to an account of changed social and
historical circumstances. Andreas Huyssen, although critical o f postmodernism,
provides a typical summary:
The earlier avant-garde was confronted with the culture industry in its stage of 
inception while postmodernism had to face a technologically and economically 
fully developed media culture which had mastered the high art of integrating, 
diffusing, and marketing even the most serious challenges. This factor, 
combined with the altered constitution of audiences, accounts for the fact that, 
compared with the earlier 20th Century, the shock of the new was much harder, 
perhaps even impossible, to sustain.9
The avant-garde - as a radical force, as “a genuinely critical and adversary culture” - is 
“no longer viable”, Huyssen argues, because it has become depoliticised and because its 
context has been overtaken by a “massive technological, social, and political change”. 10 
If the 1960s had seen a revival of the conditions favourable to the development of an 
avant-garde (social turmoil, questioning of the future, challenging of tradition, efforts to 
bridge gaps between art and life), by the ’70s, he continues, confidence in social 
transformation had been shaken, and the emergence of postmodernism in the US 
represented “the endgame” and “the colorful death mask of the classical avant-garde”. 11 
Despite “all the radical rhetoric of rupture, discontinuity and epistemological breaks”,
negates the avant-gardiste intention of returning art to the praxis of life” (p.58). He notes: "This is true 
independently of the consciousness artists have of their activity, a consciousness that may perfectly well 
be avant-gardiste” (p.58).
8. Hadjinicolaou locates a particular surge of attention to the idea of the avant-garde from c.1977, 
marking, he suggests, a crisis in the very ideology of avant-gardism and possibly the end of the avant- 
garde itself. See Nicos Hadjinicolaou, “Sur l'ideologie de l’avant-gardisme”, Histoire el Critique d'Arts, 
vol. 2, 1976. pp.49-76. Likewise, we may see the self-consciousness about critical terms, definitions 
and categories as indexed to these phenomena. Two television series may function as convenient and 
popular markers for the shift that emerged, one addressing the historical, the other the contemporary 
avant-garde: Robert Hughes’ Shock o f the New: Art and the Century o f Change, Thames & Hudson, 
1980 and Sandy Nairne’s State of the Art: Ideas & Images in the 1980s, Chatto & Windus, 1987.
9. See Huyssen, “The Search for Tradition”, op. cit., p.32.
10. Ibid.. p.34, p.36. p.33.
11. Ibid., p.31. Huyssen and Hal Foster have argued for a critical, rather than affirmative, form of 
postmodernism. See Hal Foster, “Postmodernism: A Preface” (1983), Postmodern Culture, Pluto Press,
1985, pp.vii-xiv; Andreas Huyssen, “Mapping the Postmodern” (earlier versions from 1983), New  
German Critique, no.33, Fall 1984, pp.5-52. In the same issue Foster qualifies his arguments in Hal 
Foster, “(Post)Modern Polemics”, pp.67-78 (reprinted in Recodings. Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics, 
Bay Press, 1985, pp. 121-37).
postmodernism, Huyssen claims - returning to the theme of depoliticisation - has been 
“in danger of becoming affirmative culture right from the start”.12
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In fact, Huyssen goes further, suggesting that this affirmative relation to capitalism was
the case for the avant-garde itself, a view shared by Hal Foster who also argues that the
avant-garde was in “complicity with capital”.13 As Foster explains:
... the real radicality is always capital’s, for it not only effects the new symbolic 
forms by which we live but also destroys the old. More than any avant-garde, 
capital is the agent of transgression and shock - which is one reason why such 
strategies in ait now seem as redundant as resistance seems futile.14
The theme of complicity between negativity and capital will be addressed more 
substantively in Chapter 2 .15 Crucial here, though, is the act of “bourgeois divestiture” - 
where the dominant class abandoned their own culture and ideology, and sought instead 
to appropriate or recuperate the cultural practices of others. The argument is not specific 
to critical postmodernists, like Foster, but has had a long life since Marx’s “The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”.16 But Foster’s conclusions about this 
divestiture are particularly striking and sweeping: divestiture has problematised, he 
insists, any assertion of difference; indeed, difference is “often fabricated in the interests
12. Huyssen, “The Search for Tradition”, op. cit., p.32, p.33. Burger also objects to postmodernist 
art’s tendency to quote and copy, and to their denial of the concept of authenticity. He want to retain at 
least a sense of “the pathos of authenticity”, for "to abandon the notion of authenticity also means to 
abandon the notion of experience”. See “Interview with Peter Burger”, op. cit., p.65.
13. See Hal Foster, “For a Concept of the Political in Contemporary Art” (drafted 1984), 
Recodings, op. cit., p. 148.
14. Ibid., p.147.
15. According to Huyssen, the avant-garde shared modernity’s “project”, which he describes as its 
universalising tendencies and its sense of progress. The terms of reference here are loaded.
16. See Karl Marx. "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, Marx/Engels Selected Works 
in one volume, Lawrence & Wishart, 1968, pp.96-179. See also, for example: Walter Benjamin, 
Charles Baudelaire, op. cit., p. 106; Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch”, Clement Greenberg. 
The Collected Essays and Criticism. Volume 1. Perceptions and Judgments, 1939-1944, ed. John 
O ’Brian, The University of Chicago Press,1988, pp.5-22; T.J. Clark, “Clement Greenberg’s Theory of 
Art”, op. cit.. The list could be extended, for it is tied into an account - almost a commonsense to 
Marxists of the Second and Third Internationals - which suggests that, after 1848 (or, for some, 1871), 
the bourgeoisie no longer wanted to advance its revolution. This moment is seen as one where the 
bourgeoisie is seen to become historically reactionary.
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of social control” and “if difference can be fabricated, so too can resistance”.17
These ideas often echo the debates about the collapse of Marxism, but what may be
more intriguing is that they also have a prominent place within the traditions of Western
Marxism where theories of art and aesthetics have had a prominent place. At a number
of conferences in the early ’80s there was an attempt to retain the radical force of
negativity, although the participants themselves adopted some of these same premises.
In 1981, at the Vancouver conference “Modernism and Modernity” - including, inter
alia, Guilbaut, Buchloh, Crow, Clark (and also Greenberg and Lefebvre) - a defence of
modernism’s radical edge in the face of attacks by postmodernism was a central
theme.18 Guilbaut, introducing the publication of papers from the conference, notes that
contributions and discussion drifted from an initial emphasis on definitions of
modernism and modernity to one on the theme of negativity as resistance:
... we concentrated on one area which seemed to be the keystone o f any 
modernist procedure: its critical/subversive stance, the negative side of a new 
culture which based its realizations on a coefficient of resistance to the prevailing 
system .19
“This element of negativity has been present in modern art since the nineteenth century”, 
he wrote, an “art o f combat”, modernism’s “living, critical core” with which 
postmodernism dispenses too hastily.20
Similar themes were addressed at “The Politics of Interpretation” (Chicago, 1981), 
sponsored by the journal Critical Inquiry, and at “Marxism and the Interpretation of
17. Hal Foster, “Readings in Cultural Resistance”, Recodings, op. cit., p. 167, p. 171.
18. The papers are collected in Modernism and Modernity, eds. Benjamin Buchloh, Serge Guilbaut, 
David Solkin, The Press of Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 1983.
19. Serge Guilbaut, “The Relevance of Modernism”, in Modernism and Modernity, op. cit.. pp.IX- 
XV. The citation is from XI.
20. Ibid., p.XI, p.XII, p.XIII.
Culture” (Chicago, 1983).21 In their introduction to the publication of papers from 
“Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture”, Grossberg and Nelson note both “a 
renaissance of activity and a crisis of definition” as Marxists were confronted with the 
need to deal with, as they put it, a disjunction of historical reality and our theoretical 
categories.22 Marxism, they claim, has “reappropriated the critical power of Marx’s 
interpretive practice”.23 Other conference participants - including Perry Anderson, 
Franco Moretti, and, most explicitly, Fredric Jameson - were less convinced that this 
“reappropriation” was remotely Marxist.24 Nevertheless, the emphasis on problems of 
interpretation and method, and the sense that there was some sort of crisis impinged on 
many discussions and agendas.
The crisis of negation - and I have treated it very schematically - points to some subtle 
but substantial shifts across these accounts: from the depoliticisation of artistic activity in 
the post-war period, through arguments about the changed nature of the artist’s social 
environment in the same period, through accounts which question the very politicisation 
of the (original) avant-garde, to one which suggests that the essence o f capitalist 
modernity (since divestiture) is recuperation. Did capitalism, or the media industry, 
become all-powerful, swallowing all in its path, including all practices of negation? Has 
the tactic of negativity become obsolete? Has negation been “recuperated”? Has 
negativity become complicit with the dominant powers? Is it now the life-blood of the 
powers that it “opposes”, the driving force of capitalist competition, novelty as the 
cutting-edge of the market? These are the questions that surround the concept of
21. See Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 
University of Illinois Press, 1988; Critical Inquiry, vol.9, no.l, September 1982; and The Politics of 
Interpretation, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell, The University of Chicago Press, 1983.
22. Lawrence Grossberg and Cary Nelson, “Introduction: The Territory of Marxism”, Marxism and 
the Interpretation o f Culture, op. cit., pp. 1-13. The citation is from p. 12.
23. Ibid., p . l l .
24. See Perry Anderson, “Modernity and Revolution”, ibid., pp.317-338; Franco Moretti, “The 
Spell of Indecision”, pp.339-346; Fredric Jameson, “Cognitive Mapping”, pp.347-360, (these page 
references include the post-presentation discussion).
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negation in relation to debates on the avant-garde and modernism. The arguments and 
accounts which raise such questions will be addressed over the next two chapters in 
particular, although I do not propose to seek any simple answers. Rather my concern is 
to trace some of the recurrent theoretical nexuses around which discussions of negation 
occurs.
This, then, sketches some of the main grounds of the debates on negation and 
affirmation. Whether or not the proponents are favourably disposed to postmodernism, 
most of the accounts to be addressed from recent art history and criticism claim an 
emancipatory strain, often with activistic rhetoric worthy of any avant-garde. Despite the 
contradictions that, on closer inspection, emerge between different accounts of the crisis 
- and the place of negation within it - the combined forces add up to a powerful rhetoric, 
and one which starts to make claims beyond the question of the avant-garde per se. 
These claims are crucial to the cultural and political force of the abstract term “negation”, 
and centre on, I believe, two key strands: one which articulates a striving for 
emancipation and freedom; another which presents a tendency towards the affirmation 
of an increasingly monolithic power. The first part of this chapter will explore what I 
take to be the key modalities of negation in art theory: the question of political openness 
and closure (both in history and in philosophical concepts); and the question of, on the 
one hand, alienation and reification, and, on the other, and strategies of de-alienation. It 
is, I believe, important to separate out these different aspects in order to understand 
some of the complex stakes invested in negation, but, as will become apparent, there are 
many overlaps between these positions. These overlaps are substantive rather than 
accidental or marginal, and turn on some potent issues. Indeed, the slippage between the 
political, social, economic, aesthetic, ethical, epistemological, and even ontological 
aspects of the claims ought not to be evaded or regretted but should be taken as the core 
of the question. The ambiguities of the term negation - or its slippages - are already here: 
there are arguments which present negation as something which was once there but has
26
since been lost, others which present negation as the force which enacts that 
disappearance; and these, as we shall see, far from exhaust the options. Further to this 
level of ambiguity, negation, to reiterate a point made in the introduction, is not just the 
object of analytical endeavour, one which can be discussed as if it were “out there” or 
under a microscope. As a methodological tool, it plays its role as, and within, the act of 
analysis. For reasons which will become apparent, issues pertinent to this role will be 
introduced in the first part of the chapter, although it is in the latter part - and in the 
remaining chapters - where I shall specifically consider the play of negation within the 
process of analysis. This is the proper object of my thesis.
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SECTION ONE: NEGATION, AVANT-GARDISM & MODERNISM
I. Capitalism’s Gravediggers & Permanent Negation
One account of “practices of negation” in art is based on the understanding of some sort 
of alliance between artists and the rise of radical social movements through the 19c. and 
20c. The forms of this account often suffer from generality and vague hom ology,25 the 
view  that the inter-war avant-gardes represented progressive social forces has been 
criticised, and the association of avant-garde art practice with political radicalism may, 
as Hadjinicolaou argues, be itself an ideology.26 Nevertheless, the assumption remains
25. See, for example, John Willett. The New Sobriety. Art and Politics in the Weimar Period 
1917-1933, Thames & Hudson, 1978.
26. Hadjinicolaou, op. cit., argues that the failure to interrogate the term "avant-garde” has 
amounted to a fundamental ideology of art. He disputes the connection of 19c. "avant-gardism” with 
leftist politics, and disputes the existence of an artistic avant-garde prior to the 20c. According to 
Hadjinicolaou, 20c. artists adopted the designation “avant-garde” from its 19c. political usage, and, in 
the process, appropriated the term for more right-wing tendencies. This difference leads Hadjinicolaou to 
pose the question of avant-gardist ideology - an ideology which he considers to have stymied, and 
deluded, leftwing currents. If in its political sense, the term “avant-garde” was more frequently (although 
not exclusively) used by the left (in, he suggests, a ratio of approximately 4:1 with rightists), for the 
artistic avant-gardes, he argues, the rightwing current (including both counterrevolutionary and apolitical 
tendencies) was always the more powerful. In Hadjinicolaou’s account, then, the rhetoric of struggle and
prevalent, even in accounts which seek to criticise the avant-garde. For instance, it is 
noticeable that this association is one which has served to compromise the avant-gardes 
by way o f  the recent reappraisals of revolution in general, and of 1917 in particular; or 
which, to take another example, by way of the association of Italian Futurism with 
Fascism - and thus tainting, by association, other avant-garde - the criticism has 
effectively argued for liberalisation, but one where the content is that o f bourgeois 
liberalism and which is anathema to any version of “extremes”, extremism, revolution 
and negation.
But leaving aside these more controversial issues, it is noticeable that the matter of 
practices of negation (as avant-gardist radicalism) tends to present itself as one of 
definitions. Nearly every account of the avant-garde and modernism - and, indeed, 
postmodernism - opens with the problem of definitions. There is, from the early 1960s, 
a detectable anxiety in the literature about the imprecision of the definition, and yet 
ubiquity of use, of the term “avant-garde”. Renato Poggioli sought to replace anecdotal 
and eclectic accounts with what he called an historical or scientific one; Enzensberger 
criticised the term’s unreflexive use by both its supporters and detractors;27 and the 
worries continue right up to the onset of the modern/postmodern debates. Despite 
Poggioli’s claims, his account is considered by Jochen Schulte-Sasse to be “historically 
and theoretically too unspecific” in contrast to Peter Burger’s “historically concrete and 
theoretically exact” account.28 This judgement has not been shared by many of Burger’s
28
sacrifice serves to reconcile the artist with the social order.
27. See Poggioli, op. cit. Enzensberger’s terms are especially provocative given the themes of this 
thesis: “The minds that it separates from one another have a way of lapsing into a permanent debate 
whose beginnings are lost in a mist and whose end can he held off ad libitum” (Enzensberger, op. cit., 
P-16).
28. Jochen Schulte-Sasse, “Foreword: Theory of Modernism versus Theory of the Avant-Garde", in 
Burger’s Theory o f the Avant-Garde, op. cit., p.x.
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other commentators, and his categories have been accused of being “ b lo o d le s s ” .29 But 
while this question of definition provides a way into negation, I do not propose to 
clarify definitions. Mindful of Adorno’s comment that “Whoever wants to make the 
concept more precise easily destroys what he aims for”, the aim is rather to note some of 
the aspects of, and complexities in, identifying the operation  of “negation”, a concept 
that comes to the fore in such accounts.30
The very term “avant-garde”, which derives from military use, took on wider socio­
political and artistic resonances, first among the Utopian Socialists movements, and later 
among political radicals of 1848 and 1871.31 For the Utopian Socialists, avant-gardism 
signified advanced, progressive social and political practice to which art contributed: 
according to Henri de Saint-Simon, art per se might make this contribution, alongside 
similar contributions from industry and science; for the Fourierist Gabriel-Desire 
Laverdant, the contribution was only provided by the best, by those practices 
expressing “the most advanced social tendencies”.32 However, this is generally seen as
29. Witness Burger’s own Postscript to the Second German Edition of Theory o f the Avant-Garde, 
pp.vii-xlvii, which notes the book of essays in response. See also Daglind Sonolet, "Peter Burger, 
Theory o f the Avant-Garde”, Telos 61. Fall 1984; and Tony Pinkney, "Editor’s Introduction: 
Modernism and Cultural Theory”, in Raymond Williams, The Politics o f Modernism: Against the New 
Conformists, Verso, 1989, pp.1-29. The charge of "bloodless” categories is made by Pinkney.
30. See Theodor Adorno, "Progress” (1962), in Benjamin. Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, ed. 
Gary Smith, The University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp.84-101. I do, however, disagree with Adorno’s 
example: “progress”. Citation from p.84.
31. Baudelaire’s reference to “les litterateurs d’avant-garde”, in his personal notebooks of 1862-64, 
is widely taken - for example, by Poggioli and Hadjinicolaou - to be a jibe at militaristic metaphors, 
and those artists who saw themselves as members of the social avant-garde.
32. It should be noted that these accounts arc overwhelmingly affirmative in tone. Saint-Simon 
(1825) ventriloquises the artist in his imaginary society: "It is we artists who will serve you as 
avant-garde... the power of the aits is in fact most immediate and most rapid: when we wish to spread 
new ideas among men, we inscribe them on marble or on canvas.... What a magnificent destiny for the 
arts is that of exercising a positive power over society, a true priestly function, and of marching 
forcefully in the van of all the intellectual faculties....” (cited Linda Nochlin, “The Invention of the 
Avant-Garde: France, 1830-80”, The Politics o f Vision. Essays on Nineteenth-Century Art and Society, 
Thames and Hudson, 1991, p.2). Laverdant, in his De la mission de I'art et du role des artistes of 1845, 
wrote: "Art, the expression of society, manifests, in its highest soaring, the most advanced social 
tendencies: it is the forerunner and the revealer. Therefore, to know whether art worthily fulfils its 
proper mission as initiator, whether the artist is truly of the avant-garde, one must know where 
Humanity is going, know what the destiny of the human race is....” (cited Poggioli, op. cit., p.9)
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insufficient to constitute an artistic avant-garde. Linda Nochlin, for instance, 
distinguishes radical commitment and artistic content from the emergence of radical 
form. Accordingly, it was only with Courbet that such radical social content (the 
negation of bourgeois society) became allied with radical form (the negation of existing 
artistic and academic conventions). Nevertheless, she further narrows the definition of 
avant-gardism by adding alienation to the established criteria, a quality which she argues 
was present not in Courbet but in Manet. For Poggioli, in contrast, “authentic” avant- 
gardism requires historical self-consciousness, “when art began to contemplate itself 
from a historical viewpoint”.33 The crucial period centred, he argues, on the period of 
the Paris Commune when this authentic artistic avant-garde coincided  with a political 
avant-garde.34 Although Poggioli disputes the continuation o f the association of left- 
wing politics and avant-garde art beyond this period, he notes that this “historical 
viewpoint” instilled the belief in “the necessity of liquidating the ait of the past, once and 
for all, liquidating traditions”.35
We can find, for instance, a similar articulation in “Manifesto of the Communist Party”
(1847-8), written by Marx and Engels during the previous period of radical upsurge in
Europe, and also in Marx’s “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” (1851-2), a
text which charts its defeat. Negation - as the liquidating of traditions - is attributed to
the revolutionary activities of the bourgeoisie in their overthrowing of feudalism:
The bourgeoisie... has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It 
has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties.... It has drowned the most 
heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine
33. Bontempelli, cited ibid., p. 14.
34. Poggioli highlights publications like Bakunin’s 1878 anarchist journal L'Avant-garde (ibid., 
p. 15). However, La revue independente of 1880 represents, he argues, the last gasp of this brief alliance, 
and thereafter the tenn avant-garde is associated with a political vanguardism against which artists made 
their distance: a sort of negative relation between avant-garde art and progressive politics. Disillusioned 
with leftist politics (both anarchist and socialist), artists thenceforth preferred to see themselves as 
“decadents”. According to Poggioli. this separation remains the fundamental condition, despite attempts 
to reestablish alliances in the early 20c. - attempts which he sees as partial, equivocal, ambiguous, 
insubstantial, rhetorical, and as riddled with contradictions.
35. Ibid., p. 13.
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sentim entalism .... has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto 
honoured.... has torn away from the family its sentimental veil.36
It is also the very condition of the bourgeoisie’s own social order:
Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch 
from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient 
and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones 
become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that 
is holy is profaned....37
The provocative conjunctions of opposite characteristics - such as “uninterrupted” and 
“disturbance” - transfigure the static nature attributed to the pre-bourgeois era by 
transforming that static quality into an adjective for the qualities of change in the 
bourgeois period, thereby exacerbating the movements of overthrow and impermanency 
by making them permanent. This is a theme which has been repeated in the debates on 
negativity and which, as we saw with Foster, has been used to question the possibilities 
of resistance. For Marx and Engels, however, there were limitations to capitalism’s 
revolutionary upheavals: not only the limits reached when a revolution consolidates its 
power, as Marx discusses in the opening passages of the “Brumaire”, but also those 
inherent in its own mode of production, a mode which constantly throws up 
contradictions between the extension of productive forces and the social relations of that 
society. As a consequence, they wrote, capital also produces its own “antagonism” - 
that is, a different modality of negation - “its own gravediggers”, who “have nothing to 
lose but their chains”, and, as Marx noted of this force three years later, it “cannot draw 
its poetry from the past, but only from the future”.38
The association of negation with these themes in Marx and Engels has to be surmised
36. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Parly” (1847-8), Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels. Selected Works in One Volume, Lawrence & Wishart. 1968, p.38.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p.46, p.63. p.98.
for they do not use the term explicitly in these contexts. 39 Nevertheless, this conclusion 
is not far-fetched, for it was part of the philosophical language of their intellectual 
milieu. The political weighting of the philosophical concept of negation is particularly 
focused in the writing of a generation of Hegel’s students in the 1840s, of which Marx 
and Engels were part. For these “Left” or “Young Hegelians”, a crucial element in their 
master’s work was negation. This was not purely a philosophical choice, but one 
wrapped up in the politics of German academia, its relation to the Prussian state, and the 
ongoing debates regarding the French Revolution. Largely bourgeois republican in their 
leanings, a few of these Young Hegelians went on to become the founders of German 
socialism and communism. Although their ideas and debates are now considered matters 
of purely historical - even arcane - interest, from the perspective of negation they remain 
seminal. Readings of Hegel are notoriously controversial, and, for the purposes of this 
section, I propose to introduce Hegel via the readings of the Left Hegelians, since these 
have produced the canonical critique from the Left, and their terms remain central to 
20c. critical theory.
32
Hegel’s earlier support for the radical and democratic impulses of the French Revolution
39. Marx’s position in relation to tradition is much more complex than the points that will be 
made here. The Brumaire charts the continuity of social forces and ideologies under the sway of revised 
social conditions (see, for example, his analysis of the idies napoleoniennes. For fuller account see 
Stanley Mitchell, “ ‘The 18th Brumaire' and the Construction of a Marxist Aesthetics” in 1848: the 
Sociology o f Literature, ed. Francis Barker, et al„ University of Essex, 1978, pp.22-6. See also V.l. 
Lenin’s criticisms of Proletkult, “On Proletarian Culture” (1920), Lenin on Literature and Art, 
Progress. 1967, pp.167-169; Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution (1922/3), RedWords, 1991. The 
emphasis on a tendency in Marx which liquidates tradition has been best articulated by Marshall 
Berman’s All That Is Solid Melts Into A ir, Verso, 1983, criticised by Perry Anderson at the 1983 
conference in Chicago, “Modernity and Revolution”, published in Marxism and the Interpretation of 
Culture, op. cit. See also Berman's reply: “The Signs in the Street: a response to Perry Anderson”, New 
Left Review , no.144, March/April 1984, pp.114-23. A comparison is often made between Marx's 
account and Baudelaire’s motif of art as transient and eternal, contingent and immutable, in “The Painter 
of Modern Life” (1863), in The Painter o f Modern Life and Other Essays. Da Capo, 1986, p. 13. For an 
account which weaves these together see David Harvey, The Condition o f Postmodernity, Blackwell, 
1989, especially the chapter entitled “Modernity and modernism”. For a discussion of the notion of 
“poetry of the future”, see Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin, or, Towards a Revolutionary Criticism, 
Verso, 1981, pp. 162-170. The conjunction of Benjamin, Baudelaire and Marx has become a standard 
feature of the literature on modernity.
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was seen to have given way to a conservatism, philosophically akin to what Marx 
described, with reference to the French Revolution itself, as a passing from the codings 
of Republic to those of Empire.40 Hegel himself was considered to have reconciled his 
philosophy of history and his dialectic with the status quo, placing the Prussian state as 
the highest form of development, or the realisation of spirit.41 The movement of the 
dialectic - a movement driven by the force of the negative moment (the second moment 
in the infamous “triadic” structure of affirmation, negation, and the negation of the 
negation) -was seen to have come to a halt with a final reconciliation, negation of the 
negation, sublation, or Aufhebung. For the Young Hegelians, then, H egel’s dialectical 
movement had ceased to be a constant and ongoing procedure - each Aufhebung  
containing the supersession and preservation of the contradiction, and the beginnings of 
a new dynamic - but had, so to speak, resolved and reconciled itself. In other words, 
the power of the negative - its force-movement: the power to change, to instil movement 
and dynamic - was seen to have been stilled and neutralised, and, moreover, to have 
done so in collaboration with an oppressive and reactionary social power. In the 
M anuscripts Marx criticised Hegel, but applauded his “dialectic of negativity as the 
moving and producing principle”,42 and, much later, he commented on how: “In its 
mystified form, dialectic become the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to 
transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things”.43 These transactions between a 
philosophical concept and highly charged political commitments are important for the
40. See Karl Marx. “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, op. cit. The degree ol Hegel’s 
culpability has remained keenly debated, initiating the debate about Hegel’s “exoteric" and “esoteric” 
views. See Leszek Kolakowski. op. cit.: David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 
Macmillan, 1968: The Young Hegelians. An Anthology, ed. Lawrence S. Slepelcvich. Cambridge 
University Press, 1983. The major account of the radical Hegel is Georg Lukacs’ The Young Hegel. 
Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics, Merlin, 1975.
41. Or as Adorno was later to echo, Hegel’s system was reduced to seeing "world history being 
perfected in the Prussian state”. See Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (1966), Routledge, 1990, 
p.27. This, for Adorno, was just the most blatant aspect of Hegel’s “dialectics cut short” (p.334).
42. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), Karl Marx Early Writings, 
Penguin, 1975, p.386.
43. Karl Marx, “Afterword to the Second German Edition” (1873). Capital. A Critique o f Political 
Economy .Volume One, Lawrence & Wishart, 1954, p.29.
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loading of the life of negation, not only for 20c. critical theory, but also for its place in 
art/cultural analysis; attitudes to the fate of 1789 and stakes within 1848, for instance - 
attitudes to social and political emancipation, freedom, revolution - are crucial to an 
understanding of negation.44
Many of H egel’s younger followers, then, sought to salvage negativity as the radical,
but lost, impulse of the dialectic. The group believed that they were the fulfilment of the
true Hegel, a Hegel who had instigated “atheism, revolution and republicanism”.45 Of
the dialectic, Arnold Ruge wrote: “In its true method it is criticism, the dissolution of all
contradictions and fixed ideas”.46 Marx, of course, echoing these views in the 1860s -
by which time Hegel was, apparently, treated as a “dead dog” - continued to claim to be
seeking the dialectic’s demystified, rational form, a form which recognises “the
negation” of the state of things, and:
... regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and 
therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary 
existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and 
revolutionary.47
Engels wrote:
For it nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of 
everything and in everything;... It has, of course, also a conservative side: it
44. Derrida finds Hegel “the thinker of irreducible difference”. See O f Gramrmtology (1967), The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, p.26. Nevertheless, Derrida also worries extensively about 
Hegel’s Aufhebung, what he calls the Hegelian relive of idealism’s traditional binaries, “a resolution of 
contradiction into a third term that comes in order to aufheben, to deny while raising up, while 
idealising, while sublimating into an anamnesic interiority, while interning difference in a self- 
presence". See Posilions (1972), Athlone Press, 1981, p.43. Dialectics, he goes on, are totalising, 
“however far o ff’ the "horizon” (p.45). His "undecidables” or “non-concepts” are used to try to hold back 
from the sins of immediate identity, binarism and dialectical synthesis, and: "inhabit philosophical 
opposition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of 
speculative dialectics” (p.43). The Young Hegelian debate on Hegel's esoteric and exoteric views finds 
certain echoes in Derrida’s distinction of Hegel's “general” and “restricted economy”. Ironically, Derrida 
uses the concept of contradiction to exceed Hegel's restricted economy, although he is anxious to use 
“the necessary critical precautions” to clarify “its relationship or non-relationship to Hegel’s logic” 
(p.76).
45. Cited McLellan, op. cit., p.55.
46. Cited ibid., p.20.
47. Marx, “Afterword to the Second German Edition”, Capital, op. cit., p.29.
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recognises that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their 
time and circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of 
outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute - only the absolute 
dialectical philosophy admits.48
In a hoax critique of the dialectic, Bruno Bauer argued that it was full of “devilish
energy”, giving rise to “hellish discharge”, and bent on “the Abomination of Desolation
within the Holy Kingdom”.4  ^ These “more dangerous points of the dialectic” - “the
negative dialectic”,50 he called it - had been repressed by the older Hegelians, but lay
clearly exposed in the work of the younger ones. Indeed:
The philosophers are truly of a singular danger, for they are the most consistent 
and unrestrained revolutionaries.... [Hegel’s] theory is praxis, and for that very 
reason most dangerous, far-reaching and destructive. It is the revolution 
itself.... Hegel not only is set against the state, the Church and religion, but 
opposes everything firm and established, for - as he asserts - the philosophical 
principle has in recent times become general, all encompassing and without 
limit.51
The pitch towards praxis in Young Hegelian thought was advanced by Cieszkowski in 
1838. He argued that Hegel, although representing the culmination of philosophy, had 
failed to make the transition from interpretative thought to active criticism and practical 
action, and was, therefore, guilty o f disregarding the future. Transforming H egel’s 
philosophy of spirit into a philosophy of action, he sought to erase the difference 
between practice and philosophy through the mediating term of “praxis”, although Marx 
was to note that the Young Hegelians concept of praxis was merely the philosophy  of 
action.52
48. Frederick Engels, “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy" (1886), in 
Kart Marx and Frederick Engels. Selected Works in One Volume, op. cit., p.588. Engels outlines his 
view of the dialectic in Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature (1878-82), Progress Publishers, 1934. He 
describes its "three laws'": “The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; The 
law of the interpenetration of opposites; The law of the negation of the negation” (p.62).
49. See Bruno Bauer, The Trumpet o f the Last Judgement over Ilege! (1841), in The Young 
Hegelians: An Anthology, op. cit., pp. 178.
50. Ibid., p. 180.
51. Ibid., p.182, p.183, p.185.
52. See Count August Cieszkowski, Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (1838), in The Young 
Hegelians: An Anthology, op. cit., pp.57-89. In his account of praxis, the main agent for change was 
no longer thought but will (McLellan, op. cit., p. 10); future history was to be one of acts, and future 
philosophy was “to become a practical philosophy or rather a philosophy of practical activity, of
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The Young Hegelians, then, emphasised historical transience, “opening up” the dialectic 
again to the negative - an opening associated with emancipatory forces and with an 
orientation towards the future. Such tendencies described the dialectic as a process of 
constant self-annihilation, where any historical moment provided the basis for its own 
destruction. With the radicaiisation of the group in the early 1840s, these emphases 
became more generalised, and with this political intensification came an intensification 
of the philosophy.53 Ruge favoured “absolute negation”,54 and in his article, “A 
Self-Critique of Liberalism” (1843), he asked: “is it not the concept of critique that it
‘praxis', exercising a direct influence on social life and developing the future in the realm of concrete 
activity” (cited p. 10). Or as he put it:
Active activity... will first develop itself in the future
(a) Subjectivity, through the adequate formulation of the will;
(b) Objectivity, through the adequate formation of political life of the state;
(c) absolutely, through the attainment of the substantial and highest identity of being and 
thought which is absolute action.
... absolute action must bear witness to its teleological character par excellence, since it is 
essentially process. It has struggle constantly with itself, continuously goes through obstacles 
and constantly achieves victory. Thus the struggling and the still synthesis passes into the 
creating one. (The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, op. cit., p.74)
The degree of emphasis placed upon negation, praxis and the future - the conjunction is probably 
important - by the Young Hegelians does take the logic away from the Hegelian mode. They took issue 
with Hegel's anti-utopianism, his insistence on not using his method to predict future trends, but only 
to grasp past development via the present, or via a phenomenon's highest stage of development. 
Cieszkowski also tried to Hegelianise Hegel further by replacing the four stages of history with three - 
characterised as Antiquity, Christianity, and, significantly, Future. The sense of activist politics links 
back, often quite directly, to the Utopian Socialists. The terms of the critique of Hegel (from 
phiiosophical interpretation to action) are, of course, echoed in Marx's critique of Feuerbach - in fact, 
such terms were the main form of critique employed by Young Hegelians against one another, and not 
just against Hegel. See Karl Marx. “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845, published 1888), Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels. Selected Works in One Volume, op. cit., pp.28-30.
53. The “radicaiisation” - which saw many of the group move towards communism and anarchism 
- was prompted by the dashing of their republican hopes (hitherto invested in the new king, Friedrich 
Wilhelm IV) and the repeal of the short-lived liberalised publishing laws in 1843. Initially the power of 
this recovered negation was to be directed at extreme reactionary views, with a “proper” dialectic reserved 
for more routine democratic intervention.
54. Cited McLellan, op. cit., p.18.
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only splits, never binds, that it only dissolves, never concentrates?”.55 This approach, 
in contrast to Hegel, emphasised a disjunction between thought and the empirical world, 
and rejected the mediating - or reconciling - role of Reason; indeed, mediation, per se, 
became anathema and associated with political compromise.56 Rejecting any attempt
55. The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, op. cit., p.239. See also Karl Lowilh, “The Historical 
Background of European Nihilism” (1943), Nature, History, and Existentialism and Other Essays in the 
Philosophy o f History, ed. Arnold Levison, Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp.3-16. Lowith 
notes that Hegel’s pupils made the “negation of the existing order the basis of their thinking” (p. 12) and 
thought that “ their dissatisfaction with the present contains the strength of the future” (p.6). 
Kolakowski describes the Young Hegelians as adopting "the principle of permanent negation” and 
“universal negativism" (Kolakowski, op. cit., p.83, p.81). For the on-going life of this emphasis, and 
the slippage between political and conceptual stakes, cf. Adorno, where he notes that “dialectics will 
drive men beyond bourgeois society” (Negative Dialectics, op. cit.. p.337), and that negative dialectics 
“is suspicious of all identity. Its logic is one of disintegration” (p. 145). Also cf. Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
Search fo r  a Method (1960), Vintage Books, 1968. Sartre argued that "living Marxism” must have 
“open concepts” (p.25, p.27), but that the dialectic had become “arrested” (p.91, footnote 3) in the hands 
of the official Communist Parties, which also treated negativity as an absolute (p.33, footnote 9).
Here, the analogy between permanent negation and “permanent revolution” is particularly 
suggestive. Permanent revolution was an idea current among revolutionists in Germany in 1848. For 
Marx revolutionary socialism is “ the declaration o f the permanence o f the revolution". See “The Class 
Struggles in France: 1848 to 1850” (published in pails over 1850), Surveys from Exile, Penguin, 1973, 
p. 123. The question concerns the communists’ attitude to the bourgeois revolutions, to alliances with 
various classes/class factions, and whether the working class should lay down its arms. “While the 
democratic petty bourgeois want to bring the revolution to an end as quickly as possible... it is our 
interest and our task to make the revolution permanent until all the more or less propertied classes have 
been driven from their ruling positions, until the proletariat has conquered state power...” (Marx and 
Engels, “Address of the Central Committee” (March 1850), The Revolutions o f 1848. Penguin, 1973, 
pp.323-4). In the 20c., the argument is most associated with Leon Trotsky's The Permanent Revolution 
(1928), in The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects, New Park, 1962. Initially articulated 
in Trotsky’s 1906 Results and Prospects, it was adopted by Lenin - in a reorientation of Bolshevik 
policy - in the “April Theses” of 1917, in “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution. Draft 
Platform for the Proletarian Party", Lenin Selected Works Volume 2, Progress Publishers, 1963, pp.37-
65. Apparently, the phrase was also used by Thomas Jefferson, although, as Fredric Jameson notes, 
Jefferson's was a different sense to Trotsky’s. See Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form. Twentieth- 
Century Dialectical Theories of Literature, Princeton University Press, 1971, p.268.
56. See McLellan, op. cit., p. 18; Kolakowski, op. cit., p.93. McLellan also refers to Bruno 
Bauer’s “idea of a two-term dialectic and the rejection of all mediation”(McLellan, op. cit., p. 151). 
Moses Hess saw mediation as a dangerous compromise between private property and communism.
The role of negation for Marx is contentious. Although commentators within Marxism have 
found it necessary to emphasise the positive orientation of Marx's account in response to more 
nihilistic interpretations, it is important not to lose sight of negation. For Meszaros, negation is central 
to Marx in order to combat Feuerbach’s one-sided “positivity”. See Istvan Meszaros’ entry “Negation” 
in A Dictionary o f Marxist Thought, second revised edition, ed. Tom Bottomore, Blackwell, 1991, 
p.400. Both McLellan and Kolakowski point out that Marx adopts aspects of a theory of permanent 
negation - an emphasis on historical transience, evolution through stages via contradictions, praxis, and 
a dialectic extended to the future: “interpreting the present in terms of its own dissolution” (Kolakowski, 
op. cit, p.320). Kolakowski argues that Hegel’s “disjunction of concepts” (p.322) is developed by Marx 
as objective, historical contradictions, independent of consciousness; in other words, Marx’s sense of 
contradiction is neither a matter of logic, and nor should it be reduced to the question of social conflict.





even to recover the aims of the French Revolution, Edgar Bauer wrote:
... only extremism can assume and carry through a principle in its purity; only 
extremism has the power to create. A principle never mediates; it only destroys, 
and its inner strength is proportionate to its destructive power.57
He claimed that “anarchy... is the beginning of all good things”.58
... nothing old, nothing settled, may be the goal of our efforts.... What exists 
will always place itself above the freedom of the spirit - and with perfect right, 
for freedom is dangerous to it.59
Moreover, he insisted, “our philosophy exists only for the purpose of clearing away the 
traditional ideas of belief from human heads”, a dealing of “the old weeds”; “our time... 
is only critical and destructive”, and our response “is negative”.60
This self-consciousness of liquidating tradition - and many of the associated  
developments -seem to echo Poggioli’s “authentic avant-garde”; and we would seem, 
too, to be not that far from Marx’s advocation of the poetry of the future.61 “[I]t is not
different emphases on the question of mediation. Adorno tends to a more rarefied strain of the Young 
Hegelian argument, while Sartre treats mediation as a life project.
57. Cited McLellan, op. cit., p.83.
58. See Edgar Bauer, “The Struggle of Critique with Church and State" (1844). in The Young 
Hegelians: An Anthology, op. cit., p.267, where he wrote: "there is nothing ol value in political 
freedom or in the exalted constitutional and republican forms of the stale" (p.269). He described the call 
of bourgeois republicanism as “nothing but a reaction” (p.265), and he blamed the Revolution’s lailure 
to deliver "rational freedom” on its faith in “constitutional mediation" (p.266). Drawing on a ligure 
which sees, in Hegel’s Phenomenology, the onset of the master/slave dialectic, Edgar Bauer wrote: “ It is 
therefore clear that there can never be anything but struggle, specifically, the lile-and-dealh struggle 
through which those laws will be destroyed. But supposing that freedom begins this devastating 
struggle, will it itself contradict itself and will it consecrate new laws? Or will it finally tear down 
everything completely?” (p.270). On the master/slave dialectic - strictly, “Independence and Dependence 
of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage”, Herrschaft unci Knechtschaft - and the “life-and-death 
struggle” see Hegel, Phenomenology, op. cit., pp. 111-119.
59. “The Struggle of Critique with Church and State”, op. cit., p.268, pp.268-9.
60. Ibid., p.270, p.271.
61. Indeed, the question of the avant-garde and its orientation towards the future may be a more 
complex affair. For Enzensberger, “the aporias of the avant-garde” derive from the paradoxes of the 
concept, its being en avant: “The avant of the avant-garde contains its own contradiction: it can be 
marked out only a posteriori” (Enzensberger, op. cit., p.28), “this future has not only always begun; it 
is also... always already past” (p.25). It deals in a future that docs not belong to it” (p.41). he writes, 
and “its afterlife is immediately cashed in on and cashiered; indeed, it is transmogrified, by way of 
publicity, into a l'orelife, which the work inherits before it even appears on the scene. Its afterlife is 
factory-made” (p.25).
our business to construct”, wrote Edgar Bauer, “history will write its a f f i r m a t i o n ” . 62 
Avant-garde artists were, however, perhaps less inclined to hand over all possibility of 
affirmative practice to the forces of “history”, and even in their most “negative” 
moments they made their art. Nietzsche has become a seminal reference-point for such 
art; in order to create one must be immoral, he argued, one must be a “destroyer par  
excellence”.63 However, writing in the journal of the Young Hegelians much earlier in 
1842, Bakunin explicitly ascribed a creative force to negation:64
... the positive is opposed by the negative and the negative by the positive... the 
negative is only justified in its absolute form.... the joy of destruction is also a 
creative joy.65
My point can be no more than speculative, but while Nietzsche’s work - and specifically 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra - was undoubtedly central to the intellectual life of many avant- 
garde artists at the beginning of the 20c., it might be argued that the Bakuninite 
expression had a wider and^powerful cultural resonance via the European anarchist 
movements. This might not be a question of displacing Nietzsche for Bakunin so much 
as locating a leftist and emancipatory strain to the articulation of negation - one which 
plays directly into the debates of the First International, and which brings us into contact 
with some heightened arguments articulated through negation.66
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The question of the relation between the negative, destructive moment and subsequent
62. Edgar Bauer, in The Young Hegelians: An Anthology, op. cit., p.271.
63. Cited Lowith, op. cit., p. 15.
64. Reviewing Bruno Bauer's Posaune in 1841, Max Stirncr wrote: “Only the German and he 
alone demonstrates the mission of radicalism in the history of the world; he alone is radical and he alone 
is authentically so. No one is so inexorable and inconsiderate as he: he overturns not only the existing 
world in order to remain upright himself, he overturns himself, too. Where the German pulls down, a 
God must fall and a world perish. With the Germans destroying is creating and the destruction of the 
transient is his eternity” (cited p. 15)
65. Cited McLellan, op. cit., p.18.
66. Nietzsche’s work will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 2. I will also return to the 
borderline of dialectic and antinomy, touching on it throughout the thesis, and most explicitly in the 
Conclusion.
construction and affirmation is a problematic terrain.67 The history of the avant-garde 
itself is discussed in terms of a movement from negative to positive (from Dada to 
Surrealism; from Futurism to Constructivism), as is - by analogy - revolution (from 
revolutionary act to the pragmatics of building of a new society).68 In some accounts, 
though, this transition threatens the negative, subsuming affirmation, and returning, so 
to speak, the Young Hegelian project to its beginning. It is to this last point that we shall 
now turn.
II. Negation As Alienation & As De-Alienation
As was pointed out earlier, Nochlin defines avant-gardism by the condition of 
alienation: what Manet had, that Courbet didn’t, she suggests, was a “psychic, social, 
ontological” alienation; or to put it another way, Manet lacked a “unified and 
unselfconscious”, “direct and unambiguous” relation to his art and his society.69 Here 
Nochlin implies that there was a fundamental shift in the nature of artistic and political 
consciousness.
For Manet and for the avant-garde, as opposed to the men of 1848, the relation 
of the artist to society was a phenomenological rather than a social fact.70
Similarly, Poggioli insists on alienation - social, psychological, cultural or economic - 
as the condition of the modern artist, a condition which produces, as a “general 
phenomenon” of avant-garde art, a “culture of negation”.71 As Poggioli puts it, the 
relation between artist and society is “a purely negative function”, “a negative cultural
67. It is constantly misunderstood (by writers who would see history as a plenitudinous unfolding) 
and taken as destruction pure and simple.
68. See Sheila Fitzpatrick’s character sketch of “revolution” in her Introduction to The Russian 
Revolution. Oxford University Press, 1984.
69. Nochlin, op. cit.. p. 12, p. 17.
70. Ibid., p. 14. Moreover, Nochlin writes, Manet’s response to alienation was to adopt the 
“dandyish coolness toward immediate experience, mitigated either by art or by irony” (p. 16). This 
characteristic of blagues, a mode of ironic put-on, was described by the Goncourt brothers as a “poisoner 
of faith, killer of respect” (cited p. 14).
71. Poggioli, op. cit., pp. 107-8.
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relation”, of which the avant-garde is both a product and a participant.72 So, if 
negativity has so far been considered as a related political and philosophical 
commitment, here negation is located with the contradictions which, for Marx and 
Engels, had produced such commitments. Negation, then, can also be characterised as 
the grounding social relation of modern capitalist existence; as alienation negativity 
figures as a negative social relation. This negative relation consists in the assumption of 
a move from a relation of identity to non-identity, as in the theological idea of a loss of 
oneness and grace (the Fall), or as suggested by the German compounds frem d  and 
ausser which are often used in connection with alienation. Theology tends to treat the 
matter as an unrelenting loss, as a problematic and unpleasant relation - a sense of 
alienation adopted by many liberal accounts of “alienation”. For Hegel, Marx and 
Adorno, for instance - albeit, as we shall see, in distinct ways - the matter o f “other-ing” 
or “externalising” is altogether more complex.
Peter Burger, in contrast, defines his concept of “the historical avant-garde” - by which
72. Ibid., p. 118. Avant-gardism, he continues, represents not an “abstract negation”, but the 
negation of official society, the negation of the general culture by a particular one. This incorporates: 
the negation of mass culture and its "cult of cliche”, both in its bourgeois and proletarian forms 
(pp. 123-4); a negation of bourgeois taste and style, a taste which in its plurality, eclecticism and 
mechanicity is itself the negation of genuine style (p.120, p. 125); and the attempt to negate the 
tendency to quantification in all aspects of social life, with its eradication of genuine value (p. 125). 
Poggioli sub-divides the avant-garde into four categories, which also make a (airly good character sketch 
of negation: Activism, Antagonism, Nihilism, Agonism. Activism embraces both an initial sense of 
social activism by artists, and the subsequent, and more common, sense of gratuitous movement, 
gestures for the sake of gestures. Antagonism - described as an antagonism to both tradition and public - 
is seen as a response to alienation. This response has both plebeian and aristocratic elements, and may 
take form as the “struggle” between artist and artifact (or the "tensions” beloved ol theory!) Poggioli 
argues that Activism and Antagonism are immanent to the concept of movement, and have a rational 
logic grounded therein. In contrast. Nihilism and Agonism represent more irrational tendencies, which 
emerges with the transcendence of the concept of movement. Nihilism pushes Antagonism beyond its 
denials of tradition and public, and beyond Activism’s “inebriation of movement”(p.26), to a moment of 
gratuitous and sadistic destructiveness, “attaining nonaction by acting” (p.61). Nihilism is best rendered 
in the "denigrating image”, a description drawn from Jose Ortega y Gasset, and characterised by 
“calumniating the object to which it is applied”, “a secretion of bile”, “an attack of spleen or 
hypochondria” (p. 183). Agonism turns this destructiveness upon itself, in masochistic self-sacrifice. 
This desperation finds its form in the "hyperbolic image”, an exaggeration whereby man seeks to 
transcend his condition (of nature and immediacy) into the poetic, a megalomaniacal overreaching for the 
spiritual. Poggioli cites Trotsky: "The hyperbolic image reflects, up to a point, the fury of our times” 
(cited p. 183).
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he means the avant-gardist movements spanning the period from just before World War
One until c.1930 - precisely in opposition to this “distancing” from society;
nevertheless, it is the distancing which remains determining. He charts an increasing
tendency towards the autonomy of art in bourgeois society during the 19c.,73 an
institutionalised tendency, which produced so attenuated a relation to life that counter
tendencies - in the form of the historical avant-garde - emerged in the early 20c. This
autonomy is itself seen as a social product, and is described as a rejection of modern
social, economic and cultural life culminating in Aestheticism. According to Burger,
Aestheticism had sought to negate “the means-ends rationality o f the bourgeois
everyday”, and had turned into its very content the “apartness” or the “disjunction” from
“the praxis of life” that had characterised the condition of all art in bourgeois society.74
Burger presents his historical avant-garde as a force which negated the institution of art
and its claim to autonomy and distance from life praxis.
The European avant-garde movements can be defined as an attack on the status 
of art in bourgeois society. What is negated is not an earlier form of art (a style) 
but art as an institution that is unassociated with the life praxis of men.75
The avant-garde, he writes, did not seek to reintegrate or “sublate” art with the everyday 
of bourgeois life praxis, but to use the contents of art to raise the conditions of life, they
73. This tendency towards the autonomy of different spheres - the cognitive, the ethical/political 
and the aesthetic - has been described since Kant’s three Critiques (the true, the good and the beautiiul) 
and furthered by Weber. For a seminal articulation of this see Jurgen Habermas, “Modernity - An 
Incomplete Project” (1980), published as "Modernity versus Postmodernity" in New German Critique
22, Winter 1981, pp.3-14. and under its original title in Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster, op. cit., 
pp.3-15. For a more popular, and slightly irreverent, version, see Terry Eagleton, “From the Pol is to 
Postmodernism’’, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic, Blackwell, 1990, p. 366; and lor a systematic criticism 
of the post-Kantian separation, see J.M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art. Aesthetic Alienation from  Kant to 
Derrida and Adorno, Polity Press, 1992.
74. Burger, Theory o f the Avant-Garde. op. cit., p.49, p.51. Cf. Clement Greenberg’s "Avant- 
Garde and Kitsch”, op. cit., which argues the case for autonomy as a space beyond political or 
commercial utilitarianism. We will return to Greenberg’s (and to Adorno’s) sense of autonomy later. 
Hadjinicolaou, op. cit., also presents the 19c. as a period of increasing artistic isolation and non­
integration, resulting from the artist’s new found social and economic status under capitalism: the new 
social framework for artistic production and consumption. This condition of freedom from the strictures 
of patronage, yet new found dependence on the more amorphous open market, echoes Marx's and 
Engels’ comments on wage labour. See, for example, Karl Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital” (1847, 
published 1849), Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Selected Works in One Volume, op. cit., pp.71-93.
75. Burger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, op. cit., p.49.
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“attempt to organize a new life praxis from a basis in art”.76 Here, then, the avant-garde 
is presented explicitly as a “negation of the negation”: it attempted to negate the negative 
relation of art and life praxis, a move which included repercussion for art’s function in 
society and the categories of individual production and reception.77 In this sense, 
Burger’s historical avant-garde represents, in its practices of negation, a move of de­
alienation, an attempt to alienate us from the conditions of social alienation.
The tactic of de-alienation became central to left avant-gardist practice in the 20c. Brecht, 
for one, mounted a theatre of “estrangement” or “alienation effects”, which - like the 
Russian Formalists’ category of ostranenie, or “making-strange” - were designed to 
retrieve human consciousness from the common-sense habituation of the bourgeois 
everyday, to estrange us from our worldly estrangement.78 This same distinction might
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p.51.
78. Already, in Laverdant, there was a call for art to expose the nature of society: "Along with the 
hymn to happiness, the dolorous and despairing ode.... To lay bare with a brutal brush all the 
brutalities, all the filth, which are at the base of our society" (Laverdant, cited Poggioli, op. cit., 9). 
The use of ostranenie  moves between explicitly political and more purely artistic ambitions. 
Shklovsky’s early use of the term - and the associated “art as a device - serves more to elevate artistic 
consciousness against the humdrum banality of the everyday than to overthrow that reality. Later, 
though, Russian Formalist theory crosses over into leftist practices, and is central to the debates about 
the nature of realism. These are usually described as the modernist/Marxist or formalist/realist debates, 
with Lukacs providing the most sophisticated case for realism. I think that it is better to see the 
contenders as all trying to articulate some "claim” - in their theory ot representation - on the real. The 
debate, of course, turns on whether or not alienation effects compound social alienation or help us gain 
distance from it (and the question might return were we to consider Yve-Alain Bois’ description of Ad 
Reinhardt’s practice as an "agonistic struggle against agon”, see "The Limits ol Almost”, op. cit., 
p. 14). It should be noted that this alienation to the second power comes close to a wilful sinking into 
it. On this tendency see M.M. Bakhtin/P.M. Medvedev. "The Nihilistic Slant ol Formalism , I he 
Formal Method in Literary Scholarship. A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics (published in 
1928 under the authorship of Pavel M. Medvedev), Harvard University Press, 1985, pp.59-61, in which 
he argues that formalism nihilistically destroyed meanings without ever putting anything in their place. 
Also cf. the discussion of Tafuri and Cacciari in Chapter 2.
On ostranenie see Victor Shklovsky, "Art as Technique” (1917), Russian Formalist Criticism. 
Four Essays, eds. Lee T. Lemon & Marion J. Reis, University of Nebraska Press, 1965, pp.3-24. For 
commentary see, for example, Simon Watney. “Making Strange: The Shattered Mirror”, Thinking 
Photography, ed. Victor Burgin, Macmillan, 1982, pp. 154-176; Fredric Jameson , The Prison-House of 
Language. A Critical Account o f Structuralism and Russian Formalism, Princeton University Press, 
1972. Lukacs’ arguments can be found in, for example, Essays on Realism (1931-40), MIT, 1981. For 
a discussion of the debates between Brecht and Lukacs, see Teny Lovell, Pictures o f Reality. Aesthetics, 
Politics, Pleasure, British Film Institute, 1980; Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism. An Historical 
Study o f Lukacs, Brecht, Benjamin and Adorno. Verso 1985; Jameson, Marxism and Form, op. cit.; and
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be made for Brecht’sVerfremdungsejfektJV  The charging of the sense of negativity 
tends to oscillate between alienation (as a social fact) and de-alienation (as a conscious 
counter-practice) - the latter, as a conscious political practice of resistance, also overlays 
the values addressed in the previous section.
The concept o f alienation - although much misunderstood - is central to Marx’s
philosophy: to the sense of process in his thinking, to his sense of praxis or sensuous
practical activity, and to his understanding of the role of the negative. The similarities
and differences from Hegel are crucial. Marx’s main argument in the 1844 Manuscripts,
the Grundrisse  and Capital is concentrated on political economy, and is specifically
concerned with the tendency of its representatives to treat categories as static and given.
(As such they tended to treat “exchange” as a fact of human ontology, and likewise the
division o f labour under capitalism, private property, etc.) H egel’s philosophy, in
contrast, was valued for its sense of movement and process - of activity as the mediator
of subject and object - and gave ontological priority to activity over its forms of
externalisation or manifestation. Marx, noting the importance of negation, also pointed
to Hegel’s significance for conceiving:
... the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of object 
[,Entgegenstandlichung], as alienation and as supersession of this alienation; that 
he [Hegel] therefore grasps the nature of labour and conceives objective man - 
true, because real man - as the result of his own labour.80
for some of the original texts, the edited collection of Ernst Bloch et al„ Aesthetics and Politics, Verso,
1980. The left modernist position, drawing from the early avant-garde, notably Eisenstein, Kuleshov, 
Brecht, and Heartfield, and the revival of the tactic of alienation effects, can be found in the writings ol 
Screen throughout this period. See, for example, Colin MacCabe, “Realism and the Cinema: Notes on 
Some Brechtian Theses” Screen, vol. 15, no.2, 1974, pp.7-27; Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema”, Screen, vol.16, no.3, 1975, pp.6-18. Recent reflections on this period - and the 
success, or otherwise, of attempts to estrange us from accepted narrative and representational axles - can 
be found in Laura Mulvey, “Changes: Thoughts on Myth, Narrative and Historical Experience”, op. 
cit.; and in Jeff Wall interview with Ariellc Pelenc, Jeff Wall, eds. Thierry de Duve, et al., Phaidon 
Press, 1996, especially pp. 10-11.
79. See, for example, Bertolt Brecht, “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting” (probably written in 
1936), Brecht on Theatre, ed. John Willett, Hill & Wang, 1964, pp.91-99; "Alienation Effects in the 
Narrative Pictures of the Elder Brueghel” (believed to have been written in 1934), pp. 157-9: "A Short 
Organum for the Theatre" (written 1948), pp.179-205.
80. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, op. cit., p.386.
Categories such as objectification and estrangement or alienation in Marx’s Manuscripts 
em phasise processes and movements akin to self-splitting, re-positioning and 
expression via self-othering. The emphasis is very much on process - on the “moving 
and producing principle” - and activity or praxis.
Nevertheless, Marx distances himself from Hegel’s failure to distinguish objectification 
from alienation: between the necessary fact of human activity (that it objectifies itself in 
an act o f self-estranging) and the alienation specific to capitalism.81 Objectification 
carries a neutral value; it has both positive and negative aspects: it “affords a free man 
the possibility of contemplating himself in a world of his own m a k i n g ” , 82 the human 
self-mediation with nature, and it transposes man’s activity and work into something 
alien to him self. All human labour, then, because it o b je c tif ie s , is subject to 
objectification; this is its inescapable condition. In contrast, alienation - in Marx’s sense 
of the term - is not inescapable. Marx describes “estranged labour” - alienation - as a 
process which com m odifies, instrumentalises, devalues, enslaves, bestialises, 
dehumanises, denatures, and removes man from his reality and self. Emphasising the 
processes through which man’s own labour and social activity become externalised and 
return back to him as alien and aggressive things, he presents “estranged labour” or 
alienation as a four-fold process: the estrangement of man to his product of labour; to 
his own activity of labour and production; to his species-being; and to other men.
For Hegel, moreover, such activity and self-estrangements are those of thought: labour 
is, for Hegel, the labour of thought, activity’s mediation is merely that of thought-
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81. Marx is regarded as the first to make this distinction, and similarly distinguishes between 
Lebensausserung and Lebensentausserung, or between labour as manifestation of life and labour as 
alienation of life. See Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory o f  Alienation (1970), Merlin, 1972, p.91. 
Objectification is usually rendered from Vergegenstandlichung (the process of becoming opposite). 
Entausserung  is usually translated as alienation, but carries a broader sense of cxternalisation. 
Entfremdung is the stronger term for alienation (containing Fremd, or alien/other).
82. Gregor Benton, “Glossary of Key Terms”, Karl Marx Early Writings, op. cit., p.431.
entities, the object is “alienated subject”. But while Marx criticises this idealism  
extensively he does, in fact, argue something more. For Hegel - unable to distinguish 
between objectification and alienation - the process of mediation, the Aufhebung, must 
nullify the active condition (the activity of objectification and externalisation), collapsing 
subject and object into an identity, and effectively positing a ideal unity (a nostalgic past 
one-ness which can only be recollected via remembrance, Erinnerung - Er-innerung).^  
Marx’s distinction between objectification and alienation means that he could posit the 
possibility of overcoming alienation without simultaneously positing a collapse into the 
total identity of subject and object.
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III. Negation As Critical Distance Under “Total Reification”
The question of dealienation, however, becomes somewhat compromised on the basis 
of a variation of the theory of alienation advanced by Western Marxism. The key 
account is Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic o f Enlightenment (1944),84 and, in
83. In (he M anuscripts, private property (and. with it. alienation) seems to fo llow  from  the 
(transhistorical) estrangement of labour. But in The German Ideology Marx clearly formulates that it is 
private property and the division of labour which produce alienation. See Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels Collected Works, vol.5, Lawrence & Wishart, 1976. However, even il we just concentrate on 
The German Ideology, it could be argued, there is a big difference between alienation based on the 
division of labour and one based on private property. Marx comments that communism will be. with 
the abolition of capitalist private property, “the abolition of the alien attitude [Fremdheit]” (p.48). but 
he also locates alienation with the division of mental and material labour (p.45), an alienation which 
substantially predates capitalism. Here, alienation can refer to the gap between man’s deeds and their 
effects (p.47, p.87, p.93). This “cleavage", as Marx calls it, also applies to that between particular and 
common, or state, interest (p.47), or to the economic interests of different aspects of the international 
division of labour (p.51) - his ideas and their effects (p.23). In fact, Marx also describes the gap or 
division, prior to the division of labour, that must occur between the human animal and nature if 
consciousness is to begin (p.44). Within this early work there is a range of pitches of negation, and this 
range is adopted by 20c. critical theorists.
Some specificity may be needed here. The German Ideology was written with Engels between 
November 1845 and August 1846; first published (as a complete text) in German in 1932 (I have no 
details on partial publications before this date); and first published in English in 1969. The Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts were written April-August 1844. and were not intended for publication, 
although published in German in 1932, and in English c.1973-4. The dates, and the gap, between 
German and English language availability, are important for grasping the availability of these texts to 
20c. audiences and critical theorists.
84. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic o f Enlightenment, Verso, 1986.
particular, its reworking of Georg Lukacs’ essay “Reification and the Consciousness of 
the Proletariat”, and - because this is central to Lukacs’ essay - also of Marx’s account 
of “commodity fetishism” from Capital The shift made by Adorno and Horkheimer 
marks the beginning of Critical Theory proper. The themes have been central to both 
Critical Theory (specifically the Frankfurt School) and in critical theory more widely 
(although perhaps less so the work of poststructuralists). The terrain o f discussion  
crosses between the debates of revolutionary praxis by revolutionary activists, art 
activists, and academic social and aesthetic theorists.86 For Adorno and Horkheimer, 
“liberal capitalism” - based on free commodity exchange, the liberal state and patriarchal 
bourgeois family - had been displaced by “administered capitalism”. Liberal capitalism, 
they argued, posed both the possibility and desire for freedom, and with these the scope 
for the development and exercise of a rebellious personality. But by the mid-19c., with 
the emergence of the tendency to administered capitalism, human nature, needs and 
desires became increasingly subjected to standardisation and commodification, and 
every pore of life became inflected by what had previously been an “economic” matter: 
“bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence”,87 they argued, working the theme of 
equivalence into the psychic and everyday with their concept of the rising “culture 
industry”. Later Adorno referred to capitalism’s “increasingly integrative trend, the fact 
that its elements entwine into a more and more total concept of functions”.88 The 
individual was no longer formed through a struggle with the social, they argued, but 
was directly incorporated into the structures of dominant power, subsumed within its
85. See Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness. Studies in Marxist Dialectics, Merlin, 
1971.
86. The term “Western Marxism” was coined by Perry Anderson to describe the generation who 
made this shift from revolutionary practice to philosophical and aesthetic theory. See Perry Anderson, 
Considerations on Western Marxism, New Left Books, 1976.
87. Adorno and Horkheimer, op. cit., p.7.
88. See Negative Dialectics, op. cit., p. 166. Horkheimer wrote that: "Today the individual ego has 
been absorbed by the pseudo-ego of totalitarian planning. Even those who hatch the totalitarian plan, 
despite and because of the huge amount of capital over which they dispose, have as little autonomy as 





This theory of modern society had repercussions for the methodology of Adorno and 
Horkheimer. We have, contained in the approach of these writers, a theory o f  modern 
society and its phenomena, a n d  a theory of theory, or, a theory o f h o w  to address this 
object. Negativity is at stake in both these cases. “Instrumental reason” - which 
proceeds, they argued, through “identity thinking” - tends to equate the real with rational 
concepts, privileging categories of formal identity over those o f non-identity, and 
elevating continuity over discontinuity. Drawing on Marx’s distinction of the qualitative 
and quantitative aspects of value (use-value and exchange-value respectively), Adorno 
and Horkheimer (treating these categories as, respectively non-identity and identity) 
emphasised that “Bourgeois society... makes the dissimilar comparable by reducing it to
89. No longer mediated by the ego, social reproduction was no longer constituted through the self’s 
“dialectic of struggle and submission” - again a reference to Hegel’s master/slave dialectic. Sec Peter 
Dews, Logics o f Disintegration, Verso, 1987, p.225.
A different account of alienation can be found in Sartre, one which holds to the importance of 
praxis in defining human activity. This account specifically resists any sense of total subsumption in a 
reified world. This is worked from Marx’s statement "men make their own history’’ in the Brumaire; or 
as Sartre put it: “man is characterized above all by his going beyond a situation” (Sartre, op. cit., p.91); 
“Man defines himself by his project. This material being perpetually goes beyond the condition which 
is made for him" (p. 150). Particular alienated beings struggle against their alienation (p .133), Sartre 
insists, they work upon external objects and upon themselves, "the agent never undertakes anything 
which is not the negation of alienation and which does not fall back into an alienated world” (p.99, 
footnote). This can be compared to Hegel's account of praxis for the slave in the master/slave dialectic 
in the Phenomenology, op. cit. The approach is also related to Heidegger”s vorhanden (the simply there, 
inert) and zuhanden (latent action, tools ready to hand). Jameson notes that Heidegger and Sartre give 
ontological priority to the latter (Marxism and Form, op. cit., p.234). The project, for Sartre, is based 
on negativity (Sartre, op. cit., p.171); or "Every man is defined negatively by the sum total of possibles 
which are impossible for him; that is. by a future more or less blocked o f f ’ (p.95). Warnock says that 
Sartre’s emphasis on praxis is particular to his later writing, but in Being and Nothingness he treats the 
origin of action as nothingness in the heart of pure being, an ontological act and its overcoming become 
the means to define being. See Mary Warnock, Introduction to Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 
(1943). Routledge, 1989. The shift from Sartre’s early to later writing consists more in working the 
categories as socio-historical rather than as ontological ones, although Sartre seems not to abandon the 
latter. Jameson puts it this way: “He makes himself an object in order to work on objects, he makes 
himself inertia in order to overcome inertia... Thus initially man’s ultimate possibility of being 
alienated or dehumanized is given in the first basic structure of his relationship; to maUer" (Marxism 
and Form, op. cit., p.237).
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abstract quantities” .90 Ideologiekritik - where im manent critique^  defetishises the 
ideological claims of the dominant class - was no longer appropriate. With the one­
dim ensional relation - strictly, a non-relation or immediate identity - o f ideology and 
reality  in bourgeois society, “ ideology” in its classic sense, had ceased to exist. 
Criticism could no longer prise apart truth from untruth, because ideology had become 
totally reified. So prevalent were the forces of rationalisation that even critical modes of 
thought become tainted, as the epistemological grounds for critique were compromised 
by the very theory of modernity.92
The literature on the Frankfurt School makes clear some of the problems introduced by 
the account of Adorno and Horkheimer, problems which are sidestepped by the use of
90. Adorno and Horkheimer, op. cit.. p.7. Under these new circumstances, which are seen to reach 
full development in the early 20c., the distance that had hitherto existed between bourgeois reality and 
bourgeois ideology was seen to have disappeared. Things had become “one-dimensional", producing the 
subm issive personality whose super ego had been subject to “automatisation”. Marcuse also wrote 
extensively on this one-dimensionality. See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, One Dim ensional Man. The 
Ideology o f  Industrial Society  (1964), Sphere, 1968.
“Instrumental reason” far from being an externally imposed form o f thought is, for Adorno and 
Horkheimer, a form o f subjective reason turned against itself, and thereby appearing to be objective (cf. 
alienation). Emphasising the general, the abstract and the universal, identity thinking tries to eliminate 
otherness (which is associated with the particular and the concrete); and in this sense it is a 
“com m odified" form o f thought, subject to the rule o f equivalence. Or as D ew s describes it. 
instrumental reason becom es “a world-historical process o f reification” (D ew s. op. cit., p. 150). 
Instrumental reason and identity thinking, then, signify, as Susan Buck-M orss puts it. "a pseudo­
reconciliation” o f subject and object, consciousness and society: it was the product not o f  a classless 
society but o f  “mass society”. See Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin o f the N egative D ialectic. Theodor 
W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankf urt Institute, The Free Press, 1977, p. 173.
91. See Peter Dews and Peter Osborne, "The Frankfurt School and the Problem o f Critique: A 
Reply to McCarney”, Radical Philosophy 45, Spring 1987, pp .2-11. As "a transfigurative transcription 
o f  social reality” (p.4), “ideology", for the Frankfurt School theorists, was not the false to be 
counterposed to the truth (reality), but itself contained moments of both truth and falsehood. Immanent 
critique was a mode o f  critique which works from within its objcct o f  critique and does not rely on 
challenging that object externally. It is associated with Hegel's critique o f  natural right, where he argued 
that the criteria for right are a posteriori rather than a priori. Adorno’s project was to use immanent 
critique to make idealist philosophy - all philosophy being a mediated form o f social contradictions - 
implode under its own contradictions. This sounds like deconstruction, but, as Buck-Morss points out. 
Adornian immanent critique was “a means of discovering the truth" (Buck-M orss, op. cit., p.66).
92. A s Hohendahl puts it: “critical thought... cannot formulate truth because it is already 
contam inated by the logic o f  instrumental reason”. See Peter U. Hohendahl, "The D ialectic o f  
Enlightenment Revisited: Habermas’ Critique o f  the Frankfurt School”, N ew Germ an C ritique  35, 
Spring/Summer 1985, p.8. This aporia of Critical Theory was not unrecognised by Adorno, and it was 
as a strategy against total reification that Adorno devised his “negative dialectics".
their thesis in more recent art and cultural w r it in g .93 These problems have a particular 
bearing on the account of negativity. Adorno and H orkheim er’s account sets modern 
society on track for total reification, for a world dominated by the quantification of 
exchange value. This argum ent is based on Lukacs’ essay, “ R eification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat”, where the author generalises the sway of reification 
from M arx’s account of commodity fetishism. Lukacs charts the dialectic of quality and 
quantity through different aspects of social existence, and highlights its “potentiation” : 
from  the experience of time, through the structures of law, to the m ovem ents of 
philosophy, to nam e a few examples. However, whereas Lukacs m aintains a link 
between the most esoteric elements of his account (such as philosophy’s categories of 
thought) and M arx’s law of value, Adorno and Horkheimer tend to dissociate reification 
from  cap italist developm ent, thereby reifying reification. For Lukacs, how ever 
potentiated reification became, it was always under the threat of interruption and 
collapse due the periodic nature of capitalist econom ic crises which exposes the 
t o t a l i t y .94 A dorno’s and H orkheim er’s dissociation (a sort of negative condition) of 
reification (another negative condition) is not, however, a “ negation of the negation”, 
but a spiralling of negation into itself.95 Here, then, reification is extrapolated into a 
generalised philosophy of m odernity, on the one hand, and into an account of the
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93. See, for exam ple, Paul Piccone, "General Introduction” , The Essential Frankfurt School 
R ea d er , eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, Basil Blackwell, 1978, pp.xi-xxii; Jurgen Habermas, 
“The Entwinem ent o f  Myth and Enlightenment: Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno". 7 he 
Philosophical D iscourse o f  Modernity. Twelve Lectures, Polity Press, 1990, p p .106-130 (the original 
essay  appeared as “The Entwinement o f  Myth and Enlightenment: R e-R eading D ia le c tic  of 
E nligh tenm ent”, N ew  German Critique  26. Spring/Summer 1982, pp. 13-30); Hohendahl. op. cit.; 
Benhabib, op. cit.
94 . Hohendahl also remarks that Lukacs had “cpistem ological as well as social lim its to the 
reification o f  reason” (Hohendahl, op. cit., p. 10).
95 . A similar point could be made about their dialectic. Following Adorno’s dialectical-accounts- 
on-the-verge-of-breakdown can be fascinating, but they are seen to be prem ised on som e very 
undialectical assessments. In a sense the two tendencies here are connected: on the one hand a complete 
lack o f  dialectical analysis, on the other a dialectics that is so potentiated, and restricted, that its author 
is forced constantly to have to outwit it with further dialectical manoeuvres.
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human condition, on the other.96 Marked as it is by a loss of agency for change, and 
devised through a period of defeat by intellectuals rather than activists, this account has 
dominated not only W estern Marxism, but also, more generally, critical theory and the 
accounts o f m odernity. From  where might the negative force o f “resistance” com e 
when: (i) revolution seemed to have been defeated; (ii) alienation was now so total that 
dealienation could scarcely be thought, let alone acted on? The parallels with the 
developments within Left Heglianism are interesting: both tendencies are conceived in a 
clim ate dom inated by a feeling of politically ineffectivity: the Young Hegelians in the 
face of retrenchments of the Prussian state, the Frankfurt School theorists in that of the 
rise o f Fascism  (and also in what they saw as the one-dim ensionality of the American 
culture industry).97 However, for the Frankfurt School thinkers the consequences were 
to be a m aintenance of the distance from political activity, whereas for some of the 
Young Hegelians 1848 soon came onto the horizon. If the Young Hegelians generalised 
negation to the point o f reinscribing antinomy, Adorno and H orkheim er generalised 
reification to the point o f instituting one dim ensionality, and, therefore, required 
antinomy to break it.
A further look at the account of the totally administered society reveals that it is based on 
a m isreading - or explicit revision - of M arx’s C apita l which proposes the total 
overrunning of use-value by exchange-value. As early as 1935 Adorno is most explicit 
on this point: “The com modity is, on the one hand, an alienated object in which use-
96. As Scyla Benhabib puts it: "The discourse o f rationalization shifts from a socially specific to a 
global-anthropological level. The critique o f  the instrum ental rationalization  o f  soc ie ty  is thereby 
transformed into a critique o f  the structure o f Western reason ” (p.43). “Whereas Lukacs em phasizes the 
phantom objectivity o f the social world, which is nonetheless a product of the praxis o f  socialized  
individuals, the Frankfurt School theorists emphasize the totalizing anonymity o f  domination, which 
thereby ceases to appeal' as domination” (p.42). Piccone notes Adorno’s dehistoricisation o f  the dialectic, 
a m ove which allowed him to present all o f  society and culture as caught under “the domination o f the 
concept” (Piccone, op. cit., p.xviii). This account. Piccone continues, “ended up losing... precisely that 
nonidentity which it sought to preserve" (p.xix), culminating in the totally administered society and 
one-dimensionality.
97. Sec the account o f the culture industry: Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “The Culture 
Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception”, D ialectic o f  Enlightenment, op. cit., pp .120-67.
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value perishes, and on the other, an alien survivor that outlives its own im m ediacy”.98
The point is developed a few years later:
The appearance of immediacy is as strong as the compulsion of exchange-value 
is inexorable. The social compact harmonizes the contradiction. The appearance 
of immediacy takes possession of the mediated, exchange-value itself. If the 
com m odity in general com bines exchange-value and use-value, then the pure 
use-value, whose illusion the cultural goods m ust preserve in com pletely 
capitalist society, m ust be replaced by pure exchange-value, which precisely in 
its capacity as exchange-value deceptively takes over the function of use- 
value.99
And in Aesthetic Theory we find Adorno arguing that exchange-value in monopoly 
capitalism should be compared to “abstractness, which always leaves in doubt what they 
[art works] are and what they are for, becomes a cipher of the essence o f the works 
them selves” .100
A dorno’s account here runs counter to M arx’s sense of the “dual nature” of the 
com m odity which is so central to the first chapter of C apita l. It is possible - in 
countering Adorno - to argue that use-values remain what are used, and remain what we 
exchange: the market exchanges on the basis of quantitative equivalences (measured as 
abstract human labour), but it does not exchange non-use-values; w ithout use-value, 
there is nothing to exchange; use-value is a necessary ground for commodity exchange. 
Interm inable argum ents could be had on each of these assertions; the point I want to 
make, however, has a different (and more theoretical) emphasis. M arx’s argum ent was 
with political econom ists and not Critical Theorists, and so his reason for em phasising 
the dual nature of the commodity does not directly answer the latter’s points; instead the
98. Theodor Adorno. Letter to Walter Benjamin, 2nd August 1935, in Aesthetics and P o litics, op. 
cit., p .l 13.
99 . Theodor W. Adorno, “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression o f  Listening” 
(1938), in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, op. cit., p.279. Lambert Zuidervaart remarks that 
Adorno introduces a “shift" in the understanding o f the com m odity, distinguishing earlier from later 
forms o f  capitalism. In the latter form exchange-value is no longer the means to realising use-values, 
but replaces use-value with exchange-value, which is in turn treated with the im m ediacy, and 
enjoyment, that would pertain to a use-value. See Lambert Zuidervaart, A dorno’s Aesthetic Theory. The 
Redem ption o f  Illusion. MIT, 1993, pp.77-9.
100. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (c. 1968), Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, p.32.
onus is on the reader to pay close attention to M arx’s argument. For M arx, the rule of
equivalence does displace the centrality of use-value and useful, concrete labour, for the
econom y o f capitalism , but - and this is the crucial point - this displacem ent itself
remains functional. To say that use-value is the vehicle for exchange-value means, I
think, something very specific, and is advanced by Marx subsequent to his argument for
understanding the commodity as having a dual character. The crucial passage occurs not
in the infamous section on commodity fetishism in section 4, but in section 1, on the
elementary (accidental) form of value:
The opposition or contrast existing internally in each commodity between use- 
value and value, is, therefore, made evident externally by two com m odities 
being placed in such relation to each other, that the commodity whose value it is 
sought to express, figures directly as a mere use-value, while the commodity in 
which that value is to be expressed, figures directly as mere exchange-value.10]
This is, I believe, one o f those points where some sensitivity to the H egelian-type 
movements of M arx’s text is required, for what Marx presents are m ovements akin to 
self-splitting and self-othering, where a complex of qualities takes form in reduced and 
one-sided ways. The whole point about equivalence and abstraction, and their insidious 
effects, can be found here, and this grounds the logical unfolding of M arx’s account of 
the commodity through the remaining sections. The dual nature of a commodity is only 
realised once it has been put into an exchange relation with another com m odity, but, 
once done, its dual nature is rendered externally visible by attributing its two “natures” - 
use-value and exchange-value - to, respectively, itself and the commodity with which it 
is to be exchanged. For its part, the use-value o f the latter commodity (the one in the 
equivalent form ) becom es the pure expression of the exchange-value o f  the fir s t  
commodity. It is from this argument that Marx derives some of the most powerful social 
forms of equivalence - the universal equivalent, the money-form and the argument about 
commodity fetishism. The point about the universal equivalent is that it is a commodity 
whose use-value is to be the pure expression of exchange-value; and to do this, there
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101. Marx, C apita l, op. cit., p. 67.
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must also be present a commodity (in the relative form) which expresses its value in the 
universal equivalent. Equivalence is rendered a nonsense (or reduced to an ideology) 
without the relation (conceived dynamically) through which this figuring of self-splitting 
takes place, albeit a “s e l f ’ that is, in fact, no “s e lf ’ outside of an exchange r e l a t i o n .  1 0 2  
W ithout a grasp on this passage, the very force o f the fetishism  of com m odities for 
M arx is itself rendered one-dim ensional; rather than - as in the accounts of critical 
theorists - one-dim ensionality being the logical outcome of com m odity fetishism. 103 
Indeed, the very force of the theory of reification - so central to later critical theorists - 
is, on my reading, com pletely undermined by the idea of the “ loss” - or mere fictional 
appearance - of use-value. Nevertheless, many accounts of art and cultural theory are 
dominated by this idea.
Buchloh, for exam ple, referring to avant-gardist montage, writes that the objects 
“ultimately function exclusively as producers of exchange value”; 104 and when Huyssen 
argues that the avant-garde was deeply “implicated in the western tradition of growth 
and progress... the universalizing, totalizing and centralizing im petus inherent in the 
very concept of avant-garde” and that there was a “secret bond between avant-garde and 
official culture”, he is drawing on a set of assumptions based on the Frankfurt School
102. 1 deliberately personify the commodity here, not only to echo Marx’s com ic personification o f  
the com m odities at the end o f the section on commodity fetishism (ibid., p.87), but also to reference the 
relations o f mutual dependency which, in Hegel, provides the grounding for any sense o f  self at all in 
Hegel: the necessity o f  an other, animate or inanimate, in order that the se lf can gain even its most 
primal consciousness. The necessity here of what we might call “lack” in the dialectic o f  desire (and 
recognition) has been much used, especially in the French Hegelian tradition. See for exam ple: 
Alexandre Kojeve. Introduction to the Reading o f  H egel (original lectures 1933-9), Cornell University  
Press, 1980: Jean Hyppolite. “Self-Consciousness and Life: The Independence o f Self-C onsciousness” 
(1946), in H egel’s D ialectic o f  Desire and Recognition. Texts and Com m entary, ed. John O ’N eill, State 
University o f  New York Press, 1996, pp.67-86. These ideas have subsequently been adapted by, for 
exam ple, Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts o f  Psycho-analysis  (from original seminar 
1964), Penguin, 1994 and, more recently, Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime O bject o f  Ideology, Verso. 1989.
103. In addition to speaking about the commodity having argued the com m odity out o f  existence, 
the concept o f  m oney as the universal equivalent (its use-value) must also be erased, as must, in due 
course, the account o f crisis.
104. Benjam in H .D . Buchloh, “A llegorical Procedures: Appropriation and M ontage in 
Contemporary Art”. Artforum , vol.21, n o .l, September 1982, p.44.
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acc o u n t.105 His presentation of the post-w ar period, as one of obsolescence of the
avant-garde in the face of a culture industry, describes the loss of the distance or gap
across which critical art practice might be effective (the loss of negativity), and the slip
into categorial com plicity with the dominant pow er.106 For Fredric Jam eson, critical
distance (including negativity, opposition, subversion), like distance in general, “ has
very precisely been abolished in the new space of postm odernism ” . N evertheless,
d isjunctions, gaps and rifts have opened w ider than ever, as the hum an body is
dislocated in its hyperspace and internally fragmented.107 He continues:
We are subm erged in its henceforth filled and suffused volum es to the point 
where our now postm odern bodies are bereft of spatial coordinates and 
practically (let alone theoretically) incapable of distantiation; meanwhile,... the 
prodigious new expansion of m ultinational capital ends up penetrating and 
colonizing those very precapitalist enclaves (Nature and the Unconscious) which 
offered extraterritorial and Archimedean footholds for critical effectivity.108
The “cultural dom inant” of postmodernism and multinational capital produces “ a new 
depthlessness”, flatness and superficiality, which calls into doubt any traditional “depth 
m o d e l” . 109 S im ilarly , Hal Foster, describ ing  the com prom ised cond itions of 
contem porary radical art practice writes: “ Appropriation is so efficacious because it 
proceeds by abstraction” , for it operates through the recognition of otherness and by 
reducing otherness to sam eness.110 Here, then, the analogy is quickly made between 
the reign of exchange-value (Foster’s concept of abstraction), the potential of radical art, 
and, by implication, the potential of any radical act. With “ the hegemonic culture”, and 
the “all-but-global reach of capital”, “there may be no natural limit to transgress”,111 and 
there can be no exposing of ideology, no Ideologiekritik, where “ the com modity is its
105. Huyssen, “The Search for Tradition", op. cit.. p.22, p.36.
106. Indeed, although like many post-Adornian theorists he likes to mark a distance from Adorno’s 
account, Huyssen, it could be argued, goes much lurther than Adorno: a whole array ol terms tind 
themselves collapsed into a “secret bond” with an oppressive power.
107. See Fredric Jameson, Postm odernism , op. cit., p.30, p.44. Jameson builds this account out of 
Heidegger.
108. Ibid., pp.48-9.
109. Ibid., p.6, p.9, p. 12.
110. Foster. "Readings in Cultural Resistance”, op. cit.. p.168, p. 166.
111. Foster, “For a Concept of the Political in Contemporary Art”, op. cit., p.152.
own ideology”. 112 We must, he goes on, move from A dorno’s “negative com m itm ent” 
to a Gramscian “strategy of interference” if we are to retain a piactice of lesistance . 113 
A vant-gardism , then, m ust give up on transgressive p ra c tic e s^ 4 . its “aesthetic 
negations” - for “a practice of resistance or interference . ' 15
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A sim ilar conclusion, albeit from a position critical of postm odernism  and tiying to 
defend radical m odernism , is presented by Guilbaut. According to G uilbaut, today 
modern culture is being killed from the inside, through the very stiuctu te of post­
industrial society”. 116 "In fact” , he continues, it seems as though lesistance to 
dom inant culture must come, if it does at all, either from the fringes of high cultuie, oi, 
better still, from  outside, as Tom Crow has argued..., through short disiuption 
Here, we find ideas from Situationism as much as from the Frankfurt School. D eboid s 
theory of spectacle - which has also been widely adopted in such accounts of art - 
follows a similar direction to Adorno, and again on the basis of a reading of L ukacs.118
112. Foster, “Introduction”, Recodings, op. cit., p .5.
113. Sec Hal Foster. “Postmodernism: A Preface”, Postm odern Culture (1983 under a dilterent 
title), Pluto Press, 1985, p.xiv. This is a very particular reading o f Gramsci, who argued for a difference 
between “war o f  manoeuvre” and “war o f  position , that is, between, respectively, the outiight class 
confrontation o f  insurrection and the on-going skirmishes o f the non-revolutionary situation. Whereas 
for Gramsci a war o f position was conducted as a holding operation, awaiting that o l manoeuvre, his 
argument has subsequently been reduced to a reformist (anti-revolutionaiy) account by the communist 
parties. What Foster is voicing is a left edge of this, but overwritten with the arguments of, what he 
calls, “a postmodernism o f resistance” (p.x). See Antonio Gramsci, Selection from  Prison N otebooks of 
A ntonio G ram sc i, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, especially the section ol State and Civil Society , 
pp.229-9. In the context o f  post-war developm ents, what Foster articulates is somewhere between a 
radical postmodernism (what he intends) and the “historical com prom ise” o f  the Italian Communist 
Party (implicit in his logic, despite the rhetoric of activism). Foster’s adoption o f Gramsci here has 
som e ironic consequences (an observation for which I must thank Steve Edwards): Adorno s position is 
effectively presented <J$ the war of manoeuvre, or ss a revolutionary offensive! When Adorno is put in 
the position o f Lenin, alarms should ring.
114. Foster, “Introduction”, R ecodings , op. cit., p.7.
115. Foster, “For a Concept o f the Political in Contemporary Art”, op. cit., p. 148, p. 149.
116. Guilbaut, “The Relevence of Modernism”, op. cit., p.XV. A similar crisis to the one noted by 
Clement Greenberg in the 1940s was now current; but, Guilbaut argues, the danger had been "clearly 
visible" and came "from the outside" lor Greenberg.
117. Ibid.
118. See Guy Debord, Society o f  the Spectacle  (1967), Black & Red, 1983, unpaginated, all 
references are given by thesis number.
Arguing that while exchange-value arose on the back of use-value, Debord asserts that
exchange-value cam e to “ autonom ous dom ination” , and that use-value has a
“tendency... to fall” . The spectacle (like Adorno’s commodity) becomes “ the servant of
pseudo-use" , “exchange value has ended up by directing use”:119
In the inverted reality of the spectacle, use value (which was implicitly contained 
in exchange value) must now be explicitly proclaim ed precisely because its 
factual reality is eroded by the overdeveloped commodity economy and because 
counterfeit life requires pseudo-justification. 120
Debord, however, pulls short of Adorno’s conclusions, and seems to find some critical 
distance within theory, staying closer to Lukacs for his conclusions about the prospects 
for p ractice.121 It is, he argues (and maintaining some scope for Ideologiekritik), the 
task of critical/dialectical theory to break open the false reconciliations presented by the 
spectacle and to disrupt the language of domination with the language of contradiction 
and negation.122
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119. The spectacle is a version o f commodity fetishism which emphasises the image-form that this 
lakes: “not a collection o f im ages, but a social relation among people, mediated by im ages (ibid., 
thesis 4); or capital so accumulated that it becomes an image (thesis 34). Debord explicitly establishes 
the spectacle as similar to “a concrete manufacture of alienation" (thesis 32). It is, he suggests, a 
“negation of life” which appears as “affirmation”, but an affirmation ol mere appearance or “lalse  
reconciliation” (theses 10 & 29).
120. Ibid.. theses 46-9.
121. Debord wants such theory to move into practice; and not to stay within the remit ot cultural 
negation, but to becom e a real negation (ibid., theses 210-211). Jameson pulls Debord more iniclirection 
of Baudrillard (Jameson, Postm odernism , op. cit., p. 18). The conflation ot Baudrillard s "simulacrum  
with D ebord's "spectacle" is com m on, but mistaken. The accounts o f  Debord and Baudrillard weic 
distinguished in Johanna Drucker, “Simulation/Spectacle: B e y o n d B o u n d a r ies  of the Old Avant-Garde 
and Exhausted Modernism", paper presented at the Association o f Art Historians Annual Conference, 
Leeds. April 1992. See Jean Baudrillard, The M irror o f  P roduction  (1973), T elos Press, 1975. 
Baudrillard, without any o f the dialectical m oves of Adorno or Debord, also disputes the existence of 
use-value, which, he says, is treated as “a realm beyond political econom y” (p.23), an entity which 
retains “concrete positivity” (p.24), and which acts as an antecedent to the emergence o f exchange-value. 
According to Baudrillard, it is use-value which is "produced by the p lay o f  exchange value”: “Such is the 
twist by which exchange value retrospectively originates and logically terminates in use value. In other 
words, the signified ‘use value' here is still a code effect, the final precipitate o f  the law o f  value" 
(p.25). The same argument - which supports his rejection of the referent as an objective reality, and his 
advocation o f a world o f  self-referential signs, one o f the favoured themes o f contemporary art theory - is 
made for the role of concrete labour.
122. Dialectical theory, he argues, following a long tradition, rediscovers the fluidity and transience 
o f concepts that have becom e frozen; it displays its own "negative spirit”, both a consciousness of 
movement and the display o f  the traces marks o f this movement (Debord, op. cit., theses 204-206).
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IV. Autonomy As A Practice O f Negation Or Affirmation
The phrase “practice of negation” is also used specifically to describe Adorno’s strategy
against total reification. 123 This might be regarded as a sub-set of negation as resistance
to capitalism , but it is one of a very particular kind, predicated on the moves of the
d ia lectic  o f en ligh tenm ent (and, therefore, on argum ents w hich have already
com prom ised negation). The category of autonom y as a practice of negation, for
Adorno, has to be regarded as an outcome of the approaches already discussed. With
the force of critical reflection now in retreat, it must, for Adorno operate as a sort of
tacking m ovem ent tow ards, rather than as a revealer of, truth; or, as H ohendahl
describes A dorno’s position, critical reflection “can only hint at the tru th” . 124 i n as
much as critical thought (another practice of negativity) can be maintained in the face of
increasing one-dim ensionality or total reification, it lies within autonom ous art. 125
Adomo is quite definite on this point, and claims that only autonomous art - and not all
autonom ous art at that - can maintain this site for resistance. Only autonom ous ait is a
non-instrum entalised  practice; “art denounces repression” , he argues, and is a
“negation” of society. 126 This argument has to carefully handled, for, as Adorno puts it,
art has a “dual essence” : it is both “social fact” and “autonomy”.
Art, however, is not social only because it is brought about in such a way that it 
em bodies the dialectic of forces and relations of production. Nor is art social 
only because it derives its material content from society. Rather, it is social 
prim arily because it stands opposed to society.... This social deviance of art is 
the determinate negation of a determinate society.... Art will live on only as long 
as it has the power to resist society. If it refuses to objectify itself, it becomes a 
commodity. W hat it contributes to society is not some directly com m unicable 
content but something more mediate, i.e. resistance. 127
123. See Jochen Schulte-Sasse, op. cit.
124. Hohendahl, op. cit., p.8.
125. If the Young Hegelians emphasised negation as active critical thought, there is, in Adorno, a 
m ove back, with action becoming more and more remote, and even critical thought at risk.
126. Adorno. Aesthetic Theory , op. cit., p.72. Not all autonomous art succeeds in maintaining this 
resistance, and, for Adorno, autonomous art is in a constant tension on the edge o f  losing this mimetic 
elem ent. Even those practices which he approves of - such as Schonberg’s - are subjected to forceful 
criticism. See Theodor W. Adomo, Philosophy o f  Modern Music (1948), Sheed & Ward, 1987.
127. A esthetic Theory, op. cit., p.321; cf. pp.358-9.
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“ Autonomous works of art... firmly negate empirical reality, destroy the destroyer, that 
which m erely ex ists...” 128 . they are, to reiterate, “the determ inate negation o f a 
determ inate society” . “The imagination of the artist is not a creation ex nihilp ; only 
dilettanti and aesthetes believe it to be so”, rather art works “ react against em pirical 
reality” and obey its forces; and abstraction in art - Adorno has Beckett in mind - “is a 
reflex response to the abstraction of the law which objectively dominates society” . 129 
To put it another way, Adorno values “the distance between the work of art and real 
life”, and rejects the “false immediacy” of commercialisation and kitsch. 130 Adorno was 
especially critical o f B recht’s practice on this point. For Adorno, B rech t’s plays, in 
trying to move closer to a social reality, “had to move farther and farther away”. 131 And 
in response to the debate on committed versus autonomous literature, Adorno argues: 
“Once the life of the mind renounces the duty and liberty of its own objectification, it 
has abdicated. Thereafter, works of art merely assim ilate them selves to the brute 
existence against which they protest”. i32 The mind, he concludes, “ m ust go where it 
need not degrade itse lf’: “This is not a time for political art, but politics has migrated 
into autonom ous art, and now here more so than where it seems to be politically 
dead”. i33
In A dorno’s account, then, the loss of the power of radical negativity at the wider social 
level of the totally adm inistered world - the dem ise of its em ancipatory force - is 
paralleled by its increased im portance at the centre o f the aesthetic and o f advanced 
modern (autonomous) art practice. Even here problems continue to mount, and become 
more and more exacerbated. Of Schonberg, for instance, Adorno remarks: “The material
128. Theodor Adorno, “Commitment” (1965), in Aesthetics and P o litics , op. cit.. p.190.
129. Ibid.
130. A esthetic Theory, op. cit., p.359.
131. Ibid., p .322.
132. “Commitment”, op. cit., pp. 177-8.
133. Ibid., p. 194.
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transform ation of those elem ents responsible for expression in m usic... has today 
become so radical that the possibility of expression itself comes into question”.134 
This displacem ent of the force of negativity may seem to represent a loss - the scope or 
range of effectivity seem somewhat marginal next to the em ancipatory ideals of the 
Manifesto of Marx and Engels - but, for Adorno, facing his totally administered world, 
this was the only locus of hope: art’s modernity, he noted, “lies in its mimetic relation to 
a petrified and alienated reality”. 135 The impact of this is considerable. As Jameson puts 
it:
No theory of cultural politics current on the left today has been able to do 
without one notion or another of a certain minimal aesthetic distance, of the 
possibility of the positioning of the cultural act outside the m assive Being of 
capital, from  which to assault this last.136
Hal Foster goes even further, arguing that even this mom ent of negation in A dorno’s 
autonom ous art has passed: “this aesthetic space too is eclipsed”, he warns, and any 
remaining “criticality is now largely illusory (and so instrumental)” .137
A dorno’s em phasis on autonom y was shared with Clem ent G reenberg - who is 
foregrounded m ore in art history and criticism  - although the social loading of 
G reenberg’s category has been disputed.138 The later Greenberg is often contrasted to 
the earlier one: social readings, commitments to socialism, and dialectical formulations,
134. Adorno, The Philosophy o f  Modern M usic , op. cit., p. 19.
135. A esthetic Theory , op. cit., p.31. It is important to recognise that negativity has not moved  
from the “social" to the “aesthetic”, for the latter is itself rendered a social category by Adorno, and as 
such it takes on a significance o f immense proportions. Commentators such as Schulte-Sasse lend to 
em phasise - not without justification - the pessimistic caste in Adorno’s aesthetics. In Adorno’s totally 
administered world, resistance must hibernate in autonomous art; that is, art is the negation o f  society, 
and negation must hold out in the moment o f mimesis. The danger with these views is that they tend to 
collapse what Adorno says into an account o f  art as absolu tely  asocial. Adorno, however, has a more 
com plex picture of negations.
136. Jameson, Postm odernism , op. cit., p.48.
137. Foster, “Postmodernism: A Preface”, op. cit., p.xiii.
138. See Peter Osborne, “Modernism, Abstraction and the Return o f  Painting”, Thinking A rt: 
B eyond Traditional A esthetics , eds. Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne, Institute o f Contemporary 
Arts, 1991, pp.59-79; Steve Edwards, "Kitsch and Avant-Garde”, Open University A 316, Modern Art: 
Practices and D ebates, Radiovision Broadcast 7, Radio 5, 1993.
giving way to narrower schema in support of Cold W ar US ideology; from the cultural 
pessim ism  o f “ Eliotic Trotskyism ” to the optim ism  based on the rising post-w ar 
cultural, middle-class e lite .139 Greenberg’s trajectory is, on such political points, more 
extrem e than A dorno’s infamous criticisms of the student unrest of ’68; his philosophy 
is less programmatic; and his work, as a critic, pitches more into the particularities of art 
works. Moreover, and in contrast to Adorno, Greenberg would seem to have produced 
an affirm ative account of art: “ Aesthetic judgm ents are given and contained in the 
im m ediate experience of art” as he wrote in “Complaints of an Art C ritic” in 1967.140 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify dialectical figures - and, indeed, negation - in his 
approach.
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Serge Guilbaut, for instance, notes G reenberg’s insistence on “the need for m odernist
resistance to and negation o f the integrating positivism of consum erist society” in the
1940s.141 In one o f those infamous passages - this one from 1949 - edited out of Art
and Culture in 1961, Greenberg puts forward the concept of “dialectical conversion”:
The process by which cubism , in pushing naturalism to its ultimate limits and 
over-em phasizing modeling - which is perhaps the most im portant m eans of 
naturalism in painting - arrived at the antithesis of naturalism, flat abstract art,
139. See, for example: Donald Kuspit, Clement Greenberg: Art C ritic , University o f W isconsin  
Press, 1979; Serge Guilbaut, “New Adventures o f the Avant-Garde in America. Greenberg, Pollock, or 
from Trotskyism to the New Liberalism o f the ‘Vital Center’”, in P ollock and After, op. cit., pp. 153- 
166: Fred Orton and Griselda Pollock, ‘‘Avant-Gardes and Partisans R eview ed”. A rt H istory, vo l.4 , 
no.3, September 1981, pp.305-327: T.J. Clark, “More on the Differences Between Comrade Greenberg 
and Ourselves” (1981), in M odernism  and M odernity , op. cit. pp. 169-87, a later version o f  this can be 
found as “Clem ent Greenberg's Theory of Art”, in Pollock and A fter, op. cit., pp.47-63; Serge 
Guilbaut, H ow N ew  York Stole the Idea o f  Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom  and the C old  
W ar, University of Chicago Press, 1983: John O ’Brian, ed., “Introduction”, Clem ent Greenberg. The 
C ollected  Essays and Criticism. V o l .l: Perceptions and Judgments. 1939-1944, University o f  Chicago 
Pi 'ess, 1986, pp.xvii-xxv. and "Introduction”, Clement Greenberg. The C ollected Essays and Criticism. 
Vol.3: Affirm ations and Refusals, 1950-56 , University o f  Chicago Press, 1993. For a perspective 
which celebrates the later work o f Greenberg, see Thierry de Duve, Clem ent G reenberg Between the 
L ines, Dis Voir, 1996.
140. Clement Greenberg, “Complaints o f an Art Critic” (1967), Clement Greenberg. C ollected  
E ssays and Criticism . Vol. 4: M odernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969, The University o f  Chicago 
Press, 1993. p.265.
141. Guilbaut, “The Relevance o f Modernism”, op. cit., p.XIII.
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might be considered a case of “dialectical c o n v e r s io n ” . 142 
And in 1946 he explicitly  states that “it is one of the functions of art to keep 
contradictions in suspension, u n r e s o lv e d ” . 143 This contrasts with later statements, this 
one from 1964: “Contradictory impulses are at work, and the triumph of art lies - as 
always - in their reconciliation”. 144 The shift from an account which privileges open 
dialectical tension - or negative moment - to a culturally affirmative one would seem, at 
first sight, to be sustained in the classic work of late G reenberg. “ Nothing could be 
further from the authentic art of our time than the idea of a rupture of continuity” , he 
wrote in the early ’60s, disputing the idea that Modernism was a break with tradition; 145 
“ M odernist art would be im possible” without the continuity with the past and its 
standards. >46 M odernism  proceeded, he argued, through im m anent criticism , self- 
criticism  and reflection on its own foundations; a tendency which has been subject to 
“ in tensifica tion” and “exacerbation”, and which has sought “ to entrench it [the 
discipline] more firmly in its area of competence”, to the point where each art’s “proper 
area of com petence” displayed what was “unique and irreducible” , and was “ more 
conscious of itself” . 147 The drive to autonomy, then, served to preserve quality in art, a
142. Clement Greenberg, “The Role o f Nature in Modern Painting” (1949). Clement Greenberg. 
C o llec ted  E ssays and Criticism . V o l.l: Arrogant Purpose, 1945-1949, The University o f  Chicago  
Press, 1986, p.273. This idea o f “dialectical conversion” may be compared to Engels' second law of  
diaelctics: "the interpenetration o f opposites”. See Engels, D ialectics o f  Nature, op. cit., p.62.
143. Clement Greenberg, “The Impressionists and Proust: Review o f Proust and Painting  by Morris 
Chernowitz” (1946), Clement Greenberg. Collected Essays and Criticism. Vol.2: Arrogant Purpose, 
1945-1949 , op. cit., p.96.
144. “David Smith’s New Sculpture” (1964), Clement Greenberg. C ollected Essays and Criticism. 
Vol.4 . op. cit., p. 191. These points are raised by Kuspit. Kuspit insists that Greenbergian autonomy 
treats art's connection with society as indirect and mediated, rather than as direct and immediate (Kuspit, 
op. cit., p.39). He writes that Greenberg presents a tension between the disunity (or discontinuity) o f  
life - its atomisation, chaos and irrationality - and aesthetic unity (or fiction o f unity). “As unity 
becom es harder to realize in practice, it becomes more crucial to comprehend and imagine in theory, for 
it remains essential to life" (p.39). Accordingly, art can “displace the problem o f the reconciliation of 
opposites from the realm o f life to that o f the medium” (p.42) - but whereas life, or politics, must 
address such questions directly, art can only work at a distance, as autonomous.
145. Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting” (1960), Clement G reenberg. C ollected  E ssays and  
C riticism . V ol.4 , op. cit., p.93.
146. This is the phrase used in the 1965 version, reprinted in Art in Theory, op. cit., p .760. In the 
1960 version this reads: "Modernist art would lack both substance and justification”. See C lem ent 
Greenberg. C ollected Essays and Criticism. Vol.4, op. cit.
147. Ibid., pp.85-89.
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quality which Greenberg considered to be under threat.
This approach, how ever, is not unilaterally affirm ative. In “Com plaints of an Art 
Critic” , Greenberg supports the necessity of the violation of the ideas so long as quality 
is maintained. Furthermore, the status of the self-critical tendency is questionable, and 
can be read as a process of internal self-negation. 148 Moreover, the point, in “M odernist 
Painting”, about the self-critical process reaching “almost” the point of “exacerbation” is 
interesting. 149 Greenberg insists on the importance of a “dialectical tension” - or at least 
he does in the 1965 version I50 -between the picture as illusion and the “ integrity of the 
picture plane” 151 - a tension which he presents as the condition of art in general, 
including M odernism , where the terms are not eradicated but reverse their priority. 
Abstraction, he insists, is not the result of purging painting of representation per se, but 
o f the purging o f the three-dim ensional, sculptural illusion that it traditionally  
suggests.*52 Attention to the picture plane, then, does not result in “absolute flatness” - 
an impossibility once the first mark of charcoal or paint invades and destroys its “ literal 
or utter flatness” - but in the supplanting of sculptural illusion with optical illusion. 153 if
148. Greenberg associates immanent criticism with Kant, and many commentators have follow ed  
this line o f  thought. The Enlightenment introduced such criticism, Greenberg argues, but it proceeded  
from the outside, whereas Modernism’s criticism came from inside, “through the procedures themselves 
o f  that which is being criticized” (ibid., p.85). N icolas Calas, however, suggested that Greenberg was 
less Kantian than Hegelian, and that the sell-critical process paralleled H egel’s passages on self- 
consciousness (see Kuspit, op. cit.. p. 18). See also Stephen M elville, “A spects”, Reconsidering the 
O bject o f  Art 1965-75, MIT, 1996, pp.228-245. ll is difficult to judge this, for in 1944, in "Abstract 
Art”, Greenberg presented specialisation as counter to Hegelian “world system s”. See C lem en t 
G reenberg. C ollected  E ssays and Criticism. Vol. 1. op. cit., p.201.
149. A sense o f  some sort o f crisis is intimated in his worries about the designation "formalist”, in 
“Complaints o f  an Art Critic" (although his terms run close to advocating the ineffability o f  art): "ll 
assum es that “form” and “content” in art can be adequately distinguished for the purposes o f  discourse. 
This im plies in turn that discursive thought has solved just those problem s o f  art upon whose 
im perviousness to discursive thinking the very possibility o f  art depends.” See Clement Greenberg. 
C ollec ted  E ssays and Criticism . Vol.4, op. cit., p.269.
150. See Art in Theory, op. cit., p.756.
151. Clement G reenberg. Collected Essays and Criticism. Vol.4, op. cit., p.87.
152. However, in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch" he equates abstraction with the “non-representational”. 
See Clem ent Greenberg. C ollected Essays and Criticism. V o l.l, op. cit., p.9.
153. In the 1965 version o f  “Modernist Painting”, there is an interesting shift in phraseology, and 
an interesting duplicity in the performance of the word “utter”: “absolute flatness” becom es “utter 
flatness", and "literal and utter flatness” becomes "virtual flatness”. See Art in Theory, op. cit., p.90.
“flatness” is central to the Greenbergian account, it must, nevertheless, m aintain some 
resistance unless it is to lapse into decoration. 154 Similarly, while G reenberg sees the 
increasing self-consciousness of art as an increasing attention to norms and conventions
- rather than as a release or, as he puts it in 1965, a “ liberation” from  them  -155 
Modernist art, he insists with Mondrian in mind, walks the line between “ the danger of 
arbitrariness” , in the absence of a model in nature”, and the danger of becom ing “ too 
disciplined”.156
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V. Atrophy & Ends
A ccounts of autonomy in both Greenberg and Adorno are seen to lead into atrophy or 
aporia, or, at least, their accounts are seen to hover on the verge of this. Biirger, 
remarking on Adorno’s aesthetics of radical autonomy, refers to “the danger of semantic 
a t r o p h y ” . 157 This danger, for Adorno, was precisely the point, and he too warns of it,
154. Elsewhere he writes o f  sharpening "the problem by increasing the tension between decorative 
means and nondecorative ends". See “Milton Avery”, Clem ent G reenberg. C o llec ted  E ssays and  
C ritic ism . V ol.4 , op. cit., p.43. Modern art, in this sense, puts more em phasis on tension than 
pictorial unity, a tension produced by. as Kuspit puts it, “a compulsion to wholeness which conceives 
o f it but cannot experience it” (Kuspit, op. cit., pp.44-5). He further argues that Greenberg's notion of 
“purity” is a historical tendency o f the modern period, but an unattainable one (p.46) - a process o f  
tension, not its resolution (p.49). To collapse the distance between art and life would threaten the 
“particular experience o f life 's disequilibrium” and the “personal experience o f a particular medium” 
(p.81). The loss o f this distance results, for Greenberg, in kitsch or baroque. Abstraction is not, then, 
the telos o f art in general, but the best o f “the general end o f art” in the modern world (p.97). If art 
follow s the line o f Platonic unity and form, it risks conventionalism and becoming design; if  it allows 
itself to sink into irrationality, it risks destroying its roots and becoming arbitrary and chaotic (pp. 109- 
110). Further to this - and suggesting more o f that exacerbation - Kuspit argues, there is a constant 
danger that: “A mechanical tension replaces a dialectical one. The art acquires a Platonic intelligibility; 
its unity is no longer lived, but has becom e the dead letter o f an idea o f unity.... As such, it becomes 
m eaningless as art, i.e., as a dialectical transformation o f  a resistant life content... It becom es an 
ornamental excrescence rather than an articulate tension... decadent” (pp.68-9).
155. Art in Theory, op. cit., p.758.
156. Clem ent G reenberg. C ollected  Essays and Criticism . V ol.4 , op. cit., p .65. In the 1965 
version, Greenberg adds: “the danger o f o f arbitrariness in the absence o f  a model in nature” (A rt in 
Theory, op. cit., p.758). A similar point is made in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch”: the “aesthetic validity” 
o f  abstraction, Greenberg argues, “cannot be arbitrary or accidental, but must stem from obedience to 
som e worthy constraint or original”. Clement Greenberg. C ollected  Essays and Criticism . Vol. / , op. 
cit., p.9.
157. Peter Burger, “The Significance of the Avant-Garde for Contemporary Aesthetics: A Reply to 
Jurgen Habermas”, N ew  German Critique 22, Winter 1981, p.21.
but suggested that there was no way out of facing the risk without at the same time 
becom ing com placent to the situation that had generated the need for autonomy in the 
first place. W orking at the edge of this tension, always hovering on the verge o f total 
irrelevance or meaningless, was, for Adorno the modus operandi of the best modern art. 
Even the best could fail, cutting short this extremely exacerbated dialectic, or finding its 
attenuated dynamic extracted and itself reduced to “dialectics at a standstill” . 158
Similarly, critiques of Greenbergian Modernism argue that his account, in “ M odernist 
Painting”, however triumphant, posits a logic which suggests a reduction or purification 
that m ight reach some end, or some moment so emptied of “extraneous” material, so 
attentive to its own specificity, that it dissolves in solipsistic vacuity. Greenberg him self 
always resisted this account which seemed to “stop” with the blank or the monochrome 
canvas, and denied any a priori logic in his work which might produce it (except for, 
perhaps, the dem and for quality). Nevertheless it has been an em phasis suggested by 
Clark, and charted by de Duve and Bois, for example. 159 In addition, argum ents for an 
end of m odernism  have been posited on the need to leap out of this logic. These 
arguments were bound up with the emergence (and success) of practices which fail to fit 
the criteria of Greenbergian painting, and which, in some cases, explicitly pitched back 
into social and political issues.160 As John O ’Brian has remarked, the codification and 
popularisation of Greenberg’s own position occurred at the very moment that its validity 
seemed to dissolve - whether by its own hand, or by external activity is a m atter for
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158. See, lor exam ple Adorno’s comments on Schonberg, in Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy o f  
M odern M usic , op. cit., pp. 123-4. The figure of “dialecics at a standstill”, as wc will see in Chapter 3, 
is also prominent in the work o f  Walter Benjamin.
159. See, for example, T.J. Clark, “Clement Greenberg’s Theory o f Art”, op. cit.; Thierry de Duve, 
“The Monochrome and the Blank Canvas" in Reconstructing M odernism: Art in New York, Paris and 
M ontreal 1945-64, cd. Serge Guilbaut, MIT, 1990, pp.244-310; Yve-Alain Bois, "Ryman's Tact”, op. 
cit.
160. Cf. Burger’s comment that Adorno’s account o f modernist aporia at the lim its o f  advanced 
material "fell apart and was replaced by a broad and many-faceted spectrum o f possible materials”. See 
Isabelle Graw, "Interview with Peter Burger”, op. cit., p.65.
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some debate.161
The idea of the “end o f art” has a further range of readings, em bracing not only high 
M odernist painting, but also the avant-gardist type practices of which G reenberg and 
Adorno were always sceptical.162 As we have seen, the end of avant-gardism is usually 
based on an argum ent about the loss of the power of negativity (as resistance) in the 
(post)m odern world. However, other accounts of this process can be made. Matei 
Calinescu (1977) remarks that “ait itse lf’ was “the first victim” of “artistic negativism” - 
“ universal and hysterical negation” .163 Hugo Ball had said that the D adaist “suffers 
from  dissonances to the point of self-destruction” . 164 Som ewhat rem iniscent of the 
D adaist theme of negation all the way to self-destruction, Rosenberg observed of the 
avant-garde that “having cancelled or submerged traditional modes of art, the new has 
reached the point of cancelling its e lf ’. 165 Poggioli indexes the m atter som ew hat 
differently, and describes the relation between artists and society - the “purely negative 
function” of alienation - as “reciprocally destructive” , and in “a continual process of 
disintegration”.166 Paraphrasing Marx, Poggioli identifies a dialectic shaped by “ social
161. John O ’Brian, "Introduction”, Clement Greenberg. The C ollected Essays and Criticism . Vol.3. 
Affirmations and Refusals, 1950-1956. University o f Chicago Press, 1995, p.xix.
162. The source o f  the idea o f the “end o f art" is in G.W.F. Hegel, Aestheics. Lectures on Fine A rt, 
trails. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1975. Hegel describes “the culmination o f  the romantic” 
form o f  art where “art annuls itse lf' (p.529). For a commentary, see Lucian Krukowski, “H egel, 
‘Progress’, and the End o f the Avant-Garde”, The Journal o f  Aesthetics and Art C ritic ism , vol.44. 
Spring 1986, pp.279-90.
163. Cited Huyssen, “The Search for Tradition”, op. cit., p.26.
164. See Ball, in Art in T h eo ry , op. cit., p.246. See also Hiilsenbeck: “Dada foresees its end and 
laughs. Death is a thoroughly Dadaist business, in that it signifies nothing at all. Dada has the right to 
dissolve itself and will exert this right when the time com es” (Hiilsenbeck, in ibid., p.259).
165. Harold Rosenberg, “Keeping Up”, The De-Definition o f  Art, op. cit., p.223.
166. Poggioli, op. cit., p. 118. P oggioli’s fourth and last sub-section o f  avant-gardism, Agonism , is 
typified by self-im molation. He sees this as a continuation of the romantic cult o f death and agony, but 
taking a more exacerbated form: sinking from tragedy to pathos, placing creativity into permanent crisis 
and under the threat of constant failure: “... sacrifice and consecration: an hyperbolic passion, a bow bent 
toward the impossible, a paradoxical and positive form of spiritual defeatism” (p.66). Poggioli describes 
a still more pathos-ridden and passive form o f Agonism with a Dionysian edge - “Decadence” - which is 
highly conscious o f itse lf as “last” and "resigns itself to awaiting... [the future] passively, with 
anguished fatality and inert anxiety” (p.75).
degeneration, an ineluctable crisis of society at once unable to die or to renew i t s e l f 167 
Sim ilarly, Debord refers to an “ever more individualized art of negation perpetually 
renewing itself to the point of the fragmentation and complete negation of the artistic 
sphere” . 168
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However, far from being the negation of avant-gardism in general, Poggioli insists that 
the crisis is the negation of particular avant-gardes by another. It is, he argues, a 
“ mutation, not a negation” of the avant-garde itself, a process whereby the avant-garde 
“ transform s itself... into its own opposite” . I69 W hat appears to us as its “crisis” or 
“overcom ing” of the avant-garde is, for Poggioli, the moment of its generalisation, its 
transformation from “the epidemic stage into the endemic and chronic” ; “a defeat in the 
letter and a victory in the spirit of avant-gardism”. i70 Burger also presents the “failure” 
o f the historical avant-garde as a m atter of success through the generalisation of its 
resources. He claims that the avant-garde marked the emergence of consciousness, and 
a moment of generalisation of the categories of artistic modernism. Thus categories like 
estrangem ent, defam iliarisation, allegorisation and m ontage becom e available as 
languages and resources of expression; and the consciousness that art could be more 
than its reified self is raised, and: i7i “the claim formulated by avant-garde movements to 
abolish the separation of art and life, although it failed, continues as before to define the 
situation of today’s art”. 172 In contrast to Poggioli, who emphasises that this situation is
167. Ibid.. p. 109. He also cites Caudwell on the dissolution o f  social values under capitalism, 
reducing activity to private phantasy, and entrapping the artwork between commercial vulgarisation and 
hypostatisation (p.64).
168. Debord, op. cit., thesis 189.
169. Poggioli, op. cit., p.223.
170. Ibid., p.224. p.223. Cf. Rosenberg, who, casting a sceptical eye over the crisis, remarked: 
“Painting divided by zero has, however, proved to equal infinity: art might be com ing to an end but 
there has been no end to anti-art". Harold Rosenberg, “Confrontation”, The D e-Definition o f  A rt, op. 
cit., pp.203-4.
171. O f montage, Burger notes (after Adorno) that it was “the negation of synthesis as a negation of 
meaning”; but he adds the rider that "even the withholding o f meaning is a positing o f it". See Theory 
o f  the A vant-G arde, op. cit., p.79.
172. Peter Biirger, “The Decline o f  the Modern A ge”, Telos 62, Winter 1984/5, p. 130.
“not a negation”, the process of generalisation can be seen as negation’s work, or as the 
work of, what we might call, a “vanishing mediator” .!73
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However, Burger also points to some crises at the heart of the crisis. It is, he argues,
“ the end of art” if the gap between art and life praxis remains (the prospects of atrophy,
etc.), but it is also the end of art if that gap is erased.174
... the avant-gardiste’s attempt to reintegrate art into the life process is itself a 
profoundly contradictory endeavour. For the (relative) freedom of art vis-a-vis 
the praxis of life is at the same time the condition that must be fulfilled if there is 
to be a critical cognition of reality. An art no longer distinct from  the praxis of 
life but wholly absorbed in it will lose the capacity to criticize it, along with its 
d istance.175
173. See Slavoj Zizek. "Why Should a Dialectician Learn to Count to Four” , Radical Philosophy, 
no.58.. Summer 1991, pp.3-9. The vanishing mediator is, prior to its vanishing, a concrete historical 
entity whose very success and universalisation effectively transforms it into pure content, allowing it to 
lose its form. Subsequently the whole episode of its existence is seen as one ol excess, an aberration on 
the face o f  history. The classic example is the Jacobins, who, according to this argument, are seen not 
as utopian-terrorists who naively tried to enforce democratic ideals on those who would prefer more 
gradualist m ethods, but as an absolutely necessary force - in the passage from ancien reg im e  to 
bourgeois life - who “vanished not because of their weakness but because ol their very success (p.8); 
we are, Zizek notes, “Jacobins without Jacobinical form". The argument is specilically  articulated 
around the role o f negation. Zizek notes that there are two readings - (i) the dialectical triad and its 
excess; (ii) a four-stage dialectical movement - and that, he insists, what is at stake is the veiy  status ol 
social antagonism viz. negativity” (p.8): "Is the emergence ol negativity in the social space a mere 
intermediary in the passage from one to another form o f positivity, the "exception that characterises the 
transition from one to another “normalcy", or is this very "normalcy nothing but the attermath, the 
“gentrification” o f  a forgotten excess ot negativity? (p.8). According to Zizek s reading ol Hegel, the 
moment o f  negation in the dialectic can be seen as double:
... as soon as we add to the immediate its negation [self-relating, inner negativity], this 
negation reuoactively changes the meaning ol immediacy, so  we must count to three, although 
what we effectively have are just two elements. Or, if we envisage the com plete cycle o l  the 
dialectical process, there are just three “positive" moments to count over (the im mediacy, its 
mediation and the final return to the mediated immediacy). What we lose is the unfathomable 
surplus o f  the pure difference which "counts for nothing” although it makes the entire process 
go, this "void o f  the substance" which is at the same time the “receptacle ( Rezeptakulum ) lor 
all and everything”, as Hegel put it. (p.4)
On vanishing mediators see also Fredric Jameson, “The Vanishing Mediator; or. Max W eber as 
Storyteller”, The Ideologies o f  Theory. Essays 1971-1986. Volume 2: Syntax o f  H istory, Routledge, 
1988, pp.3-34; Slavoj Zizek, "The Subject as “Vanishing Mediator””, Tarrying with the N egative. 
Kant, H egel, and the Critique o f  Ideology, Duke University Press, 1993. pp.33-5. For a similar figure 
of excess, although conceived as trying to outmanoeuvre the Hegelian dialectic and its figures, see 
Jacques Derrida’s differance. As Alan Bass notes it is "the excess of the trace Aufhehung itself - that is 
precisely what the Aufhebung can never aufheben: lift up, conserve, and negate” (translator’s note in 
Derrida’s M argins o f  Philosophy, University of Chicago Press. 1982, p.20).
174. Burger. "The Decline o f  the Modern Age”, op. cit., p. 130.
175. Theory o f  the Avant-G arde, op. cit., p.50.
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This “critical distance” draws attention to a non-identity that allows critical reflection 
across the gap separating thought from being, and returns us to earlier points raised by 
Adorno. This, in turn, is presented as a capacity to make a social critique, to be able to 
turn back on the conditions of reification and take a stand against t h e m .  176 in Aesthetic 
Theory, Adorno argues a point that goes beyond the relatively local claim s concerning 
20c. modernist art:
The so-called crisis of art, which seems to be a completely new quality of very 
recent origin, is in fact as old as the concept of art itself.... Art cannot live up to 
its concept, i77
In A dorno’s thought, this crisis has been im m anent to art since its first mom ent, since 
the emergence of the distinction of subject and object, and the opening of the dialectics 
of mim esis and rationality that is intrinsic to art” . 178 The subject/object distinction is 
usually seen as a split which represents the fall from  grace, a loss o f one-ness or 
harmony with God, or “alienation” in its pre-M arxist sense. I79 For Adorno, how ever, 
this is not so m uch a “loss” - a Fall - as the gain of the first mom ent of hum anity, the 
mom ent of hum anity’s very consciousness of its separation from nature, the process of 
m an’s em ancipation from  his fear of the om nipotent oneness and hom ogeneity ot 
nature” and “ im m ediate existence”. 18° This is, then, a necessary “ alienation” , a 
separation or gap or split through which human consciousness can em erge as 
consciousness of itself. This moment, for Adorno - which sees the onset of the dialectic
176. Adorno describes a related problem this way: “Each o f the two alternatives [committed and 
autonomous art] negates itself with the other. Committed art, necessarily detached as ait from leality, 
cancels the distance between the two. ‘Art for art’s sake' denies by its absolute claim s that ineradicable 
connection with reality which is the polemical a priori o f the attempt to make ait autonomous from the 
real. Between these two poles the tension in which art has lived in every age till now is dissolved". See 
“Comm itment”, op. cit., p. 178.
177. Adorno, A esthetic Theory, op. cit., p.80.
178. Ibid.
179. This recalls the discussion o f identity and non-identity earlier, and that of objectification, 
although Adorno is describing a fundamental philosophical point, rather than - as Marx did - the 
objectification o f labour - Adorno's account o f art as objectified process seem s to be the nearest he gets 
(see ibid., p.250-1), but again the criteria o f the discussion are different. In the end, Adorno’s argument 
does not distinguish alienation from objectification, but charts an on-going dialectic o f  reification and 
necessary non-identity at play ever since the moment of subject/object distinction.
180. Ibid.. p.76.
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of mimesis and rationality - provides art not ju st with the crisis of its concept but also, 
as we encountered earlier, with the potential to resist the reified w orld.181
Hohendahl notes that A dorno’s concept of autonomy “can only hint at the truth in the 
form of mimesis” .182 This mimetic element intimates the centrality of the role of art for 
A dorno, although art and aesthetics do not exhaust m im esis’ range of functions. 
Mimesis, it should be noted, is described by Adorno as “ the non-conceptual affinity of a 
subjective creation with its objective and unposited other” - it is itself based on 
negativity and is “a paradigm  of non-identity” . 183 M imetic activity, in its Adornian 
sense, is an active transformation of its object.184 M imesis, then, is at the root o f the
181. Originating in prim itive magic and its imitations of nature, m im esis survived the rise ol 
rationality, “ the organizing and unity-constitutive m om ent’ (ibid., p .81). Rationality, for Adorno, 
ushers in the human subject’s “nascent sense ol freedom (p.70) from myth, nature, and archaic 
unfreedom” (p.98). Rationality dem ystifies the enchantment represented by the archaic, and maintained 
in the mimetic faculty, and also ushers the technologicisation ol the world. However, this increasing 
rationalisation and instrumentality (which escalate in the modern era) lail to realise the freedom they 
promised: "rationality has yet to becom e rational” (p.95). Indeed, for Adorno, enlightenment unrealised 
tends to myth, reason tends to unreason, and so rationality tends to hypostatisation: ...modern art seeks 
to obviate the magical com m odity fetishism o f the disenchanted world by means ol its own magical 
moment, which is blackness” (p.86). Adorno distinguishes this dialectic from, what he considers to be, 
Benjamin's tendency to dichotomise in the latter's treatment of auratic and mass produced ait (pp.82-3). 
“Art is a refuge for mimetic behaviour" (p.79) yet simultaneously shares in rationality and the denial ol 
m im esis, for it is a constant, and irreconcilable, dialectic o f mimesis and rationality. Thus art is neither 
nature nor intellect; and while it must neither relapse back into magic, nor surrender to the world s 
increasing rationalisation, it is nevertheless caught within these possibilities.
What mimetic behaviour responds to is the telos o f cognition, which it sim ultaneously hinders 
through its categories. Ai t expands cognition into an area where it was said to be non-existent. 
In doing so, art undermines its uniqueness and univocality vis-a-vis knowledge. Since magic, 
which is being secularized by art, refuses in effect to go along, whereas the magic essence in 
the framework o f secularization deteriorates into a mythological residue called superstition, ait 
is threatened with destruction (p.80).
182. Hohendahl, op. cit., p.8.
183. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory , op. cit., p.80. Martin Jay describes m im esis as “a human ability to 
respond affirmatively to form” (Martin Jay, A dorno, Fontana, 1984, p .157). We must be careful to 
understand this well; Adorno argues that "... in their antithetical opposition man and nature are 
dependent on each other: nature on the experience o f  a mediated and objectified world, art on nature 
which is the mediated plenipotentiary o f immediacy”. See Aesthetic Theory, op. cit.. p.91.
184. As Buck-M orss puts it. m imesis is where: “The subject yielded to the objects, yet it did not 
leave them unchanged. Instead of being merely duplicated in thought, they were transformed within a 
verbal representation” (Buck-M orss, op. cit.. pp.86-7). M im esis, then, is not reducible to imitation, 
unless one understands that as an activity o f identification across the gap of non-identity (Peter Burger, 
“Aporias o f Modern Aesthetics”, in Thinking Art: Beyond Traditional A esthetics, op. cit.). Cf. Adorno: 
“Art’s separation from nature can be undone, but only in virtue o f this sepaiation (Aesthetic Theoiy, 
op. cit., p.80). Adorno notes that “even the rejection of m imesis... is m im etic”. See Theodor Adorno,
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tension of identity and non-identity, and of Adorno’s argument that art is both social and
yet also irreducible to the social. So although Adorno sees “ natural beauty” as an
ideological presentation of “mediateness in the guise of im m e d ia c y ” , >85 he insists that:
The image of nature survives because its complete negation by artefacts would 
necessarily involve closing one’s eyes to the possibility of a sphere beyond 
bourgeois work and commodity relations. In spite of its social mediateness, the 
beautiful in nature remains an allegory of that beyond. i86
Debord captures something of the same dialectical tension, and a sim ilar focus on a
“ beyond”. Charting an “art of negation” - an art for “a world which [since the baroque]
has lost its centre” - he claims that:
As a negative m ovem ent which seeks the supersession of art in a historical 
society where history is not yet lived, art in the epoch of its dissolution is 
simultaneously an art of change and the pure expression of impossible change. 
The more grandiose its reach, the more its true realization is beyond it. This art 
is perforce avant-garde, and it is not. Its avant-garde is its d i s a p p e a r a n c e . '87
O f Adorno and Horkheimer, Benhabib remarks:
The flight of critique from the immanent em ancipatory ideals of socially and 
historically situated agents to the esoteric heights of absolute spirit means 
nothing less than that the fate of m odernity can only be overcom e by its 
transfiguration. If social rationalization destroys the possibility of exercising 
freedom and if cultural rationalization destroys the desire for freedom, then no 
less than an apocalyptic reversal of the fate of the m oderns and a break in the 
continuum  of history can initiate the em ancipatory dynam ic. Critical theory 
becomes the messenger of the apocalypse, i88
This need for “an apocalyptic reversal” , with its quasi messianic tones, is produced as a
necessity out of their dialectic of enlightenment. Having virtually written-off negation, it
now returns with a vengeance: the demise of “ practices o f negativity” (as political
radicalism, critical distance, dealienation, non-identity thinking) having held out in a
Minima M oralia. Reflections from  D am aged Life (1951), New Left Books/Verso, 1974, p. 145.
185. Adom o, Aesthetic Theory, op. cit., p. 101. Cf. idealism ’s view, which A dom o characterises as 
“an act o f  usurpation by a subject reducing unconstrained, qualitatively different entities to mere 
materials and indeterminate potentials in order to dispose o f  them, whereas a truly dialectical concept 
would retain them" (p.92). Cf. Benjamin position on the neo-Kantians, to be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Incidentally, given that his coding o f  this ideological presentation echoes that for use-value, it is 
regrettable that Adorno didn't make the same dialectical twist lor his sense o f  the commodity.
186. Ibid., p. 102.
187. Debord, op. cit., thesis 190.
188. See Benhabib. op. cit., p.45.
very attenuated “practice of negation” (certain forms of autonomous art, in one aspect of
the mimetic faculty), we must now find another “practice of negation” (the apocalyptic
reversal, eschatology). W e com e, in this logic - the logic of the d ialectic of
enlightenm ent and total reification - full circle, to something akin to the avant-gardists’
own dem and for a radical break or leap. A similar strain can be heard in G uilbaut’s
Vancouver conclusion:
Nor should we expect any form of viable resistance or negation to emerge from 
art practice as we generally know it today. If our culture is dying of implosion, 
only explosion offers any real potential for change.... This is the age of the
guerilla. 189
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SECTION TWO: T.J. CLARK’S PRACTICES OF NEGATION
If the first section of this chapter tends to keep negation as the object of analysis, and at 
a distance from the interpretations and debates, the second section no longer allows that 
distance to be quite so secure. This em phasis on method - and on tracking the role, 
work and play of negation therein - remains a theme of the remaining chapters.
I subscribe to the view that it is impossible to talk about method in isolation from the 
matters over which that method operates. However, having said this, I need to qualify 
this statem ent, for this is not something that 1 would say about every text. Too often 
“ theory” is an “application” like a coat of paint. In such cases, methodological analysis 
is more like decoding, which at its worst becomes an exercise of spot-the-theory. Apart 
from the challenges provided by the encounter with a new set of concepts, this decoding
189. Guilbaut, “The Relevence o f  Modernism'’, op. cit., p.XV. In these com m ents, Guilbaut is 
responding to Baudrillard's account of “implosion”. See, for example, Jean Baudrillard, "The Beaubourg- 
Efl'ect: Implosion and Deterrence”, O ctober 20, Spring 1982, pp.3-13.
is, I think, quite an easy game to play. However, it doesn’t sustain my interest, and its 
object usually seems to be reduced to an appendage or an afterthought, and the object 
ju s t doesn’t seem able to carry the burden that the theory proffers. The work that does 
interest me is more difficult to characterise, and is not necessarily immune to the points 
just made, but can be said to be of a dialectical orientation. To define this bent presents a 
major difficulty because this is a method which I think has to be articulated through its 
materials. However, since this may sound quasi-m ystical or you-know -it-w hen-you- 
see-it, I feel obliged to say a little more. What makes this quality is self-reflexivity and a 
self-consciousness about one’s method, the sort of self-reflexivity which worries or 
struggles or - to opt for less “ tormented” descriptions - constantly reworks its object and 
its own grasp thereof. To put this another way, in such work one may see some 
tra n s itio n s  o ccu rrin g  betw een  ob jec t o f an a ly s is /in te rp re ta tio n  and  the 
analysing/interpreting subject. This is the point being made in the opening paragraph to 
this section. Because I want to draw these points out of my material, because I want to 
probe the method through its materials, the interrogation of the concept of negation that 
follow s will take the form of an extended case-study. This already overinvests and 
overburdens the texts and materials that follow. In a sense they chose them selves for 
this study by the am ount of effort that 1 expended on them, but I have (perhaps as a 
consequence) used them  as a way to follow negation through some art historical 
applications - and, here, I mean “application” in the sense of “ turning” one’s tools or 
m aterials to a task at hand, as in the phrase “to apply o n ese lf’. The way that I have 
orchestrated this material may make its authors sound more conscious and calculating 
than perhaps they ever were. This is a function of my work rather than theirs; in reality, 
their processes were probably far more ad hoc. This said, neither does my own activity 
o f “orchestration” live out some master plan but emerged along the way.
This is perhaps the moment to address H egel’s account of negation, from which some 
of the points regarding the dialectic can be drawn. In The Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel
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notes that “ thinking exercises a negative activity” . 190 However, the classic discussion of 
negation occurs in the preface to Hegel's Phenomenology o f Spirit where the essentials 
of H egel’s position on the dialectical method are laid out, and the central terms negation, 
becom ing, mediation - set forth. W hat superficial thinking lacks, he contends, is “ the 
seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative”; *91 it takes 
(what it takes to be) the im mediate (in itself), and fails to work for the m ediate (for 
itself); it takes the beginning - or the “first immediately enunciated” - as the Absolute 
instead of the result o f the process of mediation or “ a becom ing-other that has to be 
taken back”. 192 Hegel makes this point against forms of philosophy or mysticism which 
operate around abstract universals, or against those modes of thought which emphasise 
(what is assumed as) the concrete: what they take to be the simple im m ediate must, 
Hegel argues, be mediated and put through the pain of the negative. 193
Negation is raised in the context of a discussion of the True and the A bsolute - 
specifically in that of the relation of Substance (that which is) to Subject (that which 
thinks): “everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, 
but equally as Subject” . 194 The emphasis in the discussion, then, is upon the movement 
o f living Substance, its becoming actual - “ it is the movement of positing itself, or is the
190. See G.W.F. H egel, The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part I o f  the Encyclopaedia o f  the Philosophical 
Sciences with the Zusdtze, (third edition o f 1830), Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, p.96; "thinking 
the empirical world essentially means altering its empirical form, and transforming it into something- 
universal; so thinking exercises a negative activity...” (p.96).
191. P henom en ology , op. cit., p. 10.
192. Ibid., p. 11.
193. Initially, his argument is explicitly with a superficial form o f thinking which claim s to grasp 
God or the Absolute “intuitively”; but the same m oves are made against formalism’s empty abstractions 
(ibid., p.29). The argument is also mounted against the sensuous im mediacy privileged by common 
sense and by empiricism , and against “material thinking” and “picture thinking”, unable to abstract 
them selves from “material stuff” (p.35).
194. Ibid., p. 10. According to Hegel, philosophy has tended to separate these elem ents when, in 
fact, they are one: Subject is living Substance, it is actualised Substance, or Substance in and for itself 
(see p.14). The Absolute has both essence and form, and both are actualised/realised through the process 
o f movement and development, or self-consummation (see p .l 1). In H egel’s account, the labour o f the 
negative - or the self-m ovem ent o f  form - actualises the Absolute/divine essence, and “form is as 
essential to the essence as the essence is to itself" (p.l 1).
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m ediation of its self-othering with itself” . 195 Initially, in this process of “doubling”, 
“bifurcation”, self-alienation, or self-negation, Substance as Subject becomes “simple 
negativity” ; and as an “indifferent diversity” it is an antithesis of “immediate simplicity”. 
In turn, this indifferent diversity is negated (the negation is itself negated); the 
m ovem ent of self-alienation turns into a movement of self-return and self-restoration. 
C rucially , how ever, this is not a return to im m ediate sim plicity, but a m ediated 
immediacy; a reconciliation of becoming and result; a mediation of self-negation and the 
negation of this negation.196 This is the infamous Hegelian Aufhebung.197
For Hegel, this strenuous effort of the negative must be distinguished from some false 
friends or erroneous conceptions of the negative and its role: the negative as merely 
negative, the negative as false, and the negative as an external, alien force. Firstly, 
negation must not be understood as mere denial, but as determinate negation: abstract 
immediate unity must be destroyed for a determinate mediated unity, Hegel argues.198 
Thus determ inate negation has not just a negative but also a “positive content” . 199 
Secondly, true and false tend, Hegel says, to be treated as fixed, ready made, mutually
195. Ibid., p .10. If, H egel argues, the ancients put their effort into challenging natural 
consciousness in order to establish the idea o f the universal, the moderns have inherited fixed forms of  
the universal, and have the task o f restoring the fluidity to notions and ideas (pp. 19-20). Thinking in 
terms o f the Notion demands, Hegel writes, “strenuous effort” (p.35); true cognition is “only won 
through the labour o f  the Notion” (p.43). Cf. the section on “Sense Certainty” and the discussion o f  the 
“not-This”.
196. The True, or Absolute, in other words, "is the process o f its own becom ing” (ibid., p. 10), the 
“becom ing o f  itself” (p. 11), the "reflection in otherness within itself” (p .10) - a mediated not an 
immediate unity: "only by being worked out to its end, is it actual” (p. 10). Hegel writes. "M ediation  is 
nothing beyond self-m oving selfsam eness, or is reflection into self, the movement o f  the T  which is 
for itself pure negativity or, when reduced to its pure abstraction, sim ple becoming" (p .l 1)
197. “Aufheben has in the German language a double meaning in that it sign ifies conserving, 
p re serv in g  and at the same time also making cease, making an end. Even conserving includes the 
negative aspect that something is taken out o f its immediacy and thus out o f an existence that is open 
to external influence, to be preserved” (Hegel cited in McLellan, op. cit.. p.52).
198. P h en o m en o lo g y , op. cit., pp. 18-19. The concept o f  determinate negation is traditionally 
attributed to Spinoza’s dictum “omnis determ inatio est negatio"  (see, for exam ple, Islvan Meszaros, 
“N egation”, A D ictionary o f  M arxist Thought, second edition, Blackwell, 1991, p.400).
199. P h e n o m e n o lo g y ,  op. cit., p .36: “The negative belongs to the content itself, and is the 
p o sitive ,  both as the im m anent movement and determination o f  the content, and as the whole of the 
process”.
external notions, with positive and negative allocated respectively. Yet, while true and 
false should not be collapsed (such as in the idea that all truths contain some 
falsehoods), the True itself still has the negative “directly present” w i t h i n .200 And 
finally, because the negative presents itself as a disparity between Subject and Substance 
(between “I” and its object), there has been a tendency to mistake that disparity or gap as 
som ething externally  im posed, w hereas the truth is that the negative is its own 
self-alienation. The ancients, Hegel notes, correctly recognised “the void as the principle 
of motion... the moving principle as the negative” - the motion of subject to object and 
object to subject - but what they failed to see was that “ the negative is the s e l f ’.201
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I. Practices O f Negation
Reflecting on the attempts to produce a revolutionary ait in France between 1848 and 
1851, but saying ju s t as much about the situation in 1981, Clark writes: “ Bourgeois 
society is efficient at m aking all art its own”.202 i n this new 1981 preface to The 
Absolute Bourgeois and Image o f the People, he ponders his own books’ relation to the 
fall-out, and retreat from politics post-1968; what he regards as the misinterpretation of 
this work by both Left and Right; and - ju s t as significant - expresses a self- 
consciousness of his own part in the academic “ r e c u p e r a t i o n ” . 2 0 3  i t  j s  the conjunction of 
these concerns - in short, the question of politics, the question of method (or a politics 
o f method), and the question of the interpreter’s own role therein - which returns us to 
the concerns already addressed, and which m akes this body of work particularly
200. Ibid.. p.23: "disparity, rather, as the negative, the self, is itself still directly present in the True 
as such”.
201. Ibid.. p.21.
202. T.J. Clark, The Absolute Bourgeois. Artists and Politics in France 1848-1851  (1973), Thames 
& Hudson, 1982, p.6.
203. T.J. Clark, Image o f the People. Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution  (1973), Thames & 
Hudson, 1982.
77
interesting; not least, because Clark centres a concern with negativity and mediation. I 
shall argue that this concern produces some fascinating problems.
Responding to C lark’s Vancouver paper (re-presented at the Critical Inquiry symposium 
in Chicago), Fried argued that C lark’s critique of, and alternative to, Greenberg’s theory
o f art was especially ill-equipped to deal with abstraction, invoking, am ong other 
works, Jackson Pollock’s painting Lavender M ist.204 Clark responded with a paragraph 
outlining how his argument - an argument which centred on the concept of “ negation” - 
was essential if you were to understand what he calls the “delectable im passe” reached 
by Pollock’s paintings in the late 1940s.
The phrase “practices of negation” had been introduced by Clark to try “ to recast 
[Greenberg’s] sketch of modernism’s formal logic” , and to open that logic back onto, or 
into, “history” and “ the social”.205 The modernist account of art, as Clark characterises
204. T.J. Clark, "Clement Greenberg’s Theory o f Art”, op. cit.; Michael Fried, "How Modernism  
Works: A R esponse to T.J. Clark", Pollock and A fter , op. cit., pp.65-79 (originally published in 
C ritical Inquiry, vol.9, n o .l, September 1982, pp.217-234); T.J. Clark, “Arguments about Modernism: 
A Reply to M ichael Fried", Pollock and After, op. cit., pp.81-88 (originally published in The Politics 
o f  Interpretation, ed. W J.T . Mitchell, The University o f Chicago Press, 1983, pp.239-248.)
205. “Clement Greenberg’s Theory o f Art”, op. cit., p .55. The idea however goes back much 
further. Clark had remarked that art history shrinks from "gestures o f renunciation” , such as those in 
Courbet, Rimbaud and Lautreamont. See T.J. Clark, “A bourgeois Dance o f Death: Max Buchon on 
Courbet - 1”, The Burlington M agazine, April 1969. pp.208-213 (the quotation is from p.208). The 
issue crops up, most famously, in the 1980 article in Screen. See Timothy J. Clark, “Preliminaries to a 
Possible Treatment o f ‘Olym pia’ in 1865”, Screen, vol.21, n o .l, Spring 1980, pp. 18-41. Here Clark 
distinguishes between his claim that Olympia “failed to signify in 1865” (p.25) -or “refuses to signify” 
(p.39) - and Screen's own fascination with "dis-idenlificatory practices” (MacCabe cited p.37). Manet's 
painting:
...erodes the term s in which the normal recognitions are enacted, but it leaves the structure 
itself intact.... To escape that structure what would be needed would be, exactly, another set o f 
terms - terms which would be discovered, doubtless, in the act o f unsettling the old codes and 
conventions, but which would have themselves to be se ttled , consistent, forming a finished 
sentence (p.39).
... any critique of the established, dominant system s o f  meaning will degenerate into a mere 
refusal to signify unless it seeks to found its meanings - discover its contrary meaning - not in 
som e magic re-presentation, on the other side o f  negation and refusal, but in signs which are 
already present, fighting for room - meanings rooted in actual forms o f  life; repressed  
meanings, the meanings of the dominated (p.40).
These com m ents provoked W ollen to reply. Screen  had been central in the revival o f  attention to 
Benjamin, Brecht and LEF, and favoured what might be called a Godardian approach to artistic and
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it in his reply to Fried, describes a sequence of “triumphant openings on to fullness and
positiv ity” .206 Bringing the concept of negation into the foreground, Clark couches
G reenberg ’s logic m ore in terms of difficulty and desperation than in term s of
purification: “All the way to the Black Square” sums up a painful process - albeit a
productive one. C lark explains in an au thor’s note (added to the paper for its
republication in 1984):
By “practices of negation” I meant some form of decisive innovation, in method 
or materials or imagery, whereby a previously established set of skills or frame 
of reference - skills and references which up till then had been taken as essential 
to art making of any seriousness - are deliberately avoided or travestied, in such 
a way as to imply that only by such incompetence or obscurity will genuine 
picturing get d o n e .207
But, whatever Clark claims he meant to mean, the identity of negation does not present 
itself so easily. Initially, everything seems in order: practices of negation are prim arily 
enactm ents on, or of, m edium , and yet are also a m etaphorical articu la tion  of 
negationary values at the social level.208  Firstly negation is cast as “of medium”, as
cultural engagem ent. In this context, then, Clark's com m ents were seen as a re-run o f  the 
Realism/Modernism debates o f German Marxists in the ’30s, or of the Russians in the ’20s. The issue 
might also be seen as a conflict between two sensesof negation: internal and external - although it tends 
to figure for Clark, here, as “dis-identificatory practices". See Peter W ollen, “Manet: Modernism and 
A vant-G arde”, S c re e n , vo l.21, no.2. Summer 1980, pp. 15-25; and for further com m ent on the 
Clark/Wollen exchange, Charles Harrison, Michael Baldwin and Mel Ramsden, “Manet’s 'Olympia’ and 
Contradiction”, B lo ck , no.5, 1981, pp.34-43. The material on Olympia is reworked for the chapter 
“O lym pia's C hoice” in T.J. Clark, The Painting o f  M odern Life. P aris in the Art o f  M anet and his 
F ollow ers, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp.79-146.
Clark's position continues in many ways that adopted by the English Section o f  the 
Situationist International in 1967 in what was an unpublished pamphlet entitled The Revolution o f  
M odern Art and the Modern Art o f  Revolution, Chronos Publications, London, 1994. “N egation” is not 
as prominent as it is in Debord, but occurs briefly in this formulation: “The project o f  art - for Blake, 
for N ietzsche - became the transvaluation of all values and the destruction o f  all that prevents it. Art 
becam e negation: in Goya, in Beethoven, or in Gericault one can see the change from celebrant to 
subversive within the space o f a lifetim e” ( p.4). Like Debord, the position is a refusal o f  the comforts 
of “illusory revolts” o f contemporary avant-gardism, which, the authors argue, com e in two forms: 
“reformism and nihilism ” (p.15). There is a sense that aesthetic negations must be fulfilled by practical 
revolution: “Life and revolution w ill be invented together or not at all” (p.26). The concept o f  
revolutionary praxis as ludic, however, and the argument in favour of delinquency, petty crime and “the 
new lumpen”, may not meet most o f  the Left’s sense o f  the revolution and its agent.
206. “Arguments about Modernism: A Reply to Michael Fried”, op. cit., p.82.
207. “Clement Greenberg's Theory of Art”, op. cit., p.55.
208. "This phrase in my essay ( ‘practices o f  negation’] seem s to have given rise to som e 
misunderstanding, among those who approved o f it as much as those who thought it a dreadful slur” 
(ibid., p.55).
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som ething prim arily to do with the medium and processes of art, as affirm ed in the
author’s note, and in statements like: “the medium has appeared m ost characteristically
as the site o f negation and estrangement” , and “practices of negation... seem to me the
very form of the practices of purity (the recognitions and enactments of medium) which
G r e e n b e r g  e x t o l s ” . 209 Practices of negation, then, are presented not as a process of
controlled self-cleansing, or a dialectic of plenitude, but as “a whole strategy of release,
exacerbation, em ptying, and self-splitting” .2io Clark states his adm iration for the
struggles of “casting off “ , “ the ruthlessness of negation”. Yet this positive evaluation is
matched by a more negative one;2H
[Modernist] practice... is extraordinary and desperate: it presents itself as a work 
of interm inable and absolute decomposition, a work which is always pushing 
“m edium ” to its limits - to its ending - to the point where it breaks or evaporates 
or turns back into mere unworked material. That is the form in which medium is 
retrieved or reinvented: the fact of Alt, in modernism, is the fact of negation .212
By contrast, when we consider the qualities “of outside of the m edium ” we have “ the
external” , “the social” - the world of history and politics - the “context” that bears on
this instance. Here we find that the primary identification of negation is different. This is
written about by Clark in two ways: (i) as an active social/political engagem ent by the
artists; and (ii) as concerning their social basis. First there are what we might call, for
want o f a less clumsy phrase, the social values of resistance:
[T]he avant-garde... has regularly and rightly seen an advantage for art in the 
particular conditions of “ideological confusion and violence” under capital; it 
wished to take part in the general untidy work of negation and has seen no 
necessary contradiction (rather the contrary) between doing so and com ing to 
terms once again with its “ m e d iu m ” .2i3
209. Ibid., p.58, p.55.
210. “Arguments about Modernism: A Reply to Michael Fried”, op. cit., p.83.
211. This idea o f  negation, as the expending of superfluous conventions, would seem to be more in 
tune with Greenberg’s logic than with the H egel’s. Clark's analysis might, however, best be compared 
with Adorno’s analysis o f modernism. While Greenberg’s descriptions seem to be closely paralleled by 
Adorno’s, the latter’s categories retain a social loading o f frequently weighty proportions - which pose 
serious art with 110 (historical) option but to run, via a series o f increasingly exacerbated crises, to its 
desperate “end". For Greenberg, by contrast, art’s disengagement allow s it to “get 011" with the job at 
hand, that is, to dispense with the expendable.
212. "Clement Greenberg’s Theory o f Art", op. cit., p.59.
213. Ibid.. p.52.
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On the other hand, negation is also identified prim arily as a question of the loss and 
absence o f a solid social basis, with practices of negation being predicated on a 
condition of lack:
And surely that dance of negation has to do with the social facts... the decline of 
ruling class elites, the absence of a “social base” for artistic production, the 
paradox involved in making bourgeois art in the absence of a b o u r g e o i s i e .214
And, as he goes on:
Negation is the sign inside art o f this wider decom position: it is an attem pt to 
capture the lack of consistent and repeatable meanings in the culture - to capture 
the lack and make it over into fo rm .215
In a sense, these two aspects of contextual “ location” echo the two aspects o f “casting 
o f f ’ m entioned above, indeed, they might be seen to provide some sort of explanation 
for them.216 But can you have negation as the product of active social engagement and a 
sort of socially enforced isolation (Clark’s recasting of what Greenberg has as an active 
disengagement)? This problem might be grasped as coherent when it is seen in terms of 
two points in a process o f historical change - as a “beginning” and “end” - turning on 
the m om ent of the Paris Comm une. “ A strategy o f negation and refusal is not an 
unreasonable response to bourgeois civ ilization since 1871 ” ,217 w rites C lark, 
suggesting a loss of revolutionary fervour in the afterm ath, a defeat of historical 
proportion, confirm ing and exacerbating the absenting of artists’ social base. This 
leaves negation, as far as the subsequent periods are concerned, as the paradox of being 
non-bourgeois/bourgeois art (making bourgeois art without the bourgeoisie), a paradox 
provoking a drift into a void o f signification - presumably because it does not find it 
possible to predicate its values on, say, the opposition to the bourgeoisie.
214. Ibid., p .59.
215. Ibid.
216. The matter had been addressed in The Absolute Bourgeois, where Clark had written o f  Courbet: 
“A bourgeois artist is shown to fail to make his art ‘revolutionary’, but his failure is in its way 
exemplary and at least serious... it suggests the way in which a struggle against dominant discursive 
conventions in a culture is bound up with attempts to break or circumvent the social forms in which 
those conventions are embedded”. The Absolute Bourgeois, op. cit., p.7.
217 . “Arguments about Modernism: A Reply to Michael Fried”, op. cit., p.82.
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This is quite different, of course, to that more fam iliar life and times of practices of
negation where the concept is synonymous with radical, socially-engaged cultural
activities. But, then, Clark lets us have this too with “ the negation of em pty negation”,
an attempt at re-engagement, and a challenge to that atrophy of meaning:
There is a way - and this again is something which happens within modernism 
or at its limits - in which that empty negation is in turn negated.... For there is an 
art - a m odernist art - which has challenged the notion that art stands only to 
suffer from the fact that now all meanings are disputable... B recht’s is only the 
most doctrinaire example.... Art wants to address someone, it wants something 
precise and extended to do; it wants resistance, it needs criteria; it will take risks 
in order to find them, including the risk of its own dissolution.218
It should not be surprising, then, that the phrase “practices of negation” led to “ some 
m isunderstanding”. The phrase itself is soon dropped by Clark, (initially, it seems, 
because of Fried’s assumption that it signified nihilism), and replaced by “practices of 
resistance and refusal” - a phrase which survives into the paper on P o l lo c k .2 1 9  i n 
“Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”, negation is, so to speak, set loose from  a category of 
practices (of whatever type or aspect), and allowed a more performative function as, and 
within, the dynam ics of ongoing processes of analysis. The consequences o f this are 
what I want to explore.
218. “Clement Greenberg’s Theory o f  Art”, op. cit., p.60.
219. T.J. Clark, “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”, Reconstructing M odernism , op. cit., pp. 172-238; 
see also the discussion on pp.239-243. A quick glance through the critical writings on art over the past 
decade reveals the ubiquity o f  “practices o f  negation”, especially  where the question o f  the 
modern/postmodern and avant-gardism has been at issue. As Charles Harrison has put it: '“ Practices of 
negation’ are now the stuff o f artistic and intellectual fashion” (Harrison, op. cit.. p. 231). We all get 
the gist o f “negation” in these writings - roughly, a set o f  emancipatory claim s made in the realm o f ai t 
practice, o f  a more or less political nature. The dominant issue has been the recuperation problem: 
whether society has gone through a qualitative change which makes resistance recuperable. and negation 
impossible; whether negation was, in any case, simply the motor o f  the capitalist market (and thereby 
perhaps complicit with the dominant powers at a deep level); and what strategies might be adopted for 
circumnavigating any or all o f  these problems. While Clark is  drawn to comment briefly on Baudrillard, 
and he does touch on “the bad dream o f modernism”, his discussion does not really have the same focus. 
In a characteristic twist, he notes: “And the test in all cases is not, it seem s to m e, the cogency or 
adequacy o f  the discursive claims, but whether the claims have led to production-whether the claim s, for 
all their muddle and doublethink, have been associated with som e real complexity and vehem ence in the 
work o f representation” (“Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”, op. cit., p.220).
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II. Searching For A Method
The internalisation of negation in the procedures of analysis may not be entirely novel.
In his 1974 article, “The conditions of artistic creation” , Clark argues for a dialectical
view which, he claims, has been lost in art histoiy: its absence has led to a stultification
of art-historical categories, and the field has become “incapable of renovation”. W hat
Clark wants to resuscitate is the Hegelian “habit of mind” or ‘ kind of thinking , with, as
he puts it, “ its power to open up a field of inquiry, to enable certain questions to be
asked”. In his work of the early ’Eighties, Clark considers how Greenberg conceives
the values of ait as becoming self-contained and self-legitimating. This, he says, reflects
a “ceasing of the dialectic” in G reenberg’s understanding of the relation between the
values of art and other social values. In contrast, Clark argues for “active interplays” ,
for relations that make for living distinctions rather than atrophied oppositions.220
D ialectics seem s to offer a way out of a set of frozen antinom ies or m etaphorical
oppositions: background and foreground, inside and outside, and form and content. In
Image o f the People Clark describes his own project with these words:
If the social history of art has a specific field of study, it is exactly this - the 
processes of conversion and relation which so much ait histoiy takes tot 
granted. I w ant to discover what concrete transactions are hidden behind the
220 See “The conditions o f artistic creation”, op. cit., p.561. Cf. Sartre in Search fo r  a M e n o d  
(1960), op. cit. - although we should note that Sartre is pitching his comm ents in a different political 
direction. Sartre accuses the Marxism o f the official communist parties o f  adopting a prion m odels, 
forcing matters into “prefabricated m olds” (p.37), and of making its reductions too quickly (p.. ), in 
other words, he charges contemporary Marxists o f  being “poor dialecticians and mecham ca 
materialists" (p. 17, footnote 2). The “charge” o f this can be seen here: “They [their concepts are no 
longer keys, interpretive schemata; they are posited for themselves as an already totalized knowledge.... 
The totalizing investigation has given way to a Scholasticism ot the totality. The heuristic princip e - 
‘to search for the w hole in the parts’ - has becom e the terroristic practice o f^ liqu id ating  the 
particularity”' (pp 27-28) Existentialism - which Sartre would like to be a complementjMarxism - aims, 
he argues, “to discover a supple, patient dialectic which espouses m ovements as they really are and 
which refuses to consider a priori that all lived conflicts pose contradictions or even contraries (p 126). 
Instead o f charting the mediations, official Marxism histoncises via a “system  of correspondences 
betw een abstract universals” (p.53). The last point invokes com m ents made by Marx in his 
“ Introduction” (1857) to the G rundrisse, op. cit., pp.83-111; see. in particular, the section entitled e 
Method o f  Political Econom y”, pp. 100-108. Sartre’s argument is with a dialectics based in Engels 
account, and with its orthodoxy for the communist parties - the araenua ot a Marxism based oi 
"dogmatic metaphysics (a dialectic o f Nature)” (Search fo r  a Method, op. cit., p.181).
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m echanical im age of “reflection”, to know how “ background” becom es 
“foreground”; instead of analogy between form and content, to discover the 
network of real, complex relations between the tw o.221
The point of C lark’s social history of art, then, at least as he defines it here, is to deal
with the relation between, or processes of m e d i a t i o n . 222  He is, he writes, “for a history
of m ediation” : “How, in a particular case, a content of experience becomes a form, an
event becomes an image, boredom becomes its representation, despair becom es spleen:
these are the p r o b l e m s ” .223 in 1986, these same concerns are rearticulated in “Jackson
Pollock’s Abstraction” . This time though, the project is spoken through the language of
Mikhail Bakhtin - the terms “text” and “context” replace those of “form ” and “content”,
“background” and “foreground”:
IT |he so-called context of a work of art is therefore not a m ere surrounding, 
separable from form; it is what the speaker or m aker has m ost concretely to 
work with; context is text; the context is the medium.... All utterances anticipate 
answ ers, provoking them, eluding them, orientating them selves tow ards an 
imagined future in which something is said or done in reply; and works of art, 
being specially elaborate, pondered cases of utterance, are m ost of all shot 
through with such d ire c te d n e s s .2 2 4
Just how do you m ediate between Pollock’s art and the social world, Clark wonders, 
apart from  asserting the “brute fact” of an artist’s social and historical belonging: that 
they live and produce in a specific time and place, and from a certain social p o s i t io n :22?
221. Image o f  the P eople, op. cit., p. 12.
222. Clark also describes these as "the actual complex links which bind together ai t and politics” 
(ibid., p. 10). or “the connecting links” (p. 12).
223. Ibid., p.13.
224. “Jackson P o llock ’s Abstraction”, op. cit.. p .177. Cf. V .N . V olosinov, M arxism  and the 
Philosophy o f Language (1929). Harvard University Press, 1973, and M.M. Bakhtin, D iscouise in the 
N ovel” (1934-5), The D ia log ica l Imagination. Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin , University o f Texas 
Press, 1981. pp.259-422.
225. Apparently after attending a lecture on Pollock given by Serge Guilbaut, a student had objected 
that Pollock had been found “ guilty by association” with Cecil Beaton’s photos for Vogue, in which 
fashion m odels posed in front o f Autumn Rhythm. Lavender M ist. N o .2 8  & N o.27. This prompted 
Clark into some thoughts about the “before” and “after” life o f abstract paintings, about the problems of 
recuperation of radical practice, about the fears o f  becom ing merely decorative wallpaper rather than 
serious art - what he calls "the bad dream o f modernism”. See “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction", op. cit, 
p. 178. Cf. Kurt W. Forster. "Critical History of Art, or Transfiguration o f V alues?”, N ew Literary  
H istory, vol.3, 1972, pp.459-70. Forster argues against the isolation o f  history from accounts o f art. or 
the use o f  an alogy  to make parallels between the two. usually introduced to account for moments of 
change and rupture in the narrative.
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Nobody wants to write a history of Pollock’s painting which works by “vague 
association', whether it end up proving the artist guilty or innocent of his class; 
nobody w ants the social history of art to be, “an external activity  - the 
wiping-off of some drops of rain or specks of dust from the [artistic] fruit... one 
which erects an intricate scaffolding o f the dead elem ents of their outward 
existence - the language, the historical circum stances, and so on”; but to do 
otherwise is difficult, especially with fruit of this kind.226
These words cited by Clark belong, of course, to H e g e l.2 2 7  By “fruits o f this k ind” 
Clark claims not to imply anything mythic about Pollock, but, as he puts it, simply the 
painting’s perfectly “ordinary, entirely representative distance from  the world it is part 
o f ’.228 C lark’s version of the social history of ait, therefore, can be seen as the desire to 
elucidate those “processes of conversion and relation”, the “how s” of the “concrete 
transac tions” , or (to use the openly H egelian language o f “ Jackson Pollock s 
A bstraction”), to show the processes of “ingestion” , “becom ing”, “ interiorization and
“ in t e r n a l i z a t io n ” . 229
226. “Jackson Pollock's Abstraction”, op. cit., p. 181, my emphasis.
227. The citation is from the P h en om en o logy , op. cit.. pp.455-6. C l. The Encyclopaedia Logic, 
where Hegel warns about approaches where an “external art” tends to find, or produce, contradictions in 
determinate concepts; dialectical analysis must, instead, be conducted as an immanent tianscending
(The Encyclopaedia Logic, op. cit., p. 128). The artistic metaphor is pursued where Hegel discusses whal 
he knows as formalism: “The instrument of this monotonous formalism is no more difficult to 
handle than a painter’s palette having only two colours, say red and green, the one for colouring the 
surface when a historical scene is wanted, the other tor landscapes. It would be haid to decide which is 
greater in all this, the casual ease with which everything in heaven and on eaith and undei the eaith is 
coated with this broth o f  colour, or the conceit regarding the excellence o f  this universal recipe: each 
supports the other” (Phenom enology, op. cit., pp.30-1). C riticising the schem atic m ethod, he 
continues, this is a "way o f  thinking... a style o f  painting that is absolutely m onochromatic;... from 
which pure identity, form less whiteness, is produced” (p.31). “Monochromatic form alism ” is also  
discussed, most famously, in connection with “the night in which... all cow s are black (p.9).
228. “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”, op. cit.. p. 181.
229. Ironically, Clark has been subjected to such dichotomy, and has been characterised as both an 
“internalist” and  an “externalist”, though not usually with these designations. The latter is largely a 
charge from the more “traditional” wings of the discipline (the accusation that he leduces everything to 
the social, or that he “makes the evidence fit” his thesis). In contrast, the charge o f  “internalist” largely 
em anates from the “radical” end o f art/cultural history/theory, from where he has been accused, 
variously, o f sticking to the canonical works, o f paying too much attention to the ait object, and ol 
being caught up in Modernist categories. See, for example, N icholas Green and Frank Mort, “Visual 
Representation and Cultural Politics”, Block  7, 1982, pp.59-68; Adrian Rifkin, “Marx’ Clarkism”, A rt 
H istory, vol.8. no.4, December 1985, pp.488-95; Frank Mort and N ick Green, “Is There Anyone Here 
From Education (Again)? Radical Art and Education for the 1990s”, B lock  12, 1987-88, pp.20-7; 
Griselda Pollock, “V ision, V oice and Power: Fem inist Art Histories and M arxism ”, Vision and  
D ifference. Fem ininity, Feminism and the H istories o f  A rt, Routledge, 1988, pp. 18-49, and, in the 
same collection, “Modernity and the Spaces of Femininity”, pp.50-90. It is the self-reflexive focus on 
this problem which marks the distance between Clark’s project and what, for som e, com es to mind with
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The argument is consistent. In The Absolute Bourgeois, Clark is suspicious of forms ot 
the social history of art which establish “confident equations between techniques and 
patrons, between political liberty and artistic h e a l t h ” . 230 Bad social history of art fails to 
interrogate its key categories - experience, for example - but leans on them to shore up 
the lack of work of mediation. This too - like traditional art history - produces a history 
that is “painless and absurd” and “dares not name those structures which m ediate and 
determ ine the nature of that contact - ideology, class, the conflict of classes, the 
conU'adictions within any ideological view of the world”.231
The question of ideology had provided a terrain for debate about the social history of art
- and there was a particular concern with ideology’s mediating role. The argum ent 
pursued the problem of the general and particular, and the problematic encounter of
the phrase “the social history of art". The distance does not lie so much between “vulgar reductivism” 
and other, purportedly “non-reductive”, strategies, as it is usually conceived. Rather than the self-im age, 
adhered to by parts o f the discipline, that “reductivism” is som e long ago abandoned monster, it ought 
to be recognised that all interpretive frameworks by their nature must “reduce” if they are to in terpret. 
This issue docs not d issolve according to (or at the level of) on e’s framework, politics, revisions, 
priorities, or whatever one calls them, but rather according to the work that is done to try to mediate.
Clark's argument has a double articulation. What the "Guilbaut challenge raises very directly. 
- that the polemical edge o f  the "Fried challenge” tends not to do - is the need to put those mediations in 
place; it highlights a need to articulate, or make present, in language. Writing about Jackson Pollock, it 
would seem , provides Clark with an opportunity to address “The Most Ditticult Task Yet Faced By The 
Social History O f Art”. It is important to realise that what is at stake here might be Clark's intellectual 
project. That “ordinary distance” which he mentions itself com es to represent the very inadequacies of 
the social history o f  art - and the gap that its interpretive framework must, and yet seem s unable to. 
cross. It appears that Clark docs not believe his project has yet been realised in even its most basic 
defining sense. Indeed, it is this "most basic sense” which is so elusive. What is continually registered 
in Clark's text is the difficu lty o f  speaking  those mediations: the difficulty o f  saying w h at these 
processes o f becom ing and internalisation actually are; the difficulty o f  speaking beyond “brute facts”, 
"vague associations”, and “external activ ities'. The strategy, Clark tells us. is to confront the dilticulties 
and make them "into the m otor o f the argument” (ibid., p. 181).
230. The Absolute B ourgeois , op. cit.. p.57.
231. T.J. Clark, “Preliminary Arguments: Work of Art and Ideology”, C ollege Arts A ssociation, 
session on Marxism and Art History, Chicago, January 1976, unpublished, thesis VIII.
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these e m p h a s e s .  232  Clark argues that there is a need to bring w ider categories like 
“ ideology” or “contradiction” into the m aterial, concrete particulars of historical 
practices, “ the politics of the particular”, not just the “more general c o n c e r n s ” 233 - in, it 
would seem, the spirit of Sartre’s comments on Valery.234 Ideology, Clark had said, 
“takes as its material the real substance, the constraints and contradictions, of a given 
historical situation.... But it generalises the repressions, it im agined the contradictions 
s o l v e d ” . 235 M oreover, he writes, art history tends to erase the “discontinuity in the 
object” and to produce a “fiction of a consisten t and R eal entity, recoverable in 
d i s c o u r s e ” .236 The point, then, was to recover and em phasise the fissures, gaps, 
contradictions, inconsistencies, and the “figures of discontinuity” which wreck art 
h istory’s “assumption of coherence and linearity” - the same call as was made against
232. Werckmeister counterposes philosophy (abstraction) to history (concrete), and he identifies two 
contradictory tendencies in M arx's approach to art: an idealist and a determ inistic one. This 
contradiction, he argues, has been compounded by political resignation and attention to aesthetics as the 
locus o f revolutionary potential; and it has led to an emphasis on abstract philosophy or aesthetics 
rather than the concrete specificity of history and ideology critique. See O.K. Werckmeister, “Marx on 
Ideology and Art”, N ew  Literary H is to iy , vol.4. Spring 1973, pp.501-19. See also O.K. Werckmeister, 
“From Marxist to Critical Art History” , C ollege Arts A ssociation, session on Marxism and Art 
H istory, C hicago, January 1976, unpublished, where the author argues against “ id eologica l 
generalization” o f  academic art history, in contrast to "critical art history”. The former is itself caught 
up in institutional ideology which accom modates “ in an ideological medium both affirm ative and 
critical responses to society” and sustains "the mental disconnection” between contemporary political 
realities and art history. In terms which anticipate some ol the concerns o f Chapter 3, Kurt Forster - 
arguing against Ackerman’s distinction o f art and history - distinguishes a traditional art history (as 
Ackerman sets it up) from a social history o f art. The former, Forster argues, relies on abstract 
universals, philosophy and a history ot ideas to establish art as a matter ot diiect experience and 
“spontaneous access”; the latter concerns itself with material production, ideology critique, the concrete 
and the particular, and is seen by the former to be incapable o f  experiencing the ait w oik. See Kuit 
Forster, op. cit.
233. Im age o f  the P eople, op. cit., p. 17.
234. He may have been a petit-bourgeois intellectual, Sartre argued, but not every petit-bourgeois 
intellectual was Valery (Sartre, Search fo r  a M ethod , op. cit., p.56).
235. “Preliminary Arguments: Work o f Art and Ideology”, op. cit., thesis I.
236. T.J. Clark, "Courbet the Communist and the Temple Bar M agazine”, Block  4 , 1981, pp.32-38  
(the citations are from p.35, p.38). Cf. “A bourgeois Dance o f Death: Max Buchon on Courbet - 2 ”, 
The Burlington M agazine, May 1969, pp.286-290, where Clark comments that myths are “in a stale of  
constant self-developm ent and self-contradiction” (p.289). The bourgeoisie, he argues, eliminated the 
“middle terms o f  this process, the unstable categories... in which bourgeois identity is gradually and 
painfully assem bled” (Image o f  the P eop le, op. cit., p. 151). A lso cf. W erckmeister’s argument, with 
reference to Marx, that ideology “projects harmony between two social positions that were actually 
antagonistic, and in whose continuing contlict it was meant to serve as a diversion . See O.K. 
W erckm eister, "The Political Ideology o f  the Bayeux Tapestry”, Studi M edieva li, third series, vol. 
XVII, no.2, 1976, p.589.
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Greenberg and Fried under die name of n e g a t i o n . 237
C lark’s discussion of practices of negation, then, can be seen through the structures of 
Ideologiekritik. In fact, this might make less dichotomous the analytical distinctions I 
have been m aking between “of m edium ” and “of outside of the m e d i u m ” .2 3 8  The 
Greenbergian claim - that the values of art are self-sufficient, and self-legitimating - are, 
C lark seem s to im ply, precisely how things appeal" that, if you like, such critics 
correctly  transcribed what was happening in art. But these critics recognised only the 
appearance, and missed, or mistook, the substance of what was happening - a substance 
which lay outside the confines of the material itself. Of course, such comparisons might 
reek of absurd overinvestment, ascribing far too much premeditation, too much control, 
too much consciousness to C lark’s strategies. Yet at another level it makes sense, and 
reopens to fresh scrutiny those issues which are immanent to his project. It is not an 
alien pattern for Clark to adopt. It is, to put it bluntly, what is at stake in his method of 
“recasting”, or in the disagreement that is “small but definite” - the substance of the twist 
on G reenberg’s home ground.239 For instance, we find that Clark does not dispute the 
notion of “autonom y” as such (by counterposing, say, an anti-autonom y thesis), but 
instead challenges “ the grounds on which that autonomy is secured” in G reenberg’s
237. “Courbet the Communist and the Temple Bar Magazine”, op. cit., p.37.
238. In the dynamics o f Ideologiekritik  a distinction and relation is made between moments of truth 
and falsehood. In bourgeois thought, an accurate (mimetic) transcription ol reality nevertheless fails 
adequately to explain or understand, since it is premise upon an abstraction o f form from content. See 
Peter D ew s and Peter Osborne, “The Frankfurt School & the Problem o f Critique: A Reply to 
McCarney”, op. cit. The movements o f Ideologiekritik  are taken from Marx’s renowned section, “The 
Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret thereof’, from Capital:
To the [producers], therefore, the relations connecting the labour o f one individual with that o f  
the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they 
rea lly  a re , material relations between persons and social relations between things. (K. Marx, 
C a p ita l, op. cit.. p.78, my emphasis)
Appearing “as what they really are", these relations nevertheless deflect any recognition o f their own 
social substance. The terms here parallel those of the more advanced forms o f the debates on Realism, 
and are also the basis for Brecht’s advocation of alienation effects in the face o f  photographs o f  the AEG  
or Krupp. See Brecht cited in Walter Benjamin, “A Small History o f  Photography” (1931), One Way 
Street and Other W ritings, Verso, 1985, p.255.
239. "Clement Greenberg's Theory o f Art", op. cit., p.59.
theory - the way it is spoken, thought and understood.240 It is similar with negation, the 
nam e o f w hich openly acknow ledges the language of the tradition  to w hich 
Ideologiekritik belongs. So, Clark writes:
Negation is inscribed in the very practice of modernism, as the form in which art 
appears to itself as a value.241
The split, as it were, between the “mom ent of truth” and the “m om ent of falsehood” - 
the “reification” of the practices as described by Greenberg - has to be effected, in the 
context o f C lark’s theory, through a metaphorical process.242 In o ther words, it is 
through mediation and metaphor - through the mediation o f metaphor - that the values of 
art can take the form of, and appear as, self-sufficient.
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III. The Mediation O f  Metaphor
M etaphor, then, is the key term through which Clark argues that the values o f art are 
social, are in fact other to medium-itself. It is this term which functions as the point of 
m ediation, the bridge between  text and context. So, as we can see from  “Clem ent 
G reenberg’s Theory of Art” , Clark describes the M odernist category of flatness as 
emerging from a metaphorical articulation of a variety of values current in Parisian life in 
the late 19c.: an analogy for the modern, an equivalent with posters, the work-like, et 
cetera:
Flatness in its heyday was these various meanings and valuation; they were its 
substance, so to speak; they were what it was seen as. Their particularity was
240. Sec the discussion between Clark and Greenberg, published in Buchloh, M odernism  and  
M odern ity , op. cit., p.192. A lso cf. the editors’ introduction, “Introduction: M odernism. Explanation 
and Knowledge” in Charles Harrison and Fred Orton (eds.), M odernism, Criticism , Realism , op. cit.
241. “Clement Greenberg's Theory o f  Art”, op. cit., p.59, my emphasis.
242. Peter D ew s and Peter Osborne have argued, vis-a-vis Adorno’s conception o f ideology, that 
Ideologiekritik  not only involves the elucidation of the moments o f  truth and falsity in consciousness' 
tran scrip tion  o f  social reality, but also that a similar distinction needs to be made with respect to a 
sim ultaneous process o f  transfiguration . See "The Frankfurt School & the Problem o f Critique: A 
Reply to M cCam ey”, op. cit. This can be compared to the discussion o f m im esis in Part One ol this 
chapter. See also Joseph McCarney, “What Makes Critical Theory •Critical’?”, R adical Philosophy  
no.42, Winter/Spring 1986, p p .11-22.
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what made it vivid - made it a matter to be painted over again. Flatness was 
therefore in play - as an irreducible technical “fact” of painting - with all these 
totalizations, all of these attempts to make it a m e t a p h o r .243
The point to note here is not so much that Clark “gives flatness a kind of sociological
m e a n i n g ” 2 4 4  . left in this form ulation, the social sounds too external, and such
m eanings read as too imposed - but that he makes a tw ist on the hom e-ground of
M odernist theory itself. Modernist art practice, he claims, has an important and defining
component: it attempts to negate its metaphorical status - Pollock’s is a “work against
m etaphor” . Here Clark describes Pollock’s attempts to seek the “origin” of the sign, the
“first m om ent” of the “first” metaphor: “Painting had now to find its way back to the
ground of representation, to the moment when marks first stood for things other than
t h e m s e l v e s ” .245 To find “what it is that stands in the way of likeness” , Pollock’s marks
seek “ways of circling around likeness, ways of looking for likeness on the other side
of resemblance. And not finding it” .246 For the M odernist critics, C lark argues, these
very actions against metaphor are seen as the triumph of medium (for instance, paint and
canvas addressed to eyesight alone) against meaning, against metaphor and, on a more
restricted level, against l i k e n e s s . 247 For Clark, those same actions are proof of the
priority of the metaphorical relation itself:
O f course in a sense [m odernist painting] resisted the m etaphors, and the 
painters we most admire insisted also on it as an awkward em pirical quiddity; 
but the “also” is the key word here: there was no fact w ithout the metaphor, no 
medium without its being the vehicle of a complex act of m e a n i n g . 248
243. “Clement Greenberg’s Theory o f  Art", op. cit., p.58.
244. Charles Harrison. Essays on Art & Language, op. cit., p.228.
245. “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”, op. cit., p. 197.
246. Ibid., p.218.
247. This seem s to echo - albeit by negation, by the “work against” - the distinction made by Art & 
Language between the work o f representing and resembling. See, for exam ple, Art & Language, 
“Portrait o f  V.I. Lenin” (1980), in M odernism. Criticism . R ealism , op. cit., pp. 145-169; M ichael 
Baldwin, Charles Harrison, and Mel Ramsden, “Art History, Art Criticism and Explanation” (1981). 
Pollock and After, op. cit., pp.191-296; and Char les Harrison, “Introduction: Modernism, Problems and 
M ethods”, A 315, M odern Art and Modernism: Manet to Pollock, Introduction (units 1 -2), The Open 
University Press, 1984, pp.28-31.
248. “Clement Greenberg’s Theory o f Art”, op. cit., p.58.
90
W hat is here implicit becomes explicit in “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”:
In order to represent at all, I suppose, a series of marks in a picture have to be 
seen as standing for something beside themselves; they have to be construed 
m etaphorically.... M etaphor is inescapable, and what in any case would an exit 
from it be like?249
M etaphor, then, is now foregrounded as the very condition  of representation. The 
processes of representation, it would seem, necessarily em erge fro m  the state of 
metaphor. W ithout metaphor we cannot think representation; w ithout the mediation of 
m etaphor the text-context opposition itself cannot even be conceived. Having set out to 
find the processes of conversion and relation, what stands in-between background and 
foreground, text and context, Clark shows that the key m om ent of mediation, namely 
m etaphor, is in fact the first, or logically prior m om ent of the whole process of 
text-context articulation.2-5^  The self-sufficient status of the text in M odernist accounts is 
revealed as illusory, as nothing but the product of its very social belonging. Similarly, 
one m ust conclude that the attempts to reintegrate or prioritise context, despite their
249. “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”, op. cit., p. 199.
250. Clark’s approach stands out, but there are problems, not least with his tendency to mesh 
together the above distinctions; this seem s to be inadvertent, yet it is consistent with his concern to 
link the m icrocosm ic and macrocosmic. If we accept Hayden W hite's tropological typology, Clark's 
method may w ell rely on the organicism of synecdoche, which is, for W hite, a typically Hegelian 
strategy. However, this is also an oversimplification, for White describes a number o i tropic strategies 
in Hegel that are “held" by synecdoche only in the final analysis. (Note how this mirrors the debates on 
H eg el’s m ethod and its result). See Hayden W hite, M etah istory: the H is to rica l Im agination  in 
N ineteenth-C entury Europe, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, p.34. In the light o f this, it 
might be useful to reconsider Clark's mesh - though it would be a mistake sim ply to map on the 
pattern W hile sees in Hegel - let alone from "Hegel’s whole philosophy o f history" to the social history 
o f art.
In the end... it can be seen that H egel’s w hole philosophy o f  history led f r o m  an original 
Metaphorical characterization o f  the world-process through  a M etonym ic reduction and 
Synecdochic inflation o f the process in which its various possible m odes o f  relationship are 
explicated, to an Ironic comprehension o f  the ambiguity of the “meaning” of the process - until 
it came to rest, finally, in the more general Synecdochic identification o f the whole process as 
a Drama of essentially Comic significance, (p. 122)
Nevertheless, it is synecdoche which seem s to best sum up Clark’s initial attempts to bridge the "text” 
and “context” divide with metaphor: "With Synecdoche... a phenomenon can be characterized by using 
the part to sym bolize som e qu ality  presumed to inhere in the totality... (p.34) What we have are 
different kinds o f  “reductions or integrations” to the matter of Jackson Pollock’s abstraction. Adrian 
Rifkin, “Marx' Clarkism”, Art H istory , vol.8, no.4, December 1985, pp.488-495, argues that Clark’s 
dependence on the trope o f synecdoche "leads him ineluctably to a syncretic exegisis o f  the meaning of 
works of art” (p .49l).
oppositional stance tow ards M odernism , m ust be seen as follow ing from  some 
acceptance of this logic. Seen in this light, Pollock’s strivings to resist metaphor become 
exercises of im possibility - and rather grand ones at that. M etaphoricity cannot be 
eradicated when it is the condition of one’s activity. Paradoxically, Pollock’s work 
against m etaphor can only be achieved by multiplying the metaphors - a multiplication 
generated, Clark suggests, between two metaphoric poles: “figures of to tality” and 
“figures of dissonance”.
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Now it is clear that, treated without caution, these very m etaphoric poles could be 
opened onto a narrow formal interpretation, and reassimilated into a M odernist account 
for instance, in terms of the extent of the unifying or shattering of the pictorial field. The 
point, however, is not that any picture by Pollock is total, or is dissonant - it is not the 
“truth of Pollock’s practice” , Clark tells us - but rather that, within the paintings, there 
are functions of the metaphors of totality and dissonance.251 In other words, how ever 
apt the descriptions are on a formal level (and you don’t have to be particularly well 
trained in M odernist categories to “ see” them), they cannot be contained there. As 
simply formal characteristics they are insufficient, and meanings are generated “beyond” 
and “outside”:
Pollock’s project, as 1 see it, is exactly not to allow the figures of dissonance to 
hold sway, any more than the figures of totality. His painting is a work against 
metaphor - against any one of his pictures settling down inside a single
m etaphorical fram e of reference. He wishes to cross m etaphors, to block 
connotation by m ultiplying it. He intends so to accelerate the business of 
signifying that any one frame of reference will not fit. Figures of dissonance 
cancel out figures of totality; no metaphor will get hold of this picture’s standing 
for a world, though we think the picture does somehow stand for one: it has the 
requisite density.252
251. Clark avoids making a direct analogy between social contradiction and the metaphors o f  totality 
and dissonance. Instead these metaphoric poles are interpreted into the problems o f  language and the 
categories o f  thought - and Pollock’s struggling with the “grounds o f representation”. See “Jackson 
P ollock’s Abstraction”, op. cit.
252 . Ibid., p.201.
W hile the distinction from the Modernist account can be maintained, there still remains
scope for confusion, or, rather, slippage, in the Pollock essay. For instance, the word
“figure” drifts between a number of distinct meanings and functions: from the purely
optical or formal (as in “figure and ground”), through a substitute for “m etaphor” (as in
“figural”), to signifying the iconic (as in “figurative”). The latter two prove problematic,
particularly where Clark makes, but seems not to sustain, a distinction between the
“work against m etaphor” and the “work against likeness” - one which, he says, charts
his difference from Modernist accounts:253
A painting could be freed of all traces and afterimages of likeness, and still not 
do the... work against metaphor.... W e could have - no doubt we do have - a 
strictly “optical” , non-figurative abstract painting that nonetheless stood in a 
confirming relation to a world we might recognize - an inert relation - a relation 
to “ N ature” , say, in which nothing of that dismal category was in the least 
negated.254
The work against likeness has a limited power: we can easily envisage such work being 
done, and, moreover, being achieved - and it is work that has been well established in 
the histories of modernism. The work against metaphor is, by contrast, more com plex - 
we cannot im agine its “com pletion”. The work of denying m etaphor seem s to be 
something that can only be partial, temporary or a product of some wilful tunnel-vision, 
or intellectual “bracketing o f f ’ (of everything but the putative immediacy of opticality, 
say). The (would-be non-metaphoric) sign will always find itself reinvested (or, will 
alw ays re invest itself). This is all the more so once we take on board the 
all-encom passing notion that representation is necessarily m etaphoric, essentially a 
stand-in - be it for social values, iconic resemblance, the index of artistic presence, or 
w hatever. From this perspective the work against likeness is ju s t one part, ju s t one 
kind, of the work against metaphor; but where the one is a finite project, the other
253. The grounds o f  this distinction suggest som e interesting parallels with that made between  
transcription and transfiguration earlier in the discussion of Ideologiekritik. As representations, both 
categories mark a gap with that which they seek to represent, but transfiguration suggests a substantial 






C lark’s notion of metaphor, then, operates as the baseline of representation per se. The 
casting of Pollock’s practice as a work against metaphor, serves to move that practice 
onto the terrain of aporetic activity - a work built on an unresolvable contradiction - an 
insecurity, a continual restlessness, as Pollock is caught in the econom y of his own 
m etaphoric multiplication. But the problem insinuates itself into C lark’s analysis too. 
M etaphor - both in Clark’s description of Pollock and as a key methodological category 
for his analysis - has to be read as having a duality.255 In C lark’s own analysis, then, 
m etaphor can no longer simply function as “ the bridge”, the “relations between” - nor 
simply the “precondition” of, or prerequisite ground for - the text-context articulation 
since at the same time it acts as a reminder (or producer) of some radical disjunction. We 
are left, therefore, with som ething of a paradox.256 W hile the concept of m etaphor 
provides Clark with the means to mediate text with context, it seems at some deeper 
level to undermine this very function by effecting an inversion. So where Clark starts by 
asking questions of the relation of art to the social (how  does background becom e  
foreground?), he ends up with a moment of non-relation reinstated.257 Let me put this
255. However - and this is where the slippages could again start to multiply: metaphor is itself the 
trope operating through similarity, “likeness”, if  you will, but where the likeness is an equivalent ol 
values or qualities rather than simply iconic resemblance. The character ol' “metaphor”, both in Clark’s 
texts and in this chapter, has been a loose, generic, one - its status as “standing between" straying, and 
being allowed to stray, close to becoming a state o f  being. For a start, it becom es clear that metaphor, 
for Hayden White, does  have a dual operation: “In Metaphor (literally, “transfer”)... phenomenon can be 
characterized in terms o f their similarity to, and difference from, one another...” (W hite, op. cit., 34). 
More than just a “dual operation”, metaphor might be seen as analogous with the dialectical relation of 
identity and non-identity.
256. It is possible that “paradox” is not strictly the right word, although it might be, depending on 
how one assesses the “duality” that I describe in Clark. If, in the end, the two movements o f metaphor - 
of its structure o f identity and o f  non-identity - are comprehended as duality, disjunction, etc.. then Clark 
may be working with an antinomy. The issues of disjunction and dialectic will be discussed in Chapter 
3. For the moment, though, we might flag the similarities in structure between the dual operation of 
metaphor in Clark and Adorno’s concept o f mimesis, or the transcriptive/transfigurative aspects of 
consciousness in Ideologiekritik.
257. Indeed, if we return to Image o f  the People we find that Clark effectively prem ises artistic 
activity on non-identity: there is, he argues, a non-identity between the relation of the artist to aesthetic 
tradition and to ideology, "there is a gap between the artist’s social experience and his activity of formal 
representation” (Image o f  the People , op. cit., pp.12-13).
more explicitly: we are faced with two aporia, one in C lark’s object (what he attributes 
to Pollock: the negation of metaphor unravels as the m ultiplication of m etaphor), and 
one in his own methodological project (the search for mediations unravels as the return 
to disjunction).
IV. The “Permanently Unresolved Dialectic”
In his article “The conditions of artistic creation”, Clark, for all his optimism about the 
possibilities o f the Hegelian habit of mind, leaves us feeling that a turn to dialectics will 
be no sim ple panacea. W hat it can do, it is suggested, is bring us back into critical 
d ialogue with w hat he calls “ the fundam ental questions” : nam ely, “ the nature of 
‘representation’” and “ the conditions of consciousness”.258 But, we are told, there will 
be no easy answ ers: we will be on a “territory beyond ideology” where we will be 
susceptible to the “old concepts”. 2$9 W hat Clark seems to index is the problem  of our 
categories of thought. In a discussion following a delivery of the Pollock paper Clark 
remarked that we will not “ever magically escape” the metaphorical divisions of inside 
and outside, text and context, before and after, and so fo rth .260 In fact, we cannot 
escape those very divisions which the social history of art had hoped to avoid. The 
difficulty of speaking the mediations, then, is really the difficulty of speaking without 
recourse to, and without the fossilisation of, those analytical oppositions.
In the Pollock essay the sense of impasse is thoroughly foregrounded. Even “ the bad 
dream of modernism ” can be read as impasse at the level of practices of resistance and
258. “The condition of artistic creation”, op. cit., p.561.
259. Ibid., p.562.
260. S ee the d iscussion  follow ing the presentation o f “Jackson P o llock ’s A bstraction” in 
Reconstructing M odernism , op. cit., p. 243; and cf. the inescapability o f  metaphor more generally, as 
discussed in the previous section. This can also be compared to H egel's famous discussion o f the 
inescapability o f  abstraction in the Phenomenology - specifically the inescapable abstraction of deictic 
language, a form o f language that attempts to deal with particularity. This will be returned to in Chapter 
3, although it should be recalled that this question is intimately related to with the question o f  negation.
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refusal (and their assim ilation, or adm inistration). Impasse is also the substance of
P o llo ck ’s practice as described through the contrad ictions of, am ong others,
metaphorical denial and multiplication, figures of dissonance and totality. But impasse is
also foregrounded as a question of history - as a problem  of representation within
capitalist culture. As Clark puts it:
P o llo ck ’s painting in its best period... is contrad ictory ; it lives on its 
contrad ictions, thrives on them, com es to nothing because of them . Its 
contradictions are the ones that any abstract painting will encounter, as long as it 
is done within bourgeois society, in a culture that cannot grasp - for all its wish 
to do so - the social reality of the Sign. That is to say, on the one hand, abstract 
painting m ust set itself the task of cancelling Nature, ending painting’s relation 
to the world of things. It will make a new order to experience, it will put its faith 
in the sign, in the medium, it will have painting be a kind of writing at last, and 
therefore write a script none of us has read before. But on the other hand, 
painting discovers that none of this is achievable with the means it has.261
From this perspective, the “delectable impasse” of Pollock’s painting is itself a metaphor 
for the status of representation or language under bourgeois social relations.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that, in “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”, Clark draws 
on H egel’s concept of “the unhappy consciousness”.262 This concept, despite being,
261. “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”, op. cit., p.221.
262. The theme o f  the unhappy consciousness recurs in the literature. Fredric Jameson describes 
Shklovsky as a historical form o f the unhappy consciousness, a description which echoes back on the 
theories o f  the avant-garde. With his concept o f “bal ing the device”, Jameson argues, Shklovsky treats 
his own time as “the new”, an approach which inevitably leads to the wearing out ol this new, and. in 
short, “to on e’s own death” . See Fredric Jameson, The Prison House o f  L anguage, op. cit., p.90. He 
later treats Barthes as the unhappy consciousness “on the stylistic level" (p.209). See also Richard 
Sennett. A uthority  (1980), Faber & Faber. 1993. where the unhappy consciousness and negation are 
discussed in relation to emotional and social bonds. Donald Kuspit (1981) describes modernism ’s drive 
to “presentism” - he has Greenberg in mind - as its “unhappy consciousness”: an unresolved paradox or 
pseudo-dialectic of, on the one hand, the pure immediacy of material, and, on the other, the claim to an 
abstract openness to any possibility. See Donald B. Kuspit. “The Unhappy C onsciousness of 
Modernism”, Artforum , vol.19, January 1981, pp.53-57. “The aura o f openness degenerates into a felt 
void, and material presence fades into matter-of-fact giveness” (p.53). He cites Greenberg as the key 
example o f  this “quasi-Marxist" materialism, which treats “art-as-making to an extreme”, and dispenses 
with the unconscious or preconscious elements as a sort ol unessential and dispensable ideological- 
superstructural surface noise (p.53). Here, Kuspit continues, “purity is defined as much by what it 
negates as by what it affirms, and... its self-certainty or affirmative character rests on a foundation o f  
uncertainty, a shaky negation” (pp.53-4). Moreover, the drive to literal purity results in unhappiness, 
because modernism “is haunted by the desire to communicate beyond itse lf ’; its inward turn to “the 
language o f  art” being met by its awareness o f  “its uselessness for com m unication; its antidote 
(literalness and purity) to the insecurities o f the present - “the flux o f  historical experience and the
for the m ost part, confined to the footnotes, is no minor player. Indeed, what Hegel has 
to say on the unhappy consciousness is, for Clark, no less than “ the essen tia l 
fra m ew o rk  for an understanding of modernism  and its perm anently unresolved  
dialectic” - it best sums up Pollock’s p r a c t i c e . 263 But, perhaps, it is also the essential 
fram ework for understanding Clark’s approach. It is a question of analysis,perhaps the 
problem of interpretation, which itself starts to live out some condition of impasse.
The unhappy consciousness can be loosely defined as “the consciousness of self as a 
dual-na tu red , m erely  con trad ic to ry  being” .264 But the aw areness of that self- 
contradiction is limited, and the unhappy consciousness “ is not as yet explicitly aware 
that this [duality] is its essential nature, or that it is the unity of both [parts]” .265 This 
produces a continual striving for reconciliation of one part with its other - a striving to 
unite with (or destroy) an other that is always already itself. In a sense, the unhappy 
consciousness is aporia par excellence - antinomy, impasse, difficulty. But it suggests 
more: a persistence, a continual going at, or over, a problem, a circling - and this despite 
half knowing the impossibility of solution or end (at least, in the term s at its disposal). 
Seen thus, the dynam ics are more far-reaching, more intractable, more involved  than 
any “ undecidable” , and the historian or interpreter cannot extricate her/himself from that 
circling.
For Clark, the “perm anently unresolved dialectic” of m odernism  is the problem  of 
bourgeois society and its inability to recognise “ the social reality of the Sign”.266 The 
difficulty  com es, though, in thinking through to what a “recognition” of the social
relativity o f  meaning and com m unication” (p.54) - turning, like the ph a rm a k o n , into an insidious 
poison, and leading to "the dead end of presentness” (p.55).
263. “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction”, op. cit., p.234.
264. Phenom enology, op. cit., p. 126.
265. Ibid.
266. Cf. Sartre: "Our historical task, at the heart o f  this polyvalent world, is to bring closer the 
moment when History will have only one meaning, when it w ill tend to be dissolved in the concrete 
men who will make it in common". See Search fo r  a M ethod, op. cit.. p.90.
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reality o f the Sign could amount; in what sense might it “reconcile” the sign and the 
social, text and context? In my reading of Clark, the phrase refers to nothing more than 
the inability to see what already exists (returning us to the discussion of Ideologiekritik). 
So, how might some post-bourgeois society have a capacity to speak the mediations that 
m ake a Jackson Pollock drip “ social” in any more than a brute-fact-ish way? This 
becom es C lark’s problem - not simply one for Pollock, bourgeois society, m odernism  
or M odernist theory. Never mind the bourgeoisie, this problem affects even those who 
can  “recognize the social reality of the Sign”, or, at least, actively seek it out. 
Contradictions abound: m etaphor’s duality emerges, but only half recognised; C lark’s 
focusing upon mediation, and the desire to speak it, seeming to return us, once again, to 
square one of the interpretive project.267
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261. Indeed, as Clark predicted in 19"74, the issues raised by his work do have something o f  the deja 
vu, som ething perhaps, o f  those “old concepts”. Oddly, perhaps, the conduit for this seems to be 
Bakhtin. It would seem that Clark’s use o f Bakhtin facilitates a drift from a performative and dialectical 
sem iology onto this terrain  of aesthetic work. One important concept derived trom Bakhtin’s dialogism  
is “anticipation: the anticipation o f a reply to the utterance, the pitching or angling o f the utterance into 
an arena known to be “charged with value” (cited “Jackson Pollock’s Abstraction", op. cit., p. 177). The 
utterance is therefore made o f “contextual" material, “text” is always “already bespoken". Clark’s use of 
Bakhtin, as we have already seen, is to enable a “way of thinking beyond" the conceptual antinomies ol 
inside/outside, before/after, etc. The utterance as anticipation provides Clark with a model for thinking 
the inside/outside and the before/after o f  Pollock’s paintings. Anticipation, in P ollock ’s “specially  
elaborate, pondered” case is an anticipation of the bad dream of Cecil Beaton. It is conceivable that this 
m ight generate abstraction’s fear o f  becoming mere decoration, and hence its drive to “seriousness” (the 
attention to the “grounds o f representation”). But, we are left, nevertheless, with a rather grand claim for 
absuact painting, one that has it in a “dialogue” on a historical scale.
W e are also faced with the question o f the interiorising o f this bad dream - with the question of 
how anticipation “enters” the painting. What happens, if  you like, is that Pollock’s paintings are made 
to “prefigure” history. In the radical aesthetic tradition prefiguration, by its anticipation o f the future 
possibility o f  subject/object reconciliation, acts as a reminder o f its current im possibility. Here, the 
artistic sym bol is that prefiguration. Clark’s anticipation, however, prefigures not som e radical or 
utopian future o f  a different social order (and thereby mediating such desires in or through art), but only 
the immediate tomorrow o f the Vogue photos - a tomorrow o f continued unhappy consciousness, o f 
continued inability to recognise the social reality o f the sign. Pollock’s abstraction is written, by Clark, 
as a sym bol which is a “reconciliation” with “the social” o f  the existing order, and is thus “falsely  
reconciled”, to use som e Adomian terminology, a “false sublation".
Consequently, there are some odd things going on. Firstly, the dialogic (via “anticipation”) is 
inflated temporally from a process o f language between two speakers (conversing sim ultaneously) to 
Jackson Pollock, painting Autumn Rhythm, and trying to outmanoeuvre C ecil Beaton. M eanwhile, the 
notion o f  prefiguration (via “interiorisation”) is reduced in its temporal scope. Usually, the dialogic and 
the aesthetic occupy the opposite temporal modes: dialogic operating in a more limited way, aesthetics 
claiming to traverse the particular and the general, the now and the future.
The m otif of impasse, then, pervades C lark’s work in two ways: increasingly as the 
object o f his deliberations, and also as an on-going condition o f them - a condition 
which is more and more foregrounded. This is easily said, of course, but it is not so 
simple to define the relation between the two. Abstraction, Clark suggests, has become 
“ a little battleground of basic cultural p ie t i e s ” , 268 and paintings act as em blem s for 
com peting truth claims. In which case, it would seem abstraction just “ lends itse lf’ as a 
vacant ground for such critical projections - thus, not only running the risk of becoming 
(non-apocalyptic) wallpaper for Vogue models, but also, it seems, of becom ing the 
backdrop for a form of ideological struggle performed by critics. N evertheless, we are 
left wondering if maybe there were aspects of abstraction which did confront (in a soi't 
o f m uddled way) the “fundamental questions” of representation and if m aybe we can 
still be invited to consider the relation of language and consciousness, and, also, how 
these relate to history.
The permanently unresolved dialectic: this is the manner of C lark’s final “resolution” , or
reading, of The Wooden Horse as “bourgeois society’s inability to recognize the social
reality of the Sign”.269 Of the appearance of the wooden head, Clark writes:
So let the Figure be in the picture on purpose - in the negative, taking the lordly, 
footling, infantile form that is the best (or worst) that painting can do with it. Let 
it be there as negation, as the sign of antinomy, not dialectic. For the grounds 
are lacking on which the contraries of bourgeois art - its claim  to Nature and its 
wish for the free play of the signifier - could be dialectically reconciled.270
Both sides of the antinomy of bourgeois art - the claim to an identity of sign and reality 
and the claim  to absolute non-identity - are attendant upon, or articulate, the work 
against metaphor. Clark is no doubt correct to say that these cannot yet be reconciled.
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268. Ibid., p .224.
269. This point might also be considered through the question o f  allegory and symbol. Symbol and 
allegory in relation to negation is the subject o f  Chapter 3. See Chris Riding, ’’Bonjour M. Clark, 
Bonjour M. Fried, Jackson Speaking”, unpublished paper presented at the Association o f Art Historians 
Annual Conference, Leeds, 1992.
270. "Jackson Pollock's Abstraction”, op. cit., p.222.
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C lark’s concern to fully mediate reflects a desire to find the identity of text and context, 
(which is not, I em phasise, to say that he seeks an immediate identity). N evertheless, 
the m om ent of non-identity keeps reasserting itself; and strangely, despite all his 
concern with negation, resistance, and refusal, and with difficulty and discom fort 
generally, he seems somewhat reticent - a touch uneasy - with this return. As such, 
having the wooden horse’s head figure “ as negation, as the sign of antinom y, not 
dialectic” reads as somewhat compensatory, perhaps as a displacement of some deeper 
m om ent of non-identity. This assertion of negation as antinom y m ight read as the 
flip-side of the desire (yet impossibility) for full mediation. Here there are echoes of 
“dialectics at a standstill” , with Pollock (for Clark) akin to Schonberg (for Adorno). 
Both tend to lose the movement, the motive, of negation - reducing it to antinom y, 
hypostatising it, abandoning (or having to abandon) its determ inate action and the 
attendant force movement. The question remains whether the “both” just mentioned are 
Pollock and Schonberg (and the problem s encountered in their practice, correctly 
described by Clark and Adorno); or whether the “both” are Clark and Adorno, and the 
problem s encountered in their interpretive processes? This is not ju s t a m atter of 
Pollock’s abstract paintings at an impasse, but also about a mom ent of intransigence in 
interpretation itself - which is where it may be described as Clark’s dilemma.
O f course, this could be put in a more obvious fashion: the grappling with the structures 
o f aporia and the unhappy consciousness might be read as the conceptual reflex of social 
contradictions. But the question concerns the kind of “reductions or integrations” that 
are m ade.271 The explanation of that ever-circling aporia may be pushed further. There
271. Those contradictions can be, and have been, given historical placing. It is quite possible to read 
the w hole - P ollock ’s practice and  Clark’s interpretive framework, narrative devices, strategies and 
struggling - as an allegory o f a set o f  political aspirations and disappointments. However, put thus, it 
personalises what may be, in different ways, characteristic o f various generations o f intellectuals: in the 
fallout post-Popular Front and post-’68 - a fallout panning back and encom passing other lost moments 
1923, 1917 and 1871; arguably also 1848. If earlier we encountered the attempts to make art with the 
“absence” o f  the bourgeoisie, then here we seem to have a problem concerning the “absence" o f the 
proletariat as agent - which, sincc the interwar period, and as an absence/presence, has made itself more
m ight be another weighting to that moment of non-identity which keeps popping up, 
and this may well be the “fundam ental question’ that lies at the heart o f the 
intransigence: the non-identity of consciousness and being, thought and reality - what 
Lukacs referred to as “ the unbridgeable abyss between concept and reality” and the 
‘“ pernicious chasm ’ of the present” between subject and object .-1- Is this the condition 
o f consciousness, and therefore the condition of our rep resen ta tions, o f our 
thought-appropriation of the world, and of interpretation - of how we figure that world 
to ourselves? It is here, then, where Clark’s dilemma ultimately takes us.
100
W e seem to be presented with a twofold sense of “impossibility” : it is both the historical
impasse of our time, and that fundamental moment of non-identity which cannot be fully
m ediated, for all the wish to do so. The articulation of both the present and a distant
past, with an eye on a beyond, has already been encountered in A dorno’s aesthetic; and
that distant past, for Adorno at least, continues as a remote possibility of resistance. I do
not wish to push this too far; C lark’s account is not reducible to Adorno - his em phasis
on m ediation is more Sartrean - and it is perhaps better to say that they share certain
resources. Susan Buck-Morss has remarked:
Adorno argued that the autonomous, spontaneous m om ent of cognition lay in 
refusing to acquiesce to the resulting fetishization of thought in which subject 
was split from  object, mind from  matter. The subject had to get out of
insistently felt on intellectual questions. The danger with this formulation - as much as it is necessary 
to say because it remains our inescapable horizon, or what Istvan M eszaros calls “our inescapable 
historical predicam ent” - is its susceptibility to triteness. See Istvan M eszaros, "The Cunning ol 
History in Reverse Gear'', Radical Philosophy, no.42, Winter/Spring 1986, p.9.
272. See Georg Lukacs, H istory & Class C on sciousn ess, op. cit.. p .203, p .204. He went on to 
note (in part o f  a discussion on the process o f Becom ing) that “every attempt to overcom e the duality 
dialectically in logic... is doomed to failure”. Of course, on this last point, Lukacs posed the matter in 
much stronger terms, for he was talking o f “a system o f thought shipped o f  every concrete relation to 
existence” (p.203). This is not an accusation one would throw in Clark's direction, but we are back at 
the heart o f  what it is to interpret, and to the binds on that process. Lukacs marshalled Hegel, and an 
agency, to his strategies for negotiating this abyss, a strategy that, for today’s intellectuals, itself adds 
another dimension to the circling in “impossibility", another ring to consciousness’ unhappiness.
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sub jectiv ity ’s box by giving itself over to the object, entering into it, as 
Benjamin had stated in his Trauerspiel b o o k .273
There is something of this in the ambiguities of negation in C lark’s work, although I 
suspect the transactions between method and object are less program m atic than they 
w ere for Adorno. But neither should Clark be turned entirely into a passive/innocent 
actor in the situation, for he displays a marked self-consciousness about m atters of 
dialectical interpretation in general, and negation in particular.
To repeat the points made earlier, but with different examples: the locus of contradiction 
in the following comments by Clark is variable. Clark remarks that the texts encountered 
by the art historian often contradict themselves rather than recognising contradictions in 
the ir object of study, and goes on to say that “ the facts of d iscon tinu ity  and 
contradiction” constitute the object of art h i s t o r y .  274  in addition, he argues that the 
historian should look for the gaps and hiatuses in such texts (for exam ple, in those of 
C ourbet’s critics), and that Courbet exploited the disjunction that existed between 
bourgeois and feudal popular representations, “ images with a dual public, and a double 
m e a n i n g ” .275 Similarly, Clark’s argument about the concrete and the abstract, explicitly 
advanced in relation to the method of study, is made, in addition, for the object of 
C lark’s s t u d y . 276 My point is not just that Clark favours particular tropes or figures, but
273. See Susan Buck-Morss, op. cit., p.85. She continues: “Mimetic transformation can be seen as 
a reversal o f  Kantian subjectivity. The creativity of the latter consisted in the subject's projecting onto 
experience its own a priori forms and categories, absorbing the object into itself. But Adorno’s subject 
let the object take the lead; it formed the object only in the sense o f tra n s forming it into a new  
m odality” (p.88). Benjamin is contrasting “the view o f the object, resolved in the idea" with the 
empathetic method where the subject projects their subjective state into the work. See Waller Benjamin, 
The Origin o f German Tragic D ram a , op. cit., p.42.
274. "Courbet the Communist and the Temple Bar Magazine”, op. cit., pp.34-5.
275. Image o f  the People, op. cit., p.158.
276. 01' M illet’s Ruth and Boaz, he writes: “Alm ost alw ays it involves a m ove towards the 
particular, away from the approximate sublime. Often it means putting things in opposition that started 
o ff  in harmony.... It involves keeping anonymous gestures in tension with actual faces” (The Absolute 
B o u rg e o is , op. cit., p.97). O f Daumier, he notes: “The old abstractions o f Daum ier’s art - France, 
Republic, Charter, Constitution - had worked because they were confronted by the details o f  a real 
politics, one he knew at first hand. Now that he did not, the abstractions multiplied and the politics 
became increasingly second-hand; a politics o f ‘figures’ and 'personalities’, not a politics o f  the streets"
that there are movements between subject and object, and that these result from pursuing 
a dialectical inteipretation. This movement is, on the whole, desirable - it makes for 
m ore interesting work - and, for all the criticisms that are levelled against the grand 
totalising schemas of dialectics or the mode of its “reductions and integrations” , there is 
a way in which such work is far less “controlling” of its m aterials than its critics often 
are of theirs. This is a debatable point, and, in the end, contentious for a whole range of 
approaches. Just as contentious are the assessments about how successfully or not 
C lark ’s version of this is... or A dorno’s... or.... For the m om ent though I think the 
obligation is on articulating the general realm of the problem  - and this is one of 
negation. Having said that I find the process described by Buck-M orss desirable, its 
results are not necessarily satisfactory; indeed, I should add that it is always in danger of 
self-implosion, always treading a line with incoherence. This is no incidental matter. An 
argument of my thesis is that this danger must be vastly exacerbated when “ negation” or 
“negativity” - key moments or movements of that dialectic - become the object of study.
The pow er and work of the Understanding, Hegel wrote in paragraph 32 of his
Phenomenology, is the activity of dissolution, the dissolution of an im mediate relation,
the breakdown of elements or moments - their acquisition of some freedom  from one
another. This, he argued, reveals “ the tremendous pow er of the negative” . Such is its
pow er, such is the “devastation” , that “death” is threatened. Im m ediate unity is
destroyed in order for Understanding to progress, but that m om ent of devastation risks
losing the idea to the unreal. To step back from this risk, however, risks more:
But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from  death and keeps itself 
untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and m aintains itself 
in it. It wins its U'uth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this 
power, not as something positive, which closes its eyes to the negative, as when 
we say of something that it is nothing or is false, and then, having done with it, 
turn away and pass on to something else; on the contrary Spirit is this power 
only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying with
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(p .107); or, o f the mid-19c. ait public, he writes that it became “either too fixed and concrete a presence 
or too abstract and unreal a concept” (Image o f the People , op. cit., p. 15).
the negative is the magical power that converts it into being.277
For A dorno, H egel’s “ program of self-yielding” to the object was never realised 
because “ the Hegelian thought finds satisfaction in itse lf’; and he goes on to argue that 
“im m ersion in particularity, that extreme enhancement of dialectical im m anence, must 
also be the freedom  to step out of the object, a freedom which the identity claim  cuts 
short” .
If  thought really yielded to the object, if its attention were on the object, not its 
category, the very objects would start talking under the lingering eye.278
Nevertheless, the question remains: what happens on this edge, when one decides to 
look the negative in the face?
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277. Hegel. Phenom enology, op. cit, p.19. We might compare Clark’s account of modernism, cited 
earlier: “it presents itself as a work of interminable and absolute decomposition, a work which is always 
pushing •medium’ to its limits - to its ending - to the point where it breaks or evaporates or turns back 
into mere unworked material. That is the form in which medium is retrieved or reinvented” (“Clement 
Greenberg's Theory of Art”, op. cit., p .59).
278. Adorno, N egative D ialectics, op. cit., pp.27-8. Marx Wartofsky also doubts whether Hegel's 
own thought realised this. D istinguishing the external approach to dialectic of Socrates to the 
internal/immanent approach of Plato, Marx and Feuerbach, he remarks that “it is not clear to me that 
Hegel subjects h im se lf  to an engagement in the dialectic, in his own thought". See Marx W. 
W artofsky, Feuerbach, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p.9.
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Chapter 2
LOOKING THE NEGATIVE IN THE FACE
‘W hat is B azarov?’ Arkady smiled. ‘Would you like me to tell you, uncle, 
what he is exactly?’
‘Please do, nephew .’
‘He is a nihilist!’ , , .  , . ,
‘A w hat?’ asked Nikolai Petrovich, while his brother lifted his knife in the air
with a small piece of butter on the tip and remained motionless.
‘He is a nihilist,’ repeated Arkady.
‘A nihilist,’ said Nikolai Petrovich. ‘That comes from the Latin nihil - nothing, 
I imagine; the term must signify a man who... who recognizes nothing?
‘Say - who respects nothing,’ put in Pavel Petrovich, and set to work with the
butter again.
‘W ho looks at everything critically,’ observed Arkady.
‘Isn’t that exactly the same thing?’ asked Pavel Petrovich.
‘No its not the same thing. A nihilist is a person who does not take any
principle for granted, however much that principle niay be teveied .......
‘Yes. It used to be Hegelians, and now there are nihilists....’
(Ivan Turgenev)1
* * *
The relation between the avant-garde and negation is played out in a very self-conscious 
m anner in the arguments put forward by the historians and theotists based at Venice s 
School o f A rchitecture from the 1960s onwards. Best known in the English speaking 
world from  translations of their work are Manfredo Tafuri and - to a far lesser extent - 
Massimo Cacciari. 2 The work of both is widely regarded as difficult, largely, I believe,
1. Ivan Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, Penguin, 1975, p.94.
2. Tafuri was the director of the Instituto di storia from 1968 (from 1976 the Department ol 
Historical and Critical Analysis) at the Instituto Universitario di Architettura di Venezia until his death 
in 1994 Cacciari was appointed in this department in the early ‘70s, but had been active in factory- 
based agitations and an editor on leftist journal since 1968. He has subsequently become mayor ol 
Venice and is professor of aesthetics. The School has also been the base for Francesco Dal Co.
Tafuri has been widely translated into English, and his work has a high protile in architectuial 
studies, enough so that Sherer (see below) can. in his acknowledgements, refer to “an on-going.d iscorso  
Tafuriano" Tafuri's major works include: Theories and H istory o f  Architecture (1968), Granada, 1980; 
Architecture and Utopia. Design and Capitalist D evelopm ent, MIT. 1976 (originally published in 1973 
in Italy, and based on a 1969 essay for the journal C o n tro p ia n o )\ M odern  A rch itec tu re /1 ,  and 
Modern/Architecture/2 (1976), Faber & Faber, 1986, co-authored with Francesco Dal Co; The Sphere
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due to the “dialectical” movements that their analyses make. 3 Because of this, and the 
relative unfamiliarity of their material outside departments of architecture, I shall spend 
more time in exegesis than in the previous chapter, but I also intend that my account 
should establish an analytical structure for addressing their work, and, in particular, 
their approach to negation. I shall not, for instance, become involved in disputing any of 
their claims for architecture or the avant-garde except in so far as this might contribute to 
understanding their use of negation; and I shall concentrate especially on the writing on 
the avant-garde rather than on specifically architectural concerns.
T afu ri’s work in particular challenged  the ideology of avant-gardism , regarded the 
appropriation of avant-gardist rhetoric by radicals with suspicion, and questioned the 
avan t-garde’s own adoption of em ancipatory claim s.4 A ccordingly, avant-gard ist
and the L abyrin th : Avant-G ardes and Architecture from  Piranesi to the 1970s (1980), M IT, 1987; 
H istory o f  Italian Architecture, 1944-1985  (1986), MIT, 1989; Venice and the Renaissance  (1985), 
MIT, 1989. There is far less o f Cacciari’s work in English (although plenty in German, French, and 
Spanish). Architecture and Nihilism: On the Philosophy o f Modern Architecture, Yale University Press, 
1993, brings together a range essays from the 1970s to the early 1980s and a new epilogue. Epilogue: 
On the Architecture of N ihilism ”. Also in English is "Eupalinos or Architecture , O p p o sitio n s , 21,
1980, pp.106-17, and The N ecessary Angel (1984), Stale University New York Press, 1994.
On the Venice School see the following article by one of the fold: Paolo M orachiello, “The 
Department o f Architectural History. A Detailed Description”, A rchitectural Design  , 55, 516, 1985, 
pp.68-71 (Profile 59: “School of Venice”). Probably the best all-round introduction is one which 
foregrounds the political and intellectual dimensions of C acciari’s project: Patrizia Lombardo, 
“Introduction: The Philosophy of the City”, in Cacciari, Architecture and Nihilism , op. cit., pp.ix-lviii. 
This is the only piece, to my knowledge, on Cacciari, but also situates the activities ol Taluri. Writings 
on Tafuri are more frequent, and most frequently critical reviews. See: Yve-Alain Bois, "On Manfredo 
T afuri’s Theories et histoire de l ’architecture. O p p o sitio n s , 11, W inter 1977. p p .118-123; Roger 
Scruton, “ In and out of history”, Times L iterary Supplement, July 25, 1980, pp.847-848; Adrian D. 
Rifkin “Theories and H istory o f Architecture by Manfredo Tafuri , Art H istory , vol.4, no.3, September
1981, p.349; Tomas Llorens, “Manfredo Tafuri: Neo-Avant-Garde and History", Architectural Design  
Profile: On the M ethodology o f  Architectural H istory, 1981, pp.83-94; Fredric Jameson. "Architecture 
and the Critique if Ideology” (1985), The Ideologies o f  Theory: E ssays 1971-86. V o l.2 : Syntax of 
H isto ry , Routledge, 1988, pp.35-60. All these texts - with the exception of Scruton’s - seem to be 
engaged in the debates, somehow wrapped up in the same scene of concerns. Two more recent pieces 
tend To a more academic address and to intellectual archaeology, and echo a number of academic forumsin 
North America focused on Tafuri's writing. They are, nevertheless, very valuable: Helene Lipstadt and 
Harvey Mendelsohn, “Philosophy, Histoiy, and Autobiography: Manfredo Tafuri and the ‘Unsurpassed 
Lesson' of Le Corbusier”, A ssem blage  22, 1994, pp.58-103; Daniel Sherer, “Tafuri’s Renaissance: 
Architecture, Representation, Transgression, Assem blage 28, 1996, pp.34-45.
3 I scare-quote the word "dialectical’’ for, as we shall see, the application of the term to their work
may be contentious - both trom their own position, and from that oi their critics.
4. In this sense his position is not too dissimilar to Hadjinicolaou’s which has been discussed
above.
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negation was not a once radical thing which had unfortunately been “appropriated” by
capitalism ’s com mercial and political machinery - it was not “armed vision disarm ed
nor “w eapon” becom e “ style” ; and nor was it som ething which m ight usefully be
reclaimed by historiography for its current disciplinary battles. Rather, the negativity of
the avant-garde had, from the outset, been wrapped up with capitalism . Cacciari s
em phasis is to map this relation through German cultural, sociological and econom ic
thought, again revealing a sort of coming-to-being of modern capital and its cultural
existence. Fredric Jameson introduces Tafuri’s account as:
... a powerful indictment of... “protopolitical” impulses in high m odernism  (the 
“ U topian” substitution of cultural politics for politics proper, the vocation to 
transform  the world by transforming its forms, space, or language). Tafuri is, 
however, no less harsh in his anatomy of the negative, dem ystifying, critical 
vocation of the various m odernism s... whereby the instrum entaliz ing  and 
desacralizing tendencies of capital itself are ultimately realized through just such 
dem olition work by the thinkers and artists of the modern m ovem ent. Their 
“anticapitalism ” therefore ends up laying the basis for the total bureaucratic 
organization and control of late capitalism....5
This, then, was no retrieval exercise, no salvaging of the avant-garde s negative 
(radical) moment.
But despite Tafuri’s and Cacciari’s criticism of negation, negation was nevertheless to 
becom e very central to their own method and argument. This statem ent is liable to be 
m isunderstood, for their use of negation does not mean that they said no to many 
things, nor that they successively sought to outmanoeuvre - or to lead - methodological 
fashions (in the way that people often see the avant-gardes successively overthrowing 
one another). W ithout anticipating the chapter’s unfolding, it can be said that it rehearses 
some similar points about subject/object transitions addressed at the end of the pievious 
chapter. As before, these matters are entwined with an em ancipatory politics - here, 
specifically those of that section of the Italian Marxist far-left known as autonomisti or 
operaista (autonom ists or workerists), and, once again, the concept o f negation is
5. See Jameson. Postm odernism , op. cit., pp.60-1.
w rapped up with these. This was a form ation which decisively tefused  to accept 
reform ism  or any associated illusions of social dem ocratic inteivention. Some of the 
twists through which this politic  renders itself as nihilism lie at the coie of this chaptei, 
tw ists which I hope to clarify through its part in the analysis of architecture and the 
avant-garde.6 The point is that this trajectory, which,at its far end, engages the materials 
o f ina tionalism , is here the product of some thinkers who w ete not oblivious to 
negativ ity ’s dialectic o f reason and unreason, nor to its place in the avant-gaide
heritage.7
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S E C T IO N  ONE: TH E M E T R O P O L IS ,  THE PL A N  & TH E  
AVANT-GARDE
I. The Metropolis, Or, “The Intrinsic Negativeness O f  The Large City”* 
The concept of the M etropolis plays a major part in the thought of Tafuii and Cacciaii,
6 If this sounds like an account of the route from 60s radicalism  to some lorm ot 
postmodernism - as might the critique of the avant-garde and the compromising of negation, or the 
opposition to Universal Histoiy - one should beware, for Tafuri and Cacciari have distanced themselves 
from the claims of postmodernism. See, for example. H istory o f  Italian A rch itec tu re , op. cit., P l 99, 
and “There is no criticism, only history” , Design Book Review , vol.9. Spring 1986, pp.8-11. Tafuri s 
critique o f the avant-gardes should not be confused with that emanating from the advocates ol 
postmodernism. Jam eson's characterisation of Tafuri as anti-modernist and  anti-postmodernist comes 
closer to the truth, although even this has to be handled with care. See Jameson, Postm odernism , op. 
cit., pp.60-62. The approach taken by Tafuri and Cacciari is rooted in a socio-economic analysis which 
differentiates a base from a superstructure; their perspective on the Enlightenment is more dialectical 
than condemnatory; postmodernism’s appropriation of emancipatory critique tails prey to the myths ot 
substitutionalism which they reject. Tafuri remarks that postmodernism lends to obstruct questioning, 
and presents matters as resolved, as if "we are already beyond (post)” (History o f Italian Architecture, op. 
cit., p. 199). See also his criticisms of semiotics, rhizomes, and Derridean difference in 'Ihe Spheie and 
the Labyrinth, op. cit., p .l.
7 ’ But before thinking that this opposition of rational and irrational is an easy one, or one which 
presupposes the outcome, one might want to bear in mind what Trotsky said about the question of 
artistic form: “One must judge [the question of artistic form] not with one’s reason, which does not go 
beyond formal logic, but with one's whole mind, which includes the irrational, insofar as it is alive and 
vital” (Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution, RedWords, 1991, p. 173).
8. Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p. 119.
and is central to their understanding of the avant-gardes. As Tafuri writes, it was the 
M etropolis “from whose reality the avant-garde drew its very existence, which was the 
real proving ground for all its proposals”.9 It is Cacciari, in particular, who develops the 
question of the M etropolis, a discussion which is worked from the late ’60s through 
analyses of G erm an sociological thought. Negation is the central category of this 
exploration of critical theory, in which the crucial loci are figures such as N ietzsche, 
W eber, Simmel, and Benjamin.
In his 1973 essay “The D ialectics of the Negative and the M etropolis” , Cacciari, 
d iscussing S im m el’s “The M etropolis and M ental L ife” (1903), establishes “ the 
M etropolis” as a figure for the “ life” of capitalism - its life as the abstract, general form 
of the rationalisation of social relations.10 Simmel addressed “the adaptations made by 
the personality in its adjustment to the forces that lay outside of it” , a m atter discussed 
by way of the contrast between metropolitan and small town or rural ind iv iduals.11 
Rationalisation, Cacciari says, is “a process that abstracts from the personal and rebuilds 
upon subjectivity as calculation, reason, and interest” . 12 In other words, the M etropolis 
points to the effects o f rationalisation which go beyond the realm  o f production 
relations, invading the most intimate pores of daily existence and the psyche.13
In the Metropolis the speed of innovation and change grows exponentially:
Every dynamic extension becomes a preparation not only for a similar extension 
but rather for a larger one and from every thread which is spun out of it there 
continue, growing as out of themselves, an endless number of o thers.14
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9. M odern Architecture/1 , op. cit., p. 110.
10. Georg Simmel, op. cit. Cacciari’s essay is republished in Architecture and N ihilism , op. cit., 
along with “Loos and His Contemporaries” (1975) and "Loos and his Angel” (1981).
11. Simmel, op. cit., p .325.
12. "The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis” , op. cit., p.4.
13 This account echoes Adorno and Horkheimer in many ways, although Lukacs may provide the 
better focus for Simmel - and the debates about rationalisation - were central to his early work, and 
remain clearly visible in his 1923 essay.
14. Simmel, op. cit., p.334.
This experience has produced, Simmel argued, “the intensification o f emotional life due
to the swift and continuous shift of external and internal stimuli”. 15 Mental life takes on
an “essentially  intellectualistic character” ; no longer focusing upon “feelings and
emotional relationships” which “are rooted in the unconscious levels of the m ind”, now
reason is located in its “lucid, conscious upper strata”.!6 This intellectualist framework
is a necessary response - “a protective organ” - Simmel argued, to “ the fluctuations and
discon tinu ities” which threaten i t ;17 a protection achieved by sub lim ating  the
intensification of N ervenleben  (the life of the nerves) within an intensification of
V erstand  (intellect). Thus in S im m el’s M etropolis, Cacciari argues, all becom es
analogous to the m arket’s universal equivalent, and everything - all concrete use-value,
all qualitative m eaning - becomes subsumed under the sway of quantification and
exchange. As Simmel put it:
[The] money economy and the domination of the intellect stand in the closest 
relationship to one another. They have in com m on a purely m atter-of-fact 
attitude in the treatment of persons and things in which a formal justice is often 
combined with an unrelenting hardness.18
Individuality  and em otion find their equivalent to exchange value: “ in tellectual
relationships deal with persons and numbers; the modern mind characterised - like the
capitalist labour process - by “punctuality, calculability, and exactness” . 19 This is
Cacciari’s description:
The m onetary econom y form alizes econom ic relations, ju s t as the intellect 
formalizes psychic relations and movements. It transcends use value, ju st as the 
intellect transcends the immediate stimulus, the quality of an impression.20
And, recalling, perhaps, M arx’s argum ent that the character o f the com m odity is 
“ tw ofold” , that exchange value does not so much replace  use value, but uses it as its
15. Ibid.. p.325. This is also translated as "the intensification o f  nervous stim ulation” (Georg 
Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life” , Art in Theory . op. cit., p. 131).
16. Ibid., p.325
17. Ibid., p .326.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.. p.326, p. 328.




... the N ervenleben  corresponds to the continuous and relentlessly innovated 
transubstantiation of exchange value into use value - that is, it corresponds to the 
necessary instance in which exchange value becomes real value. The intellect, 
the Verstand, in turn abstracts from the appearance of use value the substance of 
exchange value; it extracts money from the process and thus correctly reflects 
upon the commodity as such - that is, it once again produces merchandise.22
This Cacciari calls the process of Vergeistigung, or the realisation of Geist.
W hen Geist abandons the simple and direct relations of production, it no longer 
creates the city but the M etropolis. It is the Geist, not the individual, that o f  
necessity inhabits the Metropolis.23
O r as Sim m el put it: “The developm ent of modern culture is characterised by the 
predominance of what one can call the objective spirit over the subjective” .24
The city itself - that is, the city conceived as an organic entity, or polls  - is likewise
destroyed, henceforth figuring only as some nostalgic ideal. The M etropolis, Tafuri
argued (following Cacciari), is not just “calculation” and “reason”, but is also the site of
its “ d o w n f a l l ” ,25 and is marked by “ the loss of a c e n te r ” . 26 A t the level of behaviour
and attitude, spleen becomes the form of universal equivalence, the response to, what
Tafuri calls, “ the logic of assassination”.27
[The M etropolis] dissolves individuality into the current im pressions and 
reintegrates these, precisely by virtue of their constitution, into the overall 
process of Vergeistigung. In its first stage of evolution, the M etropolis uproots 
individuality from its conservative fixity; the process begun by this uprooting
21. Cacciari. here, seems to hold back from the full-blown subsum ption o f use-value into 
exchange-value that characterises much critical theory (for example. Adorno and Horkheimer). His 
account contains the ambiguity of the accounts of Marx/Lukacs/Simmel. For Lukacs in “Reification 
and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” , conscious control, law and rationalisation at the level of 
isolated phenomena, is matched by the "relative irrationality” of the whole process (Lukacs, H istory and 
C la ss  C on sc iou sn ess , op. cit., p .lO lff.). Cacciari’s sense of the M etropolis, then, is akin to the 
“potentiation” of reification described by Lukacs, ibid., p.93.
22. “The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis”, op. cit., pp.6-7. The idea that Verstand  
“extracts money from the process” is, perhaps, less satisfying.
23. Ibid., p.4.
24. Simmel, op. cit., p.337.
25. Architecture and U topia, op. cit., p.78.
26. M odern Architecture/1 , op. cit., p.100.
27. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p. 119.
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will of necessity lead to the dialectical reasoning that governs, m easures, and 
directs social relations, the interest (inter-esse) of the M e t r o p o l i s . 28
This dialectical process of Vergeistigung finds a certain completion with the emergence
of types such as the blase, for whom “the intellectualized multiplicity of stimuli becomes
b e h a v io r ” .29 Blase behaviour results from the overload of Nervenleben, so much so that
the nerves and emotions are dulled through overexposure, producing, as Simmel put it,
the “ incapacity to react to new stimulations with the required amount of energy .30 The
blase type is utterly attuned to the life of the “money econom y : The essence of the
blase attitude is an indifference toward the distinctions between things” :
... the meaning and the value of the distinctions between things, and therewith 
of the things them selves, are experienced as meaningless.... money takes the 
place of all the manifoldness of things.... it hollows out the core of things.... 
They all float with the same specific gravity.31
This effect on things - “devaluing the entire objective w orld” - also drags “ the 
personality dow nw ard into a feeling of its own valuelessness” , affecting the entire 
pattern of social interaction, now characterised by “ indifference”, “reserve” ,“ aversion 
and even “ hatred and conflict”.32
The blase type, Cacciari goes on, is not unaware of this situation, knowing that he can 
buy commodities (both goods and people), but that “he cannot get close to the goods, he 
cannot name them, he cannot love them” 33 He also grasps that this situation “ is beyond 
repair” .34 This blase subject, then, rejects any flight into the Goethian city (the symbol 
of a nostalgia for totality, a plenitude of experience, and an integrity of values).
28. "The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis”, op. cit., pp.5-6.
29. Ibid., pp.7-8.
30. Simmel, op. cit., p.329. This result is the same as Benjamin’s concept of “shock” . The blase 




33. “The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis”, op. cit., p.8.
34. Ibid., p.330. Simmel is, in fact, remarking on the levelling effect of money.
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II. The Plan, Or, “A Posit ive Realization O f  The D ia lec t ic”, uThe 
Negative... Inherent In The System” 3 5
The same rejection of the nostalgia for organic wholeness was developed by other social 
thinkers. Through a discussion of this, Tafuri and Cacciari advance a specific theory of 
the changes in capitalism ’s development, one which inform s their analysis of artistic 
developm ents in the early 20c. In an effort to grasp the developing capitalist epoch - 
and, some would say, in order to provide an alternative to M arx ’s analysis of it - 
capitalism ’s key thinkers re-conceived reality as a dynamic system of constant rupture. 
For M annheim , K eynes and W eber, Tafuri argues, reality w as a dynam ic of 
developm ent, w ithin which conflict was inherent, and where that antagonism  was 
transformed into “a rational solution of the conflicts, development” .36
Past standards and values were abandoned and desacralised. Tradition and its models 
w ere usurped by an em phasis on a future. M annheim , for instance, challenged 
“conservative thought” with “progressive thought”, the former drawing its significance 
from  the past, the latter from  a future utopia or abstract norm. Thus M annheim  
developed w hat he described as “a structural vision of the totality that is and is 
becom ing” .37 This “prefiguration of final and universal models” was understood, Tafuri 
tells us, “ in terms of the given reality”;38 defined, in other w ords, in term s of the 
present. Sim ilarly, with his concept of W ahrfreiheit (truth- or value-free), W eber 
adopted a disenchanted outlook where value was no longer the basis of judgem ent. In 
this challenge to the intellectuals’ traditional role (as legitimators of values), ideologists 
were to be “desacralised” in order that the system could be rationalised unhindered.39
35. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.62, p.61.
36. Ibid., p.54.
37. Mannheim cited ibid., p.53.
38. Ibid., p.53.
39. Although not the same argument, cf. Zygmunt Bauman, Legitim ators and Interpreters: on 
m odernity, post-m odernity and intellectuals. Polity Press, 1987
H ow ever, unlike M annheim ’s approach, in the w ork of W eber (and K eynes) the 
em phasis w as less on the anticipated  utopian model than on the need to realise that 
m odel in the present, to realise the future now. Thus, if we take the them e of 
abandoning past models and values - the classic version of negation - the distinction of 
M annheim  from  W eber and Keynes makes some interesting tem poral adjustm ents. 
Tafuri suggests that W eber and Keynes wanted the idea of utopia to be put to w ork , to 
be more than mere ideology, to be productive for the present. The move was, as Tafuri 
puts it, from “utopia” to “plan” or “project” : a move, in other words, from “value” to 
“action”:
L ib a tio n  from  value in this sense signifies establishing the prem ises for action 
in that reality, in that field of indeterminant, fluid, and ambiguous forces.40
The Plan, then, needed the negation of tradition and value to be free from  ethical 
justification, and to incorporate negativity - the transitory, the temporary, the contingent 
- into itself. Thus, instead of yearning for a “ lost” (probably im aginary) social order, 
and instead o f trying to resolve the crises of capitalism , the em phasis turned to 
m anaging the chaos of the modern world and making those crises work (or working 
with them).41
Developm ent’s dynamic and dialectic character having been revealed, a plan was 
required against the constant danger of internal deflagration.4?
Intervening within the dynamic, the attempt was to absorb capitalism’s contradictions at 
ever higher levels.43 Instead of counterposing the ideal of Reason to the anarchy of 
capitalist production, Reason was imported into  that anarchy. So, w rites Tafuri, 
“economic models are devised starting from the crisis and not abstractly against it” .44
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40. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.56.
41. The shift from laissez-faire to monopoly capitalism provides the necessary backdrop to these 
ideas, with, ironically, “ the Plan" of monopoly capitalism being a manager of anarchy. The point about 





The key source for Tafuri’s argument is an essay by Antonio Negri entitled “Keynes & 
the Capitalist Theory of the State post-1929”, published in the first issue of Contropiano 
in 1968.45 The journal Contropiano - meaning “Anti-Plan” - was formed by a number 
of Italian leftist intellectuals. The line-up of its first editors is interesting: Mario Tronti, 
Antonio Negri, A lberto Asor Rosa and M assimo C a c c i a r i . 4 6  Some exploration of the 
themes and background to the piece by Negri, and the orientation of the journal, will be 
of help for understanding the role of negation for the thinkers from the Venice School. 
Negri was a leading intellectual figure on Italy’s far-left. He is associated with the 
autonomisti, and specifically with Potere Operaio, formed in opposition to the Italian 
C om m unist Party (PCI) and Italian Socialist Party (PSI), and by the late ’60s 
com m anding a large base of support among industrial w orkers as well as attracting 
significant intellectuals.47 N egri’s argum ent can be characterised as a “w orkerist” (or 
operaista ) one.48 C o n tro p ia n o  was a journal for in tellectuals o f a “ w orkerist”
45. Re-publishcd in Toni Negri, Revolution R etrieved. S elected  W riting on M arx, K eynes, 
C apita list C risis and N ew Social Subjects (1967-83), Red Notes, 1988, pp.9-42. Both books contain 
useful introductions addressing the culture of the Italian far-left: the former by John M errington, 
"Preface” , op. cit., pp. 1-4, and "Introduction to Keynes & the Capitalist Theory of the State post- 
1929”, op. cit., pp.5-7; the latter by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, “Communism as Critique” , 
pp.3-21. Patrizia Lom bardo’s essay, op. cit., is also helpful. Chris Harman, The Fire Last Time: 1968  
and After. Bookmarks. 1988, provides a wider context for understanding this section o f the Italian Left, 
as does Tobias Abse, "Judging the PCI”, N ew Left Review  153, September/October 1985, pp.5-43.
46. C acciari’s early essays were published in this journal, including “Sulla genesi del pensiero 
negativo” in 1969, and “Utopia e socialismo” in 1970; Tafuri published “Austromarxismo e cita: ‘Das 
rote W ien”' in 1971; and Francesco Dal Co published "Sviluppo e localizzazione industriale” in 1971.
47. In the late-'70s Negri was arrested and charged in connection with the activities of the Red 
Brigades and became something of a cause c ildbre . Some of the bombings - and especially that at 
Bologna railway station - attributed to the Red Brigades, are now considered to have been the 
responsibility of the Italian secret service; but more importantly, the charge that Negri was a member of 
the Red Brigades is widely regarded as trumped-up by the state in order to discredit the left in general and 
the far-left in particular. Since then, Negri has produced a text in collaboration with Felix Guattari 
(written in 1983-4), in what might best be characterised as a far-left communist Nietzscheanism, but 
one where the concepts of the state and labour play important roles - concepts whose centrality sets the 
work at some distance to most “postmodernist” accounts. See Com m unists Like Us. New Spaces o f  
Liberty, N ew  Lines o f  Alliance, Semiotext(e), 1990.
48. The term can carry pejorative inflections, but, it seems, was adopted as a positive description.
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p e r s u a s io n .49 Operaista ideas had been developed through the ’60s, prior to the political 
upheavals that followed 1967 (and also prior to those that occurred in Italy in 1963) by 
Raniero Panzieri and Mario Tronti. 5« Their thesis, which is also found in N egri’s article 
on Keynes, centres on the working class as the active and the determ inant force of 
capitalist development; or, to put it another way, its “autonomy . Tronti s inveision
formula of 1964 states that:
A t the level of a fully socialised capital, capitalist developm ent becom es 
subordinated to working-class struggles, it follows behind them.51
This focus was conceived as a “recovery” of Marx from the orthodox Left - by which 
was meant the PCI and its arguments for reformism and gradualism - who, the operaista 
argued, had erased any sense of the working class as the key m otor and dynam ic to 
developm ent. N egri’s Keynes thesis, then, was thus not ju s t a mattei of historical 
dispute, but, more im portantly, it was intended as a crucial foundation for their 
contem porary political strategy. Negri writes that “ the only way to understand the 
specificity of our present state form is to highlight the dramatic im pact of the working 
class on the structures of capitalism”.52 Closely associated with this is a belief that they
49. However, a number of these intellectuals were, or were to become, members ot the PCI. Asoi 
Rosa, it seems, remained a memebr of the PCI, and Cacciari later became one ol its lepiesentatives. 
O ther sections of workerists - the group II M anifesto being one - started in the PCI, but were later 
expelled, or else resigned. This was clearly a complex period, and, as Llorens notes, attei 1969, Tafuri 
“ systematically attacked 'official' marxism from gauchist positions, while actively continuing to be a 
member of the PCI’’ (Llorens, op. cit., p.94, footnote 15).
50 Negri had worked together with Tronti through the ’60s on other journals such as Q uaderni 
R ossi (1961-63) and Classe Operaia  (1964-67). Negri’s paper had first been aired at a series of research 
seminars in 1967 at the Institute of Social & Political Science at the University of Padua, a series 
initiated to commemorate the half centenary of the Russian Revolution. This paper along with others 
from the seminar series were republished in 1972 in O perai e Stato, an anthology which became very 
significant on the Italian Left, especially those of an operaista  orientation. N egri's own theses had their 
early formulation in the writings of Raniero Panzieri (for example, "The Capitalist Use of Machinery , 
1961) and Mario Tronti's 1966 collection Operai e Capitaie.
51. Mario Tronti cited by John Merrington in Revolution R etrieved, op. cit., p.45.
52. Negri, "Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State post-1929” , op. cit., p.30. The “militant 
research” of opera ista  intellectuals was orientated towards determining the new class composition ol 
mass production: the "mass worker” - the unskilled or semi skilled worker who had displaced the skilled 
worker through the restructuring of capitalist production. Associated with this displacement was the 
diminishing o f the bargaining power and strategies of the class “aristocracy” (focusing on skills and the 
hierarchies0 of grading). The levelling of the working class in the factories had instead focused the 
struggle against the capitalist organisation of work per se; and the refusal of this characterised class
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were recovering M arx’s concept o f value - not to be confused with the values of 
tradition discussed above - as a class relation. They argued that the L eft’s ideas had 
stagnated into static, objectivised and economistic categories which inflected both the 
L eft’s activities within the capitalist state (such as, the means of trade union struggle 
adopted) and their idealisation of the “productivist” ideals of Third International 
“ socialism”. All this, the operaista argued, accepted the framework of capitalism; merely 
struggling for the control of productive forces, it left, as one com m entator puts it, “ the 
objectivity of production and work itself... unquestioned” , reducing the working class 
to “mere labour pow er” , to a mere function.53 The point, instead, was to conceive that 
class as “an independent material subject of antagonism”.54 Thus, they argued, the Left 
was “ basically K e y n e s i a n ” . 55 The task was to break from reform ist logic and assert 
class autonom y. N egri’s analysis of Keynes, then, is an operation to “ know thine 
enem y” : to surpass (what was seen as) the more backward looking approaches of the 
traditional Left and to challenge capitalist science in the form  of its most sophisticated 
exponent.
In his essay Negri charts a periodisation of modern state developm ent which focuses 
upon class relations. Accordingly 1848-71 is a period o f rising class autonom y, 
1871-1917 marks a period of political organisation of that autonomy, and the period 
between the two W orld W ars marks the rise of a new state form. It is this last period 
upon which N egri’s analysis concentrates. The capitalist state, Negri argues, was forced
autonomy and self-interest. The new theory of the state (“social capital , capitalist socialism ) was, ol 
course, central to this analysis. Negri’s article on Keynes was an attempt to flesh out this transition.
Research was backed with political activity. Negri, Paola Meo and Cacciari organised Capital 
reading groups in the petrochemical plants at Porto Marghera, near Venice, in August 1963. (This was 
simultaneous with the appearance of Potere O pera io , or W oikers Powei. Initially a supplement to the 
P S I’s regional paper II P rogresso  Veneto, this was to become, by 1967, the paper of the Porto 
M arghera petrochem ical workers, and the name of N egri’s organisation). See M errington’s “ A 
Biographical Note” , Revolution R e trieved , op. cit., p.270. Operaista formed a base through particular 
struggles and organising around questions of speedup and divisive grading systems (Harman, op. cit., 
p.203).




to respond to the events and impact of 1917 in a qualitatively new way: not simply to 
respond to it as an external threat through military and diplomatic isolation, but, more 
importantly, to respond to the internal threat that arose - the explosion of new mass tiade 
unions and factory councils across Europe. Capital’s reaction to this internal thieat took 
a form  that affected its own substantive content. Instead of the brute leptession of the 
immature ruling classes (Negri has Italy in mind), he centres out attention upon capital s 
m ost advanced sections and their “ technological path of repression as a m eans to 
underm ine the m aterial base” of the working class vanguaids.56 H ence Taylot and 
Ford, with their “m assification of the productive process and deskilling of the labout 
fo rce”, forced a “leap in organic com position in new sectors; assem bly line; flow 
production; scientific organization of work; sub-division/ fragmentation of jobs, etc. .57
But for Negri, this social levelling of the working class could only be one elem ent of the 
strategy o f capital. The crucial point was the danger - for capital - o f “ political 
recom position at a higher level of massification and socialisation of the w oikfotce , a 
danger intensified with the now constant horizon of the Russian Revolution, a spectte 
that could not be exorcised”.58 But it was not until after the 1929 crisis that capital s 
own response manifested itself (to itself). Negri’s formulation of this is important, in the 
wake of 1929, he says, it was 1917 which “manifested itself in a crisis of the entire 
system”.59 it took 1929 for the ruling class finally to abandon its nostalgia for the liberal 
constitutional state and to face the loss of values - values that had already been rejected
56. “Keynes and the Capitalist Theory ol' the State post-1929” , op. cit., p .l 1.
57. Ibid. Cf. N egri's concept of the “social factory” where he advances the idea ol "the state ol 
social capital" (ibid., p.26) - where the state is “a prime mover of economic activity" (p.27), and where 
“ society itself is cast in the mould of the factory” (p.28). In this account capital shilts trom the 
“antithesis o f despotism in the factory and anarchy in society” to "the so c ia l organization ol that 
despotism , to diffuse the organization of exploitation throughout society, in the new form of a 
planning-based state which - in the particular way in which it articulates organization and lepression 
throughout society - directly reproduces the figure of the factory” (p.30).
58. ° Ibid., p .l 1. Both the phrases used - and the emphasis on capital’s increasing socialisation 
realising, simultaneously, the increasing socialisation of its gravediggers - echo the Marx & Engels, 
The M anifesto o f  the Communist Tarty, op. cit.
59. Ibid., p. 12.
and destroyed by the protagonists of 1917.
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In this formulation we start to see N egri’s emphasis upon capital’s internalisation of the
threat of the proletariat, its internalisation of negation. “M assification” not only forces
cap ital’s urgency to recognise the political autonomy of the working class, it foices a
recognition that the proletariat was now “the decisive element and motive power behind
any future m odel of developm ent” .60 For Negri, contrary to other analyses, the
post-1929 crisis is not primarily significant for the recourse to state intervention (which
had, he tells us, been a growing tendency since 1871); and nor is it characteiised by a
shift from “liberal” to “totalitarian” state form (which, he says, confuses the regime with
the state form). The significance of the crisis is that it provokes the leconstiuction of a
state based on the discovery of the inherent antagonism of the working class :61
W hat was new, and what marks this moment as decisive, was the lecognition of 
the working class and of the ineliminable antagonism it lepiesented within the 
system as a necessary feature o f the system which state pow er would have to
accommodate.62
The specific characteristic of the new form of state that emerged from  1929 was 
rather the type o f class dynamic at work within the fram ew ork o f  state  
interventionism, on which intervention was premised.63
It was, to em phasise, the strength of the working class - note the phi ase inelim inable 
antagonism ” - that “imposed... disecjuilibria that constantly lequiied  inteivention at all
levels of the system”.64
Paradoxically, capital turned to Marx, or at least learned to lead Das K apita l.... 
Once the antagonism  was recognised, the problem was to m ake it function in 
such a way as to prevent one pole of the antagonism  breaking free into 
independent destructive action.65
W orking class autonomy and antagonism had to be sublimated “into a dynamic element
60. “Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State post-1929", op. cit., p. 12.
61. Ibid., p. 13.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., p.22.
64. Ibid., p. 14.
65. Ibid., p. 13.
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of the system”, its threat absorbed “at ever new levels”.66 Hence the need for the Plan:
Capital must ensure that the dynamic factors of growth are controlled, in such a 
way that the balance of power rem ains the same. The problem, in other words,
is never resolved; it is only postponed.67
The state becom es simultaneously “planner-state” and “crisis state - a state which has 
descended into civil society, and one which “continuously recreate[s] the souice of its 
legitim acy in a process of permanent readjustm ent of the conditions of equilibrium ” -
readjustments that necessarily revised the state itself.68
the path to stability now seemed to depend on the recognition of this new 
precarious basis of state power: the dynamic of state planning implied acceptance 
of a soit of “permanent revolution” as its object - a paradoxical Aufhebung or the
slogan on the part of capital.69
Negri also describes this “acceptance” as a recuperation: through experiences like the 
New Deal, capital tried “recuperating the notion of ‘permanent revolution , for its own
self-preservation” .70
new weapons are forged in order to prevent the [w oiking] class acting 
outside capital, and to make it act within a fram ew ork w hose outlines aie
continually being drawn anew.71
This, then, is the nature of “capitalist reform ism ”. Unlike the reform ism  of social 
dem ocracy it does not, as Negri puts it, “whine” about the im balances of the system, 
rather it asserts its own class interest, and seeks to resolve the difficulties through its 
own self-reproduction. Accepting bourgeois “disenchantm ent , it was K eynes who
66. Ibid., p.13, p.28.
67. Ibid., p.28.
59 Ibid p 14 c f  permanent revolution and negativity as discussed in Chaptei 1. Tafuri and
Cacciari a ls o  draw attention to the writings of Preobrazensky, who provided the Left Opposition’s 
economic theory for the Soviet Union and, as Tafuri puts it, "a theory of the plan based explicitly on 
dynam ic developm ent, on organized disequilibrium, on interventions that presuppose a continual 
revolution of mass production” (Architecture and U topia , op. cit.. p. 173). Tafuri cites his argument to 
Cacciari’s essay, “ le teorie dello sviLuppo”, Contropiano, n o .l, 1971.
70. “Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State post-1929", op. cit.. p.34.
71. Ibid., pp.28-9.
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provided the most advanced capitalist science for the new situation.72 K eynes’ theory of 
demand, Negri argues, marks the recognition of working class autonomy within capital, 
and K eynes’ attempt to posit “a balance of power between classes in struggle” .73
W hile Keynes orientates towards the future, the crisis shook confidence and prompted 
attem pts to establish some guidelines of convention: “the future m ust be fixed as 
present”.74 For the planner state “ the life of the system no longer depends on the spirit 
o f entrepreneurialism , but on liberation from the fear of the future” and that “ the state 
has to defend the present from the future”.75 Thus, Negri argues, w hile K eynes 
destroyed the traditional object of political science, he did so only as a prelude to its 
reconstruction - a reconstruction of the conditions of econom ic balance, and “ the 
reaffirm ation of the mystified form of general equivalence” : “The bourgeois dialectic 
know s no sublation, it cannot overthrow its object” .76 K eynes’ delusion - and his 
m ystification of his science - Negri argues, came from his attem pt to have capital 
w ithout its com petition and without its anarchic aspects; even to posit a realm  beyond 
class contradictions; but Keynes never txied to eliminate exploitation. The Keynesian 
paradox is that it:
... is forced to recognize that the w orking class is the driv ing m otor of 
developm ent, and that therefore K eynes’ sta tically  defined  notions of 
equilibrium can in fact never be attained in static terms.... In effect... the system 
functions not because the working class is always inside capital, but because it is 
also capable of stepping outside it...77
72. N egri’s essay follows the emergence of Keynes’ analysis into a systematic science in the 
General Theory of 1936. Say’s Law (which represented old-style capitalist science) "denied the existence 
of the working class as the political negation o f the system’’ (ibid., p. 19). Challenging Say’s Law, 
Keynes challenged the basis of traditional bourgeois political science, a basis that had now become 
"naturalised”: “the theory o f economic equilibrium,... an integrated and functional symbiosis of 
elements allowing an infinite, free access to the world of wealth” (p.21). Keynes recognised, Negri 
argues, the tensions of the situation and anticipated problems; seeing the 1929 crisis as the product of 








For Keynes, “everything beyond the equilibrium” 78 is the “Party of Catastrophe”. The
spectre haunting Keynes - the Party of Catastrophe - is that which Negri hopes to
activate.7  ^He concludes:
The com m unism  of capital can absorb all values within its movement, and can 
represent to the full the general social goal of developm ent; but it can never 
expropriate the particularity  of the w orking class which is its hatred of 
exploitation, its uncontainability at any given level of equilibrium. Because the 
w orking class is also a project for the destruction of the capitalist m ode of 
production.80
* * *
For Tafuri and Cacciari, the developm ents described by Negri negotiated a crisis -
em erging  from  the 19c. - regarding the role of the in te llec tu a l.81 No longer
“unproductive” , intellectuals could now get in on the action, and have a role within the
realisation of the Plan.82
In order to survive, ideology had to negate itself as such, break its own 
crystallised  form s, and throw itself entirely into the “construction o f the 
future” .83
Tafuri cites a growing collaboration, or mutual recognition, between the representatives
78. Ibid., p.21.
79. There was a split at the journal after a couple of issues which saw Negri go in a different 
direction to the majority. In the second issue, Tronti et al. opposed Negri, regarding, as Merrington puts 
it, the question of “class antagonism in Keynesian development and its implications for an independent 
class politics” (M errington, in Revolution R e trieved , op. cit., p.45). Negri argued for the complete 
political rupture of working class autonomy from the capitalist reform cycle, while Tronti - 
accommodating to the PCI - proposed a dual-power model where autonomy could coexist with capitalist 
reformism. It is difficult to assess the relevance of this split to the work of Tafuri and Cacciari. The 
details of the history of these disputes - and the differences between various factions of the autonomisti - 
is complex and probably does not help the argument of this chapter, and certainly did not stop Tafuri 
citing N egri’s essay on Keynes in 1973.
80. “Keynes and the Capitalist Theory of the State post-1929”, op. cit., p.36.
81. The relation o f the intellectual to Metropolitan chaos, Tafuri wrote, has been explored by 
Nietzsche, Simmel, and Weber - and, in their wake, by W alter Benjamin. See, for example, M odern  
Architecture!1, op. cit., p. 105. and Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., pp.78-88.
82. The centrality of a technocratic elite in the modern state - here signified by “ the Plan” - has 
been widely commented upon. For Tafuri, however, it does not seem to be associated with any notion 
of the “death of the working class”.
83. Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p.50.
of big capital and the new intellectual-designers (such as in the German W erkbund). In 
this way, the avant-gardes - assessing their objective  role in the process (however 
m arginal) - contributed to this changing emphasis of capitalism, the transform ation of 
strategy from utopia to Plan; they were, in other words, part of the Plan, a function of 
capitalism . A vant-gard ist strategies were designed to provoke the public into 
participation. “ Provocation” - that “slap in the face of public taste” , that “ epater le 
bourgeois" , “ was only the outer skin of a process in which the bourgeoisie took 
possession of the technological universe” .84 For Tafuri, the avant-garde helped to 
acclim atise the public to the shocks of that metropolitan world and helped to teach the 
acceptance of shock through its own formal and spatial tactics. M etropolitan shock was 
transform ed into technique, Tafuri w rites:85 E isenstein’s montage o f attractions, for 
instance, was concentrated Nervenleben; or, in another vein, “ since the assem bled 
objects belonged to the real world, the picture became a neutral field on which to project 
the experience o f the shock suffered in the city”.86
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The way was cleared for active intervention in the here and now. By “translating art into 
action”, the Futurists and Dadaists began their “reconstruction of the universe” .87 W hat 
we w itness with the rise of the avant-gardes, Tafuri argues, was not the negation of 
history, but the negation of historicism;88 in other words, the reconception of history - 
echoing that described earlier - from a notion of history as a source of values to history
84. M odern  A rch itecture! 1, op. cit., p .l 10. In fact, his assessment is even more damning: “ It 
would be absurd to attribute other political values to movements that flirted with the reality of social 
struggle only in order to assert the superiority of their own ideological proposal" (p .l 10).
85. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p. 105.
86. Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p.86. And, Tafuri tells us, M oholy-Nagy's description of the 
Theatre o f Totality (in Painting, Photography, Film): “relies on the primary means of the various 
instrum ents of communication; its intent is to give life to ‘a great dynamic rhythmic formal event, 
which gathers together, in a form reduced to the elementary, the most extensive heap o f means, 
ricocheting off one another’” (The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p. 105).
87. M odern Architecture! 1, op. cit., p. 106. Cf. Fred Orton, “Action, Revolution and Painting”, 
The O xford Art Journal, vol. 14, no. 2, 1991, pp.3-17.
88. Theories and H istory o f  Architecture, op. cit., p.60.
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as an “event”.89 The anti-historicism of the avant-gardes allowed an “explosion toward 
the fu tu re” , and enabled  avant-gardists to find a ro le  w ith in  the em erg ing  
planner-state.90 They helped to release the “potential energies” of the bourgeoisie, 
hitherto enU'apped in their adherence to past values or unable to recognise the essence of 
their own creation. If the flaneur - who, in his im pressionist and sym bolist form, is 
described by Tafuri as the “pre-avant-garde91” - had a “consciousness of participation”, 
in the new reality, it was the avant-garde that advanced this with their “ linguistic 
revolution of contem porary art” .92 With their transform ation of visual codes, their 
involvem ent of the public, and their reduction of artistic experience to pure object, the 
avant-garde brought the public into effective participation.93
The M etropolis, then, was made productive, and the elem ents available for the
construction o f a new language emerged from the M etropolis’ remains - but only “once
it has neutralized the paralyzing anguish that can only contem plate itself” . 94 The key
problem , for the avant-garde’s relation to the M etropolis, Tafuri argues, was to go
beyond a response characterised as “tragic anguish”:
... how to shake off the anxiety provoked by the loss of a center, by the solitude 
of the individual immersed in revolt, of how to convert that anxiety into action 
so as not to remain forever dumb in the face of it.95
Tafuri describes the “revolt of the objects” - the reference is to M ayakovsky’s The 
Revolt o f  the Objects of 1913 - as “ the dominating m otif of bourgeois anguish”. 96 But
89. Ibid., p.63. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life” (1874), 
U ntim ely M editations, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp.59-123.
90. Ibid., p.31.
91. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p. 119.
92. Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p.84.
93. Ibid., p.92. This starts to sound as if the avant-garde is being treated as a singular and, 
moreover, conscious subject. Tafuri does point out, however, that this role is an effect often counter to 
the intentions of the individuals or groups involved.
94. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p. 105.
95. M odern Architecture! 1. op. cit., p.105.
96. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p. 131.
while he thinks Russian Futurism sought immersion “in the sea of disordered objects to 
attem pt the last possible synthesis with them”,97 the Italian Futurists [broke] with all 
vindication of lost objects”. 9  ^ M eanwhile, Dada s negation of Expressionism  was not 
sim ply a negation in that passage from one avant-garde to another, the continual 
revolution of avant-garde movements;99 instead, its significance was to annul that 
anguish propagated by the Expressionist m ovem ents - in other words, to negate 
anguish, anxiety and the tragic consciousness. Drawing the point more widely, he notes 
that:
It was necessary to pass from M unch’s Scream  to El Lissitzky s Story of Two 
Squares', from the anguished discovery of the nullification of values, to the use 
of a language of pure signs, perceptible by a mass that had com pletely absorbed 
the universe without quality of the money econom y.100
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III. The Negation O f  Sense & Syntax: Signs Reduced To Zero & “Things  
Devoid  O f  Significance” 101
T afuri’s em phasis upon the avant-gardes’ “effective participation and invocation to 
action is one plank of their negation of the tragic and tradition. This has an impact upon 
the strategies, and the very sign, of artistic practice, and informs Tafuri’s dialectic of the 
avant-garde.
... with Cezanne as point of departure, Picasso and Braque made the illusory 
nature o f the differences, which Simmel had recognized  as typical of 
metropolitan life, the basis for reflection on the loss of center experienced by the 
individual.102
From Les Demoiselles d ’ Avignon through Analytic Cubism, an awareness and display 
o f fragm entation was evidenced in their work. But, Tafuri argues, this loss of a
97. Ibid., p. 100.
98. M odern Architecture/1, op. cit., p. 106.
99. Architecture and U topia , op. cit.. pp.84-6.
100. Ibid., p.89.
101. M odern Architecture! 1, op. cit., p.l 10.
102. Ibid., p.105.
center”, really made its way into art with the sensibility of Italian Futurism . W ith its 
negation of tradition and old values, Futurism  - placing itself at the head of the 
anonymous impulse” and the “total revolt of things and mobs” - asserted an intellectual 
will-to-power.103 The anxiety over the M etropolis was supplanted with its em brace. 
And along with the negation of the institutions of tradition, the Futurists advocated the 
sm ashing of “ the syntactical connections in all the semantic areas .1()4 in Futurist 
cabarets, art m im icked S im m el’s M etropolis with the use of “ bom barding words
liberated of sense and syntax”.
It was the machine that was now determining the modes of communication, and 
its m essages w ere com pounded of pure energy w hich had no need for 
syntactical nexuses. The technological language was based on something new: 
shock, pure signs assaulting the interlocutor all at once.103
Sim ilarly, the Dadaists refused to submit to “ the anguish that assails anyone who
perceives that the signifier - the word - has lost all significance”.
The indifferent objects that float in the flux of the monetary econom y become 
grist to any mill. Reduced to signs, they can be inserted into a process of 
continuous metamorphoses.... All reality is “ready-made ,106
From here Tafuri describes “the dialectic of the avant-garde ’, which he explores through 
the exam ples of De Stijl and Dada, and their response to the M etropolis. W here Dada 
goes for a “violent insertion” into the irrational, and celebration of the formless, De Stijl 
opts for the control of form, a “silent immersion in the structure of the city by the 
idealization o f its contradictions”.107 But, according to Tafuri, this opposition - ot De 
S tijl’s form  and D ada’s form lessness, of rational and irrational - inverts. D ada’s 
im mersion “in the unformed” - its “displaying the void that the end of values... leaves 
behind it” - by its very representation of chaos and nullification, affirmed, and sought
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103. Ibid.
104. Ibid., p. 106.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid., p. 108. This, Tafuri insists, and not the aim to scandalise, was Ducham ps’s “ultimate 
objective”.
107. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.92.
contro l of, its rea lity .108 As Tafuri put it: “ a yes given to the real perm its  its 
tran sform ation , makes it possible in fact to act within it . 109 By giving form  to 
N ietzsche’s death of God, Tafuri argues, by ironising the anarchy of the M etropolis, 
Dada dem onstrated its own constructive face, its own counter-tendency towards the 
planning and control of that formlessness. M eanwhile, De Stijl s exploration of the 
elem ents of form, instead of leading to the conU'ol of form - instead of m arking a space 
against chaos - contributes to it. Seeking those elements of language and form, de Stijl 
goes through a process of decom posing , but only to find (and participate in) uttei 
decom position , a decom position which echoes that of the M etropolis. U nable ever to 
convincingly  recom bine its elem ents - as intended - de Stijl can only produce 
“disarticulated recom position” , echoing the mechanical world dem onstrating that no 
form  can be given to the recovery of totality (of being, as of ait) except fo im  derived 
from  the problem atic nature of form itse lf’.11° This inversion, or conversion into 
opposites - of the rational into the irrational, and of chaos into form, and vice versa - 
marks, for Tafuri, a new condition which clearly echoes the transform ation of social 
theory discussed earlier: “ from now on form is not sought outside of chaos, it is sought 
within it. It is order that confers significance upon chaos and transform s it into value, 
into ‘liberty’” .!11
A fter 1922, Tafuri writes, these two roads which we might recognise as Poggio li’s 
negative and positive avant-gardes - were increasingly synthesised in the approaches of 
practitioners such as Moholy-Nagy, El Lissitzky, Hans Richtei and Van D oesbuig.*
In the early 1920s, the avant-garde was moving toward a com m on language.
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111. Ibid., p.96.
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Destruction and construction were proving com plem entary.113
For example, Tafuri discusses how Van D oesburg’s practice straddled a multiplicity of 
avant-garde sites - ones often seen as contradictory - and brought into common currency 
Dada, Futurism and de Stijl.114 Tafuri locates this complementarity of destruction and 
construction as emerging at the core of Dadaism. Here, “the vitalistic and ‘positive’ pole 
o f dada tendencies” are ascribed to the im pact of Yefim G olyscheff - a Russian in 
Berlin, who was described by Raoul Hausmann as more authentically Dada than the 
D adaists.115 G olyscheff’s work was described by another contemporary as wanting “ to 
incite his viewer to the joy of producing”, to engage in the “joy of proletarian work . 116 
G olyscheff’s polem ic against seriousness and for lightheartedness - his D adaist 
invocation to self-liberatory behaviour - was directed at the proletariat, Tafuri says; the 
w orking class was seen as “the only historical subject capable... of making its own the 
‘gay science’ of purifying devastation” . 117 Indeed, Tafuri suggests, faced with the
exam ple of Soviet Russia:
... d ad a’s very spirit of contestation found itself in crisis. O r rather, the 
contestation now seemed a wholly contingent task, waiting to be able to create a 
productive organization in the field of ait and collective behavior.118
The arrival of large numbers of Russian avant-gardists in Berlin around 1922, and the 
exhibition at van D iem en’s gallery marks the height of this crisis. W here Dada had 
“ lim ited itself merely to specifying the instrum ents” adequate to the M etropolis (for 
exam ple, assem blage, photom ontage), Constructivism  showed how to put them to 
institutional use” - from “mere enunciation of principles to the systematic definition of
113. M odem  Architecture! 1 , op. cit., p .l 12. This is a characteristic move: “decomposition” , Tafuri 
wrote of another matter, "showed its constructive side (7he Sphere and the L abyiin th , op. cit.. p. 123). 
This mutuality of destruction and construction was also discussed in Chapter 1.
114. This is a matter argued with full acknowledgement of Van Doesberg’s role as protagonist in 
the latter’s fractionalising.
115. The Sphere and the Labyrinth , op. cit., p. 127.
116. Behne cited ibid.
117. Ibid., p.128.
118. Ibid., p.131.
a... language complete in itse lf’.119
Now socialism ’s “ liberated objects” had replaced anguish over the “ revolt o f the 
objects” , providing “ an answer - by turns desperate or cynical - to the tragic, and that 
now appeared under a new sign”. 120 “Constructivism was a m etaphor for the technical 
organization of the real”, writes Tafuri, “ the dynamic articulation of signs that were 
com pletely disenchanted”. 121 Thus L issitzky’s Story of Two Squares realised the 
“disenchanted sign” as the basis of working construction.122 By seeking the sign’s zero 
degree (w hether as prehistory  or as a-history), the avant-garde, Tafuri argues, 
estab lished  its building blocks. These signs - evacuated of m eaning and of any 
qualitative value, and functioning as some cultural analogue to universal equivalence - 
prepared the way, Tafuri argues, for their recombination, in order that the future could 
be made. By reducing the environm ent “ to things devoid of significance” , and a rt’s 
syntax “ to pure geometrical signs” 123 - or to a “desert”, as Tafuri describes M alevich’s 
w hite canvasses - the avant-gardes accom m odated to the clim ate of dynam ic 
intervention.
Some of the means for arriving at the “disenchanted sign” were not theoretically “pure”: 
“ mystical residues and disenchanted cynicism alternated and were superim posed”.124 
Tafuri’s essay “The Uncertainties of Formalism: Victor Shklovsky and the Denuding of 
A rt” addresses th is m atter. H ere S hk lovsky’s form alism  is described  (after
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119. Ibid., p.135.
120. Ibid., p. 134.
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122. The time has come to build on openground“ , wrote Lissitzky in 1922: “W hatever is exhausted 
will die anyway, without assistance from us; for land that is lying fallow needs not a program, not a 
school of thought, but simply work" (cited ibid., p. 140).
123. M odern Architecture!1, op. cit.. p.l 10.
124. Ibid. Some anticipated a new future harmony where art would be superfluous; W orringer 
contrasted the language of the world with the language of the soul; and the Russian Formalists sought 
“the resurrection of the word".
M ukarovsky) as a means to an end that lay “beyond f o r m a l i s m ” . 125 The form alist 
exclusion of all external factors, and attention to “the internal laws of Literature” , >26 is 
presented, Tafuri argues, as a “ laboratory” period for an attem pt “ to reconcile the 
internal dynamics of the artistic structure with the context in which it is set” . 127 T afuri’s 
argum ent is based upon the category, central to Russian Form alism , ostranenie  or 
esd'angement, which was also touched on in Chapter 1 - “a displacement of the time and 
space internal to the work vis-a-vis those of real life”. I28 The problem is expressed by 
Shklovsky:
W e rarely hear the words we utter. W e speak a poor language, the words of 
which are not thoroughly spoken. W e look at each other, but we do not see each 
other. O ur perception of the world has dried up and all we are left w ith is the 
faculty to recognize objects. 129
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The tactics of formalism, then, are designed to “defam iliarise” in order that language 
may speak again, to retrieve words from their habituality, their impotency and “semantic 
exhaustion”. In other words, the aim is to retrieve human com m unication from  its 
reified condition - a condition alienated from  “an original m eaning” “ for things and 
concepts”. 13° “Art is basically ironic and destructive”, wrote Shklovsky: “ It revives the 
world. Its task is to create deform ity through confrontation”.131 Thus, form alism ’s 
ostranenie is “ a project of ‘recuperation’” - echoed in the title to Shklovsky’s book of 
1914: The Resurrection o f the Word. Here, montage, juxtaposition, dislocation, etc. - 
the tactics of the avant-garde associated with Russian Formalism - are aimed at closing 
the gap between sign and meaning. 132 Ostranenie was:
125. “The Uncertainties of Formalism: Victor Shklovsky and the Denuding of Art”, Architectural 
D esign Profile: On the M ethodology o f  Architectural H istory , 1981, pp.73-77. Quotation from p.74.
126. Shklovsky cited ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid., p.75.
129. Shklovsky cited ibid.
130. Ibid., p.76.
131. Shklovsky cited ibid.
132. For Russian Futurist Kruchenyk in 1913, the instrument (or device) was the neologism: “The 
lily is beautiful, but the word ‘lily’ has been sullied by fingers and defiled. Therefore. I call the lily euy 
and, thus, its original purity is restored” (cited ibid., p.76).
130
... an instrument which disalienates, a device which makes it possible to salvage 
the “natural” relationship between name and thing, an act of violence done to 
convention so as to arrive at a primeval nucleus of meaning which is pre-existing 
but hidden somewhere under the floor of a “ sunken cathedral”.133
Tatlin’s counter-reliefs provide Tafuri with an example from the plastic arts. Shklovsky 
described Tatlin’s materials - the bits of tin and iron - as materials enabling a break with 
painting; but he went on to suggest that they, in T afuri’s words, “ also reconstruct 
m etaphorically the unbroken continuum of a mythical Eden” . 134 The m aterials are, in 
S hklovsky’s phrase, “pieces of a certain personal paradise where there are neither 
nam es nor voids” .135
Thus the move to abstraction in the arts, far from being the “flight from the real”, as is 
usually described, marks, for Tafuri, an “effort to rejoin reality” : 136 from  Shklovsky’s 
“resurrections” to the effort to build a new language adequate to active intervention 
within the M etropolis. Indeed, Tafuri suggests that “ the very concept of the avant- 
garde” holds a contradiction which becomes apparent “ as m om ents of conflict that 
em erge along the problematic boundary line separating the avant-garde itself from the 
reality  p rincip le” .137 The problem is one of separation. Explicit attem pts to bring 
together art and reality, to collapse the difference, met with failure. There are two 
elements to Tafuri’s argument: (i) the avant-gardes are unable ever to affect the real; (ii) 
their striving to fuse art and life inverts and turns into its opposite, reaffirm ing the 
condition o f alienation they sought to transcend. Together these elem ents form  the 
param eters of a mounting crisis, and an ever exacerbating of tension.138
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid., p.77.
135. Shklovsky cited ibid.
136. M odern Architecture! 1 , op. cit., p.l 12.
137. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p .l 19.
138. The achievements of Analytic Cubism were erased after 1910, Tafuri argues, by the likes ol 
Juan Gris, who - under the influence of Henri Bergson - tr ied to synthesise subject and object, and tried 
to reclaim the subject through a reconquest of the real. It was, however, doomed: “that reconquest cannot 
act on what is real. It can only fluctuate over it, imposing its own synthesis as supreme will-to-form" 
(M odern Architecture! 1 , op. cit., p. 105).
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Like L issitzky’s “Proun” paintings, Tatlin’s counter reliefs are “condem ned to ‘tend 
tow ards’” the real, “ to remain... pure aspiration, to live enclosed in a d r e a m ” . 139 The 
“M onum ent to the Third International” - with its “m aterials” “ of iron, glass and 
revolution” - was faced with the same fate, imagining that it could reconnect art and life 
because its materials were “iron, glass and revolution”. It hoped that this might sidestep 
the void between conventional signs and their meaning. To believe that art can merge 
w ith reality is, for Tafuri, wrongheaded. Form, closed within its own system s of 
self-examination, does not have the power to “link”.140
W ith the example of avant-garde theatre, Tafuri argues this point again. Here, he tracks 
the desire to m erge the sign (the body in scenic space) with its action. No longer 
m ediated by signification, this “sign” aimed to be immediate with its perform ance, to 
recover authentic expression, and “a portion of unalienated space.141 Yet even with 
M eyerhold’s attempt at the “construction of life”, G ropius’ Totaltheater and Piscator’s 
Proletarian Theatre, theatre remained theatre, separated from the real. W hen Piscator 
tried to establish a counter-city or alternative reality it was, Tafuri argues, tantamount to 
self-deception:
P iscator is well aware that the alienation between language and things has 
becom e internal to language itself, but he still deceives him self that he can 
dominate it.142
These counter-realities were doomed, condemned to be but pale alternatives, always 
superfluous to the Metropolis itself. Moreover, Tafuri argues, M eyerhold’s inability to
139. "The Uncertainties of Formalism”, op. cit., p.77.
140. Ibid.
141. Adolphe A ppia’s rebellion against naturalistic theatre and his dream of a theatre for a 
community that needed no theatre (The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., pp .95-111): "The theatre 
became the means for the recovery of a collective catharsis - for the recovery of a portion of unalienated 
space” (p.96). Once again this project finds its ascetic moment, here in Fuch’s theatre, where: "the 
marriage between soul and form presumes renunciation as the supreme means of representation” (p.97).
142. Ibid., p. 110.
synthesise art and life transforms into a celebration of their estrangem ent; 143 Piscator’s
self-deception acts back upon his work and his theatre teaches (as does Moholy N agy’s)
“the elimination of non-objective time from daily behavior, of every expet ience that does
not com e from  things and does not return to them .144 And, of Giopius, he wiites.
. the technolog ical languages that have taken ovet Totaltheatei sing 
independently the hymn of victory of the negative that has taken over the real 
from which that theatre tries to isolate itself.145
The “victory of the negative” - of estrangem ent and alienation, of the M etropolis - 
conquers art, then, in the very moment that art seeks to counter it, or to conquer reality. 
Always the Metropolis will be victorious.
Returning to the practices of El Lissitzky, et al., Tafuri notes that the tension towatd
the real was valid only so long as it remained just that, so long as it did not pietend to
arrive at concrete results” .146 Ultimately, he suggests, the avant-gaide needed.
... intellectual work that stopped at the doors of industrial production, that 
touched the world of labour only tangentially, that did not abandon the field of
pure ideology.147
The fusion of art and life was a “fiction” of “pure intellectual e laboration” ; and, 
moreover, it “ had to remain just that: a horizon constantly shifted toiwaid that could act 
as a catalyst for action. 14« Between artistic form and the real there is a “swerve”, Tafuri 
argued, echoing the dynamics of Shklovsky’s knight’s move. The avant-garde tried to 
extinguish “that ‘swerve’ between the work and what is other to it, between the object 
and its conditions of existence, of production, of use” , they tried “ to break the barrier 
between the language of forms and that of existence .14^
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N evertheless, a certain arrival “at concrete results” did occur - in the ideals of the 
architectural-urban plan. Within the surrounding chaos, the avant-garde made, as Tafuri 
puts it, an “entreaty of Reason”, as it pooled its efforts into action, and into its “ hopes 
for design”, 150 foreshadowing “the coming of collective action, that will result in the 
new city” . 151 The futility of such efforts remained; and this very drive to concretise 
exacted a price. It started with the crisis or the “ suicide of art”. 152 Both Dada and De 
Stijl had negated “any validity of the object” .153 Thenceforth - as the avant-garde moved 
into “design”, and, more specifically, into architectural design - the crisis ol the object 
proceeded through architecture itself. The architectural object - the individual building 
project, say - was, in a sense, a denial of the Metropolis that had given the avant-garde 
its raison d ’etre. It denied the Metropolis by attempting to be discrete from it, by turning 
its back upon the urban flux o f capitalism ; and, by denying the M etropolis, the 
avant-garde threatened its own existence. In fact, “architecture” itself self-negates: the 
conception of architecture as object displaced by an approach which addresses the total 
environment; from the individual building within the city, attention moved to the urban 
process itself. Henceforth, “architecture” can only be an “am biguous object” in the 
Metropolitan Merz. This:
... dissolution of the architectural object in the overall process only em phasized 
the internal contradictions of the modern movement.154
... the entire cycle of modern architecture... [emerged, developed and cam e to 
crisis] as an enormous attempt - the last to be made by the great bourgeois 
artistic culture - to resolve, on the always more outdated level of ideology, the 
im balances, contradictions, and retardations characteristic of the capitalist 
reorganization of the world market and productive developm ent.155
Thus, once the avant-garde had “come within the sphere of the reorganization of
150. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.96, p. 182.
151. Theories and H istory o f  Architecture, op. cit., p.36.
152. Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p.92.
153. Theories and H istory o f  Architecture, op. cit., p.36.
154. Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p .l 17.
155. Ibid., p. 178.
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production in general” their efforts became “the objects and not the subjects of the
P lan” .156
SECTION TWO: “THE NEGATIVE ASSUMES WITHIN ITSELF.. .  
‘THE TRAGEDY OF THE GIVEN’” 157
I. Form Without Utopia
In Tafuri’s writing, as we have seen, the negative is attributed to the flux of capitalism  
itself, and has been harnessed. Capitalist development, therefore, is understood as a 
dialectic based on - and propelled by - the negative, and the role of the avant-garde 
within this is related to the questions of the Metropolis and the Plan. This is a strategy 
that Llorens describes as “tracing architectural conceptions” - and we m ight add avant- 
gardist forms - “ to some basic kernel in the economic domain”. 158 According to Tafuri, 
capitalist science, in its more advanced forms, incorporated both Nietzsche s negation of 
tradition and  the negative motor of H egel’s dialectic. There was, said Tafuri, “ a global 
rationalisation, with a positive realization of the dialectic” - “no longer Hegel but 
K eynes” . 159 “The negative is inherent in the system” - this is obvious enough, Tafuri 
says; rather the task was to identify what “actually makes this ‘negativity’ (the negative 
of the w orking class) function as a ‘necessity’” . 160 Negation - as the Party of 
Catastrophe - has been internalised by the system of capital accumulation. In this sense, 
negation was now capitalism ’s motor; or, as we encountered in Negri, capital had 
“ learned to read Das /Capital”.
156. Ibid.. p. 100.
157. Cacciari, “The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis”, op. cit.. pp. 19-20.
158. Llorens, op. cit., p.85. Llorens also raises the possibility that T afuri’s analysis is no more 
than one proceeding by analogy.
159. Architecture and U topia , op. cit.. p.62, p.61.
160. Ibid., p.61.
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But N egri’s argum ent places negation in a further light: cap ital’s move to a political 
econom y of “dynam ic equilibrium ” may have internalised negation, but, as we saw 
earlier, it also must stop “one pole of that antagonism breaking free into independent 
destructive action” and must perpetually postpone the resolution of the dialectic. Put this 
way, negation - and its autonomy - is rendered even more important. This is not so 
different^onthe em phasis on negation articulated by the Young H egelians and their 
attem pt to release the negative from its imprisonment within the strictures of- the 
status quo.
It is a workerist thesis which is advanced by Tafuri in Architecture and Utopia - a book 
which m ight be regarded as a synthesis of positions and materials from  Contropiano, 
rew orked through the material of architectural and avant-garde histories. 161 The 
orientation to the “autonomy” of class interests marks out their space from both capital 
and the established Left. W hat is really at stake in Tafuri’s account - and for which the 
fate of the avant-garde provides some allegory - is the politics of reform; both N egri’s 
“capitalist reform ism ” and a socialist reform ism .162 If the form er type of reform ism  
provides the necessary ground, it is the latter which seems to be treated with more 
urgency. This social democratic politics is, perhaps, the real “ am biguous object” which 
Tafuri thinks needs divesting of its ambiguous quality, and needs its radical rhetoric 
exposing as the sound o f capitalist m anagem ent.163 The politics o f classic social
161. There are significant elements of this approach in both earlier and later writings.
162. Socialist reformism is classically described as a commitment to a gradual, evolutionary 
progression to socialism, where capitalism can be effectively reformed out of existence. The main 
criticisms of this approach are: its illusion in the neutrality of the state and its institutions, and thus its 
political avoidance of the question of the state and state power; and its faith in the essentially stable basis 
to capitalism ’s economy rather than a conception of capitalism as based on crisis, a faith which 
imagines capital as open to rational control and argument.
163. It is not insignificant that Weimar Germany provides a central, and recurring, case study: nor 
that, for Cacciari, the focus is Germany’s emergence as a modern technological nation in the early years 
of the 20c. The period marks the height of social democratic activity, takes in the major split between 
the Second and Third Internationals, and the impact of the Soviet Union on Weimar' politics and culture.
dem ocracy arc, however, only a part of Tafuri’s object of critique, and in the 1960s the 
operaisto  associated that politic with much wider sections of the Left, as much with 
those strains (who in the 1920s had been) associated with revolution as with lefoim  , 
all - whether PSI or PCI - were now “basically K e y n e s i a n ” . 164 If the P C I’s claim  to 
revolu tion  had already been com prom ised by the decisions ol the C om m unist 
International under Stalin, its complicity in disarming w orkeis in (among othei places) 
Italy im m ediately after the W orld W ar Two, and (by 1973) the PCI s historical 
com prom ise” with the Christian Democrats, would have helped fixed this assessment in 
the eyes of many Leftists.
If we read Tafuri’s account of the architectural “ambiguous object and the avant-gaide 
through the prism  of the operaista  critique of reform ism  his point becom es c learei. 
A ccording to Tafuri, a dialectic of reason and chaos unfolds along with the avant- 
gardists’ belief that they could realise their dreams in the capitalist heie and now. The 
consequence of this dialectic is that the closer their aims get to “ fruition , the more 
remote and vacuous they become; and, finally, these aims must turn into theii opposites. 
Tafuri refers to the gap between the avant-garde’s subjective aims and the ttanslation of 
that ideology into techniques which functioned for capitalism, i65 The critique o f the 
avant-garde, then, was a critique made on the grounds of its false illusions in 
substitutionalism; and, in the context of the post-war world, it marks his rejection of the 
professional ideology of architects, and their sense that they are m ajor players in 
“improving the world”: their “dream of a ‘new world’ arising from the realization of the 
principle of Reason become the P l a n ” . 166 Against the radical rhetoric of this ideology, 
Tafuri asserts that we must accept “the ineffective nature of architecture” - or, we might 
add, the inevitability of its always finding itself the object and not the subject of the
164. Negri suggests that social democracy is labour power’s self-negation. See Negri, “ Labor m the 
Constitution” , Labor o f  D ionysus, op. cit., pp.53-136.
165. The Sphere and the Labyrinth , op. cit., p.21.
166. Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p .171.
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If we take seriously this context, a number of points need to be raised concerning some 
of the com m entaries on Tafuri’s work. There are two different elem ents here which I 
shall characterise as the provincialist argument and the pessimist argum ent.168
(i) The provincialist argument: This argument - which exists more as a com mon refrain 
than a full-blown argument - tries to “provincialise” Tafuri’s analysis, claiming that it is 
peculiarly Italian. Certainly, the specificities of the Italian situation in the ’60s and 70s 
are important, but such comments usually serve to keep at a distance the politics and the 
critique advanced by Tafuri, and their effect is to localise T a fu ri’s argum ent 
geographically, and thereby to “ localise” its validity, rem oving its force vis-a-vis 
capitalism in general. W hat is never taken into account by the provincialist argument, for 
example, is the insistence - explicit in Negri, and present, I think, in Tafuri’s work - that 
it is the USA which provides the classic model of capitalist developm ent and the realm 
of the disenchanted. 169 W hatever one thinks of Tafuri’s account, a careful reading of it 
reveals its claim to be an anti-reformist position. Treating his account provincially, then, 
is another way of liberalising it. A further effect is to temporally provincialise the work, 
if  not to absent it as some quaint, lost ( ’68-ish) m om ent. The upshot o f this 
p rovincialising  and liberalising is that the dynam ic of Tafuri s analysis of the 
avant-garde is missed, and is rendered as a postmodernist critique of m odernism . In 
o ther w ords, having stripped the analysis of its revolutionary in ten t - how ever 
problem atic that claim  might be - and, more specifically, of its m ore generalised 
applicability as a critique of capitalism and of “radical” activity in that capitalism , it is 
localised but only so that it can be made available for another generalised account. In as
Plan .167
167. Theories and H istory o f  Architecture, op. cit., p.4.
168. There is also a postmodernist argument, but I have chosen to incorporate it as following from 
the logic of the provincialist argument.
169. W e should also recall the point about the importance of Germany above. Llorens is critical of 
this American bias (Llorens, op. cit., p.95 tootnote 37).
much as T afuri’s analysis is found to be of wider intellectual interest - in particular, to 
the A nglophone world - it is generalised at an abstrac t level, and thereby 
“postm odernised”, ignoring Tafuri’s own critique of the postmodernist outlook. 170
(ii) The pessimist argument: The initial response to Tafuri’s early work was to see it as a 
pessim istic account. In part what is being read here is Tafuri’s critique of avant-gardist 
and architectural ideology, and what appears to be the claim  that they cannot effect 
significant change (or, at least, the sort of changes they intend) . ! 71 The charge of 
pessim ism , as we have already seen, tends to adhere to anyone who raises negativity 
and to anyone who does not present an affirmative (life enhancing) account of art. 
Tafuri, for his part, works overtime in the preface to Architecture and Utopia to distance 
him self from the charge of being doom-laden: “ the expression o f renunciation” , he 
insists, was not an apocalyptic prophecy of the “death of architecture” , rather the point 
is that capitalism  has destroyed certain key tasks for architecture, “ what it has taken 
away in general from ideological prefiguration”. 172 There are two aspects then that need 
to be distinguished in Tafuri’s argument, and which may be confused in the charges of 
pessim ism : the critique o f avant-gardist substitutionalism, and the critique o f social 
dem ocracy. From the perspective of the latter, for instance, we m ight w onder is the 
critique of reform ism  pessimistic or realistic? This is a difficult questions on the Left, 
never mind more broadly.
T afuri’s argum ent on this point amounts to little more than a base-superstructure one: 
the escape from the chaos of the Metropolis cannot be effected by architectural projects,
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170. Furthermore, Tafuri’s intellectual trajectory cannot be grasped; on my reading, despite the 
supposed “break” or “phases” of Tafuri’s, the workerist critique remains constant. This, o f course, has 
implications for how one sees negation.
171. Tafuri himself alludes to the reception of Theories and H istory and Architecture and Utopia in 
the prefaces. Lipstadt and Mendelsohn note that it is understandable how the charges of pessimism could 
be made, but ar gue that they are based 011 a “superficial reading” , op. cit., p.59.
172. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.ix.
but only through social revolution. As he reiterates in 1986, “there are no more utopias, 
the architecture of commitment, which tried to engage us politically and socially, is 
fin ished” .173 Tafuri’s argument, then, has value as a refusal of reform ist illusions (in 
both their political and artistic senses) - it m ight even be described as an activistic 
version o f Adorno in this respect, a refusal of the consolation of (imagined) wholeness 
or a refusal of a retreat from the negative conditions of modem social life .174 However, 
there is another dimension to this, specifically in the programme of response advocated 
by Tafuri and Cacciari - or to be more precise, in their programme (if it can be so called) 
of non-response. As he argues in the 1973 preface, we must accept that we are left with 
“form  without utopia” , with a return to “pure architecture” ,175 or as he writes thirteen 
years later: “what is left to pursue is empty architecture” .176 Seen from this position, the 
charge of pessimism may also have a different valence. T.J. Clark - him self potentially 
on the receiving end of such a charge from Fried - refers to Tafuri as a “rank pessim ist” 
along with Foucault; and Fredric Jameson attributes “cultural pessim ism ” to him  by 
association  w ith A dorno’s negative dialectic and Roland B arthes zero-degree 
w ritin g .177 Such com m ents do, of course, beg the question of w hat m ight be the 
counter-criteria of optimism on this occasion. Clark does not follow up the charge, but 
Jameson pursues the matter and tries to define the problem politically and intellectually. 
H owever, to try to do battle with Tafuri on Italian soil by m obilising the figure of 
Gram sci som ew hat misses the point in a context where Gram sci had been rendered 
“safe” and a figurehead by the PCI.178 Nevertheless, the likes of Clark and Jameson are
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173. See Tafuri, “There is no criticism, only history” , op. cit., p. 11. This is not. he insists, a 
declaration of the "failure of Modern architecture”.
174. Llorens, op. cit., p.94 footnote 29, points out that Tafuri never works with the concept of 
alienation, although it could be argued that Cacciari’s discussion of exchange value and Vergeistigung  
effectively move us onto this terrain but without the "tragic" dimensions that have often been read into 
alienation.
175. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.ix.
176. “There is no criticism, only history”, op. cit., p . l l .
177. Jam eson, P ostm odernism , op. cit., p.60.
178. Jameson does, in fact, acknowledge this problem, but pursues the point nevertheless.
not making an everyday charge of pessimism. As the rest of this chapter will show, the 
argument about pessimism - once we have distanced it from the more usual accounts of 
w hat pessimism might be, and taken Tafuri’s points on board - is not so easy to dismiss 
as illusions in capitalism’s potential beneficence.
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B efore pursuing this m atter of pessimism , another point needs to be noted. Tafuri 
m akes his argum ent across a broader historical terrain than the 20c. avant-garde. A 
number of key moves and patterns recur in Tafuri’s writings, and, once identified, these 
moves can be tracked across some very different historical objects - pointing, peihaps, 
to a program m e of analysis that is driven primarily from the level of theory. The 
centrality of the M etropolis and the Plan to his account may not, in fact, be so central. It 
is not only the historical avant-garde which seeks out the elements of language in oidei 
to rearticulate them and only to discover their loss; Tafuri finds this process underway 
since the R enaissance, w hich he describes as the origins of the avan t-g ard e’s
anti-historicism:
.. the first great attempt of modern history to actualise  historical values as a 
transition  of m ythical tim e into present tim e, of archaic m eanings into 
revolutionary messages, of ancient “words” into civil actions...17-1
Through the denial of old values - achieved, paradoxically, by the appropriation of the 
ancient syntax - Brunelleschi (who, Tafuri says, was the first artistic avant-gardist) 
establishes the condition whereby “one drow ns in a sea of em pty and disposable 
symbolSj pure fragm ents of a decomposed order” .i«o Precisely through his quotations 
and allusions to an historical precedent, Brunelleschi unleashed “ the eclipse of histoiy , 
the dehistoricisation that would allow a new reality - and a new history - to be bu ilt.1*1
179. Theories and H istory o f  Architecture, op. cit., p. 15.
181 These ^ comments on Brunelleschi are from Theories and H istory o f  Architecture. In his 1985 
book Tafuri explores “ the doubts about the values of form that tormented the heterodox individuals ot 
^ ° s ix le e n th  century” (Venice and the Renaissance, op. cit.. p.196). Again, we encounter a smular
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It is debatable whether Tafuri is being totally ahistorical, or whether he is articulating a 
sort of long duree of rising m odernity,182 and although Tafuri is critical of the work of 
Argan, he shares the same large interpretive schem a that can be found th e re .183 
However, I do not want to follow the question of historical research and the question of 
m ethod therein, or the validity or otherw ise of T afuri’s account. The point is to 
recognise the centrality, for his approach, of the crisis of the object, the critique of the 
tragic response, and the art-historical dialectic established. Each of these issues in Tafuti 
works a sense of negation, and does so before we even encounter categories such as the 
M etropolis and the Plan.
argument: Palladio’s philology of Vitruvian grammar, Tafuri tells us, tar liom  being the leassertion ot a 
given value, or the submission to "a handbook of rules’ , was the route to syntactic tieedom (p. 127). 
Palladio’s reading of Antiquity, Tafuri argues, allowed him to treat the classical codes as a (ield ol 
variations” . Accordingly, invention did not proceed from  the type, rather the type (heie the exemplum  ol 
Vitruvius) already contained invention; indeed, Taturi points out, Palladio s reconsttuction ol Vitruvius 
“villa house of the ancients” only proceeded after he had conducted his own inventions.
The norm thus becomes something purely conceptual. Indefinable, it lives ideally in a planned 
adventure that discovers the value of a serial arrangement, devoid ol models , Palladio s ai s 
com binatoria  criticizes the concept ot the type and presents itself as an open structure, a logical 
concatenation of experiments on the aggregation of spaces, on the syntax of stiuctuies, and on 
the composition of pivotal elements, made possible thanks to grammatical purification . 
(p .127)
Again the tension towards the real is an issue. Palladio (and Alberti), Tafuri argues, pieserved the 
nucleus of the humanist hypothesis in an absolutely pure  form” . Yet they built “ ‘fin ite’ islands of 
rationality” which were clearly demarcated and separated fiom leality, theii linality tiagically isolated 
in "the universe of representation”. Palladio’s work, especially of the 1560s and '70s, “created a virtual 
reality that contrasted with immediate reality ’, living on in that leality due to its estianging powei . 
“The harmony of Palladian architecture thus projects itself beyond the present, drawing a horizon ol 
meaning that goes beyond the sixteenth century” (p.128). However, Scamozzi (Palladio’s immediate 
successor): “reduced scientia to norms validated by archaeological knowledge ... [which] were assumed as 
invariants devoid of internal flexibility.... abstract completeness, ‘without tim e” ’ (p. 163); “Scamozzian 
abstraction seems to have foreshadowed the even more radical abstraction o f Inigo Jones and the 
ambiguity of an international Palladianism made of emptied forms” (p. 196). Scam ozzi’s work. Tafuri 
suggests, consisted of “formal overdetermination”, such that its move towards “atemporal abstraction” 
threatened, in the Venetian context, to overspill and invert, introducing “metaphysical nuances” (p. 195). 
For V enice 's rising g io va n i, “empty content” represented the ostentation and architecture o f the 
Rom anist patricians; here, form could not be an “autonomous system " (p. 175), and Scam ozzi’s 
“atemporal abstraction” was rendered oveiloaded (p.190).
182 For instance, cf. the senses of “modern history" or the long rise of secularism, olten through 
forms which suggest an entrenched religiosity, as Benjamin suggests of the Baroque.
183 See Giulio Carlo Argan. The Baroque Age  (1964), Skira, 1989. Argan runs his dialectic as 
essentially harmonious, which is where, of course, Tafuri’s account is sharply different, charting an 
increasing exacerbation of tensions. For Tafuri, the “unity in variety” of the late Baroque passes over 
into an approach to the city characterised as “order and chaos, regularity and irregularity, organic 
structure and the lack of organic structure” (Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.21). Llorens sees these 
more as paradoxes than as dialectic, effectively re-living a common distinction made between Adorman 
and Lukacsian approaches to cultural history.
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Tracking forward historically to the Enlightenment we find him writing of Pii anesi. all 
form s of classical derivation are treated as meie fragments, as defoim ed symbols , 184 
O rder itse lf thus dissolves into “a m onstrous pullulation of sym bols devoid of 
significance”, rationalism becomes irrationalism.185 In Puanesi s Campo Mai do , Tafuri 
says, these opposite forces exist in extreme tension; but in his Cat cet i we encountei the 
“ silence o f things” .186 “A universe of empty signs is a place of total disoidei . this is 
P iranesi’s prophecy, Tafuri insists, his “anguished anticipation of a w oild which has 
lost its ancient order and values.187 Piranesi reptesents, foi Tafuri, the fiist m odem  
manifestation of “the experience of anguish” , and the fii st lesponse to the levolt of the 
objects”; yet it is in his work, nevertheless - and inescapably - that im ages and forms 
are reduced to empty signs” . 188 Thenceforth, he tells us, two loads become available to 
modem ait and architecture: the one explores the depths and wietchedness of leality (the 
“ forest”); the other tries to go beyond reality and to cteate ex novo (the aiistociatic 
reserve”). The anxiety provoked by the M etropolis is now on the caids, but the 
opposition of two roads has a longer genesis. In At chitectm e and Utopia , Tafuri divides 
the Enlightenm ent architects between those with “excessive sym bolism ” (Ledoux and 
Lequeu) and those who work with “geometric silence (D uiand).18^  In the case of eaily 
20c. architecture, Tafuri charts this same duality through Expressionism  and Neue 
Sachlichkeit: respectively, the “exasperation of the object” and the “destruction of the
184. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.14.
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid., p. 19.
187. Ibid.
188. Ibid. , ,  . ,  
189 In late 16c. Venice, Scamozzi’s excess found its dialectical counterpart, we are told, in the
“formal silence" and “restrained subdivisions” of the plans for the Fondamenta Nuova draughted by
Giovanni Alvise Galesi (Venice and the R enaissance , op. cit., p. 190). In Theories and H istory  o f
A rch itectu re , op. cit.,pp.l5-17 and pp.19-21, Tafuri’s counterpoints are set up between, tor example,
A lberti and Brunelleschi (and their relation to the Gothic); and between Borromini and Bernini
(historicist expcrimentalism versus rigorist abstraction).
object and its substitution by a process to be lived”. 190 Once again, one recognises this 
as tragic anguish versus anti-tragic, active consciousness: the two responses to the crisis 
of form  and the crisis of value. For the m id-20c., T afu ri’s opposition is between 
neo-avant-garde “noise” (with its desperate - and, he notes, sceptical - formal distortion) 
on the one hand, and, on the other, the silence and deliberate muteness of form  in the 
work of M ies van der Rohe.
II. “Only Through A Total Alienation” & The “Total Introjection Of... 
N o th in g n e s s ” 191
For the avant-garde movements the destruction of values offered a wholly new 
type o f  rationality, which was capable of coming face to face with the negative, 
in order to make the negative itself the release valve of an unlimited potential for 
developm ent. 192
If we have addressed the negative as “release valve”, what might it be to com e face to 
face” with it? W e may ask this question of Tafuri’s analysis of the avant-garde , but also 
o f his analysis. In fact, it might be said that it is facing the negative to which Tafuii and 
Cacciari increasingly turn their attentions, both as something to investigate and as 
something to make into a methodological and political strategy. W heie did that negative 
take the avant-garde? It lay, says Tafuri, in “the discovery of the silence surrounding the 
sign, that residue, that insuppressible boundary that rem ained after the dadaist
devastation”. 193 He continues:
The negative, having arrived at the limit that separates language from  silence, 
was in a position to organize syntactical structures deprived of referents - or, 
better, full of referents intent on verifying themselves. 194
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190. Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p. 110.
191. The Sphere and the Labyrinth , op. cit., p p .101-2, p.98.
192. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.56, my emphasis.
193. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit.. p. 148.
194. Ibid., my emphasis. There is an interesting parallel with C lark’s account of the negation of 
metaphor turning into the multiplication ol metaphor.
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W e have seen the central issues of Tafuri’s dialectic of the avant-garde, a dialectic that
ran into increasingly fraught relations with the M etropolis, the avant-garde’s validity
becoming more and more attenuated. So what, then, might be the correct response to the
M etropolis? W hat scope is there, and for what sort of action? As might be anticipated, it
is the “ silence”, rather than the “noise” , which is the answer favoured by Tafuri. Since
the crisis of die object - simultaneous with the Metropolis - architecture has been obliged
“to become a spectre of itse lf’. 195 M ies’ buildings, he argues, “are objects that ‘exist by
means of their own death’, only in this way saving themselves from certain f a i l u r e ” . 196
Such buildings have ceased resisting, and have surrendered to total alienation.
In that space [the “ Barcelona Pavilion”], a place of absence , em pty, conscious 
of the im possibility  of restoring “ synthesis” once the “ negative” o f the 
metropolis has been understood, man, the spectator of a spectacle that is really 
“ to tal” because it is nonexistent, is obliged to perform  a pantom im e that 
reproduces the wandering in the urban labyrinth of sign-beings am ong signs 
having no sense, a pantomime that he must attempt daily. In the absoluteness of 
silence, the audience of the Barcelona Pavilion can thus be “reintegrated” with 
that absence.... Mies gives life to a language com posed o f em pty and isolated 
signifiers, in which things are portrayed as mute events.197
Thus, in such works one faces the “ ‘negative’ of the m etropolis” . Having accepted its
elem ents as “pure signs”, architecture abandons any attempt to reconstruct or reimpose
meaning, and refuses any illusory claim that it can patch-up the fissures and gaps.
The expressionist, futurist, or dadaist cabaret is thus the crucible in which the 
metropolitan grotesque, the clash between objects in ebullition, is assumed and 
represented - even if only as a means of provoking the total introjection of the 
nothingness that runs through its formless structure. 198
Here, T afuri’s qualification - “even if only” - threatens what is, in fact, central to his 
account: “ the total introjection of the nothingness” is a crucial aspect o f Tafurian 
negation.
195. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., p.145. Hence the phenomenon o f university “cities” as 
collections of formal architectural experiments.
196. Ibid., p. 148.
197. The Sphere and the Labyrinth , op. cit., pp. 111-2.
198. Ibid., p.98.
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It is Schopenhauer w hose philosophy is explicitly referred to in this respect of 
resignation . Tafuri notes the “Schopenhauerian negation of all w ill and of all 
representation” and Schopenhauer’s “asceticism as flight from the tragic” . 199 W hat we 
find in Schopenhauer’s writing is a philosophy of pessimism, or a strong and explicit 
advocation o f pessim ism , which may shed some light on the question of pessim ism  
addressed earlier. In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer advances an 
argum ent which privileges “w ill” (essence, or noumena) over “representation” (the 
world of life, contingency and appearance, or phenom ena).200 This echoes a long 
dualist tradition from Plato to Kant, but in the third and fourth books Schopenhauer re­
addresses these categories in w hat he calls their “ second aspec t” . H ere the 
straightforward privileging of will gives way: he argues that will is objectified as “ the 
w ill-to -live” , that w ill com es to know itself insofar as it m irrors itse lf in life or 
representation, and that this knowledge can either affirm or deny the will-to-live.2°i
The affirm ation o f the w ill-to-live is haunted by an “original d isco rd” or inner 
antagonism  because it derives from  the principium  individuationis (principle of 
individuation).202 Here the ego’s “enhanced distinctness” wills not only to live, but to 
do so at the expense of, and in conflict with, others.203 Thus willing is “destined to
199. M odern Architect w e l l ,  op. cit., p.108, p. 111. Cf. his comments on Shklovsky's irony instead 
o f pathos ("The Uncertainties of Formalism”, op. cit., p.76).
200. See Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1, Dover Publications, 
1969. Schopenhauer’s asceticism is another key site for the debate over pessimism. R.J. Hollingdale 
notes that Schopenhauer is unusual for the depth of his justification of pessimism and for establishing a 
metaphysics to advance the pessimistic ethic. See R.J. Hollingdale, “Introduction” (1970) to Arthur 
Schopenhauer, E ssays and A phorism s, Penguin, 1970, p. 22-3. See also Julian Roberts, G erm an  
P hilosoph y: An Introduction, Polity Press, 1990, pp. 162-184 (and pp. 183-184 for a discussion of 
pessim ism , the via negativa, and comparison with Adorno); Christopher Janaway, Schopenhauer, 
Oxford University Press, 1994, especially pp.85-99.
201. Schopenhauer, op. cit., p.285.
202. Ibid.. p.333.
203. Ibid., p.331; "every individual, completely vanishing and reduced to nothing in a boundless 
world, nevertheless makes him self the centre o f the world, and considers his own existence and 
well-being before everything else. In fact, from the natural standpoint, he is ready for this to sacrifice 
everything else; he is ready to annihilate the world, in order to maintain his own self, that drop in the
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pain” and “all life is suffering”. 204 Consequently, happiness is not a positive concept, 
but a negative one: merely the diminution of suffering. 205 Pessimism, he argues, is the 
only appropriate ethical response; optimism is for the shallow-minded or the wicked: a 
bitter m ockery of the unspeakable suffering of m ankind” 206 K now ledge m ust be 
know ledge o f the w ill itse lf - not of particular and contingent phenom ena (the 
principium iridividuationis which continually “motivates the will), know ledge must 
“become the quieter of all and every willing”,207 the denial of the will-to-live, silencing 
and suppressing all willing” .208 This “elective decision” to “escape” life’s suffering and 
conflict is a will that “freely abolishes itse lf’,2°9 and is best realised as asceticism  which 
is “a constant m ortification of the w ill” , a via negativa to a state o f fieedom  of the
w ill” .210
The “negative avant-gardes” , Tafuri argues, advocated salvation from the M etropolis 
through a total surrender to it - “ by losing oneself in the unform ed”, he notes, “ one 
might be able to save one’s soul”.2H For the Futurists, salvation m ight be found at the 
far end o f alienation, and so they followed the process of Vergeistigung through to its
conclusion.212
The vitalism that shapes the first dadaist cabaret rushes toward the most absolute 
annihilation of the soul, toward the “yes” said to collective alienation, to the
ocean, a little longer” (p.332).
204 Ibid p 312. p.310. The idea of pain is very central to Schopenhauer: its absence, or the
absence of the need to struggle to survive, renders life empty and boring and makes existence an
intolerable burden” (p.312).
205 Ibid. p .319. He argues that art is unable to produce images of enduring happiness, but can 
only propose or imply it. Dante, for instance, could represent Hell, for it is our world, but his 
representation of Heaven was limited to repeating second-hand images gleaned from the saints and
Beatrice.
206. Ibid.. p.326.
207. Ibid., p .379.
208. Ibid., p.308.
209. Ibid., p.285. j ,
2 jq  p 3 8 i  p.404. Schopenhauer compares this to the state of “ grace advocated by Christian
mystics.
211 M odern Architecture! 1 , op. cit., p .108.
212 And turning to the Cabaret Voltaire, he tells us that the “sole duty" of the dada-pnest "is to 
have everyone witness his own decomposition” {The Sphere and the Labyrinth , op. cit., p. 100).
147
putting to death of values.-13
Tafuri’s point becomes most explicit - and makes us recall Golyscheff - in his comments
on M eyerhold’s 1922 production of Magnanimous Cuckold:
“The art of the festival” is no longer just the destruction of old churches. Now it 
m ust penetrate into the interior of the productive processes, transform  their 
forms, bring back to them a Dionysian liberation. To M eyerhold, planning and 
Taylorization meant establishing within work the need for play. Only through a 
m aximum of planning and mechanization (thus, only through a total alienation) 
can m an-m ass be dragged into a collective work-festival, liberated from  the 
sacrificial rites of dadaism.214
Accordingly, one must acknowledge and indulge the M ettopolitan situation. One m ust 
discover the “value of n o n - v a lu e ” , 215 and participate  in this - participate in this to the 
poin t o f  excess in order to come out on the far side. The possibility of "salvation” can 
only be achieved through total submission to the dynamics of the Metropolis - one must 
accept the void between sign and meaning, and revel in it: “To save oneself one m ust 
lose one’s self, one must resign oneself to being submerged in the chaos, one m ust 
m ake oneself sign among signs. But by action” .216 Salvation lay not in revolt but in 
surrender,217 argues Tafuri, and it takes courage to surrender:
... Dada displayed not only the indifference that is the badge of the man who has 
the courage to open his eyes to the reality of a merchandising world, but also the 
void that the end of values - the Nietzschean death of God - leaves behind it.218
Those who resist it - whether by nostalgia or tragic anxiety, by attem pts to escape in 
“alternatives” , or to synthesise its contradictions - are doom ed to repeat, and to 
exacerbate, the pain of im possibility.219 Those who can face this negative may make
213. Ibid., p. 100.
214. Ibid., pp.101-2.
215. Ibid., p. 135.
216. M odern Architecture/1 , op. cit., p.108. Of Schlemmer, Tafuri notes that the “great yes” said to 
the reality that reduces man to a marionette “liberates” that same marionette (The Sphere and the 
L abyrinth , op. cit., p. 106).
217. Architecture and U topia , op. cit., pp.72-4.
218. M odern Architecture/1, op. cit., p. 108.
219. Baudelaire’s flaneur and Simmel’s blase type recognised the inescapability of Metropolitan 
Vergeistigung, Tafuri argues. Moreover, we are told, Baudelaire recognised that the situation would be 
e x a c erb a ted  by any attempt to escape it (A rchitecture and U topia , op. cit., p.92); all would lead,
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their gains, and find a space for liberation.220
III. Negative Thought
The trajectory demanded by facing the negative is, Tafuri suggests, also recognised by a 
section of the avant-garde - this time the “positive a v a n t - g a r d e ” .2 2 i
The avant-garde, brought back to its elementary principles, was thus obliged to 
reveal its cards completely, to recognize its own origins in “negative thought , to 
declare once again not only its own nonpolitical nature, but also its own
immoralism...222
Further attention to this “negative thought” - a focus developed by Cacciari - will take us 
to a more theoretical exploration of the notion of negation used by Tafuri.
Cacciari defines negative thought as the blase type’s sense of the M etropolis, his 
“perspective of his own inability to go beyond it... the perspective of his own negated
individuality” :223
Merely to reflect it [the Metropolis] would be to reflect it not at all: between the 
form s and modes of such a simple reflection and the specifically dialectical 
structure of the M etropolis, no consistency is possible.... only a thought that is 
able to see the subsuming of individuality not in terms of negation but in terms 
of use and functionality... can express the ideology of the M e t t o p o l i s . 2 2 4
nevertheless, to “pure silence” (p.74).
220. “The acceptance of the mask transforms the reified condition into a term of "probation’ : the 
only  liberty still attainable and able to show the possibility of a space of action in which the man who 
has learned to accept the conditioning of objects may find new ritual dimensions, in harmony with a 
geometric freezing of the real” (The Sphere and the Labyrinth , op. cit., p. 106).
221. Here is an extract from the manifesto of the International Union of Neoplastic Constructivists 
of 1922, signed by van Doesburg, Hans Richter, Karel Maes, Max Burchartz and Lissitzky, and cited by 
Tafuri: “This international is not the result of some humanitarian, idealistic, or political sentiment, but 
springs from the same amoral and elementary principles on which both science and technology aic 
based” (cited ibid., pp. 147-8).
222. Ibid., p. 148.
223. Cacciari, “The Dialectics of the Negative and the M etropolis” , op. cit., p.9. According to 
Cacciari the Metropolitan experience is infused through and through with the negative - this is, after all, 
its definition - infused with devaluation, with the removal of all quality, and with a complete subjection 
to a field of equivalent signs. The ideology appropriate to the Metropolis is “negative thought”; and its 




Negative thought reflects the structural contradictions of the M enopolis: “negative 
thought presupposes contradictions”, and signifies “ the discovery of the negativity of 
the M etropolis i t s e l f ’.225 Fantasies and illusions of the good life, of the organic city - 
w hether in social visions, or in art - are m ystifications of the worst kind. N egative 
thought, in contrast, presupposes devaluation (Entwertung). The negative is negative 
“precisely because it is Entwertung”, Cacciari argues: it accepts that escape (practical or 
theoretical) is hopeless, simply “a prayer for c o n s o l a t i o n ” . 226  it not only assum es its 
own total im m ersion within the condition of the M etropolis, it takes this seriously. 
Simm el, Cacciari continues, addressed negativity, but only went so far with negative 
thought, follow ing the logic of the negative only to the point where the social 
equilibrium  - its synthesis and recuperation - m ight be cut off. He treated negative 
thought as an entity with some autonomy from the M etropolis, able to take its distance 
in sociological objectivity. As such, Simmel only described the relations of the 
M etropolis, but remained oblivious to its function as a tool of political d o m i n a t i o n . 227 
Consequently, Cacciari argues, S im m ers exploration of Verstand and Nervenleben did 
not progress to a theory of Vergeistigung of capitalist production relations, but tried 
instead to forge a synthesis of the individual and society, of the particular and the 
g e n e r a l . 228 Simmel thereby assim ilated the negative, and constantly organising his 
analysis under the sway of humanist values. In contrast, Cacciari argues, B enjam in’s
225. Ibid., p. 10. For Cacciari, “negative thought registers the leaps, the ruptures, the innovations 
that occur in history, never the transition, the flow, the continuum”, and, with echoes of Negri, he 
continues, “ herein lies its formidable function, its value as symbol; it represents not merely a 
movement of crisis in the growth of capitalism but the very crisis serving as a function within this 
growth” (p. 13).
226. Ibid.. p. 19, p.20.
227. Simmel himself concludes "The Metropolis and Mental Life” with the statement: “it is our 
task not to complain or to condone but only to understand” (Simmel, op. cit., p.339). He did not 
explain the use of N ervenleben  and Verstand , and he saw the division of labour, Cacciari says, as 
nothing more than “specialisation” (“The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis” , op. cit., p .l 1) 
and scope for some “freedom” and "individuality” (Simmel, op. cit., p .324). In fact, Simmel did note 
some of the less benign effects of the division of labour, although Cacciari’s point stands.
228. Simmel: “It is the function of the metropolis to make a place for the conflict [of individual and 
totality] and for the attempts at unification of both of these in the sense that its own peculiar conditions 
have been revealed to us as the occasion and the stimulus for the development of both” (Simmel, op. 
cit., p.339).
analysis more fully sublimates M etropolitan stimuli, and “ the cultural form s of the 
M etropolis appear totally integrated into the overall functions and contents of its 
g r o w t h ” .229  i n  Benjam in’s Metropolis “no aura can survive”, everything and everybody 
is e n g u l f e d . 2 3 0  The subject, discovering his own com m ercialisation, learns to enjoy 
“ being simultaneously torturer and tortured” .231 This sado-m asochistic im age is one 
favoured by B e n j a m i n ;  232 here, for Tafuri and Cacciari, it functions as a transition from 
object to subject. In fact, the crossing of this “divide”, the collapsing of the distinction, 
is precisely what is at stake not ju st in the Metropolis, but in negative thought, and not 
ju s t in the negative thought of Benjamin, but also in that advocated and adopted by 
Tafuri and Cacciari. As Cacciari put it, “the negative assumes within itself, completely 
internalizes ‘the tragedy of the g iven’, and lets it speak for i t s e l f ’;2 3 3  the negative 
presupposes shock and presumes no distance from that shock. Or as Tafuri puts it (in a 
different context): “criticism takes over the instruments hitherto belonging to the object 
of a n a l y s i s ” .234 W hat we need, Cacciari says, is an approach which is self-conscious of 
what it means to “integrate the negative within i t s e l f ’.235
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229. “The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis”, op. cit., p.17.
230. Ibid., p.21. Benjamin describes Baudelaire’s crowd as one which engulfs the "observer”, which 
internalises the circulation of commodities in a way which is analogous to the labour process itself; 
hence, “the image of shock reveals its own class status” (p.21). Likewise, Tafuri discusses Baudelaire’s 
flaneur as the new user of the city, who, like Baudelaire himself, had to acknowledge “his own 
unendurable position o f participant” (Architecture and U top ia , op. c it., p .80) in the world of 
merchandise (and, therefore, his own prostitution). This discovery of the object's commercialisation 
forms a tension with those false and deluded attempts to recover authenticity. There is, in other words, 
no longer any culture which is autonomous from the Metropolis - no K ultur and no ideology of the 
“city”; now that we face Metropolitan shock, Cacciari says, thought can no longer dominate lived 
experience. Moreover, attempts to deny or reduce the negative are futile: “ the perspective of the negative 
reemerges” (“The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis”, op. cit., p. 16).
231. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p. 119.
232. See Benjamin, The Origin o f  German Tragic Drama, op. cit., p p .184-5.
233. “The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis”, op. cit., pp .19-20.
234. “The Uncertainties of Formalism”, op. cit., p.76.
235. "The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis” , op. cit., p. 16.
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IV. Completed Nihilism
Thus negative thought is seen - when exercised not only on its external object but also 
when it exercises itself - as an appropriate response to the M etropolis, capital and its 
alienation. N ihilism  has been “the motivating force of the age of technique , Tafuri 
wrote, and “has always claimed for itself the field of differences between the project and 
u t o p i a ” . 2 3 6  This nihilism  has to be “com pleted”, Cacciari argues; one m ust take 
Nietzsche and Heidegger “seriously” .237 What might this mean?
N ietzsche’s position in relation to avant-gardist negation seems straightforward; after 
all, he advocated nothing less than the death of God, the death of tradition and the death 
of values. The association of his writing with the avant-garde (both in historiography 
and the texts of the avant-gardists) typically points to the avant-garde’s “nay-saying’ - a 
nay-saying voiced with the force and gusto of a Zarathustra, the N ietzschean 
U berm ench .238 Concluding the second essay of his On the Genealogy of M orals 
(1887), Nietzsche stated: “If a temple isbfc erected a temple must be destroyed: that is the 
law ”, and described “Zarathustra the godless” as “this Anti-Christ and anti-nihilist; this 
v ictor over God and nothingness” .239 Tafuri, in his analysis o f the avant-garde, 
constantly  foregrounds the N ietzschean strain (for exam ple, D adaist and Futurist 
“gaiety”); and Cacciari situates Nietzsche’s work as part of the negation of value that is 
necessary to predicate the modern world (a negative thinker alongside W eber, Keynes, 
etc.) - a narrative within which Tafuri’s own analysis must be situated.240 Howevei, the
236. H istory o f  Italian Architecture, op. cit., p. 198, p. 199.
237. Ibid., p.199. Tafuri is paraphrasing Cacciari.
238. Many arlists of the inter-war period were confirmed Nietzscheans, and many had read Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra  in their youth, prior to W orld W ar 1 (Dix, Picasso, Le Corbusier, spring 
immediately to mind).
239. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the G enealogy o f  M orals, Random House, 1969, p.95, p.96. This 
conclusion to the second essay contains calls for destruction (what is popularly associated with 
Nietzsche). Cacciari’s and N egri's thesis (the interrelation of negation and rebuilding), and the thorn 
with which we must grapple (the question of challenge to nihilism, negation and nothingness). See also 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra  (1883), Penguin, 1969.
240. N ietzsche’s statement that “it is a scandal that one takes the trouble even o f denying God' 
(cited Lowilh. op. cit.. p.9) reeks of the resignation of “total alienation” .
coupling of the name Nietzsche with the concept of negation has, since D eleuze’s 
Nietzsche and Philosophy, been brought into question. 241 On D eleuze’s reading, it is an 
anti-nihilism  and anti-negation which best typifies the N ietzschean approach; and, in 
saying this, we m ust not understand that anti- stance, that against negation, as a 
Hegelian negation o f the negation - for Deleuze’s account aims specifically at distancing 
N ietzsche from  Hegel. It is precisely this question of N ietzschean n ihilism  and 
Nietzschean negation which needs interrogating.
N ietzsche discusses the em ergence of human morality and dism isses the existing 
philosophical accounts of ethics. These are, he argues, overwhelm ingly subsum ed by 
“ the slave revolt in m orality”,242 a “ sickness” which Nietzsche thinks has dom inated 
humanity since the shift from the Greco-Roman to Judeo-Christian era. Contrasting the 
noble knightly-aristocratic type to the base slave “herd” , Nietzsche distinguishes two 
versions of morality: respectively, the “good versus bad ( master m orality ) and the 
“ good versus evil” (“ slave morality”).243 W hereas the noble says “I am good, therefore 
you are bad”, the slave says “you are bad, thus I am good”. In other words, the noble s 
mode of valuation is, as Nietzsche puts it, its own “positive basic concept which grows 
out of itself, and “ seeks its opposite [the base] only so as to affirm itself more gratefully 
and trium phantly” .244 The slave’s morality, however, is defined negatively; the slave 
defines him self as good in reaction to his conception of “ the Evil O ne”. This re-active 
m orality  is, N ietzsche argues, characterised by ressen tim ent (a sort of festering
resentment). 245
241. Gilles Deleuzc, Nietzsche and Philosophy, The Athlone Press, 1983.
242. On the G enealogy o f M orals, op. cit., p.34.
243. The noble type is, Nietzsche asserts, powerfully physical, sensual, and healthy; he engages in 
war, hunting and vigourous dancing. Needless to say, the herd are unhealthy, anti-sensuous, impotent 
and abstinent.
244. Ibid., p.37.
245. Ibid., p.39. It is important to note that ressen tim en t does not play passivity to the noble s 
activity, but is re -active. Likewise, slave morality does not play the "will-less” to the "will to power’ 
of the Uberm ensch, but is a particular (self-contradictory and degenerative) manifestation of the will. 
Interestingly, given it recurrence in this dissertation, Nietzsche goes on to locate the concept o f "guilt”.
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The slave revolt in morality begins with ressentiment itself becomes creative and 
gives birth to values.... While every noble morality develops from a triumphant 
affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside , 
what is “different” , what is “ not itse lf’; and this No is its creative deed. This 
inversion of the value positing eye - this need  to direct one’s view  outw ard 
instead of back to oneself - is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, 
slave m orality  alw ays first needs a hostile external w orld; it needs, 
physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order tout at all - its action is 
fundamentally r e a c t i o n . 246
D eleuze specifically takes this distinction of affirming noble and negating slave as an 
argument against Hegelian negativity. Accordingly, even moments of affirmation in the 
Hegelian dialectic are seen as essentially negative, and the dialectic of self-affirm ation 
always begins with the recognition of the “not-I” realising itself as the “not-not-I”. For 
Deleuze, a properly affirmative outlook rejects opposition, contradiction and negation, 
and, instead, differentiates itself in a “Dionysian Yes” .
central to slave morality, in the relation of debtor and creditor: “Setting prices, detei mining values, 
contriving equivalences, exchanging - these preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an 
extent that in a certain sense they constitute thinking as such.... man designating himself as the creature 
that measures values, evaluates and measures, as the ‘valuating animal as such (p.70). Dismissing any 
inherent authority of law or morality - which, Nietzsche insists, are latecomers on the human stage, the 
p ro d u ct of all this buying and selling - Nietzsche returns us to the enactments o f a will-preserving 
individual, a will now perverted by the spirit of ressentiment. Both the noble s forgetting and the slave s 
memory are the a c tive  desires ot a w il l; but while the former is a form ol robust health (p.58), 
Nietzsche argues, the latter is sick. Indeed, slave morality uses memory "to stand security" (p.58) for 
any credit, and to imprint, as "fixed ideas”, the "unforgettable historical acts ol violence and violation 
conducted against the bodies and possessions of bad debtors. Compensation for the bad debt is, for the 
creditor, a veritable festival of cruelty, a pleasure in one’s exercise of power over another - although, 
this pleasure has, in recent centuries, been compromised by shame and guilt. With Christianity, man s 
indebtedness towards his origin has no "prospect of a final discharge”, it is an irredeemable penance 
(p.91). Indeed, with Christianity, even the creditor cannot escape, "the creditor sacrifices himself for his 
debtor, out of love (can one credit that?)” (p.92)!
246. Ibid., pp.36-7.
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D eleuze’s argum ent has been very influential, but, is open to m any substantive
c r i t i c i s m s . 247 My own sense of N ietzsche’s Genealogy - besides a general distaste for
his c lass p re jud ice  and irrationalism  - is that it is p rim arily  a critique of
S c h o p e n h a u e r . 2 4 8  in the preface, Nietzsche states the continuity between this book and
Human, A ll Too Human, a continuity which concerns Schopenhauer, “ my great
teacher”, but also N ietzsche’s main t a r g e t .2 4 9
W hat was especially at stake was the value of the ‘unegoistic’, the instincts of 
pity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice, which Schopenhauer has gilded, deified, 
and projected into a beyond for so long that at last they became for him ‘value- 
in -itself’, on the basis of which he said No to life and to himself. But it was 
against precisely these  instincts that there spoke from  me an ever more 
fundam ental mistrust, an ever more corrosive scepticism! It was precisely here 
that I saw the great danger to mankind, its sublimest enticement and seduction - 
but to what? to nothingness? - it was precisely here that I saw the beginning of 
the end, the dead stop, a retrospective weariness, the will turning against life, 
the tender and sorrowful signs of the ultimate illness: I understood the ever 
spreading morality of pity that had ceased even on philosophers and made them 
ill, as the m ost sinister symptom of a European culture that had itself becom e 
sinister, perhaps as its by-pass to a new Buddhism ? to a B uddhism  for 
Europeans? to - nihilism!250
The ressen tim en t of the slave is voiced, N ietzsche argues, by a priestly  caste. 
Asceticism, or ascetic ideals - propagated by the ascetic priest - form  the philosophical
247. See Daniel Breazeale, “The Hegel-Nietzsche Problem ”, N ie tzsch e-S tu d ien , 1975, vol.4, 
pp. 146-64. Breazeale gives a resume ol both the arguments of Deleuze and those who aigue foi the 
“rapprochem ent"  of Hegelian and Nietzschean philosophies. Bieazeale s own view is that Deleuze s 
account is important, but that it is cavalier with Nietzsche s text, and that Deleuze bases his own 
understanding of Hegel on Hyppolite and Wahl “from which he adopts the conclusion (with none ol 
their prudent qualifications) that the unhappy consciousness is the 'essence of Hegelianism’" (p. 159). 
Indeed. Nietzsche’s own sense ol Hegel is largely secondary, based on Burckhardt, Stiauss. Hartmann, 
Stirner and Bruno Bauer. Moreover, Breazeale argues, Deleuze makes some substantive mistakes, liislly 
suggesting that Hegel ignored “real difference” for “abstract oppositions” , whereas Hegel discussed 
precisely this in his distinction between “concrete dilference and essential difference , secondly, 
Deleuze charges Hegel with having a formal and abstract sense of negation and affirmation - a common 
but inexcusable mistake, Breazeale observes. In the end, Breazeale goes on, Deleuze's sense of Nietzsche 
is partial - a partiality that is driven by Deleuze’s determination to set Nietzsche against Hegel. 
Nietzsche’s critique of “Hegelian” history can be found in "On the uses and disadvantages of history for 
life”, op. cit.
248. Even Heidegger found it necessary to remark that Nietzsche’s philosophy was one only for 
"fovermeif (Breazeale, op. cit., p. 157). Unlike Hegel’s, Schopenhauer’s was an oeuvre - along with that of 
Plato and Kant - with which Nietzsche had a substantial and primary engagement (p. 158).
249. On the G enealogy o f  M orals, op. cit., p. 19. The third essay of the G enealogy is entitled "What 
Is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?”
250. Ibid.
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backbone, and apogee, of ressen tim en t:  “ pleasure is felt and so u g h t  in ill­
constitu tedness, decay, pain, m ischance, ugliness, voluntary deprivation , self- 
mortification, self-flagellation, s e l f - s a c r i f i c e ” . 251 Asceticism, Nietzsche says, is “a self- 
contradiction” , it is paradoxical: “a discord that wants to be discordant , that giow s 
more satisfied the more its own life d i m i n i s h e s .  252 Appearing to itself as utter will-less- 
ness, asceticism ’s denial of the self is, in fact, its very opposite: the assertion of the will; 
its claim to be disinterested - to be concerned with knowledge-in-itself (or pure reason) - 
is interested; its seemingly nay-saying, is, in fact, yay-saying.
... the ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life 
which tries by all means to sustain itself and to fight for its existence.... the 
cases... the opposite of what those who reverence this ideal believe: life wtestles 
in it and through it with death and against death; the ascetic ideal is an artifice for 
the preservation  of l i f e .  253
The No he says to life brings to light, as if by magic, an abundance of Yeses; 
even when he wounds himself, this master of destruction, of self-destruction - 
the very wound itself afterward compels him to live.254
The role of the ascetic priest is to detonate the forces that have built up - festering in the 
herd of ressentiment - without simultaneously destroying the herd and himself, in a sort 
of controlled e x p l o s i o n . 2 5 5
Schopenhauer noted that the “grace” of asceticism, or self-denial and su itendet, lead 
into “em pty n o t h i n g n e s s ” . 256 This consequence of renunciation is, he aigued, often 
evaded by resorting to myths of reabsorption. He distinguishes two types of “ nothing” : 
nihil privativum  and nihil negcttiviwv, respectively, a nothing that is telative to that which 
it negates, and a nothing that is absolute and in eveiy respect... nothing .-57 The lattei,
251. Ibid., p. 118.
252. Ibid., p. 117, p. 118.
253. Ibid., p.120.
254. Ibid., p. 121.
255. Utilising a range of devices (consolation, mechanical activity, petty pleasure, congregation), 
the priest aims to catalyse “an orgy of feeling (ibid., p. 136).
256. Schopenhauer, op. cit., p.409.
257. Ibid.
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however, is beyond c o n c e p t i o n . 258
But while Schopenhauer criticised those who failed to take on the full consequences of 
“em pty nothingness” , Nietzsche turns the same argument on Schopenhauer. In the end, 
N ietzsche insists, asceticism cannot face the horror vacui, but seeks to fill it with its 
interpretations (offering meaning to m an’s s u f f e r i n g ) . 259 N ihilism  in Nietzsche, then, is 
about “the death of G od” and “the death of values” , about meaninglessness and the lack 
of grounds for truth, validation and l e g i t i m a t i o n .  260 Forecasting that “Christianity as 
morality must now perish” and that “we stand on the threshold of this event”, Nietzsche 
argues that: “ All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self­
overcom ing [SelbstaufhebungY.261 This coming to self-consciousness will reveal what
258. Ibid., p.409. “For it is a word-combination; il is an example of the unthinkable which is 
necessarily required in logic to demonstrate the laws of thought.... Thus every nihil negalivum  or 
absolute nothing, if subordinated to a higher concept, will appear as a mere nihil privativum  or relative 
nothing, which can always change signs with what it negates, so that would then be thought ol as 
negation, but it itself as affirm ation” (p.409). Schopenhauer’s conclusion is an extrem e form of 
idealism, albeit one generated on negativity. Being, he argued, is usually assumed to be positive, the 
negation of nothing, but is in fact “ the world as representation (p.410), along with the word and the 
concept (the material of philosophy). The in-itsell (will or noumena) is nothing: “Denial, abolition, 
turning o f the will are also abolition and disappearance of the world, of its mirror. If we no longer 
perceive the will in this mirror, we ask in vain in what direction it has turned, and then, because it no 
longer has any w h ere  and any w h en , we complain that it is lost in nothingness.... No will: no 
representation, no world” (p.410, p.411).
259. The will to nothingness was a will: “man would rather will n oth in gn ess  than not w ill” , 
Nietzsche argues “the w ill itse lf was saved" (On the Genealogy of M orals, op. cit., p. 163, p. 162).
260. N ihilism , Nietzsche wrote, proceeds when “Nothing is true any longer, everything is 
perm itted” (cited Lowith, op. cit., p. 15), and Zarathustra seeks a victory over the Nothingness that 
results from the death of God. See also Stanley Rosen, Nihilism : a P h ilosoph ica l E ssay, Yale 
University Press, 1969. Rosen argues that nihilism results from the philosophical decision to separate 
reason and the good (p.xiv), compounded by the subsequent characterising of reason as objectifying, 
alienating and reifying (p.xv). In a non-nihilistic society, “ the discontinuity of remembering and 
forgetting is overcome by tradition” (p.230), and he argues for the revitalisation of traditional ideals 
instead of acquiescence to their loss (p.233). Lowith locates the rise of nihilism in the mid-19c„ when, 
as he puts it, “European historians no longer follow the pattern of progress but that of decay” (Lowith, 
op. cit., p.7); by the 20c., he continues, no “truly educated people” could evade the nihilistic belief or 
“the disavowal of existing civilization” (p. 10). For Lowith, however, the root of nihilism is the “still 
unfinished era of revolutions” since 1789 and the dissolution of old religions and moral unity since the 
German Reformation (p.3).
261. On the G enealogy o f  M orals, op. cit., p .161.
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has been hidden or repressed; or rather, it will reveal nothing,262 Completed nihilism, 
then, is this facing of nothingness.
In a point that echoes Negri, Cacciari m aintains that, one should, instead of trying
constantly to resolve the negative, look at the fundamental contradiction to which it
points. By allow ing that negativity to proceed to its limits - by surrendering to it -
negative thought, submits to the fall into the depths of “its own hopelessness” , as Hegel
put it - into “ utter d ism em berm ent” . H ere we encounter, C acciari notes, the
“ symbol-place of the contradictions”.
The negative stays within the limits of the Metropolis, since it has uncovered the 
M etropolis’s negativity. But this negativity, once demythified, dem ystified, and 
thrust whole into Erlebnis [lived experience] and Verstand, presents an image of 
the M etropolis as symbol-place of the contradictions and functions of modern 
capitalist society. The negative, used correctly - that is, according to the terms of 
its own hopelessness, and not mystified as a requisite for synthesis, as a prayer 
for consolation - leads to this limit.263
This opposition to synthesis as a figure of “consolation” is echoed in T afuri’s sense of
synthesis as a self-deluding search for origins and fullness.264 H istoriography, Tafuri
argues, entertains a fiction when it believes that it can “fill” the gap - the “ silence” -
between history and its object. Criticism, then, must throw itself, and its language, into
crisis along with the object. Historical work should be conscious of its own “ murders” -
262. Ii is not just asceticism and slave morality which has hidden this. Nietzsche locates this with 
the emergence of animals from the sea! With the exposure of their “unconscious and fallible drives” 
(ibid., p.84) these animals: "were reduced to thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-ordinating cause and 
effect..; they were reduced to their ‘consciousness’, their weakest and most fallible organ!.... All 
instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward - that is what 1 call the internalisation 
[Verinnerlichung] of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his 'sou l” ' (p.84). 
From this violent sundering of man from his animal past came “bad conscience”, “m an’s suffering... of  
h i m s e l f “an animal soul turned against itself” (p.85). The “ instinct for freedom” or will to power, is 
“pushed back and repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on 
itself" (p.87). The violent break is compared to an “artists’ violence”; and Nietzsche argues that its 
“ form -giving force” m anifests itself as either internalised bad conscience (ressen tim en t), or as 
externalised in the will to power (or instinct for freedom) exercised upon another.
263. “The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis” , op. cit., p.20.
264. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p. 1. ‘"Negative thought’ had enunciated its own project 
for survival in its refutation of the Hegelian dialectic and a recovery of the contradictions this had 
eliminated. ‘Positive thought’ does nothing but overturn that negativeness on itself. The negative is 
revealed as such, even in its ‘ineluctability’” (Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p.76)
its self-reflexivity must be r e l e n t l e s s .  265 it must work within, and explore, that negative 
space, “descend[ing] into the interstices of techniques and languages” in order to 
elaborate the l im i t s .2 6 6  What is encountered there is “the silence surrounding the sign” , 
the “residue”, the “ insuppressible boundary”, “the limit that separates language from  
s i l e n c e ” .267 Negativity, argued Tafuri, must be made to speak: speak of its making, its 
becom ing, its function, its conflicts. But what, one may be entitled to ask, does this 
“ making speak” produce? Tafuri tells us that the historian m ust make the silences, or 
negativity, into “determ inate abstractions” , and do so in order to establish “historic 
space”.
H istorical space... explores what such distance expresses: it probes what 
appears to be a void, trying to make the absence that seems to dwell in that void
s p e a k . 268
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* * *
Llorens refers to T afuri’s and C acciari’s work as “ neo-avant-garde” , and as “radical
g a u c h i s m e ” .269 He argues that their claim - that their “dialectics of negativity” is Marxist
and anti-Hegelian - is, in fact, Nietzschean and pre-Kantian.
The role of “negation” in Hegel’s dialectics is often misunderstood. Hegel made 
it correspond to the second of K ant’s “regulative principles of reason” ... or, 
more properly, “determ ination”. It can be said that Marx “ inverted” Hegel by 
transferring this category from the epistemological to the ontological domain - or 
rather, by giving priority to the latter; in this sense he went further than Hegel in 
his critique of K ant’s anti-metaphysical stance. But for this interpretation to 
make sense, it is necessary that the original framework, ie the postulation of a 
transition between the epistemological and the ontological, be retained. This is 
precisely what makes it possible to speak of marxist dialectics.... Like Marx, 
Nietzsche “ inverted” Hegel by postulating the priority of the ontological. But
265. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit. Cf. Tafuri’s comments on architectural theory and 
practice: “ it is the conflict of things that is important, that is productive” (“There is no criticism, only 
history”, op. cit., p .l 1); or on the historian’s activity: “Distance is fundamental to history: the historian 
examining current work must create artificial distance” (p. 10).
266. The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., p. 13..
267. Ibid.. p. 148.
268. Ibid., p. 13.
269. Llorens, op. cit., p.94, footnote 15.
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unlike Marx he did so by breaking it free from  the critical fram ew ork of 
epistemology. Therefore there is no transfer, in Nietzsche, of logical categories, 
and his “negativity” is “negation” in a pre-kantian, material sense. How one can 
then speak of dialectics - Hegelian or not - 1 do not understand.270
I am inclined to agree with Llorens, but the accusation he makes seems scarcely a shock 
when N ietzscheanism  has been wielded so self-consciously, and neither does it get to 
grips with the arguments with the established Left that such work proposes. M oreover - 
and as we shall see later - some may see the issues at stake here as already present in 
Hegel. W hat I find interesting is the passage in T afuri’s and C acciari’s work; not the 
passage “from ” workerism “to” nihilism - for this reduces the complex interchanges of 
the terrain, and ignores that nihilism, for these thinkers, was always inscribed in their 
form of M arxism - but the passage of negativity.
The dislike for “mediation” and the preference for negation appeal's not too far from  the 
F rankfurt School; and the “ social factory” seems rem arkably  sim ilar to “ total 
reification”. As for Adorno, the power of the negative has been com prom ised or tamed, 
and strategies must be devised for retrieving it, but whereas A dorno’s perspective sees 
the demise of the social agent for change, the Italians maintain activistic elements in their 
thought which pulls them closer to the far edges o f Young H egelianism .27! W ith 
Adorno they share a taste for the more ascetic forms of modern art/architectural practice 
and are suspicious of the radical claims of the avant-garde. For Adorno, “ autonomous 
art” is the last home of negativity as critical distance and non-identity; for Cacciari and 
Tafuri, a Loos, or a Mies, simply stops trying to resist Vergeistigung, giving in with the
270. Ibid., p.94, footnote 28.
271. Cacciari: "... our progression should be from the negative, to the Metropolis as an instrument 
o f class, to its negativity as a contradiction of class: from the perspective ol the negative to the 
perspective of class.” (“The Dialectics of the Negative and the M etropolis”, op. cit., p. 16). Cf. Negri 
where rupture is counterposed to mediation, simple negation to dialectical negation: The dialectic is 
finished. Hegel is dead. What remains of Hegel is the self-consciousness of the bourgeois world. The 
bourgeois world is dialectical and cannot but be dialectical. But we are not. The workerist ciitique is not 
today the restoration of the dialectic, but rather the discovery ol the terrain and the form of the conflict 
(Negri, “Labor in the Constitution”, op. cit., p. 135).
view to coming out the other side. As Cacciari puts it, negative thought:
... lays bare the logic of this society...; the negative reaches the point where it 
exposes this society’s internal conflicts and contradictions, its fundam ental 
problematics or negativity.272
Moreover, it seems that we need to read the criticisms of avant-gardism not so much in 
the context of the differences between Brecht and Adorno, but as a critique of post-war 
social democracy. In the end, what Cacciari and Tafuri seem to propose is both more 
reification and less; com pleted nihilism  and revolution; N ietzsche and Negri, so to 
speak. “Facing the negative” is the nihil of total negative thought, accepting the 
inorganic and  the w orking class as negation - a class tam ed, not destroyed, and 
uninterrupted class struggle.273 Indeed, in a 1978 lecture, Negri argues that “ negative 
thought, ripped from its bourgeois origins, is a fundamental elem ent o f the w orkers’ 
point of v i e w ” .274  I WOuld suggest, reductive as this formulation is, that it is possible to 
see Tafuri and Cacciari as far-left Adornians. Once again, we encounter the self- 
conscious movements from object to subject, and also the simultaneous com prom ising 
and reassertion of negation. This reassertion of negation, however, is not a retreat to the 
core o f the mim etic m om ent o f autonomous art, as it becomes for A dorno, but an 
assertion of class autonomy and its “ ineliminable antagonism”.
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272. “The Dialectics of the Negative and the Metropolis” , op. cit., p. 19.
273. In an article written in 1964 (although not published for over a decade), Negri reiterates that: 
“Even though capital's own essential negation arises from the capitalist process itself, capital cannot 
destroy that negative force but must lame it. The negation inheres within capital as a necessary product, 
which continually grows larger as capital extends across society, and which continually grows more 
antagonistic as the social accumulation of capital abstracts the value of labour and consolidates it in the 
dead substance of its own power. An uninterrupted process of struggle is thus initiated” (N egri, "Labor 
in the Constitution”, op. cit.. pp.59-60). And of the working class he notes that “its very existence is 
the sign o f a latent dissociation” (p.60). He distinguishes a “capitalist Aufhebung” which holds down 
the working class, and “the Aufhebung o f the working class” which “burns the successive levels of 
capital's development, reproposing its rupture and its supersession” (p.61).
274. Antonio Negri, "Capitalist Development and Revolutionary Class” , Marx B eyond Marx. 




OR, THE DIZZINESS OF A PERPETUALLY SELF­
ENGENDERED DISORDER
“W hat is laid on us is to accomplish the negative - the positive is already given” !
The negative has also had an interesting life in the writings on an  in the journal October. 
These texts, especially from the late ’70s and early ’80s echo the same mom ent, and to 
som e degree the same concerns, as those addressed in C hapter 1. But while the 
modern/postmodern debate is again central, both the writers and their pitch are distinct 
from  those concerns voiced at the conferences in Vancouver and Chicago in the early 
’80s. Indeed, the latter may, to a certain extent, be seen as responding to some of the 
agendas of October. At least on the surface, the fascination with postm odern art, 
photography, and allegory - which characterises a central tendency in October - seems 
not to foreground the term “negation”, probably because it resonates too much with the 
heritage of/unfavoured intellectual tradition of Hegel. But it is present in this work in a 
range of alternative designations - gap, disjunction, discontinuity, difference2 - which 
shape the direction of debates and the formulation of concepts, as is, ironically, that 
unwanted tradition itself, in the attention to the writings of Lacan and Bataille. Here the 
postm odern condition and the crisis of High M odernism  are seen to induce an
1. Franz Kafka, 'The Trial. cited Edwin Honig, Dark Conceit: The Making of Allegory (1959), 
Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 161.
2. The rejection o f the “unities of historicist thought as tradition, influence, developm ent, 
evolution, source, and origin” , for “concepts such as discontinuity, rupture, threshold, lim it, and 
transform ation”, is acknowledged by Douglas Crimp as Foucauldian. See Douglas Crimp, "On the 
M useum ’s R uins” (1980), On the Museum’s Ruins, MIT, 1993, p.47. See Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology o f Knowledge (1969), Tavistock, 1972. It may be worth noting that, for Stanley Rosen, 
“the fundamental feature of nihilism is discontinuity" (Rosen, op. cit., p.230). Gillian Rose attributes 
these Foucauldian principles - anti-identity, anti-analogy, anti-resem blance, anti-opposition - to 
D eleuze’s reading o f Nietzschc. She argues that Foucault reduces the concept o f history to four 
principles - reversal, discontinuity, specificity, and exteriority - which treat history as an "event”. See 
Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism. Poststructuralism and Law, op. cit., p.203. As we have seen, the 
sense of history as “event” is central to the account of Tafuri and Cacciar i.
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“allegorical impulse”, as Craig Owens called it.3
Allegory introduces a specific form or life of negativity into the methodologies of art 
history, and is, perhaps, negativity’s most resolutely art historical form. “A llegory”, it 
should be noted, is but one possible articulation of, one nam e for, a com m itm ent to 
discontinuity and disjunction, albeit one which has a special presence in art. In other 
words, I see the opposition of allegory and symbol - which will be discussed in this 
chapter - not as the root of the debate, but as one form ulation of, one figuring of, a 
philosophical problem. In many ways, this chapter may appear to be a departure from 
the concerns addressed so far: the emphasis is more on rhetorical figures, the historical 
material worked through may be Baroque (in the case of Benjamin) or Romanticism (de 
Man), and neither of the key authors is as overtly political as some of those in Chapters 
1 or 2. The connection with my earlier accounts exists in part in the use of this material 
for accounts of modernism and postmoderism, and in part from the return to the issue of 
affirm ative plenitude and negation. The symbol is the rhetorical figure of “throw ing 
together” (sum-ballein), allegory is that of “other-speaking” (allos-agoreuein) - that is, 
broadly speaking, the one privileges identity, the other non-identity.
A look at the history of allegory shows at least some residual antipathy towards it since 
P lato, and its rise and fall as a significant genre. R hetorically  speaking, it is an 
“extended trope” or “figure” , which can include within it other tropes.4 Typically, 
allegory is a “twice-told tale”, which depends upon an original authoritative text such as 
the Bible.5 Its roots seem to be in textual exegesis: firstly in the exegesis of H om er’s
3. See Craig Owens, “The Allegorical Impulse: Towards a Theory ot Postm odernism ”, published 
in two parts, O ctober  12, Spring 1980. pp.67-86 and O ctober 13, Sum m er 1980, pp.59-80. These 
essays form part of a wave on the theme of allegory and postmodernist art in the late-1970s and early- 
1980s. See, for instance, Joel Fineman, “The Structure ol Allegorical Desire", O ctober 12, Spring
1980, pp.47-66. and essays by Douglas Crimp and Stephen Melville, which will be introduced in the 
course of discussion.
4. Edwin Honig, op. cit., p. 114.
5. Ibid., p.12.
O dyssey and Iliad, and the Pergam ean school’s defence of H om er from  the Pre- 
Socratics; and later in the exegesis of the Bible. In the latter case, this consisted of 
m aking of analogies between episodes and themes in the Old and New Testam ents, 
largely driven by, Quilligan tells us, the need to modernise the ancient scriptures and 
m ake them  m eaningful for a changing w orld.6 In this sense of being tw ice-told, then, 
allegory can be seen as “double” ; but it is also double in the sense that it sets up 
analogies and correspondences between its “realistic” (or better: its “ literal”) and its 
“ symbolic” levels, producing, when handled well, what has been called, an “allegorical 
waver” .7 This, in turn, points to a third valence of allegory’s “doubleness” : this “waver” 
may play with our ethical and epistemological frameworks, suggesting an “ambivalence” 
between the good and the bad, or truth and falsehood.8 Fletcher notes C.S. L ew is’ 
com m ent that “ A llegory’s natural theme is tem ptation”, and Anne Ferry argued that 
“ Satan is the father of lies, the father of Sin, and in a special sense, the father of 
a llegory” .9 This Faustian quality has a ring to it which perhaps m akes it especially 
seductive for the modern ear, but the analogy with this myth for the modern age - and, 
w ithin it, the role of the spirit of negation - suggests som ething of the stakes that 
allegory is seen to provoke.
Traditionally  and typically, allegorical texts were structured around the them e of a 
journey - for example, D ante’s Commedia, Pilgrim’s Progress, The Faerie Queene - in 
which the protagonist encounters a range of personifications or daem ons (some which 
may be aspects of himself, some which may be entirely other to his being; some which 
may be good, others evil). Significantly, the journey involves the loss of home, an 
alienation from  some first moment, in order that the hero may com e to face and
6. Maureen Quilligan, The Language o f Allegory. Defining the G enre , Cornell University Press, 
1979, p.29.
7 . Honig, op. cit., p. 125.
8. See Q uilligan, op. cit., p.235, p.241; and Angus Fletcher, Allegory. The Theory o f a 
Symbolic Mode, Cornell University Press, 1964. p .219.
9. Lewis cited ibid., p.36. Ferry cited Quilligan, op. cit., p.179.
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overcom e a num ber of challenges - as he progresses via battles, and psychom achic 
struggles between good and evil - before “regaining” , or returning, “hom e” . The 
passage may be presented as a literal journey, or it may be fantastic, or it may progress 
through both, but, traditionally, these travels were allegories of (Christian) spiritual self- 
d iscovery, leading to a more profound reconciliation with God, the “ hom e” . Such 
works, of course, took as their ur-text the Christian Bible.
In the post-Reformation period, however, the textual authority of the Bible for allegories 
w aned, and, depending on how one reads the histories, allegory either w ent into 
dem ise, or it transposed itself into its modern fo rm . 10 Quilligan, for one, identifies the 
demise of previous allegorical ages with the growing suspicion of language and rhetoric. 
W hereas from late antiquity to the Renaissance etymology had been treated as a category 
of thought, subsequently there was a waning of the belief in the “ sacralizing power in 
language” which allegory had presupposed.11 Francis Bacon called the “ study of words 
and not m atter” the “first distem per”, and from the 17c., Quilligan argues, “ things” 
come to take precedence over language.12 However, there has been, Quilligan goes on, 
a revival in the interest in language as a means of “ interpenetrating the nonverbal world”,
10. Fletcher argues that Northrop Frye was wrong (o think that we are in “anti-allegorical” times; 
rather, allegory has proliferated, but in “anti-affirmative” , regressive, "katagogic", essentially negative, 
kako-daemonic, or cvil-daemoned forms (Fletcher, op. cit., p. 157, p.159, p.341). Quilligan insists that 
modern allegory is characterised not by optimism, but by doubt (Quilligan, op. cit., p.200), and that 
such doubt is not "overcome” in the course of the allegorical novel’s progress. In this sense, modern 
allegory is also marked not just by the ambivalence of the "waver” but by ambiguity. Honig describes 
how “ the ambivalent personification, though framed in a religious dualism whose doctrinal base has 
crumbled, seems to measure the distance that exists between the world of reality, order, and truth” 
(Honig, op. cit., p. 117). In its modern form, Honig writes, allegory often incorporates its authority 
within its own structure, as, for instance, with the history of whaling in M elville’s Moby Dick (p. 104). 
Quilligan sees allegories - both modern and pre-modern - as “narrative investigations of their own 
threshold texts" (Quilligan, op. cit., p.53), and as incorporating within themselves their own acts of 
self-referential allegoresis. For Quilligan, allegory is an investigation into language’s potential to lead 
the reader astray with its polysemous character. "If he [the reader] does not perceive this basic fact of his 
language [polysemy], his words will confuse and ultimately control him through their dangerous 
polysemousness” (p.63). This approach gives a particular linguistic ring to the katagogic account of the 
modern allegorical form.
11. Ibid., p. 156.
12. Ibid., p.173, p. 157.
presen t in Freud, but made central by French structuralism  - including Barthes, 
K risteva, Foucault, Derrida, Lacan; Quilligan includes here w hat has com e to be 
associated with poststructuralism - which again asks “how language defines our present 
ep istem e”.!3 W e have, according to Quilligan, w riting in the late ’70s, “reentered an 
allegorical age”;14 or, as Craig Owens put it in 1980, we are witnessing the return of an 
“ allegorical im pulse” . Indeed, these com m entators may them selves be seen as very 
much pait of what they describe.15 The tone of all these works - despite their differences 
o f objects, approaches, philosophy, etc. - suggests an intellectual clim ate in which 
allegory had to be not ju s t defended and justified as an appropriate literary device, but 
also constructed as a new (or reclaimed) world-view. This seemingly rarefied debate 
concerning symbol and allegory lies within the wider climate marked by a loss of faith in 
the modern project. (Benjamin’s book, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, it may be 
noted, although written in the 1920s, was reissued in German in 1963 and published in 
English in 1977).!6
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The attention to allegory by postmodernist ait criticism, then, follows a wave o f interest 
in literary studies, and, with an interest in structuralist and poststructuralist thought, 
brings allegory into critical orbit of the “ linguistic turn” .17 Furtherm ore, the terms of the 
questions addressed fitted well with the project - if it can be so called - to challenge the
13. Ibid., p.216, p.203 footnote 67.
14. Quilligan, op. cit., p. 155.
15. A wave of attention to allegory seems to have occurred in American literary studies since 1959, 
when Edwin Honig wrote Dark Conceit: The Making of Allegory (not published, however, until 1966). 
Angus Fletcher’s Allegory. The Theory o f a Symbolic Mode appeared in 1964, and in 1979 Maureen 
Q uilligan’s The Language of Allegory. Defining the Genre was published. De Man s seminal essay, 
“The Rhetoric of Temporality” appeared in 1969, and the collection Allegories o f Reading: Figural 
Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. YaleUniversity Press in 1979.
16. 1 will concentrate on Benjamin’s The Origin o f German Tragic Drama in this discussion, 
although he works with allegory in other works,such as his book on Charles Baudelaire, op. cit.
17. For an extended discussion of the linguistic turn see, for exam ple among a vast literature, 
Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: the Denigration o f Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought, 
California University Press, 1994. For a recent questioning of this, and the suggestion that we now lind 
ourselves in a “pictorial turn”, see W.J.T. Mitchell, "Interdisciplinarity and Visual Culture , op. cit.
dom inance of Greenbergian M odernism.18 If language and rhetoric had to be defended 
against the suspicions of Anglo-American philosophy with its empiricist bias, on the one 
hand, it was also necessary, on the other, to clarify a defence against a very different 
form of antipathy to allegory: the symbol. Indeed, these two challenges echo the terrains 
over which allegory must distinguish itself: one which reverberates within the literary 
debates as “allegory versus realism”, and the other as “allegory versus the symbol” . We 
m ight take Benjam in’s account of this as foundational, although it works over a distinct 
canon o f writing, and, in its engagement with the Baroque, would seem to offer an 
object of study somewhat out of kilter with later American-based writers. In his book 
The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin argues that Romanticism saw the onset 
of the reign of the symbol, or what he refers to as “the tyranny of a usurper” . 19 From 
circa 1800, with a new terrain of concepts and values laid out, allegory fades as a genre, 
as much due to the weakness of its own supporters as to the attacks by its detractors. 
From  Goethe, through Schopenhauer, to W.B. Yeats, Benjamin argues, allegory has 
been posited as the prosaic to symbol’s poetry, as the mechanical concept to the organic 
idea, as the conventional sign to the essential and true sym bol.20 The claim s of 
R om antic and post-R om antic sym bolic thought, he w rites, was tan tam ount to 
“illegitimate talk” and “abuse”, setting up allegory as the “speculative counterpart” to the 
symbol, “the dark background against which the bright world of the symbol might stand
OUt” .21
In this chapter I shall initially address the opposition of symbol and allegory, although 
the distinctions between the “real” and allegory will come, increasingly, to inflect the
18. October was neither the first not the only site where this challenge was made. See Chapter 1.
19. Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, op. cit., 159. From now on 1 will refer to this 
as the Trauerspiel.
20. In particular Benjamin charts the debate through the writings of German art historians, 
philosophers and aesthcticians. As his targets he has Creuzer and Gorres from the early 19c.; Hermann 
Cohen and Carl Horst (both Neo-Kantians), and (more favourably) Karl Giehlow from the early 20c. 
See, for example, Trauerspiel, pp. 168-77.
21. Ibid., pp. 160-1.
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discussion. The “real” is constantly implied by the October-ist critique of representation, 
although it is less explicit in their accounts of allegory. I shall be addressing not only 
allegorical negativity, but also the moves by which negativity comes to extend to the 
very limits of allegory, indeed, even to allegory’s “beyond”.
SECTION ONE: ALLEGORICAL NEGATIVITY, SYMBOLIC  
POSITIVITY & PREMATURE SYNTHESIS
I. Disruptions & Impluses
C raig O w ens’ two part essay “The A llegorical Im pulse: Tow ards a Theory of 
Postm odern ism ” (1980) is seminal in the art-historical reem ergence o f allegory. 
A ccording to Owens, this im pulse marks the revival of the fortunes o f allegory 
following a long period of suppression by art theory - indeed a “perm anent strategy” of 
suppression from  Rom anticism  through M o d e r n i s m .  22 Owens locates the return of 
allegory with “Postm odern” art - or, at least, with art which challenges the High 
M odernist canon. Now a set of practices - practices both in term s of technique and 
attitude - had em erged which inverted that long-standing hierarchy, and which had 
valorised those long despised qualities of allegory. Owens is quite explicit about the 
im pact of this: this allegorical impulse threatens the very foundations o f form alist 
aesthetics.23
Douglas Crimp makes a similar point. Photography’s entry into the museums is seen to
22. Craig Owens, part 1, op. cit., p.83.
23. In this sense, he represents a similar concern to that expressed at, for exam ple, the 1981 
conference "Modernism and Modernity”, discussed in Chapter 1. However, both the intellectual resources 
and some of the sites o f struggle are distinct. Owens shapes allegory with the resources of structuralism 
and poststructuralism (the supplement, the palimpsest, the shift from speech to writing, image to text; 
counter-narrative tendencies; the breaking of sign from referent and signifier from signified; the constant 
deferral of meaning). Allegory, here, is associated explicitly with the arbitrary sign (ibid., p.82).
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introduce a disruptive impulse just at the very moment when museology is asserting a
powerful homogenising gaze upon its contents. In his essay “On the M useum ’s Ruins”
(1980), Crim p describes Andre M alraux’s “M useum w ithout W alls” - a m useum
achieved through the possibilities of photographic reproduction. Imagining that it might
enable the free com parison of art- and m useum -objects throughout the w orld ’s
museum s, M alraux’s museum is seen, by Crimp, as dissolving at the very point where
photography becom es not ju s t the means of reproducing art-objects, but where
photographic-objects are also presented, as objects, within this “m useum ” . Here,
photography is seen as a force of “heterogeneity” which cannot be suppressed or
contained as some servant to the desire to h o m o g e n i s e .  24 Appearing at the very heart of
the universalising project, it has the power to unravel the systems of know ledge which
this project proposes. For the most part, Crimp argues, M alraux can contain this force
by treating it as a means - the universal language - by which to bring together disparate
and diverse objects; but the introduction of the photographic-object into his m useum
fails “ For even photography cannot hypostatize style from a photograph” . 25 Robert
Rauschenberg’s work of the early 1960s is seen to have had a similar effect, and to have
“threatened the museum ’s order of discourse” :
The vast array of objects that the museum had always attempted to systematize 
now reinvaded the institution as pure heterogeneity.26
This same destructive force - considered inherent in photography - is seen to be at play 
in the institutionalisation of a photographic canon, or in the elevation of photography to 
the status o f art, in C rim p’s article “The M useum ’s Old, the L ib ra ry ’s New 
S u b je c t” ( l 981 ).27 The attem pts by John Szarkow ski to construe photography 
“ontologically” , to override its plurality, and to bring it into the modernist mainistream
24. Crimp, “On (he M useum’s Ruins”, op. cit.. p.56.
25. Ibid.
26. Douglas Crimp, “Appropriating Appropriation” (1982), in Crimp, op. cit., p.134.




of the Museum of Modern Art, demanded, Crimp argues, a revision of the paradigm of 
modernism :28
... and it can happen only because that paradigm  has indeed becom e 
dysfunctional.... it is photography’s reevaluation as a m odernist m edium  that 
signals the end of modernism. Postmodernism begins when photography comes 
to pervert modernism 29
Here, the larger claim s echo the point made about M alraux’s project, one where: 
“ heterogeneity is reestablished at the heart of the museum; its pretensions to knowledge 
are doom ed”.30
Owens also foregrounds practices which are largely defined by the photograph - here, 
w hat have come to be accepted as postmodern practices, and which he considers to be 
self-conscious in their use of photography’s powers: for exam ple, the work of Robert 
Longo, Sherrie Levine, and Cindy Sherman. Owens sees the photographic medium as 
central to the allegorical character of such practices; indeed, the practice of photography 
is designated “an allegorical art” par excellence, and the mechanical reproducibility - 
which traditionally ensured such a lowly status for photography vis-a-vis art - is seen as 
the source of its strength.31 As Owens describes it: “Allegory is consistently attracted to 
the fragmentary, the imperfect, the i n c o m p l e t e ” . 32 Such work witnessed the return of 
devices of appropriation, site specificity, discursivity, accumulation, hybridisation. For 
exam ple, Sherrie L evine’s practice of photographing the photographs o f canonical
28. Ibid., p.72.
29. Ibid., p.77.
30. “On the M useum ’s R uins”, op. cit., p.56. The futility o f the search for know ledge is 
emphasised in C rim p's discussion - via Foucault and Eugenio Donato - of Flaubert’s novel, Bouvard el 
P tcuchet. The two protagonists realise that "the knowledge they’ve relied on is a mass of haphazard 
contradictions quite disjunct from the reality they’d sought to confront” (p.51). Donato describes how 
the m useum ’s fiction o f coherence dissolves into: “ ‘bric-a-brac’, a heap of meaningless and valueless 
fragm ents o f  objects which are incapable of substituting themselves either metonymically for the 
original objects or metaphorically for their representations” (Donato, cited p.53).
31. Owens, part 1, op. cit., p.71. For Fletcher, allegory’s “mechanical” qualities are precisely its 
virtue, and this is considered to violate the principle of “disinterestedness” - a point that would fit well 
with the critique of Greenberg.
32. Ibid., p.70.
photographers (such as Ed Weston or Ansel Adams) shows the device of appropriation 
at its most obvious, and is also seen as a discursive practice, treating its “ (re)sources” as 
textual. Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty is cited as an example of site specificity, relating 
the work to the particular myths of the lake in which it was made. This work is also seen 
as an example of impermanence - considered appropriate to allegorical art - as it decays 
and dissolves back into the landscape, “preserved” by the allegorical, and photographic, 
“ruin”.
A ccording to Benjam in Buchloh, the return of properly allegorical procedures - 
procedures which Buchloh considers to have been central to the historical avant-garde - 
is prepared by artists such as Asher, Buren and Broodthaers in the m id -’60s. Their 
work, Buchloh argues, “integrates the historical ramifications of the Ready-made model 
and the consequences of a self-referential analysis of the pictorial construction itse lf’.33 
In other words, there emerges a dual approach: a recognition and intervention both at the 
level of the sign’s framework - audience, institutions, etc., or what is called “situational 
aesthetics” - and at the level of the sign’s own internal structures.34 All these practices 
are dubbed “ allegorical deconstruc tion” by Buchloh - that is, he te lls us, a 
simultaneously negating and not negating process - and are seen to pave the way for the 
“paradigm atic shift” of the late-’70s, represented by artists such as Birnbaum, Lawler, 
Rosier, and Levine.35
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33. See Benjamin Buchloh, "Allegorical Procedures”, op. cit., p.47. The same argument is made 
by Peter Burger in Theory of the Avant-garde, op. cit.
34. Buchloh, “A llegorical Procedures”, op. cit., p.48. Buchloh states explicitly that these 
developm ents produced a situation which could never be retracted - “an irreversible change in the 
cognitive conditions of art production" (p.48). This situation is seen as echoing another one provoked, 
much earlier, by Cubism, and establishes a reading of “historical logic”.
35. Ibid., p.47. Here, Buchloh considers the different problems attendant on the varying political 
strategies of these artists under conditions where their resistances can be easily absorbed and recuperated, 
but where, nevertheless, certain temporary assaults on the institution can be maintained.
II. Some Disjunctions
Allegory has been referred to, disparagingly, as artificial, excessive, m echanical, and 
inorganic.36 Honig, in his opening pages, notes a more extensive list of derisive terms: 
allegory, its opponents claim, is obvious, polemical, sermon-like, formulaic, doctrinal, 
and dated. These terms of dismissal - or the nub o f their force - need to be further 
explored. This takes us back to the question of a llegory’s “double-ness” . Honig 
describes allegory as “ the product of disjunction between the workings of reason and the 
w orkings o f the im agination” and “a disjunction betw een the ‘in s id e ’ and the 
‘outside’”.37 Likewise, Owens favours allegory’s “atomizing, disjunctive principle” , its 
positing of “ the distance between an object and its significance”.38 According to Honig, 
the split between subject and object is the core to the allegorical w orld-view , a split 
which, although still present in the Romantics, was programmatically denied through the 
post-R om antic period.39 Fletcher also raises the themes of distance, rem oteness and 
alienation40 - what might also be described as allegory’s incorporation of both thesis and 
antithesis, its conscription to some form of “otherness” , or its belonging to a post- 
lapsarian world. Allegory has a “characteristic splitting” - indeed, the key allegorical 
agent in his account, the daem on, probably has at its etym ological root the idea of 
d iv isio n 41 - and allegory exists, he argues (rem inding us of some of its supposed 
Satanic qualities), to put secondary meanings into play, to induce dualities, pluralities, 
and polysem y.42
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36. The genre, Flelcher argues, is geared to rigid, ritualised control and schema, fixed hierarchies, 
lack of individual freedom for its characters, and a structure whereby the whole controls the function of 
all parts and agents (Fletcher, op. cit., p.64, p. 198). Details control the character’s “ fictional destiny” 
and serves “ the purposes of magical containment” (p. 199). The protagonist behaves with alm ost the 
logic of a robot, and allegorical agents are the machines or engines of a shamanistic "fantasied energy” 
(p.58).
37. Honig, op. cit., p.4, p.5.
38. Owens, pail 1, op. cit., p.79, p.85. The first phrase is straight from Benjamin (Trauerspiel. op. 
cit., p.208).
39. Honig, op. cit., p.50.




Echoing some o f these characteristics of allegory, Buchloh links allegory with montage
through a consideration of the inter-war European avant-gardes:43
The procedure of montage is one in which all allegorical principles are executed: 
appropria tion  and depletion o f m eaning, fragm entation  and d ia lectical 
juxtaposition of fragments, and separation of signifier and signified.44
This Saussurean dichotom y - signifier and signified, sign and referent - has shaped
innum erable attempts to renovate art history, despite the problem s attendant on the
application of a (not uncontroversial) language model for analysing the visual realm .4 5
In establishing the nature of allegory - in term s o f its split between signifier and
signified, its fragmentation - Buchloh explicitly draws upon Benjam in’s Baroque book,
and his “Central Park” essay.46
The allegorical mind arbitrarily selects from a vast and disordered material that its 
knowledge has to offer. It tries to match one piece with another to figure out 
whether they can be combined. This meaning with that image, or that image with 
this meaning. The result is never predictable since there is no organic relation 
between the two.47
43. Buchloh, “Allegorical Procedures”, op. cit., p.43. He calls this "the dialectic ot montage”.
44. Ibid., p.44. He takes the argument, via Duchamp, to the American post-war “neo-avant-garde” , 
as Burger would call them. Like Burger, Buchloh sees the “neo-Dadaists” (this is not his term) as a form 
of “liberal reconciliation” (p.46) which fell “for the premature delusion of an immediate reconciliation 
between high ait and mass culture' (p.47). Accordingly, Greenberg’s resistance to Duchamp, despite its 
grounding o f “conservative formalism”, probably contained nevertheless “a moment of radical truth” 
(p.47). Here Buchloh gives an Adomian gloss to the subject.
45. For visual analysis, Roland Barthes' approaches to the photographic images have been central. 
Sec, for example, Roland Barthes, “Rhetoric of the Image” (1964), Image-Music-Texf, Fontana, 1977, 
pp.32-51; “The Photographic Message" (1961), ibid, p p .15-31; “Myth Today” (1957), M ythologies, 
Paladin, 1973, pp.l 17-74. Many of these ideas were adopted by the projects of Screen, and extended into 
the analysis of films; by Judith Williamson in Decoding Advertisements. Ideology and Meaning in 
Advertising, Marion Boyars, 1978, and by Erkhardt Siepmann’s account of Heart field 's photomontages 
in “Heartfield’s ‘M illions’ Montage: (Attempt at) a Structural Analysis”, Photography/Politics: One, 
eds. Terry Dennett et al.. Photography Workshop, 1979, pp.38-50. How useful this model was beyond 
analysing advertisements, and other explicitly “coded" visual production, soon began to tell. See, for 
example, Margaret Iverson, “Saussure v. Peirce: Models for a Semiotics of Visual Art” , The New Art 
History, eds. A.L. Rees and Francis Borzello, Camden Press, 1986, pp.82-94.
46. See W alter Benjamin, “Central Park” (1939-40), New German Critique, vol.34. 1985, pp.32- 
58.
47. Cited Buchloh, op. cit., p.46.
173
Benjam in’s terms of description, in the Trauerspiel,48 point to the distinction of symbol 
and allegory along the lines of im mediate identity and disjunction, 01 p iesence and 
distance. Symbolic language insists, he writes, on the indivisible unity of form  and 
content” , implied the “unbroken whole’ of the beautiful and the Divine, 01 the unity of 
the m aterial and the transcendental object” .49 Picking up on these points, Owens 
describes M odernist criticism as symbolic, emphasising the “ indissoluble unity of form 
and substance” and “pure presence”.50 The symbol, de Man echoes in The Rhetoi ic of 
T em porality” , posits an “ intim ate unity” between subjective experience and the 
representation of that experience, “ an intimate unity between the im age that rises up 
before the senses and the supersensory totality that the image suggests ; it postulates 
the possibility of identity or identification’ P ' This marriage of experience and language 
draw s together an otherw ise distinct and disparate array of experiences into a 
configuration of symbols ultimately leading to a total, single, and univetsal m eaning , 
he argues, paraphrasing Gadamer.52
W here the symbol is traditionally seen as self-contained, as concentiated Being, 01 as 
the direct incarnation of the Idea, a totality - the sine qua non of art and poetiy, 01 that 
which overbrim s and m ultiplies in suggestive possibilities - allegoiy is tiaditionally
48. The book, based on a failed H a b ita tio n  thesis, addresses 17c. German dramatic works ol the 
Baroque period, largely through comparisons with similar, but, in certain senses, more successful plays 
from Spain (such as those by Calderon). It is interesting not only for its analysis of the designated 
object - Baroque art - but also for its implicit claims tor modernity and its art toim s, and many ol the 
themes can be traced into Benjam in’s later work. Many of the themes and figures of Benjam in’s 
Trauerspiel can be seen in “A Small History of Photography” , op. cit. For instance, cf„ Benjam in’s 
emphasis on the meaning (and power of meaning) secreted in the folds ot drapery in ibid., p.248, and in 
Trauerspiel, op. cit., p .191.
49 Trauerspiel, op. cit.. p. 160. Cf. Ernst B loch's's distinction which draws on Benjamin: allegory 
is characterised by Alieritas and by being transitory and “On The Way”, symbol by Uni las and by being 
an archetype of “a strict Absolute or final sense". See Ernst Bloch, The Principle o f  Hope, vol.l (1938-
47. revised 1953 and 1959), MIT, 1995, pp. 175-6. The discussion of allegory and symbol falls in Part 
Two, “Anticipatory Consciousness”, in the subsection entitled “Discovery of the Not-Yet-Conscious or 
of Forward Dawning...”
50. Owens, part 1, op. cit., p.81.
51. Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality” (1969), Blindness and Insight. Essays in the 
Rhetoric o f Contemporary Criticism, second edition, Minnesota University Press, 1983, p.189, p.207.
52. Ibid., p .188.
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presented as its opposite: a lesser, dogmatic art, a sign with finite m eanings.53 Both
Benjam in and de Man revalorise these qualities as one aspect of their revising of
allegory. It is; Benjam in w rites, an idea, different from  “i t s e l f ’, a substitute, a
fragm ent.54 Allegory is structured, de Man insists, in such a way that:
... the relationship between sign and meaning is discontinuous, involving an 
extraneous principle that determines the point and the manner at and in which the 
relationship is articulated.... [Tjhe sign points to something that differs from its 
literal meaning and has for its function the thematization of this difference.55
Consequently, allegory explicitly challenges both the organic claims to correspondence 
attributed to the symbol (and the claim to a mimetic continuity between fiction and 
reality). In other words, to the attributed immediacy and identity of symbol (and, we 
should note, also of mimesis), allegory is counterposed as non-identical, disjunctive, 
different and discontinuous. It is, Benjamin notes, and as Creuzer had said (albeit 
disparagingly), a Zeichenallegorie, or sign-allegory.56
W e can explore further how Benjamin describes allegory in terms which em phasise 
“radical d isjunction”, or “ the disjunctive, atom izing principle of the allegorical 
approach”.57 Allegory, he argues, accumulates fragments, sees the world in fragments 
or ruins, and makes its art fragmentary, like disjecta membra,58 The dialogues of the 
Baroque plays, or Trauerspiele - with their discontinuous, halting rhythm , and staccato 
o f conversational content - are less “dialogues” intent on conveying narrative or
53. The classic example of this account is Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Statesman’s Manual; or, 
the Bible the Best Guide to Political Skill and Foresight: a Lay Sermon, Addressed to the Higher 
Classes o f  Society, in Lay Sermons , second edition, ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge, London, 1879. “It is 
among the miseries of the present age that it recognizes no medium between literal and metaphorical. 
Faith is either to be buried in the dead letter, or its name and honors usurped by a counterfeit product of 
the mechanical understanding, which in the blindness of self-complacency confounds symbols with 
allegories” . To the sym bol's “ translucence” , allegory is defined as “a translation of abstract notions into 
a picture-language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses” (p.230).
54. Trauerspiel, op. cit., pp. 163-6.
55. "The Rhetoric of Temporality”, op. cit., p.209.
56. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p. 163.
57. Ibid., p. 193, p.208.
58. Ibid., p.199.
com m unicating, and more com m entaries or captions. Such “dialogue , Benjam in 
suggests, is characterised by “the irregular rhythm of the constant pause, the sudden 
change of d irection” . 59 “The division between signifying w ritten language and 
intoxicating spoken language? he writes, “opens up a gulf in the solid m assif of verbal 
m eaning” .60 The use of anagrams releases both word and sound from  m eaning and 
com m unication, and such linguistic m aterial is reduced to em pty signs aw aiting 
orchestration by the allegorist - 61 Benjamin describes the com ponents of allegory in 
terms of atomised image-ruins, orchestrated as tableaux vivantes.62 These Germ an plays 
of the 17c. operate with a duality of meaning (the literal and the proper m eaning in the 
double titles), and with a radical disjunction of meaning and reality, which has echoes in 
the very tectonic structure of the plays, and even in the structure of the theatres.63
The symbol, he claims, “remains persistently the same”, but allegory must constantly 
resist “ absorption” by utilising “shock”. Christine Buci-Glucksmann explains that this 
“logic of dislocation” in Benjamin counters that of symbolic transcendence, and can be 
found in allegory and montage (in both Surrealist and Brechtian m odes), and in the 
em phasis on traum a, shock, spleen, and distancing.64 A llegory’s shocks, then, are like 
the “alienation effect” discussed in Chapter 1. This can be seen in B enjam in’s work on 
Baudelaire’s Paris, where he attempts to break open the conventions of seeing, and “ the 
em pathy of the soul with the com m odity” .65 She goes on to parallel this “ baroque 
reason” - or “ the reason of allegory and the Other, the reason of an unreconciled 
history”66 - with “a rent M arxism”, as opposed to “ M arxisms of progress”; and this is
59. Ibid.. p. 197.
60. Ibid., p.201.
61. Ibid., p.207, p.209.
62. Ibid., p. 195.
63. Ibid., p. 193-4.






further associated with, respectively, female- and male-type m etaphors, where the
former emphasises break and rupture. Here negation is emphasised:
... the metaphor of the feminine then rises up as an element in the break with a 
certain discredited rationality based upon the idea of a historical and symbolic 
continuum. It does this by designating a new heterogeneity, a new otherness.... 
a whole network of negativity escaping the dominance of the Concept, a whole 
‘culture’ of the feminine.... a culture of Spaltung, of splitting...67
This “consciousness of rupture” is again given further layers by Buci-Glucksmann with,
w hat she describes as, a Judaic sense of history, as radically insecure, unstable and
catastrophic.68 The rupture is, she asserts, the “gulf between reality and illusion” which
- and this may, in the light of the discussions of Chapter 1, be significant - “cannot be
bridged”. 69
It is this rupturing device of shock which, for Benjamin, renders redundant each
successive form taken by allegory, and registers discontinuity into the historical
continuum .70 Nevertheless, he writes, allegory foregrounds history, hence the virtue of
its didacticism, for it is orientated for present use, not for future prosperity.71 Here, the
similarities with the projects and practices championed by Owens can be seen.
Throughout its history allegory has dem onstrated a capacity for w idespread 
popular appeal, suggesting that its function is social as well as aesthetic; this 
would account for its frequent appropriation for didactic and/or exhortative 
purposes.... The withdrawal of the modernist arts from  allegory may thus be 
one factor in then ever-accelerating loss of audience 72
W ork such as Levine’s, Owens implies, figures in a political battle with the forces of 
G reenbergian modernism, operating in some cause of greater populism. Rejecting the
67. Ibid., p.49.
68. Ibid., p.63.
69. Ibid., p.71. For a contrasting account of gender in allegory, see Helga Geyer-Ryan, Fables of 
D esire , Polity Press, pp. 197-8. Geyer-Ryan sees de Manian allegory as a repression of corporeality, 
specifically the mother's body, and describes allegory as a figure of patriarchal treatment of the feminine 
with the female body made a sign for masculine meaning. Even Benjam in's allegory is not exempt from 
this criticism: "allegory is a battlefield on which the body - especially the female body - is torn apart" 
(p. 199).
70. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p. 183.
71. Ibid., p.181.
72. Owens, part 2, op. cit., pp.72-3.
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claim  to an art of transcendence and aesthetic validity, postmodern practitioners collect
their “ruins” from m odernism ’s corpse, raid the archives of mass culture, assem bling
statements which intervene in contemporary discourses (artistic and political), alerting
then “reader-spectators” to historical contingency.
The appropriated image may be a film still, a photograph, a drawing; it is often 
itself already a reproduction. However, the manipulations to which these artists 
|Longo, Levine, Brauntuch] subject such images work to em pty them of their 
resonance, their significance, their authoritative claim to meaning.73
Here em ancipatory claims are associated with the freeing of meaning from any fixity,
privilege, or origin.74 Similarly, Crimp writes of Sherman:
Her photographs show that the supposed autonomous and unitary self out of 
which those other ‘directors’ would create their fictions is itself nothing other 
than a discontinuous series of representations, copies, and fakes.73
Like Benjamin, de Man picks up an ethical dimension to his reconsideration of the 
sym bol/allegory opposition. Among de M an’s targets are the tropes o f sym bol, 
m etaphor, synecdoche, m im esis, and personification; all are, he thinks, figures 
privileging immediacy, presentness, plenitude and genetic (or organic) causality; and all 
have had privileged roles within, what he calls, the “aesthetic ideology” engendered by 
Rom anticism . This privileging of the symbol has been accompanied by an increasing 
faith in its powers, and a progressive and uncritical acceptance o f its structures, such 
that few ever bother to interrogate its workings, except as an exercise in shoring up its 
already established status.76 It would be a mistake, however, to think of the symbol just
73. Ibid., p.69.
74. Cf. C rim p 's  com m ents on Richard Prince’s re-photographed photographs, or, more 
specifically, on the commodity fetishism to which they are seen to refer: “It has, we might say. acquired 
an aura, only now it is a function not of presence but of absence, severed from an origin, from an 
originator, from authenticity. In our time, the aura has become only a presence, which is to say, a ghost 
“ ("The Photographic Activity o f Postmodernism” (1980), in Crimp, op. cit., p.124).
75. Ibid., p. 122.
76. De Man suggests that all this provides temptations; or, as Jam eson puts it, for de Man 
Romanticism represents a “moment of seductiveness” (Jameson. Postmodernism, op. cit., p.221). De 
Man: “The aesthetic is, by definition, a seductive notion that appeals to the pleasure principle, a 
eudaemonic judgm ent that can displace and conceal values of truth and falsehood likely to be more 
resilient to desire than values of pleasure and pain”. Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory, Manchester 
University Press, 1986, p.64.
as immediate identity and pure presence. For aesthetic ideology, synecdoche is the 
favoured trope, one which draws an “ intimate unity” between a part and the whole. This 
is not a “causal” link, or contiguity, in the more “mechanical” or “quantitative” manner 
associated with the trope of metonymy, but an “organic” and “qualitative” connection. 
Indeed, the very term s used to make this distinction echo those which distinguish 
allegory and symbol, as well as the terms traditionally employed to set a non-dialectical 
account against a dialectical one.77
The em ergence of Romanticism, and with it the symbol, is described, by de Man, as 
laying claim to a growing play of traditional oppositions: mind and nature, subject and 
object, depth and surface. From operating by means of “associative analogy” in the early 
18c. - an analogy between self and non-self, subject and object, consciousness and 
nature - there was, he argues, as the century progresses, a move to “a more vital form of 
analogy, to one of “affinity” and “ sympathy”.7** With this, the key relation shifts from 
the realm of the intersubjective to that of the intrasubjective, and to the elevation of the 
subject as the “ infinite self” .™ Thus, those m ore thoughtful critics, as de Man 
acknowledges, conceive of the symbol/metaphor as a dialectical synthesis: “a dialectic 
between subject and object, in which the experience of the object takes on the form  of a 
percep tion  or a sensation” .80 N evertheless, de M an objects to this m anner of 
reconciliation or return to immediacy - “prematurely synthesizing” activities, Norris calls 
them  - for it is, in his view, a far stronger claim .81 This issue is central to de Man s 
work. In “ Form and Intent in the American New C riticism ” he challenges Stephen
77. The relation or difference between metaphor, synecdoche and metonymy is a fraught issue. For 
a summary discussion of the “M etaphorical-Metonymical dyad versus a "fourlold conception ot the 
tropes”, see Hayden White, op. cit., pp.31-33 footnote 13.
78. “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, op. cit., p. 195.
79. Ibid.. p. 196.
80. Ibid., p. 195.
81. See Christopher Norris. Paul de Man. Deconstruction and ilie Critique o f Aesthetic Ideology, 
Routledge. 1988. The terms of Crim p’s description of Levine’s work are also worth noting: “ no 
combinations, no transformations, no synthesis” (“Appropriating Appropriation”, op. cit., p. 129).
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U llm ann’s claim  that a continuity can be drawn between surface and depth, that is,
between sensory and subjective experience. Taking Erich Auerbach s argum ent that
W estern literature demonstrates a “ struggle between sensory appearance and meaning
as his starting-point, de Man writes:82
... if this is indeed the case, the study of the “sensory appearances” that is the 
field of stylistics can never lead to the real meaning of the themes since both, at 
least in W estern literature, are separated by a radical discontinuity that no 
dialectic is able to bridge.83
179
In “The D ead-End of Form alist C riticism ”, he argues against W illiam  E m pson’s 
characterisation of art as the reconciliation of opposites.84 In The R hetoric of 
T em porality” this same m ediating role for art is identified in the w oik of Jean 
Starobinski and Peter Szondi, who, de Man argues, manage to treat even irony - another 
trope of disjunction and discontinuity (and closely associated with allegory) - as a way 
beyond  disjunction and alienation: for Starobinski, as a leconciliation of spii it and 
world; or, in the case of Szondi, as “a reconciliation between the ideal and the real as the 
result of an action or the activity of the mind”.85 In “Literary H istory and Literary 
M odernity”, de Man criticises literature’s tendency to attempt “ to fulfil itself in a single 
m om ent”, and to try to destroy temporal distance.86 “The temptation of im m ediacy”,87 
to which de Man refers, the dangers of “im patient ‘pastoral’ thought: form alism , false 
historicism, and utopianism”, the desire to reconcile and to ledeem  thiough art. against 
all these one must be constantly vigilant, for they are the lures into the tiap of aesthetic 
ideology.88
82. Paul de Man, “Form and Intent in the American New Criticism” , Blindness and Insight, op. 
cit.. pp.20-35 (an earlier version of the essay was published in French in 1966). De Man cites Auerbach 
on p.23.
83. Ibid., p.23.
84. Paul de Man, “The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism” , Blindness and Insight, op. cit., pp.229- 
245.
85. "The Rhetoric of Temporality”, op. cit., p.220.
86. Paul de Man, “Literary History and Literary Modernity” (1972), Blindness and Insight, op. cit., 
pp. 142-165. Citation from p. 152.
87. Ibid.
88. “The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism” , op. cit., p.241.
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This point can be taken further if we attend closely to de M an’s argument. De Man 
suggests that the tropes and figures of aesthetic ideology are not only the objects of 
literary criticism  and theory (to be found, and valorised, in the texts under study), but 
also structure the critics’ and theorists’ own patterns of conceptualisation. Indeed, he 
suggests that this is» te  such an extent that a trope like synecdoche is im posed 
everyw here (it is seen everyw here) in the very acts of perception, cognition and 
u n d e rs tan d in g ,h in tin g  at the severity of the undertaking at hand. The issue appeal's to 
be clear. A llegory, it would seem, points to radical non-identity , and explicitly  
challenges both moments of identity and moments of reconciliation, both in the simple 
sense of disjunction/discontinuity, and the more complex dialectical Aufhebung. I will 
argue, however, that to leave things here would be a mistake, and that neither de Man 
nor Benjamin do so. The difference lies in the sense of disjunction propounded.90 This 
will involve some playing with the Devil, who will, as always, be som ething of a 
shifting persona.
III. Some Problems
Benjamin argued that allegory plays through a progression of temporal m om ents,91 and 
de Man wrote that allegory’s “temporal void” implies “an unreachable anteriority” .92 In
89. In other words, he suggests, there is some transference between object and subject. On this, see 
for example, “Form and Intent in the American New Criticism”, op. cit., where de Man describes how 
the hermeneutic process is misrecognised. The critics (here formalist ones) see their own interpretation, 
but mistake it as belonging to their object of study.
90. Fred Orton, in Figuring Jasper Johns , Reaktion, 1994, argues that Owens et al. are mistaken to 
fix the allegory/symbol distinction on, respectively. Postmodernism and Modernism. Orton takes this 
analogy to be less secure, and suggests that these critics simply invert the valorisation of allegory and 
symbol (pp. 12-13). My approach shares these criticisms, but is centred on the understanding of 
disjunction, and the failure to grasp its transpositions and transferences - the dynamics which shape the 
approaches in the work o f both Benjamin and de Man.
91. Trauerspiel. op. cit., pp. 163-6.
92. “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, op. cit., p.222,
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“The Dead-End of Form alist Criticism”, the importance of the stakes for this sense of
disjunction is clarified:
A truly historical poetics would attempt to think the divide in truly temporal 
dimensions instead of imposing upon it cyclical or eternalist schemata of a spatial 
nature ...93
For de Man, in “The Rhetoric of Temporality” , then, the essential point about allegorical 
disjunction is its temporal nature.
W hereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification,
allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own o r i g i n .9 4
Allegory, explains de Man, is not the mechanical assertion on the relation of sign and 
m eaning - as the language of the symbol might suggest - but rather a relation between 
signs, “ the repetition... of a previous s i g n ” . 95 Allegory, then, indicates not only the 
radical disjunction of sign and meaning, etc., which is so frequently em phasised, but, 
m ore precisely, a disjunction at the level of the temporal rather than the spatial - a 
distance which, as we shall see, sets up a dynamic of transferences. M oreover, de Man 
continues, allegory represents a “repetition... of a previous sign with which it can never 
coincide”, and it “renounc[es] the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its 
language in the void of this temporal difference”.96 This “unveiling of an authentically 
tem poral destiny”, or “discovery of a truly temporal predicam ent” , represents the 
unveiling of m an’s self-m ystification, specifically his attem pt to seek im m utability 
through an “affinity” with nature.97
93. “The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism”, op. cit., p.242.
94. "The Rhetoric of Temporality”, op. cit., p.242, my emphasis.
95. Ibid., p.207.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., p.207, p .222. This figures as G oethe's Dauer im Wechsel, or eternily in motion. De 
Man isolates within the move to affinity and analogy an aporetic kernel, unbeknown to the historians of 
Romanticism, but around which, by the dynamic of their own analysis, they are forced to circle: "They 
are obliged, on the one hand, to assert the priority of object over subject that is implicit in an organic 
conception of language... [putting] the priority unquestionably in the natural world, limiting the task of 
the mind to interpreting what is given in nature... [and, on the other hand, they] confer an equally 
absolute priority to the self over nature” (pp. 197-198). This contradiction between the solipsism of 
subjective idealism and a secularised naturalism is described by de Man as “a pseudo dialectic” (p .198), 
and one which is itself supported by the assumptions about the symbol.
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[Allegory] prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, 
which is now fully... recognized as a non-self .98
The dialectical relationship between subject and object is no longer the central 
statem ent of romantic thought, but this dialectic is now located entirely in the 
temporal relationships that exist within a system of allegorical signs. It becomes 
a conflict between a conception of the self seen in its authentically temporal 
predicam ent and a defensive strategy that tries to hide from  this negative self 
knowledge.99
This is much like Benjamin’s figure of the death’s-head, reminding us of our mutability, 
but not sim ply to dent m an’s pride, as in a vanitas or m em ento m ori, but more 
specifically as a hindrance to any attempt to hide from this knowledge. The issue, then, 
turns on challenging those modes of thinking which try to maintain the illusion, and 
refuse to face up to, indeed conceal, the truth; and it is in this epistemological claim - this 
claim  to “ truth” - that de Man and Benjamin, to note but one way, differ fundamentally 
from  Owens and Crimp. 100
* *
Veering, at times, closer to Crim p’s and O wens’ position, M aureen Quilligan, in her 
account of allegory, explicitly rejects the claim to allegorical “disjunction”. For her, the 
“other” of allegory’s alios is not some second level of meaning beyond or beneath the 
literalness o f the text itself. She argues that the tradition of allegoresis - that is, the 
textual interpretation of sacred texts, a vertical interpretation of hidden m eanings 
suggesting metaphors of surface and depth, shell and kernel - should not be confused
98. Ibid., p.207.
99. Ibid., p.2()8.
100. We should note, however, that a predisposition to structuralism and poststructuralism is not 
necessarily the only prerequisite for adopting the reading of symbol and allegory used by Owens and 
Crimp. The valorisation of the Saussurean disjunction is challenged, for instance, by Helga Geyer-Ryan. 
She argues that all signifying practices are acts of “the violence of semiosis” or processes of figuration 
and disfiguration, but that "The more signifier and signified are lorn apart to form hermetic 
constellations and hard edges, the deeper the essential abyss which opens up between them, an abyss 
bridged only by conventions. In this abyss, violence reveals itself as a strain on meaning” (Fables of 




It does not name the many other things language means, or the disjunction 
between saying and meaning, but the often problem atical process o f m eaning 
multiple things simultaneously with one w ord.101
But from  this argument for polysemy, Quilligan, without ever moving in a de M anian 
direction, com es to argue for some com patible dynamics. Instead of attending to the 
disjunction of word and meaning, of literal and m etaphorical, or the gaps between 
different levels of meaning, she argues - instead of trying to translate the texts (an 
exercise which tends to downgrade the textual surface, and can degenerate into seeing 
allegory as m ere “double-talk”) - we should be concerned, she argues, with “ the 
relationships across the g a p s ” . 102 These are “ the problem atic tensions” , tensions 
between literal and metaphoric, which play out across the very surface of the te x t.103 
She advocates “the m ost profound attention to the radical significance of that much- 
dism issed literal surface” , an attention which has often been seen as tantam ount to 
form alism , but which has also been significant for deconstructive acc o u n ts .104 
Allegory, she writes, involves complex webs of meaning working across “ horizontal 
verbal surfaces” , “peopled by words moving about an intricately reechoing landscape of 
language”.103 Indeed, the disjunctions encountered here have to be treated with caution: 
“There are disjunctions in this surface, or illogical juxtapositions of sequence, which 
tempt translation as a means of bridging the gaps” . 106 The reader is constantly involved 
in acts o f critical self-reflexivity  in which they m ust repeatedly  in terpret their 
interpretation, and reconsider its validity - “ the text constantly invites and then exposes 
the reader’s im position of m eaning” .107 Quilligan implies that there is a difference




105. Ibid., p.33, p. 156. Cf. Buci-Glucksmann, op. cit., pp.84-5, on the woven, labyrinthine nature 
of Benjamin’s concept of allegory.
106. Quilligan, op. cit., p.235.
107. Ibid., p.252, p.277.
between “bridging die gaps” and attending to “ the relationships across the gaps”, the 
“problematic tensions” . This temptation to translation - as an all-too-easy leconciliation - 
edges close to de M an’s warnings about aesthetic ideology, or the reliance on tropes like 
synecdoche at crucial points of difficulty.
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Fred Orton in Figuring Jasper Johns, like Quilligan and de Man, em phasises a close 
rhetorical attention to the “surface matter” (as distinct from subject matter ), and lefuses 
to “find” the meaning as if it was awaiting the arrival of some m aster decoder. W hile 
disjunction is a theme retained - along with allegory’s gap between signifier and 
signified - Orton suggests a disjunction or gap which figures closer to what we might 
call aporia.108
M ute and eloquent, opaque and lucid, Flag works in the space of difference 
where it articulates well-rehearsed oppositions and disarticulates them. Neither 
positive nor negative, but both positive and negative, Flag cannot be resolved 
into a pure positivity or a pure negativity and seems always to force seeing and 
understanding, reading and writing to another time and place.109
This needs to be seen in contrast to the accounts of postmodernism given by Owens (its 
being beyond modernism), but also to G reenberg’s account of Johns, related by Or ton 
as follows:
G reenberg thinks that Johns’s painting m arks a m om ent of developm ent, 
m ediation and transition in which one quality is about to be, but is not yet, 
negated by its opposite: ‘he brings de K ooning’s influence to a head by 
suspending it clearly, as it were, between abstraction and representation’. An 
effective Johns’ painting holds image (subject) and surface in tension. If either is 
allow ed to become predominant, the value, the pleasure, the effectiveness is 
lo s t.110
Orton refers to Flag's “non-synthesized tension , which suggests a diffeient weight to 
G reenberg’s sense of a surface in tension or in clear suspension.111
108. Figuring Jasper Johns, op. cit., p. 169, p. 14, p. 145.
109. Ibid., p. 146.
110. Ibid., pp. 134-5.
111. Ibid., p. 131. Cf. some of the arguments in Chapter 1.
* * *
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Stephen Melville, responding to the wave of essays on allegory in October, identified a 
num ber of problems with the accounts of this “reemergence of allegory .112 The terms 
of this response are interesting, for M elville identifies and challenges a tendency by 
Owens to de-allegorise allegory; in other words, M elville criticises the presentation of 
postmodernism as a radical break with modernism. Melville s hinge on this occasion 
is the work of M ichael Fried, in particular, his categories of “art and objecthood and 
“absorption and theaU'icality”. These terms coincide, in their conceptual economy, with 
sym bol and allegory - theatricality being “ work that distances itselt from ... the 
beholder” .! 13 Melville notes that Fried has been associated with the prioritisation of the 
sym bol over allegory and has been seen in direct continuity with the G reenbergian 
“dialectics o f purity” . m  But, M elville argues, the rush to criticise Fried on these 
grounds, as well as failing to account for the power of the argum ent it provides, also 
fails to see that “ it is between and across purity’s eclipse and recovery of itself that the 
work o f this criticism  is achieved”. 115 Fried, M elville insists, describes “pain ting’s 
continuing effort to recover itself through and across its denials and evasions of its
112. See Stephen Melville, "Notes on the Reemergence o f Allegory, the Forgetting of Modernism, 
the Necessity of Rhetoric, and the Conditions of Publicity in Art and Criticism", O ctober  19, W inter
1981, pp.55-92. Citation from p.56. He refers to the O ctober  project collectively as "this baggy 
monster”, “a position” or "a thesis” which has emerged out of a self-referring community ot interests, 
whose members have an “embeddedness in one another” (p.90).
113. Ibid., p.61.
114. Ibid., p.62. With reference to Diderot, this discussion concerns painting s "prim ordial 
convention" (Fried) of being beheld like theatre. This was denied by painting in its attempt to construct 
for itself a project “of rational self-criticism” (p.65), and to make itself “simply present”, "undivided and 
unposed, graceful” (p.75). To pul it another way, it attem pted  to negate - Fried uses the term - this 
convention, but was doomed to endure the return of the repressed. See Michael Fried, Absorption and 
Theatricality. Painting and Beholder in the Age o f Diderot, The University ol Chicago Press, 1980, 
p. 103. Melville uses the terms “displacements”, “deferrals” , and makes analogy to "the tact and tear ol 
castration” (Melville, "Notes on the Reemergence of Allegory”, op. cit., p.65): “The beholder, always 
there, gazing, is the silent motor that drives the history of modern painting forward, forcing it to tind 




necessary conditions”. 116 Fried, then, in M elville’s account, is more deconstructive than 
are the advocates o f deconstruction, and closer to “postm odernism ” than they 
recognise.*!7 The la tter’s attacks upon Fried - and also modernism - are “too easy” , 
argues M elville; and O w ens’ project, to establish “radical distinction and exclusion” 
(between m odernism  and postmodernism), is ju st a late echo of the attem pt made by 
Fried to radically distinguish art and objecthood.118 H ow ever, in F ried ’s hands, 
M elville claim s, this radical distinction has come to unfold itself, unpack itself, and 
“break dow n”. 119 The “postmodern”, Melville argues, can only be properly understood
as “an allegory of the modern”.120
W here postm odernism  would mean something more radically separate from  
modernism (where it would forget modernism) it will end by forgetting itself as 
well - and it will do so by falling into the trap of m odernism ’s favored mode of 
(self-) forgetting, the (non)dialectic of the mere and the pure. Postm odernism  
w ould proof itself against this risk by appealing to a deconstructive im pulse 
working beyond the (merely) self-critical tendency of m odernism  - but the risk 
shows itse lf in the bare statement: the practice of deconstruction cannot 
rigorously hold itself apart from something called self-criticism  except by 
hypostatizing its self in just the way it would avoid; it can articulate itself only 
insofar as it acknowledges explicitly its emergence from and dependence upon 
what might otherwise appear as mere self-criticism.121
M elville describes Fried’s narrative as “dialectically charged”122 - a phrase which points 
to the interesting boundary between dialectics and deconstruction, and one which I 
propose to consider via a closer look at the writings of Benjamin and de Man. De Man, 
we m ight note, also advocated a critical approach which had echoes of Adorno, and 
which “promised nothing except the fact that poetic thought will keep on becoming, will
116. Ibid., p.65.
117. Ibid., p.74.
118. Cf. Orton, Figuring Jasper Johns, op. cit.
119. Melville, “Notes on the Reemergence of Allegory”, op. cit., p.82.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid., p.91. Cf. the idea of vanishing mediators. “Postm odernism ” m eans, if anything, 
something about the way in which modernism must inevitably come to see in itself its own allegory 
(and so also something like its own failure, its non-identity with itself - but these then would be the 
terms of its power and success)” (p.91).
122. Ibid., p.65.
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continue to ground itself in a space beyond its failure” .123
SECTION 2: ANXIOUS BECOMINGS
I. Ideas Evaporating In Images, & Remnants O f  Meaning Lurking In The 
Depths O f  Language
Benjamin suggests that both symbol and allegory became debased concepts in the hands 
o f those who had sought to elevate the form er over the latter - initially the later 
Romantics and, later still, the neo-Kantians, used this false symbol to evade art’s ethical 
dim ension. Although the concept of the symbol is made to sound dialectical by such 
writers, it has, Benjamin insists, sunk into a pale shadow. This “distorted conception of 
the sym bol” , he argues, lacks “dialectical rigour” , and what claims to be a dialectic of 
appearance and essence is, in fact, nothing but a paradox , and “fails to do justice to 
content in formal analysis and to form in the aesthetics o f content”. 124 W e must beware, 
Benjamin warns, of treating the terms employed in describing allegory and symbol, and 
their dichotom ising, too rig id ly .125 A llegory’s opposition to the symbol cannot be 
simply rendered as the opposition of “ thing” to the “personal” , or of “fragm ent” to 
“ totality” , and, even in pro-symbol literature, he finds that G orres’ concept o f “real 
symbol” comes closer to something we might call a l l e g o r y .126
B enjam in’s key argum ent is with the neo-Kantian trad ition .127 The criticism  of the
123. “The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism”, op. cit., p.242.
124. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p. 160.
125. Ibid., p.196.
126. Ibid., p.187.
127. Gillian Rose notes that the Neo-Kantians developed an anti-dialectical account of antinomy and 
that they "resolve the oppositions of autonomy and heteronomy and of morality and legality into a 
unified legal science by drawing an ‘original’ category out of the Critique o f Pure Reason... which 
seems to reunite the realms of the practical and theoretical, o f freedom and necessity” (Gillian Rose,
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symbolic mode for Benjamin is directed at the thought of Stefan G eorge and Ludwig 
Klages, both of whom had some influence over the younger Benjamin, but had become 
the object of his distrust since the First W orld W a r. 128 For such thinkers, the symbol, 
like the Christian Creed, immediately was something (rather than being a reference to 
som ething), and Being and sign were one. In other words, the sym bol-object was 
directly entwined with meaning - meaning was immanent to it, and did not require the 
intervention, or m ediation, of conceptual analysis, nor even a subject to activate its 
significance. This immediacy of significance was seen to lie in the sym bol-object s 
material presence, and everything and every meaning was, as Julian Roberts puts it, 
“ im m ediately  physical, natural, and sensory” . 129 For Klages this “p ic tu re” was 
“unspeakable”, accessible only by “insight” (Schauung) - the access to which m ight be 
enabled by “ecstasy”, attainable perhaps by means of drugs or a state of drunkenness. 
The “ insight” was accom panied, K lages wrote, by “ the rad iant trem bling which 
surrounds it in the mom ent of becoming”.130
In the Trauerspiel, however, it is the Neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Carl Horst 
who figure larger than George or Klages. Benjamin challenges their attempts to maintain 
allegory’s subservient status. They fail, he says, to grasp dialectical complexity, indeed, 
these w riters see am biguity as something to be m istrusted, or as som ething which - 
through its hybridisation o f different forms of representation - is, as H orst put it, a
harsh disturbance of the peace and a disruption of law and order in the arts .131
Dialectic o f Nihilism. Poststructuralism and Law, op. cit., p.4). This is a philosophical tendency which 
Rose associates with poststructuralism.
128. Cf. de M an’s antipathy to aesthetic ideology. Nevertheless. Benjamin continues to draw much 
from the thought of these thinkers. These thinkers, around whom significant circles of intellectuals 
congregated represent, in fact, certain transform ations from neo-Kantianism  proper. Especially 
noteworthy is the ontological turn which finds its major proponent in the figure of Heidegger (he 
developed the ideas later); not to mention many aspects o f Benjamin’s own thought. See Julian Roberts, 
Walter Benjamin, Macmillan, 1982.
129. Ibid., p.109.
130. Cited ibid., p. 107.
131. Cail Horst cited in Benjamin’s Trauerspiel, op. cit., p .177. Here one senses the association that 
the symbol had, for Benjamin, with some enforced social stability, and part of the investment that he 
had with the negative, destructive, and allegorical. “Ambiguity”, Benjamin writes in "Paris - the Capital
The undialectical neo-Kantian mode of thought is not able to grasp the synthesis 
which is reached in allegorical writing as a result of the conflict between 
theological and artistic intentions, a synthesis not so much in the sense of a peace 
as a treuga clei between the conflicting opinions.132
In his “Epistemo-Critical Prologue”, Benjamin criticises the “attempt to find a substitute 
for reflection on the philosophy of art in a syncretism of cultural-historical, literary- 
historical, and biographical approaches” . 133 This approach tries to em pathise with its 
object - a “pathological suggestibility” and a “ self-absorbed fantasizing” - where “ idle 
curiosity m asquerades as m ethod”. Julian Roberts argues that Benjamin s antipathy to 
this lay in its tendency to seek “ only to convert all divergences into an indifferent 
h is to rica l m o tio n ” , and into “ the 'u n p o la rised  inw ard liness  o f sym b o list 
ind iv idualism ” .134 Instead, Benjamin em phasised “art philosophy” which “uses the 
extremes to construct the extensive unity of the idea”. 135 The Baroque tends to propel its 
interpreters into dizziness, Benjamin warns, so one must take a critical distance and, to 
start with, not try to address the whole. Then, he writes, “can the mind be led, through a 
more or less ascetic apprenticeship, to the position of strength from which it is possible 
to take in the whole panorama and yet remain in control of onese lf’.136
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Against the false faith in the symbol - whether neo-Kantian or neo-Classicist - Benjamin 
writes:
of the N ineteenth Century”, and with the figure of the prostitute (simultaneously the seller and the 
comm odity) in mind, “is the figurative appearance of the dialectic, the law ol the dialectic at a 
standstill". Here he suggests that it is peculiar to capitalism. See W alter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: 
A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, op. cit., p. 171.
132. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p. 177.
133. Ibid., p.53.
134. Roberts, Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 118, p. 143.
135. Ibid., p .l 18.
136. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p.56. Benjamin castigates philosophy’s dism issal ot the detail for its 
conception o f beauty. Beauty, he argues, is "empty" without "the life of the detail” , and, moreover, 
“structure [ie. the general] and detail are always historically charged" (p. 182). Philosophical criticism 
should make "historical content” and “material content” the basis of its "truth content"; rather than 
holding the latter up against the former, the issue, Benjamin claims, is to demonstrate the movements 
and transformations of the one into the other.
W here man is drawn towards the symbol, allegory emerges from the depths of 
being to intercept the intention, and to triumph over it.137
W ith this return of this repressed negative power, Benjamin is able to transform  the
symbol into allegory.138 His passage on W incklem ann’s discussion of the Belvedere
torso is revealing here. Benjamin suggests that:
By its very essence classicism was not permitted to behold the lack of freedom, 
the imperfection, the collapse of the physical, beautiful, nature.139
Nevertheless, in the very attempt to see and to describe symbolically, W incklem ann is 
forced, Benjamin argues, to render the torso allegorically: firstly, by exploring the torso 
part by part, his attention dissolves “ the false appearance of totality”; and, secondly, his 
attem pt to bring the torso into the realm of know ledge,140 of necessity, evaporates the 
symbolic claim to transcend the concept.
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In contrast to neo-classicism ’s attem pt (albeit failed) to evade the allegorical truth 
content, B aroque allegory “proclaim s” this im perfection “ w ith unprecedented  
em phasis” .141 Benjamin, as we have seen, pursues his analysis of the Trauerspiel form  
through “radical disjunction”. 142 However, such disjunction - and the language which I 
shall continue to use to describe Benjam in’s approach: antithesis, division, duality, 
dichotom y, duplicity - has to be understood, I think, in a specific m anner. The 
oppositions in play are not static negatives, whether externally defined as the negative to 
the symbol, or as allegory’s internal economy of negativity (the disjunction of sign and 
m eaning); rather, they need to be grasped in term s o f the dynam ics, m ovem ent,
137. Ibid., p. 183.
138. In addition lo the obvious Freudian reference, this can be com pared with ihe idea of the 
“vanishing mediator” , where the necessary ground and flux ol a process - by way of its very success (and 
universalisation) - disappears, so lhal (he result appears, in fact, to be radically other to it (to have 
opposed and defeated this ground/flux, lor instance). See Chapter 1. The inevitable “return” o f allegory, 
at the heart of the symbol, seems to share the claims ol the vanished m ediator to be the heart of the 
process; hcnce, the insistence of both de Man and Benjamin that allegory is “the authentic”.
139. Ibid., p .176.
140. Benjamin associates this knowledge-seeking with (he Fall, and, of course, with allegory.
141. Ibid.. p. 176.
142. Ibid., p. 193.
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unfolding, working and playing that the oppositions put into action. This goes, I think, 
even when - indeed, especially when - Benjamin explicitly refers to allegory’s staticity 
or “rigidity” .
In short, allegory functions for Benjamin as a defence of d ialectics.143 The “baroque 
apotheosis” , he argues, “is a dialectical one” ;144 allegory’s temporality is dialectical, and 
an understanding of Baroque drama requires a dialectical sense of allegory;145 we need a 
dialectical discussion of allegory’s antinomies, and a consideration of its dialectic of 
form  and its dialectic of content.146 Indeed, Benjamin goes as far as advocating a 
dialectical “ solution” to allegory’s antinomies, one which, he claims, “lies in the essence 
of writing itse lf ’.147
143. This is an interesting inversion ol' the “mechanical” qualities of allegory into the ligure of 
dialectics, for the traditional language of dialectics tends to emphasise tigures more akin to the symbol: 
organic, internalisation. This theme will be picked up again later. My argument also touches on the 
fraught question o f Adorno’s relation to Benjamin. Bainard Cowan, tor instance, claims that Adomo and, 
subsequently, Rolf Tiedemann were responsible for putting a Hegelian gloss on an essentially anti- 
Hegelian project. See Bainard Cowan, "Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Allegory , New German Critique, 
no.22, W inter 1981, pp.109-122. The issue is addressed more fully in Susan Buck-M orss, The 
Dialectics o f Seeing. Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project, MIT, 1989. Buck-Morss sixth chapter, 
“Historical Nature: Ruin” , deals extensively with the theme of allegory in Benjamin’s work. My own 
reading of the Trauerspiel is as an anti-neo-Kantian, and self-consciously dialectical, project. This would 
seem to be in line with Benjam in’s own comments on the work. W hether this makes his project 
“H egelian” is, I think, an open and complex question, depending on one’s sense of Hegel: one’s 
emphasis on the method or the result, or one’s take on the open dialectic versus a totalising one. Buck- 
Morss usefully discusses Adorno’s 1932 essay “The Idea of Natural History” where he compares and 
contrasts the treatments of the idea of “second nature” in Lukacs and Benjamin (p. 160).
144. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p. 160.
145. Ibid, p. 166, p. 189.
146. Ibid., pp.174-5. Cf. Ernst Bloch: “every metaphor that remains in m ultiplicity, Alteritas, 
represents an allegory.... If however the metaphor expresses unity, central things in general, if it 
converges towards these with an unquestionable certainty which is beginning to appear, even though it 
is still cloaked, then symbolism is achieved unequivocally.... And the form of both is that dialectical 
form which Goethe called, in a phrase which itself has a dialectical tension, 'a  public mystery’, precisely 
as a still continuing merging ol what is opened and what is cloaked, what has not yet been removed 
from the cloak" (Bloch, op. cit.. pp.176-7).
147. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p. 175. For the dialectic of form he names the antinom ies between: 
convention and expression, secret and public expressions of authority, cold technique and eruptive 
expression of interpretation. For the dialectic of content he discusses the contradictory tendencies of the 
treatment of the profane detail in allegory, where it is both devalued (anything “can mean absolutely 
anything else”, thus making the detail unimportant, and elevated (the m om ent of the d eta il's  
sanctification on the “higher plane”). The significance of Benjamin’s statement on writing will become 
apparent when we pursue de Man’s argument later in this chapter.
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The structure of Baroque drama, Benjamin explains, has its acts divided by interludes or 
choruses, and these are the centres of allegorical assaults on the dram a’s “claim to be a 
Greek tem ple” . 148 These interludes emphasise the “genuinely visual” and “spectacle 
proper” through the use of tableaux vivantes,149 and their “display of expressive 
statuary” :
W ith all the power at its disposal the will to allegory makes use of the “dumb 
show ” to bring back the fading word, in order to make it accessible to the 
unimaginative visual faculty.150
The division between the action of the acts and the frozen nature of the interludes 
echoes, for Benjamin, the division of dream and reality, or of meaning and reality. Often 
seen by the critics as a deadening device, or as a slowness of action, these interludes, 
Benjam in suggests, are best seen as “ the irregular rhythm  of the constant pause, the 
sudden change of direction, and consolidation into new rig idity” .151 This sense of a 
mom ent of frozen movement can be found in Benjamin’s other accounts of allegory: for 
example, in the famous formulation - one especially favoured by Adorno - of “dialectics 
at a standstill” ; or in that of “ the image of transfixed unrest”;152 or even his sense of 
allegory as akin to the Stations of the C ross.153 The disjunction is not static, then, but 
presented as if it was like the children’s games of musical statues or peep-behind-the- 
curtain: there is a lot of movement before the “freeze-moment”, and, it could be argued, 
ju st as much during it.
Some of the disjunctions mentioned earlier can be seen in terms of a dynam ic, and can
148. Trauerspiel, op. cit.. p. 189.
149. Ibid., p.191.
150. Ibid., p. 192.
151. Ibid., p. 197. The whole can be seen as a working of the duality of exterior and interior, of 
classicist structure and the means of expression, of mathematical precision and uncontrolled imagination 
(p. 194).
152. “Central Park”, op. cit., p.38.
153. Ibid., p.36.
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be expanded. The duality of the Trauerspiel finds plastic form in the very set-up of the 
stage, w ith its drop-scenes allow ing an alternation, or transposition , betw een 
foreground and background;154 the duplicity of the titles, signifying both subject matter 
and allegorical content, provoke the “waver” that Honig highlights. Often in Baroque 
architecture there is a division between the controlled, mathematical simplicity of the 
exterior and interior’s exuberance of expression and “uncontrolled imagination ’; 155 not 
dissim ilar to the antinomy of cold, facile technique and the eruptive expression which 
Benjamin attributes to the Trauerspiele them selves.156 The point here is not the fact of 
discontinuity, but the play of interchanges and effects it sets in motion. The soaring 
angels of Baroque architectural sculpture are, Benjamin tells us, supported from below 
by m assive pedestals and colum ns, which draw “ attention to the d ifficu lties of 
supporting from below”. 157 This is, of course, like foregrounding one’s device, but its 
effect goes beyond this highlighting of the artifice o f representation. As Benjam in s 
figure makes clear, it highlights “ the difficulties” which ground the act of representation.
Elsew here - and in an analogy which runs across Baroque dram a and painting - he 
describes how plastic form works the dichotomy of background and foreground. The 
“ exaggerated  realism ” in the foreground sets off the backg round’s “visionary  
objects” .158 In this fashion, when Christ is depicted in the foreground, he can mediate 
Heaven and earth, but, by finding himself “ in the realm of the provisional, the everyday, 
the unreliable” , this threatens to become a “provocative” and “offensive” g e s t u r e .  159
154. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p. 194.
155. Ibid., p. 194.
156. Ibid., p. 175.
157. Ibid., p.235.
158. Ibid., p. 183.
159. Ibid., p. 183. Here, I think, M urillo’s The Two Trinities (National Gallery, London) serves as 
an excellent example: both in terms of its explicit subject matter (the mediator o f the Christ child, 
linking the Holy Trinity and the earthly one, although he is, for the moment of this painting, very 
much o f our world), and in terms of the mode of painterly depiction. Despite the - to modern 
sensibilities - appearance of saccharine sweetness in the faces of the earthly family, so sweet that they 
defy any “reality effect”, there is an astounding clarity to, for example, Joseph's hand; and all this set 
against the emanating “atmospheres” of heaven, where dark clouds open into a realm of light which
One of the significant points about the Baroque for Benjam in lies in the secularising 
tendency that attends on, or countervails against its explicit religiosity, a matter that takes 
on specific twists in the post-Reformation German lands. W hat sets out in one direction 
finds itself realising effects quite opposite of either its initial intent, its explicit claims, 01 
its surface form. Repeatedly, we find that “the symbolic becom es disto ited  into the
allegorical” .160
The divisions of the Trauerspiele find form in the very speech of the actors, theii mode 
o f speech having its “structural, logical meaning” occluded by the ornamental aspect , 
the “ staged exempturn, staged antithesis, and staged m etaphor ,161 The direction 
adopted by Benjam in can be seen in his analysis of the antinom ies - or elegant 
antitheses” - in the sensuous metaphors of Baroque language.162 These metaphors are 
set side-by-side with “an extrem e recourse to concrete words , as in H allm ann s 
com position: “Lechery cannot occupy the palace of virtue.... Ironwort blossom s beside 
noble roses” . 163 But som ething odd follows from these excesses. Benjam in cites
Cysarz’s description:
Every idea, however abstract, is com pressed into an im age, and this image, 
however concrete, is then stamped out in verbal form .164
These m etaphors are not traditional poetic metaphors - or, rather, they don t behave as 
such - because they serve to do something other. In B enjam in’s account, they invert 
their traditional characteristics, and fail to emphasise the metaphorical character of the 
formulation. Indeed, the “visuality” implied by such loaded metaphors, their imagistic 
use of language - we might say: their excess of metaphoricity - serves to undermine the 
m etaphor itself. This is important, and contrasts to the usual characteristics attributed to
seem to tip over into the sulphurous.
160. Ibid., p. 183.
161. Ibid., p.192.
162. Ibid., p. 198.
163. Ibid., p. 198, Hallmann cited p. 199.
164. Cysarz cited ibid., p. 199.
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m etaphor where it finds its ultimate mom ent in its “ im age” . 165 The intensity of the
m etaphors m akes Baroque language “ heavy with m aterial display , in tent on the
display of its own substance”.!66 As Benjamin puts it:
With every idea the moment of expression coincides with a veritable eruption of 
images, which gives rise to a chaotic mass of m etaphors.i67
The metaphors are set up, and then extended, but to such a degree that theii imagery gets 
out of hand and degenerates, and the “ideas evaporate in im ages”; i68 or, as Benjamin 
writes a little later, the language of the Trauerspiel “expands in painterly fashion in the 
alexandrine”.!69
O ne further exam ple makes the same point. The question o f writing and speech has 
provided the main object of attention for recent criticism, and Benjam in him self does 
argue that the two exist in a polarity: “The division between signifying written language 
and in toxicating spoken language opens up a gulf in the solid m assif of veibal 
m e a n in g ...” .170 This polarity is one which, once again, unfolds. The dynam ic, 
mutually-inflecting quality of this antinomy is highlighted in this statement:
The antithesis of sound and meaning could not but be at its most intense wheie
165. The play of image and text as two poles in an economy ol representation - which might be 
quickly sum m arised as immediacy and mediacy - has a wider resonance, w hether, as hcie, in a 
differentiation of different forms of language-use, or as the differentiation within image types. On this 
latter point, we might - taking Richard S h iffs  examination of the proper and the figuied, loi instance - 
think of the contrast o f photography and painting. Shilf also explores this, as an historically changing 
relation, within painting itself. See Richard Shiff, “Phototropism (Figuring the Proper)” , Studies in the 
History o f Art, vol.20, 1989. pp. 161-179. See also W.J.T. Mitchell. Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1986.
166. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p.200, p.201.
167. Ibid., p. 173. This figure is adopted by Tafuri, in, for example, the monstrous pullulation ol 
symbol, discussed in Chapter 2 (Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia, op. cit., p. 14). Also cf. C lark 's 
comments on metaphorical multiplication in Chapter 1.
168. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p .199.
169. Ibid., p.206. Cf. Benjam in's comments in “Epistemo-Critical Prologue" where he compares 
the Baroque with decadence - and its exaggerated language - through explicit comparison with Riegl s 
analysis of late antiquity, and the emphasis on “artistic will” (p.54-5). Cf. also Benjamin s appioval ol 
Baudelaire because “He devalued certain poetic freedoms of the romantics by means of his classical 
management of the Alexandrine, and the classical poetic by means of those caesura and blanks within 
the classical verse itself which were peculiar to him ( Central Park , op. cit., p.37).
170. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p.201.
both could be successfully combined into one, without their actually cohering in 
the sense of forming an organic linguistic structure.171
Baroque language, Benjam in says, is constantly convulsed by the rebellion of its 
elem ents, and the fragm ents - which we have thought to have been stripped of any 
original signification - contain a threatening “rem nant of m eaning .17- And thus, in 
Baroque drama, what seem to be episodes opening into the realm of puie sound - that is, 
sound divorced from meaning, and within which Benjamin includes, on the one hand, 
what he calls the sound of spontaneous, creaturely utterance, and, on the othei, the fiee 
play of the sound of an echo - become episodes which provoke meaning and selves as a
prophecy or a w arning.173
The stakes here are high. This division of speech and writing, he argues, forces the 
gaze into the depths of language”, 174 the Baroque was particularly attuned to the 
problem atic character of art” 175 In a strange inversion of the relation of symbol and 
allegory - where, as we have seen, allegory is “ the dark background against which the 
bright world of the symbol may stand out” 176 - Benjamin implies a difteient inflection to 
the sym bolist’s own claim. Here, that “dark background ceases to be the m eie 
backdrop to the sym bol’s bright performance, and becomes its necessaiy g iound.177 
W e have, to pursue the transformation further, and to sink into Benjam in s favouied 
figures, not the lightening flash of the symbol - the mystical instant, or the momentary 
in s ig h t178 - but the flash of allegory illuminating the obfuscations of the sym bol s
171. Ibid., p.206. Cf. Adorno’s description of high and low culture: the two exist as torn halves ol 
an integral freedom, to which however they do not add up” . See Theodor Adorno, Letter to W alter 
Benjamin, 18th March, 1936, in Aesthetics and Politics, op. cit., p. 123.
172. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p.209.
173. Ibid., p.210.
174. Ibid., p.201.
175. Ibid., p. 176.
176. Ibid., p. 161. • „ . u i i
177. This might be compared to de M an's sense of allegory as more “authentic than the symbol
(“The Rhetoric of Temporality”, op. cit., p.206).
178. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p. 163.
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m ystifying world, a flash which returns us to the play of history, nature, and ethics.
II. “Charity Devoid O f  Charity”
On January 18th, 1926, Benjamin wrote in his Moscow Diary:
Then I read the lesbian scene from Proust. Asja grasped its savage nihilism: how 
Proust in a certain fashion ventures into the tidy private chamber within the petit 
bourgeois that bears the inscription sadism  and then m ercilessly  sm ashes 
everything to pieces, so that nothing rem ains of the untarnished, clear-cut 
conception of wickedness, but instead within every fracture evil explicitly shows 
its true substance - “hum anity”, or even “kindness . And as I was explaining 
this to Asja, it became clear to me how closely this coincided with the thiust 01 
my baroque book. Just as the previous evening, while reading alone in my room 
and com ing across the extraordinary passage on Giotto s Cat itas, it had become 
clear to me that Proust was here developing a conception that conesponds at 
every point to w hat I m yself have tried to subsum e undei the concept of
allegory. 179
Proust s account of G io tto’s Caritas, or Charity, also becom es the focus foi de Man, 
who m akes some sim ilar points (and m ovem ents).180 Taking a text - Pi oust s A la 
recherche du temps perdu - which has traditionally been tieated as a piim e symbolic 
w ork, de M an proceeds to deconstruct this assum ption via a close reading o f the 
rhetorical structure of some passages from Du cote de chez Swann. The work is not, de 
Man insists, “the unmediated experience of an identity” , available for consciousness to 
retrieve by memory, specifically the involuntary memory, 01 memoite involuntaii e, so 
celebrated by com m entators.181 Here, de Man reveals that what seems to be the leign of
179. W alter Benjamin, Moscow Diary (1926-7), ed. Gary Smith, Harvard University Press. 1986, 
p.95. In “Central Park" he writes: "The motif of the androgyne, the lesbian or the barren woman is to be 
dealt with in relation to the destructive violence of the allegorical intention’ ("Central Park , op. cit., 
p .35). This points to the wider resonance of the association of the figure ol the lesbian, the destructive 
principle, and allegory. For further discussion see Buci-Glucksmann, op. cit., pp.79-80, pp.106-9.
180. Jameson describes de M an's critique of metaphor as a “dethroning” , but also as one which does 
not prioritise another trope in its place. In terms which are relevant for some of the problem s in 
thinking allegory in terms of radical disjunction, he states that de M an’s account marks a "shift from 
structure to event, from the positing of a structural relationship within a textual moment to the 
attention to its subsequent effects, which then disaggregate the initial structure” (Jam eson, 
Postmodernism, op. cit., p.227). Jameson sees this as de M an's most dialectical moment.
181. Paul de Man, "Reading (Proust)” (earlier version published in 1972), Allegories o f Reading, 
op. cit., pp.57-78. Citation lroin p .57.
m etaphor can in fact be shown to be shaped by the trope of m e t o n y m y ,  182 0r, what 
seem s to be sym bol is shown to be allegory. P roust’s text may be abounding in 
“ seductive m etaphors” , and even makes explicit com m ents on the superiority  of 
metaphor, but “persuasion is achieved by a figural play in which contingent figuies of 
chance masquerade deceptively as figures of necessity” .183 W hile a thematic or literal 
reading tends to uphold metaphor as the master trope, closer rhetorical attention reveals 
the gaps and fissures in the claims of the “figures of necessity .
There are, de Man explains, two incom patible readings: one forged o f the reader s 
aesthetic response, the other by rhetorical awareness. Recognition of this diffeience 
m arks the aporetic state of the text, an aporia based on logical, and not simply 
representational, incom patibility. Thus the grand synthesis of Pi oust s w oik  - the 
submission to the master metaphor which finally brings all fragments into the oibit and 
unity of “all the forces o f ’ M arcel’s life - is revealed as false, merely the semblance of 
synthesis. The chain of m etaphoric connotations (orchestrated aiound figuies of 
in ternality , repose, darkness and coolness) and that of m etonym ic connotations 
(externality, action, light and heat) refuse to coincide or ever to add up. This would 
m ake the text, de M an says, referring to Genette and Deleuze, an allegory of its own 
deconstruction .184 But this is precisely what the latter part of de Man s essay aims to 
challenge, for if we say that Proust’s novel is an allegory of its own deconstruction we 
have effectively reinstated a coherent meaning to it. In other words, how ever much a 
deconstruc tive  reading undoes, disbands and disrupts m etaphoric or sym bolic 
structures, however much it upsets a secure epistemology with a negative one, it simply
182 The organic association of summer with the “cham ber m usic” sound o f buzzing flies is 
established by a “necessary link” characteristic of a metaphorically orientated synecdoche. Strictly 
speaking, de Man talks of the transfers or crossings (the chiasmus) between metaphor and metonymy, 
and their associated chains of connotations.
183. Ibid., p.67. , f
184 This position of Genette and Deleuze (as described by de Man) might be compared to that ot
Owens. Also cf. de M an’s argument to that o f Melville on the “anxiety for the recovery of a new 
beyond” (Melville, op. cit., p .64).
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unifies the reading at a higher level.
W hat is at stake is the possibility of including the contradicdoiK of reading in a
narrative that would be able to contain them... an allegory of reading.
In treating allegory as “ the report” of the process, its “destructive power” is evaded, and 
“ the contradictions of reading” are contained, grounding “ the stability of the text” ; 186 “at 
the far end of its successive negations, it [the interpretation/reading] will recover the 
adequation between structure and statement on which any thematic reading depends .187 
It is precisely this which de Man hopes to undermine - what might be called a “ safe” or 
“ secure” deconstruction. 188 For de Man, irony and allegory are not playful in the light 
sense of the word; and to unpack and deconstruct a symbolically saturated text is not a 
satisfying activity of work achieved. Such activity always points to som ething deadly 
serious. Any deconstructive sense of superiority, then, is challenged along with the 
targets of its purview. Not only m ust the claim s of the sym bolic and the mim etic 
accounts be traumatised, so must allegory itself. De M an’s strategy might be described, 
albeit inadequately, as a radicalising of deconstruction, radical in the sense that it pushes 
the negative moments further, and lets the degenerative potential take hold. 189
185. “Reading (Proust)” , op. cit., p.72.
186. Ibid.
188. H stw h ere 'd e  Man dislingnisl.es •'primary deconstructive n a n a ti.e s  centred
ultim ately always on metaphor" Iron, allegories which work a, the second o, the th u d d e g r e e ^  
Allegory he writes, "does not erase the figure", are always al egor.es o f h“  o f ,h '8
impossibility of rending. See Paul de Mun. "Allegory ( J u l i f .  Allegor.es o f  „
189. In this sense, certain dialectical accounts - and Adorno springs to  ; M , 
this version of deconstmction than much self-professed deconstruct,,,,,. An al = ™ l; '  ‘c‘ ^  8 h
to say ,h,„ de Mu„ is more Hegelian than deconstructive. The labels here - and th m v o c a ta m  to choose
between, or allocate different accounts to. them - fail to respond adequately to the tna
goes as far as to argue that de Man and Den ida "have nothmg whatsoever to do w,th eacl o  her
(Jam eson, P osm odern tsm , op. a t . ,  p.225), the latter bemg preoccup.ed w.th how to mag , e
unimaginable, inaccessible, radical difference, will, how lo pose language a Prc- " 'S “ ^  •
the f**tr with "the birth of absnaction and indeed philosophical conceptual,ty as such p „  Ih N om s
parallels de Manian deconstruction with Adorman negative dialectics. Dcconstiuc . iti
o l negative dialectics, an activity that carries on the project of immanent or
developed by Hegel out of Kant, but which turns this project against its own dcsu
endpoints as Symbol or Absolute Reason” (Christopher Norris, Paul de Man, op. cit., p .o u
This is where “G iotto’s Charity” becomes significant. In this episode Marcel, Proust’s 
fictional narrator, considers G iotto’s Vices and Virtues in the Arena Chapel in Padua, 
or, to be accurate, he considers the photographic reproductions of them  on his 
schoolroom  wall. The occasion is prompted by thoughts about the piegnant kitchen 
maid at Combray, who Swann, a family friend and bearer of these photogiaphic gifts, 
had nicknamed “G iotto’s Charity” on account of their resemblance. Marcel considers a 
num ber of ways of seeing this resemblance. For Swann, they are physiognom ically 
alike, and the phrase “G iotto’s Charity” becomes, in Swann’s hands, a metaphor for the 
kitchen-maid. For Marcel, the resemblance between maid and fresco is a m oie complex 
affair, and turns on the inability of each to grasp their own significance; in othei woids, 
it turns on the disjunction between “vehicle” and its proper, or allegorical, meaning. Foi 
M arcel, the kitchen-maid is blind to the spiritual import of hei mystei ious basket (that 
is, the bulge of her pregnancy which is com pared to the basket held by Charity in 
G iotto’s fresco), despite (or perhaps because of) the obvious hindtance to the dem ands 
of her em ployment. M oreover, his interpretation of the teal and the allegorical ctoss 
over, each turning into its opposite. The actual, particular k itchen-m aid  seems, to 
M arcel, to signify as abstract and figural (she is, he notes, but one m om ent in an on­
going representation of the abstract quality of “kitchen-m aid-ness ). M eanw hile the 
pow er of G iotto’s allegorical fresco, he thinks, resides in its realistic representation (the 
fact that what should be an allegorical, abstract personification tesolves itself into the 
look of secular particularity, an everyday scene of someone handing up a corkscrew  
through the cellar window). Both are representations, de Man notes, and both are 
representations requiring reading.
In de M an’s account, Proust takes the reader from symbol to allegory, prim arily in this 
shift from Swann’s perspective to that of Marcel. We might break this down as follows:
(i) The sym bol’s synthesis of literal and figural in a proper meaning is played out across 
the figure of the kitchen-maid and her basic resemblance to the fresco, (rather than in the
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fresco per se - although the im plication m ight be that Swann reads the frescoes 
sym bolically too). Here a number of oppositions seem reconciled: particular and 
universal, matron and virgin, profane and sacred, low and high.
(ii) M arcel - described by de Man as more rhetorically sophisticated than Swann - sees 
not in terms of symbol, but in terms of allegory; not as a synthesis of literal and figural, 
but as a disjunction and divergence between a meaning proper to the literal, and a 
meaning proper to the allegory. This discussion focuses upon the images, with passing 
reference to the kitchen-m aid, who simply serves to demonstrate the same process of 
crossing from the opposite direction.
(iii) Initially, M arcel does not like this discordance, and sees the frescoes as failures. Or,
at least, they fail for him: the discordance between their “look’ and their meaning being
so pronounced that Charity was “Charity devoid of charity” , Justice looked m ore like
Injustice, and Envy failed even to invoke her countering vice and looked more like a
medical illustration. But what at first seems to be the shortcomings of allegory - the way
discordance hinders the attainment of the symbolic, (the symbolic m om ent that Swann,
in his ignorance of the difficulties, can attain) - this shortcoming develops, for M arcel,
into the very heart of the frescoes’ power or “ special beauty , a pow er which now
resided precisely in this disjunction.
I came to understand that the arresting strangeness, the special beauty of these 
frescoes derived from the great pan  played in them by symbolism, and the fact 
that this was represented not as a symbol (for the thought sym bolised was 
nowhere expressed) but as a reality, actually felt or materially handled, added 
something more precise and more literal to the meaning of the work, something 
more concrete and more striking to the lesson imparted.190
(iv) It is crucial to grasp that this is not just a revaluation of allegory, in the sense of 
placing a plus where once there had stood a minus (and here we will see the difference 
of this reading with the claims of a postmodern “allegorical impulse” which has inverted 
the rule of the symbolic). M arcel’s shift in appreciation rests neither on seeing the 
frescoes as symbols (as does Swann), nor simply on the disjunctive mode summarised
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190. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, Volume 1, Penguin, 1983, p.88.
by “Charity devoid of charity” (as they do for Marcel in his initial view). Instead it rests 
on M arcel’s recognition of the necessity of the vehicle (the literal representation) for the 
allegory no matter how divorced then relation appeal's; or, to be precise, it is a necessity 
which works across the disjunction. Marcel realises that the fresco s m eaning is made 
more forcefully through the realistic representation that seems devoid of charity , and 
that the allegory is dependent upon a literal representation that seems to have nothing to 
do with the proper meaning. Allegory, asserts de Man, can not do without the poweis of 
literal representation. There is, then, not a simple disjunction between the liteial and 
allegorical meanings, but a disjunction which is articulated within some sort of dialectic 
o f m utual dependence. Marcel goes on to note that in real life the tiuly saintly 
em bodim ents of practical charity” never appear remotely com passionate, but aie as 
brusque as “ a busy surgeon” ; 191 and he m akes the follow ing analogy with his
understanding of the frescoes;
... are not the thoughts of the dying often turned towards the practical, painful, 
obscure, visceral aspect, towards that “ seamy side of death w hich is, as it 
happens, the side that death actually presents to them and foices them  to feel, 
and which far m ore closely resem bles a crushing burden, a d ifficu lty  in 
breathing, a destroying thirst, than the abstract idea to which we aie accustomed 
to give the name of Death?192
(v) W hat is there, then, to distinguish this from the “ necessary link” of metaphor, or a 
return to plenitude, or, even, the sanitisation of disjunction which de Man attributes to 
G enette and Deleuze? This mutual interaction is not one of mutual support so much as 
one of destructive  dependence, and an erosive dynam ic is set in m otion. De M an 
describes a certain deflection, whereby the literal representation overtakes the piopei 
allegorical meaning. In the case of Invidia, or Envy, an iconic detail is hypeibolised. the 
exaggerated emphasis on the serpent-tongue - and we might extend the exam ple to hei 
ears - alm ost obliterates the proper meaning. We look at Envy, but we do not think
191. Ibid., p .89. This refers us back, perhaps, to vice, in the image of Envy who "looked like 
nothing so much as a plate in some medical book, illustrating the compression of the glottis or the 




about the vice (the proper meaning), or meditate on its evil implications, and neither is 
our attention directed in line the proper intent: towards goodness and virtue. >93 De Man 
puts it this way: “ the allegorical representation leads towards a meaning that diverges 
from  the initial m eaning to the point of foreclosing its manifestation . The foice of 
our fixation upon such details, de Man says, re-directs our thoughts. ... the mind is 
distracted towards something even more threatening than vice, namely death .1 )5
III. Negative Knowledge, Permanent Parabasis & Unrelieved Vertige
Death, de M an wrote in “ Autobiography as De-Facem ent”, is “ a displaced nam e for a
193. The literal is allowed to obliterate the allegorical meaning. In the case ol C harity, the 
production of double meaning is made via Ruskin’s self-correction ol his initial leading ol the Giotto 
fresco in Fors Clavigera. The passage, and Proust’s adaptation of it. highlights the comparison between 
G iotto’s fresco of Charity and Frangoise, the cook at Combray, and immediate mistress ol the kitchen- 
maid “G iotto’s Charity". Whatever attributes may be ascribed to Frangoise, charity is not one ol them; 
indeed, any feelings of pity are somewhat hypocritical on her part, and she finds it easy to shed tears 
over written reports o f suffering, but incapable of responding to any suffering undei hei veiy nose. Cl. 
the theme of the piece: M arcel's guilty reading, the play of action and repose, and Maicel s seeming to 
better engage life through the mediation of the book, life’s opposite, (In fact, it is largely Frangoise who 
is the cause o f the kitchen-m aid’s suffering!) Thus the photograph of Giotto s Caritas invokes two 
incompatible associations: Frangoise and the kitchen-maid; uncharitability and the object ol chanty (the 
latter easily confused with charity). "The rhetorical interest of the section... is that a single icon 
engenders two meanings, the one representation and literal, the other allegoiical and piopei , and that 
the two meanings light each other with the blind power of stupidity" (“Reading (Proust)”, op. cit., 
p.76). Cf. Benjamin on the "ideas evaporating in images" in the Trauerspiel. p. 199. As de Man remarks: 
“ the literal sense of this allegory treats its proper sense in a most uncharitable manner ; but just as 
Marcel will never dispense with Frangoise, so Proust will never cast away the thematic powers ot 
literal representation”. Indeed, de Man insists, he “would not be able to do so il he tried ( Reading 
(Proust)”, op. cit., p.76). However, this still admits a possibility of treating Pioust s novel as a 
narrative of its own deconsUuction. What de Man wants to foreground is not the allegory o f the crossing 
of two incompatible readings, but the allegory of Reading per se. an allegory which "narrates the 
impossibility of reading”: “We accede to the proper meaning [of G iotto’s Caritas] by a direct act of 
reading not by the oblique reading of the allegory. This literal reading is possible because the notion ol 
charity on this level of illusion, is considered to be a referential and empirical experience that is not 
confined to an intra-textual system of relationships" (p.77). We access the meaning proper to the 
allegory, then, not by representation (which works against the allegory) but by reading the words 
“CARITAS” or "INV1DIA". In the case ol G iotto's frescoes, we can only access the propei meaning by 
way of reading the inscriptions to the images, by reading "CARITAS" or "INVID1A . However, this 
recourse to language is not the locus for a deferral of meaning, the moment of language and death, since 
- and this is de M an’s argument - the word "INVID1A” does not perform within a text, but instead refers 
us outside. Here, then, it is reading and writing which would seem to claim immediacy, not the images, 




temporal predicament” , the deferral of meaning in l a n g u a g e .  196 W hat we have, though, 
is not the deferral about which Derrida writes. The same destructive dynam ic, as we 
have seen de Man describe with respect to G iotto’s Envy in Proust, is also the sense of 
irony described by him in “The Rhetoric of Temporality .'97
The act of irony... reveals the existence of a temporality that is definitely not 
organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and difference and 
allows for no end, for no totality.198
Both [allegory and irony] are determ ined by an authentic expei ience of 
temporality which, seen from the point of view of the self engaged in the woild, 
is a negative o n e . 199
The above quotations repeat the themes already attended to in the case of de Man s 
discussion of allegory: inorganicism, distance, difference, irreconcilability; in shoit, 
some form of radical negativity. But in discussing irony, and in particulai Baudelaiie s 
conception of comedy, de Man draws out the distinction between simple com edy , oi 
le comique significatif, and le comique absolu , or irony - a distinction which has some 
im portant repercussions. The form er operates at an intersubjective level, orientated 
tow ards others for its effect - laughing at someone. In comique absolu this lelation is 
projected inwards, becoming a matter of self-duplication or dedoublement - wheie the 
self becomes a multiple consciousness capable of laughing at itself.-00 W hat is tieated as 
the mutual interaction of two different subjects in simple comedy, becom es in comique 
absolu, that between two parts of the same subject - between the two paits of a divided 
or “ split” subject, as one part of the subject reflects ironically on its other part. De Man 
implies that comique absolu is a better approximation of the gtoundlessness of negative
196. Paul de Man, “Autobiography as De-Facem ent” (1979), The Rhetoric of Romanticism, 
Colum bia University Press, 1984, pp.67-82. Citation from p .81.
197. Stephen Melville notes that, for recent criticism, allegory is "a belated rewriting ol ‘irony , 
the difference being that it allows for wider realms of application (“Notes on the Reemergence oi 
Allegory” , op. cit., p.60).
198. “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, op. cit., p.222.
199. Ibid.. p.226. . .
200. Note that there is again a movement from an inter- to intrasubjective relation. Earlier, in the 
discussion of Romanticism’s shift from analogy to affinity, this represented a movement into symbolic 
understanding. Here, by contrast, a similar pattern is set up by the shift into irony, and marks the 
internalising of the bad knowledge - the negative self-knowledge - of radical difference.
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self-knowledge, and that simple comedy entails a retreat from that knowledge.
In a false feeling of pride the self has substituted, in its relationship to natuie, an 
intersubjective feeling (of superiority) for the knowledge of a difference.-01
This high degree of self-reflexivity is seen to be the preserve of highly sophisticated,
rather than everyday, language-use (that is, the language-use of philosopheis and
artists).202 De Man clarifies the full implications of this:
The reflective disjunction not only occurs by means of language as a privileged 
category, but it transfers the self out of the em pirical world into a w oild 
constituted out of, and in, language - a language that it finds in the w oild like 
one entity among others, but that remains unique in being the only entity by 
m eans of which it can differentiate itself from  the w oild. Language thus 
conceived divides the subject into an empirical self, immeised in the woild, and 
a se lf that becom es like a sign in its attem pt at d iffeien tia tion  and self
definition.203
The ironic language splits the subject into an empirical self that exists in a state of 
inauthenticity and a self that exists only in the form of a language that asserts the 
know ledge of this inauthenticity. This does not, how evei, m ake it into an 
authentic language, for to know inauthenticity is not the sam e as to be
authentic.204
In other words, there cannot be a recovery, or reconciliation, by way ot iiony s self­
reflexiveness.205 There is an “unrelieved vertige” induced by the m ovem ent of ironic 
consciousness, which cannot be corralled without being 1 educed back into comique 
significatif, back to the level of the intersubjective, with a loss of the distance between 
fiction and the em pirical world. 2°6 There is, as Schlegel pu t it, only “perm anent
parabasis” .207
201. Ibid., p.214.
202. This concurs with Benjamin’s sense of Baroque allegory as a privileged, secret and elite mode 
of language; a point also made, with wider applicability, in the literature on allegory.
203. °  Ibid., p.213.
204. Ibid., p.214.
205 This needs to be contrasted with de M an's critique of Szondi and Starobinski for making the 
irony o f irony some form of recovery, instead of recognising its absolute, vertiginous character (ibid.,
2 0 6 ^  De Man: “ ... it serves to prevent the all too readily mystified reader from confusing fact and 
fiction and from forgetting the essential negativity of the fiction” (ibid., p.219).
207 Schlegel is unusual among the writers of the Romantic period in seeing allegory as central to 
the poetic (see Buci-Glucksmann, op. cit., p.69). Cf. Schlegel’s “permanente Insurrektion” of 1796: 
“ Der absolute Despotismus ist nicht einmal ein Quasistaat, sondern vielmehr ein Antistaat und (wenn 
auch viellecht physisch ertraglicher) doch ein ungleich groBeres politisches Ubel als selbst Anarchie.
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De M an’s very late essays pursue this question of “negative self-know ledge” and the 
“ tem poral predicam ent” further.208 The “ ideology o f the sym bol” , or “ aesthetic 
ideology,” is usually presented as the subject’s attempt to hide from this knowledge. At 
first, we appear to be on familiar territory: de Man analyses H egel’s opposition of sign 
and sym bol in his Lectures on Aesthetics, an opposition which echoes that of 
allegory/irony versus symbol. W here the symbol presum es a relation between the 
m eaning and the sensory form  in the physical world by which that m eaning finds 
signification - a relation with some causality, linkage or mutual interpenetration - the 
sign, in contrast, has this relation as arbitrary, as predicated or asserted. It is, for de 
Man, H egel’s attention to the sign which opens some interesting issues, and produces 
some strange turnings.
The arbitrariness of the sign means that the subject can enact a certain freedom  of 
intellect; he or she can will the relation, and “subject” the world via language, ju s t like 
B enjam in’s allegorist; in other words, with language, the subject predicates the world. 
At its m ost basic, such predication is deictic - using words relating to the specificity of 
the tim e and place of utterance - “th is”, “ that” , “ now ” , “ h e r e ” . 2 ° 9  Predication in 
language always presumes an implicit subject, an “ I” who declares that.... But w hat 
seems to be the very specification and particularisation of deictic statements - that most 
specifying and particularising of linguistic events - is, in fact, hollow. Language is the
Diese ist bloB eine Negation des politisch Positiven; jener eine Position des politisch Negativen. Die 
Anaichie ist entweder ein fliefiender Despotismus, in dem sowohl das Personate der henschenden Macht, 
als sie Grenzen der beherrschten Masse stets wechseln; Oder eine unechte und permanente Insurrektion: 
denn die echte und politisch mogliche ist notwendig transitorisch.” (“Versuch iiber den Begriff des 
Republikanismus - VeranlaBt durch die Kantische Schrift zum ewigen Frieden”, Friedensutopien. Kant, 
Fichte, Schlegel, G orres, eds. Zwi Batscha and Richard Saage, suhrkamp taschcnbuch wissenschalt 267, 
Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1979)
208. Paul de Man, “Sign and Symbol in Hegel’s Aesthetics”, Critical Inquiry, vol.8, Summer 1J82, 
pp.761-775, and “Hegel on the Sublime”, in Displacement: Derrida and After, ed. M ark Krupmck, 
Indiana University Press, 1983, pp. 139-153.
209. This is a matter that, as we have seen, can also be followed in the section on "Sense-Certainty 
in H egel’s Phenomenology., op. cit.. pp.58-66.
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agent by which “ thought subsumes the infinite singularity and individuation of the 
perceived world under ordering principles that lay claim to generality ,21(l and as Hegel 
puts it: “ Since language is the labour of thought, we cannot say anything in language 
that is not general” .21l There is, in other words, a perpetual failure to encountet the 
perceived world in its particularity, and that very encounter must, of necessity, reduce it 
to generality.212
De Man pursues this with another basic philosophical statement - 1 am I - the statement 
by which we earn, so to speak, our theoretical right to think anything else, indeed, oui 
right to think at all, to say “ I think” - and which has im plications for the subject. As 
before:
... the I, so singular in its independence from  anything that is not itself, 
becomes, in the general thought of logic, the most inclusive, plural, general, and 
impersonal of subjects.2!3
This subject, then, is self-effacing, in that it must lose its I -ness in the very moment 
it declares itself “ I” .214 De Man starts with H egel’s statem ent in The Encyclopaedia 
Logic. “ Since language states only what is general, I cannot say w hat is only my 
opinion”.215
210. “Sign and Symbol” , op. cit.. p.767.
211. Cited ibid., p.768. Cf. “we do not envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter 
the universal” ( P h enom enology . op. cit., p.60). Coleridge’s sense ol' allegory as “a translation of 
abstract notions into a picture-language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction tiom objects of the 
senses” may take on a twist in the light ol this discussion ol Hegel on Sense-Ceitainty (Coleiidge, op. 
cit.. p.230).
212. Jam eson discusses this with reference to de M an’s reading of Rousseau, as a question of 
“names” and “metaphors”, or between "nomination” and "absU'action (Jameson, Postmodernism, op. 
cit., p.229).
213. “Sign and Symbol”, op. cit., p.768.
214. This self-effacing, then, is not the same as philosophy’s claim s to transcend individual 
subjectivity and opinion to become a disinterested subjcct. Far from suiving to be disinterested, to lose 
our subjectivity, we cannot do other than already be self-effaced.
215. Cited by de M an, “Sign and Symbol”, op. cit., p.768. De Man pursues this point of self­
erasure through a sequence of translations of Hegel’s phrase. These are based on the arguments already 
rehearsed and on the connotations of the Gennan word Meinung, rendered above by de Man as "opinion 
but also with connotations firstly of personal possession, mein ; and, secondly of "to mean” , or "to 
make mine” meinen. The sequence of moves made by de Man can be summarised as follows: (i) "1 
cannot say what is only my opinion”; (ii) "I cannot say what I make mine/what I mean” (since to make
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W e are left, then, at the very attem pt to ground our first principles, in a state ot 
paralysis: “ I cannot say I” . In order to go on, argues de Man, (indeed, in order 
theoretically, logically, to survive), we must suspend this realisation, and forget the 
know ledge of this paralysis. The m ind m ust, o f necessity, “ shelter itself from  
self-erasure” .216 In de M an’s reading, H egel’s narrative (by which we should have in 
mind the Hegelian history of the mind in the Phenomenology) has to take the form  ot 
p ro lepsis  and anago risis .21? This anticipation (our proleptic projection of our 
hypothesis) of the mom ent of post festum recognition - that which will lead us back via 
the unravelling of the knot (anagorisis) - is itself" the plot and the suspense” of H egel’s 
narrative, thus adding an interesting inflection to the flight of M inerva’s owl.218 “The 
hyperbolic I projects itself as thought in the hope of recognizing itself when it will have
run its course” .219
m ine/to mean is “opinion”); (iii) "I cannot say what 1 think (since o think is to make mine to 
subsume or to subject the world); (iv) “I cannot say I” (since, for Hegel, to think presupposes an I, a 
subject an ego) The logic which takes us from (iii) to (iv), is also what is undermined by (iv), for if 
cannot 'say 1” the possibility of thought is erased. This, de Man observes, is “a disturbing proposition 
At first sight, all this seems a little slippery. However, the point seems to be sustained in the Hegel 
literature. The crucial passage occurs in Hegel's Remark to the twentieth proposition, or paragraph. The 
current English translation does not even render Meinung as “opinion as de Man does, but moves 
straight for “ to mean”, what de Man has to establish by connotation. De Man s own play on the words 
meinen, mein and Meinung seems to be sustained, the use, in the previous sentence ot meine and mein 
being italicised and attention drawn to them in a footnote from the translators. And bccau.se language is 
the work of thought, nothing can be said in language that is not universal. What I only mean [meine] is 
mine [mein]; it belongs to me as this particular individual But if language e x p r e s s e s  only wha ,s 
universal, then I cannot say what I only mean” ( The Encyclopaedia Logic op. cit p.50 Remarks to 
paragraph 20) The exchange between de Man and Raymond Geuss turns on the reading o is 
paragraph is a matter which I cannot make judgement on, as my German and my grasp on Hegel is 
limited. Nevertheless, I can say that de M an's reading is not as bizarre as it first 
Geuss “Critical Response I. A Response to Paul de Man”, Cniical Inquiry, vol. 10. December 1983 
pp .375-382; and Paul de M an’s reply in the same issue, “Critical Response 11. Reply to Raymond
Geuss . PP .38n3^ 0Sym bor,( op c iu  p.770 . i emphasise the necessity here, because it starts to lend a
different cast to de M an’s comments about the aesthetic. 1 will return to this point later 
217 Prolepsis (.pro-lam banein , or before-to take) is the figure o f anticipation. Anagorisis is the 
figure of recognition (at the point hitherto anticipated) which leads to denouement, a recognition leading 
to the unravelling of the knot of the plot.
218. Ibid.
219. Ibid.
However, this entirely necessary survival tactic hits a further problem. There has to be 
“ something there to recognize when the time comes”, the mind “ has to recognize itself as 
itself, that is to say, as I” .220 This is a problem because “ how are we to recognize what 
will necessarily be erased and forgotten, since I is, per definition, what I can nevei 
say? ” .221 W e have already had to forget the problem of “I cannot say I” , but now we 
m ust also turn a blind eye to this problem of delayed recognition if we aie not, once 
again, to get stuck in theoretical paralysis; we must, de Man suggests, forget again.
This abyss of forgetting the groundlessness of thought, like iiony s peim anent 
parabasis” , is a peipetual dialectic of self-destruction and self-invention with no 
reconciliation or closure. W e may, in Hegel’s account, move thiough piogiessive stages 
of self-consciousness, but, de Man suggests (against the explicit d iiection of the 
narrative, and the assessment of most of Hegel’s commentators), these aie ones without 
any resolution, with only repetitions and an increasing negative know ledge. The 
“progressive” dialectic, then is rendered as “regressive and degeneiative , 0 1 , lathei, 
de Man relates it as an account which progresses on the basis of an im plic it 
acknowledgement of this destructive dynamic. To extend the point made eailiei, de Man
writes;
The act of irony... reveals the existence of a tem porality that is definitely not 
organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and difference and 
allows for no end, for no totality. Irony divides the flow of tempoial experience 
into a past that is pure mystification and a future that remains haiassed foievei by 
a relapse into the inauthentic. It can know this inauthenticity but can never 
overcom e it. It can only restate and repeat it on an increasingly conscious level, 
but it rem ains endlessly caught in the impossibility of m aking this knowledge 
applicable to the em pirical world. It dissolves in the narrow ing spiial ot a 
linguistic sign that becomes more and more remote fiom  its meaning, and it can 
find no escape from this spiral.... More clearly even than allegory, the rhetorical 
mode of irony takes us back to the predicament of the conscious subject; this 





222. “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, op. cit., p.222.
T he reference here is clearly  to H egel, 223and in particu lar to the unhappy 
consciousness, which, in the Phenomenology, figures as a moment of internalisation of 
the problem  of negativity. It is precisely this internalising of the problem  which 
exacerbates the effect of this split (in Hegel between Subject and Substance) - in 
comparison with the externally driven dialectic of lordship and bondage.224
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Benjamin compares Baroque and modern forms of allegory in similar terms: Baroque 
allegory sees the corpse only from the outside. Baudelaire, in contrast, sees it also from 
the inside”.225 Or, as Buci-Glucksmann observes, where once death and the abyss were 
objectified, now they are internalised as spleen, and the corpse is now inside oneself: a 
rad ically  d istu rb ing  novelty  which dem olishes the acquired certa in ties of the 
‘sub ject’” .226 According to Julian Roberts, Benjam in’s Trauerspiel is best com pared 
with H egel’s Phenomenology, and the resolution found by Benjam in for allegory s 
antinomies reflects Hegel’s for the unhappy consciousness. The melancholic allegoiist is 
like H egel’s Stoic consciousness: despairing of the inaccessibility ol the absolute, he
223. “The ambiguity poetry speaks of is the fundamental one that prevails between the world of the 
spirit and the world of sentient substance: to ground itself, the spirit cannot coincide with its object and 
this separation is infinitely sorrowful” ("The Dead-End ol Formalist Criticism , op. cit., p.237). De 
Man warns of the danger of recovering a coherent historical picture in the face ^ s u b j e c t 's  incoherency 
("The Rhetoric of Temporality” , op. cit., p.222). He undermines any attempt at silting contented with 
the unhappy consciousness, emphasising its “dialectical anxiety (against Doubiovsky s plenitude), and 
the torment of its condition, a sort of condemnation to perpetual alienation (“Form and Intent in the 
American New Criticism”, op. cit., p.34) . The struggle must not be made comfortable, lest it deny or 
elide its very condition. De Man’s constant struggle is to prevent a condition of negation being turned 
into an affirmative one, preventing non-identity from being resolved into identity at another level. How, 
he wonders, can a text transcend irony, and become meta-ironical, “ without falling into the myth of an 
organic totality or bypassing the temporality of all language ? See The Rhetoric of Temporality , op. 
cit., p.223.
224. Norris contrasts Marxism’s understanding of the unhappy consciousness with de M an’s; for the 
former. Ihe dilemma of the unhappy consciousness is a historical predicament; for the latter it marks an 
“ontological g u lf’ “between phenomenal and semantic orders of sense” which cannot be overcome or 
transcended (Norris, op. cit., p.3). Norris, however, suggests that the figure is particular to de M an’s 
early, more existential work; although he also says that the later work generalises such “ them es” 
(p.xix).
225. “Central Park”, op. cit., p.35.
226. Buci-Glucksmann, op. cit., pp.76-7.
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turns to the certainties of present reality as “the symbol o f its material transience”.227
Similarly, Baroque drama, for all its allegories, remained unconscious of its antinomy of
word and script; for all its sense o f history, in the end, remained unhistorical.228
W hether w e identify the allegorical figure as the m elancholic’s “torpor or as the
intriguer’s “nihilism ”, it must, Roberts argues, be surpassed. He puts it this way:
Allegory itself now reaches its dialectical resolution, the settling of the infinity of 
m eanings w ithin which its superabundance o f sign ification  threatens to 
disappear. P recisely in the allegory o f  the grave, the “v ision  of ecstatic  
annihilation”, it reveals its own limits. “Here decay is not so much signified, 
represented allegorically, as itself significant, offered as allegory - the allegory of 
resurrection.” And so the whole nihilistic technique of destructive contemplation 
at the last moment turns in on itself. Allegory is allegorised by reality.229
IV. The “Negative Capability” O f  “Infinite Regressions”
Similar themes to Benjamin’s emerge in the other literature on allegory. Honig notes that 
in the thematic structure o f the allegorical journey the heto entets a p tocess ot self- 
discovery, which, in allegory, means confronting contiadictions, engaging in the battles 
betw een virtue and vice. He thereby “extend[s] his identity” in order to regain 
paradise.230 But in m odem  allegories, Honig argues - in the katagogic form, as Fletcher 
would describe it - the narrative comm ences from the heto s initial self-judgem ent, but 
establishes “no vital m ission”. The narrative “constantly dw indles”, and “instead of 
finding his many actual identities, he [the hero] shrinks and is finally converted into
227 Roberts W alter Benjam in , op. cit., p .134. Paradoxically, it is the German Lutheian tiadition 
which, unlike that o f Catholicism, is strictly transcendental, providing no earthly institutions, having 
no ground for ethics in the here and now. and has no access to concrete representations of the beyond 
(p. 139) - that makes the allegorical German Baroque dram a turn back to myth and symbolic 
correspondence (p. 140).
228. Ibid., p. 151.
229. Ibid., p. 150.
230. Honig, op. cit., p.68.
nothingness”.231 Quilligan also refers to “the vertigo readers of allegory often suffer 
when the plot simply evaporates”.232
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O w ens’ account is far less traumatised. Laurie Anderson’s Americans on the Move takes
on a particularly significant status in his explanation of allegory. He describes how she
utilises a range of media or signs to make her performance, and how she establishes that
“the world is a vast network o f signs... [which] continually  e lic its  reading,
interpretation”.233 But this eliciting o f reading only points to the im possibility o f its
realisation, a reference which is clearly de Manian234 - and Anderson has a character
remark on the schematic image of a man and a woman on the Apollo 10 spaceship:
In our country, we send pictures o f our sign language into outer space. They are 
speaking our sign language in these pictures. Do you think they will think his 
hand is permanently attached that way? Or do you think they will read our signs? 
In our country, goodbye looks just like hello.235
H ere, O w ens states, “two clearly defined but mutually incom patible readings are 
engaged in blind confrontation in such a way that it is im possible to choose between  
t h e m ” ,236 just as in allegory we find a confrontation between virtue and vice. This can
be compared to Quilligan’s account:
The plots o f all allegorical narratives... unfold as investigations into the literal 
truth inherent in individual words, considered in the context o f their w hole  
histories as words.237
231. Ibid.
232. Quilligan. op. cit., p.68.
233. Owens, part 2, op. cit.. p.62.
234. Owens describes de Man thus: "De Man recognizes allegory as the structural interference of two 
distinct levels or usages of language, literal and rhetorical (metaphoric), one of which denies precisely 
what the other affirms. In most allegories a literal reading will deconstiuct a metaphorical one, 
recalling medieval schemas of textual exegesis, de Man identities such leadings as tiopological. Yet 
because literal language is itself rhetorical, the product o f metaphoric substitutions and reversals, such 
readings are inevitably implicated in what they set out to expose, and the result is allegory” (ibid., 
p.63).
235. Cited ibid.. p.60.
236. Ibid., p.61. Cf. O rton's “non-synthesized tension” mentioned earlier (Figuring Jasper Johns, 
op. cit., p. 131).
237. Quilligan, op. cit., p.33.
For example, in The Faerie Queene there is a constant play on, and interrogation of, the 
name and word “Error”. Indeed, more broadly, the allegories addressed by Quilligan all 
focus on on e’s faith, or confidence, in words and language.238 The attentive reader is, 
Quilligan argues, confronted with his “tendency to misread”, by being confronted with 
“the nearly fatal m istakes”23  ^ o f the allegory’s characters, and their inability to 
distinguish, for exam ple, between “bad literal-mindedness” and “good literalness .24° 
This inability to differentiate results in a reification of language, Quilligan points out24i - 
or as Bunyan put it: “By misinterpreting evil insues”;242 and, the reader, like such 
characters, receives “a lesson in reading”.243
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At first sight, Quilligan would seem  to see allegory as radically divorced from any 
com m itm ent to the real.244 The poet, she says, does not mimic life, but the life o f the 
m ind”, and foregrounds questions of language itself: “More than any other creator of 
narrative, the allegorist begins with language purely; he also ends there .245 However, 
for Quilligan, a self-consciousness of language and textual self-referentiality per se are 
not enough. The text is not simply an intensive consideration of language but must point 
beyond. Foucault, she argues, sets up Borges as a self-referential text, but a llegoiy  
proper is not a closed  system , and has to be as much concerned with leading the 
world.246 Indeed, the very point of allegory’s questioning o f our “culture’s assumptions
238. Ibid., p.46.
239. Ibid., p.79, p.80.
240. Ibid., p.70.
241. Ibid., p.71.
242. Cited ibid., p.131.
243. Ibid.. p. 109.
244. Fletcher sees allegory as opposed to Aristotelian mimesis, organised by ritualistic necessity 
(utilising the supernatural, magical deus ex machina) rather than according to probability (Fletcher, op. 
cit., p. 150). Any appearance of realism in the narrative is, for Fletcher, superficial and must, in any 
case, give way to increasing domination by magical topoi (p. 198) - and naturalistic novels, such as 
those by Zola or Sinclair, are themselves closer to allegory than realism, with their “daemonically 
simplified" heros, whose destinies are proscribed by the machine ol the plot (p.315).
245. Quilligan, op. cit., p.42.
246. Ibid. p.219. Cf. her comments on Pynchon and Nabakov.
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about the ability o f language to state or reveal value” is to take us beyond - and not 
deeper into - linguistic self-referentiality.247
By virtue o f the fact that the immediate focus o f the narrative is the language in 
which it is written, not only must the reader com e to terms with the language in 
which such questions are asked, but he must also recognize that his answers - or 
such answers as seem to be indicated by the text - can be made only in language. 
The circular process ends in a self-consciousness the only way out of which may 
seem  to be an arbitrary act of choice. Language does or does not lie. And if a 
reader ch ooses not to choose, he or she is left with a series o f infinite  
regressions.248
The task o f allegory, Quilligan writes, is to raise the reader’s self-consciousness, and to 
provoke them to “ethical action”.249 The “burden of ch o ice”250 proffered by the 
allegorical text - truth or untruth - extends, she argues, to the extra-textual w orld .251 
Such decisions can be optim istic or dw ell in “a gloom  o f negativity’ .2 2^ Q uilligan  
concludes with D ante’s proposition that the refusal to choose or decide in what one 
believes - and thereby the refusal of self-definition - is worse than damnation: ‘[they] are 
condemned to spend eternity chasing elusive banners in the vestibule of the inferno. Not 
even hell will have them”.253 Honig notes that the “abyss o f despair” - into which, for 
him, allegory leads - ultimately lacks “a complete stultification” which might provide the 
catalyst for a “leap” to commitment. The narrative ends, he writes, “with the stark
247. Ibid., p.221. Quilligan’s sense of this beyond is quite specific: “Allegory calls attention to the 
‘o ther’ - in a word, to God, or to some sort ol possible sacredness (p.52). She makes the distinction 
between two sorts of “beyond” to textual internality: "allegory retlects... the cultuie s assumptions 
about the ability of language to state or reveal value; that is, value conceived in an extiamundane way, 
not mere market-place value, or the goings on in the agora, but something alios  (p .221).
248. Ibid., p.278. She goes on to qualify: “Such a negative capability may, however, be purely the 
privilege of authors; for even if the reader chooses to accept the infinite regressions lot what they aie - 
inconclusive - that in itself is a choice” .
249. Ibid., p.235. Quilligan argues that "Perhaps language cannot redeem language, so that poetry 
cannot redeem society; fiction may only entertain. But all allegorists do aim at redemption; and because 
they must work with language, they ultimately turn to the paradox at the heart ol theii own 
assumptions about words and make the final focus of their narratives not meiely the social tunction ol 
language, but, in particular, the slippery tensions between literalness and metaphor. They scrutinize 




253. Ibid., p .278.
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critical question of the individual and society”.254 In the end, Honig writes, a llegoiy  
abandons “the fundamental device o f hypothetical construction and reveals life, the 
allegorical work dispenses with the concept o f allegory”.255
This ethical direction of allegory’s purpose is also shared by Benjamin. Allegory may be 
a m ove beyond the symbol for Benjamin, but it is not the end; and the leaction to the 
symbol is not enough. Indeed, as w e have seen, allegoiy becomes cential only in oidei 
to subject it to dialectical scrutiny, and we watch it unfold its own contradictions and 
transform itself. It is not just the disjunctive, not just the negative, but a p iocess 01 
dynam ic in which its antinomies cross, interact, exacerbate and even degeneiate. Foi 
Benjamin, allegory dem ystifies the symbol, better approximating the tiuth o f a fallen  
world and the disarticulation of consciousness and physis. Foi the sym bol, truths aie  
(m istakenly) deem ed im m ediately present and plenitudinous, for allegory they are 
forever lost, and recognised as such. Yet despite this promise of dem ystification, 
Benjamin suggests, allegory is limited by its fetishism of fiagm ents and its letieat into 
m elancholic inwardness - an inwardness that spectates a world devoid o f m eaning and 
grieves for this loss. Unhindered negativity - even that which m oves - leads only to
“melancholic immersion”, Benjamin argues:
And those who lose their footing turn somersaults in theii fall, so would the
allegorical intention fall from emblem to emblem down into the dizziness o f its
254. Honig, op. cit.. p.68.
255. Ibid., p. 179. He sees “prescriptive allegory” and “programmatic realism” as equally abstracted 
from reality, equally hostile to representation, and that they equally contuse the particular and the 
universal (p. 180): "The literary allegory does not oppose a realistic account of the universe. Its very 
power lies in its giving proof to the physical and ethical realities ot life objectively conceivcd (p. 17)). 
"A llegory, which is symbolic in method, is realistic in aim and in the content of its perception 
(p l7 9 0 . Rom anticism  here functions as H onig’s identification o f the Fall, with its hostility to 
Christian analogy and the natural sciences, emptied the symbol of its “ontological basis (p.181): In 
losing its objective character, the symbol became a simulacrum, a disembodied form in which ideas or 
feelings were arbitrarily substituted for real events, persons, and things... reality-drained...” (p. 181). And 
thus “the search for symbolic meaning is an essential part ol the effort to name and renew a lull 
awareness of reality in contemporary term s” (p. 183). It is difficult to say whether this am ounts to 
another happy resolution. Honig ends with the words of Wallace Stevens: “a name for something that 




In the final pages o f his Baroque book, Benjamin charts allegory’s “about-turn into
salvation and redemption”, “the direction o f allegorical reflection is reversed; on the
second part o f its w ide arc it returns, to redeem ”.257 B enjam in’s approval of
“destructive” work has to be seen in a wider context.258 In 1931, he wrote this about
certain left-intellectuals and their “nihilism”:
... this left-wing radicalism is precisely the attitude to which there is no longer in 
general any corresponding political action. It is to the left not o f this or that 
tendency, but sim ply to the left o f what is in general possible. For from the 
beginning all it has in mind is to enjoy itself in a negativistic quiet.259
For Benjamin, it is clear that some further resolution must be found. It has been widely  
argued that Benjamin advocates a “resolution” - or, at least, a leap - into praxis.260
This is the direction assumed by Buchloh in his survey of allegorical practices. L evine’s
strategy is presented as closest to the allegorical melancholic, and the strongest negation
within the gallery framework”.261 Buchloh describes how:
The allegorical mind sides with the object and protests against its devaluation to 
the status o f a com m odity by devaluating it a second time in allegorical 
practice.262
L evine, he says, “devalues the object o f representation for the second tim e”, yet her
256. Trauerspiel, op. cit., p.232.
257. Ibid.
258. See, for example, “Central Park", op. cit.; "The Destructive Character” , One Way Street, op. 
cit., pp. 157-9; “Karl Kraus” , One Way S treet, op. cit., pp.256-90, especially his quotation o f Adolf 
Loos: “When human labour consists only of destruction, then it will be really human, natural and noble 
labour” (cited p.289). Benjamin had an approving sense of a “humanity that affirms itself in destruction” 
(cited Buci-Glucksmann, op. cit., p.58). Buci-Glucksmann links this “destructive principle” with the 
need to make “ leaps” across the “ unbridgeable gulf” - which, she believes, Benjamin saw as separating 
Jewish history and messianic freedom - and with a politics o f anarchism and nihilism (pp.63-4). See 
also Julian Roberts, W alter Benjamin, op. cit., p.7.
259. W alter Benjamin. "Left-Wing Melancholy. (On Erich Kastner’s new book of poems)”, Screen, 
no.2, Summer 1974, p.30.
260. Cf., for example, Julian Roberts, W alter Benjamin, op. cit., p.146.
261. Buchloh, "Allegorical Procedures”, op. cit., p.52.
262. Ibid., p.44. Once again this figure can be compared to Brecht’s Veifremdungsejfekt.
“apparently radical denial o f authorship” is “com placent in defeat , encouraging a 
“fatalistic acceptance”, “a silent complacency in the face o f the static conditions o f reified 
e x is te n c e ”.263 The work does not open up, what he calls, “a dim ension o f critical 
negativity”, but like Benjamin’s melancholic endures “the violence of the passive denial 
that the allegorical subject im poses upon itself as w ell as upon the objects o f its 
choice”.264 Buchloh sees Benjamin as moving away from this sense of allegory to one 
with a political inflection in his work on Baudelaire and in his fam ous essay The 
Author as Producer”;265 and for Buchloh it is Martha R osier’s work which best 
approximates this latter sense o f allegorical praxis. This wing o f allegorical (or beyond 
allegorical) activity is interventionist, and produces art outside of the accepted frames of 
reference; it “produces” radical work, and refuses to supply the apparatus.266
There is a choice here as to how we might read allegory: on the one hand, a move out of 
itself (in its melancholic form) into the “world”, the extra-textual, construction, or 
praxis; on the other, as an infinite regress into, what Benjamin calls, the bottomless 
depths. Of course, this formulation gives a particular inflection to the matter, and it 
might be presented differently: on the one hand, as a resolution akin to the Hegelian 
Aufhebung; on the other, as a perpetual openness. Both inflections - whatever their 
emphases, and however these emphases may be further inflected by different 
commentators - inevitably pitch the question into a political realm of judgement; and one 
which has been running at least since the debates of the 1840s. 267 it could be said that 
we are working with two versions of the dialectic: that which must move to something 
positive (whether as the building of a new social framework beyond capital, or as a
263. Ibid., p.52.
264. Ibid., p.52, p.53.
265 See W alter Benjamin, "The Author as Producer ’ (1934), Understanding B iecht, New Lett 
Books, 1973, pp.85-103.
266 Ibid. Nevertheless. Buchloh points to a problem: lor him, Rosier’s work remains subject to a 
certain impotence by this very externality.
267 For example: Left versus Right Hegelians; Lukacs versus Adorno; Lukacs versus Brecht: 
Benjamin versus Adorno; poststructuralism versus Marxism.
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return to order); or that which retains its negativity (whether as some force of 
emancipatory impulse, or as a drift into nihilism). And in this very last example I raise 
the question of the distinction between negative dialectics and nihilism.
Hegel’s account of the unhappy consciousness can be read as one stage on the way to 
Absolute Knowledge and final Aufhebung; and, according to one’s predispositions, one 
can see this as either “positive” or “negative”, reactionary or liberatory, method or 
result. What has come to interest me, however, is that it can also be read as lacking any 
internally generated resolution. The unhappy consciousness itself dives into something 
akin to nihilism. The only way beyond its incessant circlings and its ever deepening 
“ infinite regressions” - in other words, the only way forward for the narrative of the 
Phenomenology to the following section on Reason - comes via the intervention of some 
“deus ex machina”. In the final lines of the section on the unhappy consciousness we 
find the mediator in the figure of a priest.268 Put this way, H egel’s unhappy 
consciousness looks far less like part of some relentless and all-powerful mechanism, 
and seems more to resemble nihilism. This, I suspect, would not tally with the account 
of either the pro- or anti-Hegelian camps. What it seems to do, however, is problematise 
the very borders of hitherto secure “positions”. If this is so, then the frequent resort to 
the figure of the unhappy consciousness may take on more significance.
The resort, in the final analysis, to Benjamin in his Brechtian mode, is the favoured 
option of many writers, even when this is glossed by Adoinian cautions. I can see why 
this is desirable, but confess to finding it increasingly pat. In particular, it seems to close 
the issue just as things begin to look interesting. What happens if we pursue things even 
just a little further? If we hold in abeyance, just for a few pages, the choices offered by
268. Interestingly, allegory also has frequent resort to a deus ex machina (see, for example, Fletcher, 
op. cit., p. 150). Jameson notes that Rousseau, in his exploration of language’s beginning, gels caught 
in a conundrum, and has to find "a detonator” or “causal concept” to reverse his narrative (Jameson, 
P ostm odern ism , op. cit., p.223).
218
219
the call to arms? De Man, as we have seen, warns against resolving one’s sense of 
allegory too soon (for example, seeing a text as an allegory of its own deconstruction), 
but he also points to the dangers involved in a sense of allegory which tends towards 
another (connected?) complacency: as though the issue is resolved by exposing 
representation as representation, and declaring the matter resolved. Allegory and irony, 
he says, are demystified forms of language, but while "Both modes are fully de­
mystified when they remain within the realm of their respective languages (they]... are 
totally vulnerable to renewed blindness as soon as they leave it for the empirical 
world” .269 Honig notes that allegory “constantly reappears 011 the borders between 
religion or philosophy and art”,270 and within it one can find the philosophical 
metaphors of “identification, motion, unity, and immutability”.271 Allegory’s emphasis 
on the relation between reality and representation, and on the problem of interpretation, 
raises significant metaphysical, ontological, epistemological and ethical i s s u e s . 272
The further we move into these difficulties, what had seemed like two quite distinct lines 
of criticism by allegory - against the symbol and against mimesis - start to cross 
paths.273 Indeed, we are referred not just to different modalities of representation, but to
269. “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, op. cit., p.226.
270. Honig, op. cit.. p.7; or - widening the terrain still further - it "hovers on the borders between 
primitive mythological figurations and the more sophisticated structures of philosophical thought 
(p.25).
271. Ibid., p.30.
272. Jameson suggests that this range of issues - and the slippage between tropology, philosophy, 
politics, literature, etc. - amounts to a “transcoding” , and that de Man utilises his concept of metaphor 
to enact, and to generalise, this transcoding. In particular, it is not a narrow sense ol trope which de Man 
employs, but “the dynamics o f the trope” which is “identified” with, and "pronounced to be ‘the same' 
as”, other theoretical discourses. This makes, Jameson argues, de M an’s metaphor "itself a metaphorical 
act and a violent yoking together of distinct and heterogeneous objects” (Jameson, Postm odern ism , op. 
cit., p.238). This is a strong argument, and one which can be directed at most writers on art/culture who 
propose any import for their claims beyond the material. This also goes for a writer like Jameson, ol 
course - a point I make not to deflate his, but to indicate the difficulty in this matter. It brings us back 
to the question of how to mediate text and context discussed in Chapter 1; note that Jameson here 
explicitly describes de M an's concept of metaphor as “mediatory”. It also moves us into the question of 
subject/object transpositions.
273. Fredric Jameson has presented this as the heart of the de Manian matter. Jameson articulates 
this around metaphor rather than symbol: “ ... paradoxically, far from being the very heartland of the 
figural and the space in which language is liberated from the literal and the referential..., metaphor is for
the very problem of this in relation to “the real” . This is a question which has become
the ground for easy statements - the more degenerated forms of statements, such as:
there is nothing outside representation, etc. - rather than a point of difficulty for theory.
The matters of representation, of knowledge, of attempts to know the real, or represent
it - and, by extension, we might include questions such as realism, materialism, etc. -
just do not lend themselves to simple positions, or quick dismissals. I read both de Man
and Benjamin - whatever their differences, whatever their weaknesses - as dealing with
such matters as the very stakes of their projects.274 As Norris has put it: de Man “allows
of no premature appeal to rhetoric as a means of escape from epistemological issues”.275
Rhetoric may figure as the problematic term, the aspect of language that 
complicates the move from phenomenal perception to concepts of pure 
understanding. But it can exert this deconstructive leverage only in so far as it 
remains an activity of thought closely in touch with epistemology and critical 
reason.276
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V. Signs, Symbols,  A nd  Some Strange Turnings
De Man names the key moment in the mind’s resistance to self-erasure as the aesthetic, 
which operates as a defence against this negative self-knowledge. But this defense is not
de Man something like the source and origin, the deeper cause, ot the literal and referential illusions 
themselves...” (ibid., p.227).
274. Jameson describes de M an's project as an attempt at “restoring the clumsiness of some initial 
thought process” , an effort to recover the crudeness of fundamentals comparable to early hominids (ibid., 
pp.218-20). Jameson concentrates on de M an's reading of Rousseau, and suggests that the form er’s 
interest in the latter is due to Rousseau’s offering of “the spectacle of this crude new thought - history - 
on the moment of its invention out of nothingness” (p.219). This would present de Man as some 
extreme version of “foregrounding one's devices”.
275. Norris, op. cit., p.78. Discussing the question of aesthetics and epistemology in an interview 
with Robert M oynihan, de Man remarks: “ If there is a priority, that is, if there has to be one, it 
certainly is epistem ological” (cited p.71). Norris sees de Man as distinct from postmodern and 
poststructuralist thought: "For the upshot of such counterdisciplinary gestures is first to reduce every 
discourse to an undifferentiated general rhetoric, and then to deprive rhetoric itself of any critical or 
epistem ological force” (p. 101). Foucault, he writes, presents rhetoric as "the active antithesis of 
knowledge and truth - a disruptive force within language that lays bare the ruses of that will-to-power 
concealed behind (he claims of pure, disinterested reason" (p.94). Jameson reaches a different judgement 
from Norris, and says of de Man: "the positions and the arguments are “postm odern” ... even if the 
conclusions are not” (Jameson, Postm odernism , op. cit., p.255).
276. Ibid., p.94.
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just evasive, but, as we have seen, entirely n e c e s s a r y .  277 This is worth exploring, for 
de Man makes a further move: “the sign, random and singular at its first position, turns 
into s y m b o l ” ;2 7 8  0r, the sign represents itself as symbol. In other words, sign and 
symbol are not just distinct, but are found to be in a relation of paralysis like the self- 
effacing I, or, as de Man puts i t ,  one of “mutual o b l i t e i ' a t i o n ” .279 This move is lived out 
a second time - and raises further issues - as de Man goes on to consider “ the 
commanding metaphor... of i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n ’ \ 2 8 0  Interiorisation, or internalisation, is a 
powerful rhetorical model (which he sees as utilised by the ideology of the symbol or 
aesthetic ideology), which, according to de Man, is “the understanding of aesthetic 
beauty as the external manifestation of an ideal content which is itself an interiorized
experience”.281
W hat lies at the heart of the theory of the symbol is the concept of E rinnerung , 
rem em brance, or the “recollection as the inner gathering and preserving of 
e x p e r i e n c e ” .282 The emphasis in Erinnerung is on the organicism of the relations it 
mediates, the interpenetration of form and content (which reminds us of the traditional 
language of dialectics). But despite being the theoretician of Erinnerung, and despite the 
power of the “dialectics of internalization”, de Man insists that Hegel is also the 
theoretician of Geddchtnis - memorisation (in the sense of the memorisation of rote
277. Jameson also sees the “errors” of aesthetic ideology as necessary; or, as he puts it: “metaphor is 
and is not an ‘error’: it generates illusions; yet insofar as it is inescapable and part of the very fabric of 
language itself, ‘error' does not seem a particularly suitable word for it, since we have no space available 
that might allow us to get outside language and to make such judgm ents” (ibid., p.228). Accordingly, 
metaphor is an operation which emerges from this abstraction (p.229), but this is also an act of "primal 
metaphor” from which allegory itself emerges as a self-reflexive narration (p.233) - “the birth of allegoiy 
out of the primal metaphorical dilemma” (p.241).
278. “Sign and Symbol” , op. cit., p.768.
279. Ibid.. p.770. “ Since, however, it [the sign] states itself as what it is not. it represents a 
determined relationship to the world that is in fact arbitrary, that is to say it states itself as symbol” . If 
wc take up Jam eson’s point about allegory's birth from primal metaphor we have an interesting picture 
before us of the play of identity and non-identity, especially if we contrast this with the sigm,can only 




learning). The distinction, which is again often collapsed, is crucial, for Geddchtnis is to 
Erinnerung as sign is to symbol, or as allegory is to symbol, and the former’s act of 
relating name and meaning is an “empty link”, mechanical and arbitrary. De Man, of 
course, is keen to maintain the difference, as is, to some extent, de M an’s Hegel, 
although for the latter this is not without problems for his system. Indeed, it is, 
emphasises de Man, Geddchtnis, not Erinnerung, which plays the key role in Hegel’s 
philosophy. Specifically, this is a mediating role in the progression from perception 
through representation (in which G eddchtnis is a sub-species) to thought. This is a 
matter of no little importance, and one which bears significantly upon the central 
statement ot the A esthetics  - and, the work’s key claim to the symbol - “art is the 
sensory manifestation of the idea”. How, wonders de Man, is the idea (thought) 
externally manifested, made over into a form appropriable by sensory experience? To be 
experienced sensually, it must, for a start, leave “a material trace upon the world”.283
Here the full implications of Geddchtnis come into play, for the memorisation of rote
learning - particularly when one writes down words in order to forget them, or when
one copies a text mechanistically such that the meaning of the words is forgotten - treats
words as names, and memorises by material inscription in order to forget. By contrast,
the remembrance or recollection of Erinnerung occurs not in the written word, but, by
contrast, in sounds and images.
... memory [Geddchtnis] is a truth of which the aesthetic [cf. Erinnerung] is the 
defensive, ideological, and censored translation. In order to have memory one 
has to be able to forget remembrance and reach the machinelike exteriority, the 
outward turn (of rote learning].284
Thus, according to de Man, this memorisation is necessary to the existence of thought, 
and moreover, it is, as inscription, necessary for thought’s sensory manifestation. Of 




past Erinnerung - and along with it remembrance, the symbolic mode, the aesthetic, the 
preservation o f  thought, interiorised as ideal content. Erinnerung is but the “defensive, 
ideological, and censored translation” which defensively covers over this necessity.
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De Man goes still further. In inscribing, he claims - in that “outward turn” and 
“machinelike exteriority” - we preserve  that which we might otherwise forget entirely. 
We find that memorisation can only be preserved as symbol: “the sign can only survive 
as a symbol”.285
Memory effaces remembrance (or recollection) just as the I effaces itself. The 
faculty that enables thought to exist [Gedachtnis] also makes its preservation 
impossible. The art, the techne, of writing which cannot be separated from 
thought and from memorization can only be preserved in the figural mode of the 
symbol, the very model it has to do away with if it is to occur at all.286
Gedachtnis ensures the material inscription (or sensory manifestation) of the idea - in the 
act of forgetting we inscribe, in order that forgetting is not total or absolute. It implies
285. Ibid., p.774. Cl'. Benjamin’s synthesis for allegory’s antinomies, one which we recall “lies in 
the essence of writing itse lf’ {Trauerspiel, op. cit.. p. 175). Cf. the phrase - "the sign can only survive as 
symbol" - with the "symbol that is not symbolic" ("Sign and Symbol , op. cit., p.774).
It is worth noting that this idea of the sign which can only survive as a symbol has certain 
echoes of the tendency of negation to tip over into affirmation. This argument differs from the two 
predominant accounts, where negation is either lost in some political compromise or seen to be lost 
because the social grounds which hitherto supported it have changed. Atkinson has noted that 
disalfirm atory practices in art tend, in the act of making, to become affirm atory - a more prosaic 
expression of “the sign can only survive as a symbol” (Atkinson, op. cit., p.9). Sartre noted that while, 
with respect to the given, praxis is negativity, with respect to the object aimed at. it is positivity 
{Search fo r  a M eth od , op cit., p.92). Adorno argued that “art works are not being, but becom ing” 
{Aesthetic Theory, op. cit, p.252). This dynamic or “inherently processual nature of works of art”, 
Adorno goes on, have moments of “true identity of the identical and the non-identical in terms of 
process - true because that identity is only a moment and not some magic formula for the whole” 
(p.253); nevertheless their drive to form is provided by “the heterogeneous, the non-identical, the 
amorphous”.
Dynamic therefore is reciprocity, a restless antithetical process which never comes to a halt in 
static being. Works of ait exist only in actu ; their tensions never resolve themselves into pure 
identity with one or the other extreme. For all that, they can act as a dynamic field of internal 
antagonism only if and when they are finished, congealed objects. Otherwise, the pent-up forces 
in them would simply run parallel to or away from each other without ever intersecting. The 
paradoxical phenomenon of an equilibrium of forces negates itself. Their motion must come to 
a halt and yet remain visible qua motion in this standstill, (p.253)
With a tone which we might recognize in de Man, Adorno wrote “Affirmation does not surround the 
status quo with a halo. What it does is resist death...” (p.357).
286. Ibid., p.773.
“the particular temporality which makes art both the most proleptic and the most 
retrospective of activities”.287
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*  * *
This may add a somewhat different inflection to the reading of Cezanne given by Fred 
Orton. Taking de Man’s critique of aesthetic ideology, Orton charts the inversion of the 
apparently paradigmatic modernist/symbolist practice of Cezanne, turning the critics’ 
claims to aesthetic immediacy, into an allegorical account.288 Here, we find Cezanne - 
or, at least, Gasquet’s Cezanne - striving for the same immediacy, although this time not 
as the painting’s viewer-critic, receiving the appropriate sensations before it in the 
gallery, but in terms of a striving for some immediacy of representational rendition with 
phenomenal experience; for example, seeking something close to a symbolic economy in 
matching painting to its model, let’s say a matching of green oil dabs to the landscape at 
the Chateau de Medan. In Orton’s account, Cezanne’s intent of immediacy (symbolic? 
mimetic?), dissolves into its own impossibility - a point which the symbolic intents of 
the critics fail to recognise. As Orton puts it: “Each picture becomes an allegory of the
287. See “Reply to Raymond Geuss". op. cit., 389. Cf. Timothy Bahli’s comment that in de Man: 
“displacement, erasure, and forgetting are not the elimination of something true but the marking of its 
signs” . See Timothy Bahli. “Lessons of Remembering and Forgetting”, Reading de Man Reading  , eds. 
Lindsay W aters and Wlad Godzich, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p.257. For a critique of “the 
politics o f forgetting” , see Helga Geyer-Ryan, op. cit., p.5
288. See Fred Orton. “Out of Time” , unpublished paper presented at the College Arts Association 
Annual Conference, New York, February 1994 , p.3. I take this to be quite a distinct project to the one 
on Jasper Johns. Johns’ status has, as Orton convincingly argues, always been positioned as 
“undecidable” , whereas Cezanne's has not been coded in this way; so the unravelling ol the symbolic 
into the allegorical must proceed differently with Cezanne, not least because Johns has never been 
incorporated successfully into the symbolic paradigm. The resonance of the Johns project, to my mind, 
turns on the breakdown of, or hindrance to, the Greenbergian account of Modernism. In this sense, the 
problem of Johns has a similar - although, I think, quite distinct - role to that of Postmodern practices 
for Owens and Crimp: we are witnessing some sort of "beyond”, or, at least, as Orton argues for Johns, 
some sort of playing/working at the limits (hence Orton’s emphasis on “neither... nor, both... and”). 
Here we are presented with an allegorical practice to counter the paradigm of Modernism’s symbol. With 
Cezanne, however, one is forced, much more like de Man, to unravel the symbol from the inside, for he 
lies deep inside the canon of Modernism - however “peripheral" Aix-en-Provence figures for the main 
accounts o f M odernism’s driving forces, and however difficult his practice has proved to be for certain 
narratives of the development of modem ait (including the Open University’s A315 course).
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impossibility of the s y m b o l ” ;289
The symbol always turns into thoroughly troped and figured speech, that is to 
say, it always resolves into allegory. It cannot contain the tropological feint 
which makes it what it is. The troped and figured character of the symbol always 
disrupts its symbolic form and so provides it with a negative moment which 
works against its symbolic effect and the claims made in virtue of its 
transcendence by forcing to mind the constitutive gap that there is in language 
between words, or visual images, and the reality or experience of reality that 
they try to e v o k e . 290
(i) “Cezanne wants to provide a contact with immediate sensation, but can only do it by
mediated substance”.291 The artist’s serious searching for that immediacy, cannot ignore
the gaps between what de Man would call “ linguistic” and “natural reality” , or
“reference” and “ p h e n o m e n a l i s m ” . 292  Orton discusses the instability of the term
“sensation” - “it is o f  the world outside Cezanne - nature, a person, a still life - and it is
also inside o / h i m ” .293
The more he brings his sensations together, the more difficult the process of 
painting becomes. It’s a difficult task to bring them together.... The process 
produces more and more difficulties, more moments of doubt... where doubts 
and difficulties reach a p o r i a . 2 9 4
This is explicitly framed by an analogy with Derrida’s unstable terms, of which 
differance/difference is the privileged one: the “ loose links and gaps as 
u n d e c i d a b l e s ” . 2 9 5  w hat it reminds me of, however, is de M an’s discussion of 
H e g e l , 2 9 6  and indeed of Hegel - especially the passages of sense-certainty and 
perception in the section on “Consciousness” in the Phenomenology.297
289. Ibid., p. 10.
290. Ibid., p.8.
291. Sec Fred Orton, "Cezanne/M edan/de Man” , unpublished paper presented at the conference 
“ Desperately Seeking C6zanne”, University of Leeds, 7th May 1993, p.9.
292. Cited in "Out of Time” , op. cit., p. 10.
293. Ibid., p.4.
294. “C6zanne/Medan/de Man", op. cit., p.8.
295. Ibid., p.9.
296. Cf. also to de M an's discussion of the impossibility of philosophically defining "m ovem ent” 
in "The Epistemology of Metaphor”, Critical Inquiry, vol.5, n o .l, Autumn 1978, pp.13-30.
297. Note that, in the earlier paper, Orton explicitly ties the impossibility of Cezanne’s striving to 
the concept of the "unhappy consciousness”.
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(ii) “Cezanne wants to provide a contact with immediate sensation, but can only do it by
mediated s u b s t a n c e ” . 298 But if we follow the drive of de M an’s writing on Hegel - on
the complex of movements made around the term Gedachtnis and inscription - we may
find ourselves witli a sign that can only survive as a symbol. That “mediated substance”
is where the issue lies. To reiterate: “The art, the techne, of writing... can only be
preserved in the figural mode of the symbol, the very model it has to do away with if it
is to occur at all”.299 And Orton argues:
The foreknowledge of the paintings is that Cezanne’s is an art which tells us that 
reality, nature, sensations cannot be conceived except as practical activity, as 
thought. As he conceives “sensations” so he destroys them.300
To claim that the sign can only survive as a symbol is not to return us to the symbolic 
account, its illusions and ideologies, etc. What I ’ve argued for comes out, I think, on 
the far side of the argument for allegory; and it is a pedantic point to worry about 
whether this is still allegory, is beyond  allegory, or is a proper sense for allegory. 
Whatever we call it, it must take the figure of allegory seriously - or, rather, it must take 
seriously the question of representation raised by this figure. O rton’s account of 
Cezanne comes very close to this, and to working out these issues through historical 
material and a concrete practice: “reality, nature, sensations cannot be conceived except 
as practical activity, as thought”.301 This nod in the direction of Marx may make a move
298. “Cezannc/Medan/de Man", op. cit, p.9.
299. “Sign and Symbol”, op. cit., p.773.
300. “Cezanne/Mcdan/de Man”, op. cit., p. 10.
301. Jameson also sees de Man as "returning to the act o f thinking as praxis and stripping away the 
reifications that sediment around that act when it has become an object” (Jameson, Postm odern ism , op. 
cit., p.220). Another text by de Man has provided a focus for this sort o f discussion. See Paul de Man, 
“Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant”, in Hermeneutics: Questions and P ro sp e c ts , eds. Gary Shapiro 
and A lan Sica, The U niversity of M assachusetts P ress, 1984, pp. 121-144. The probing of 
“phenom enality and m ateriality” has also been taken up by T.J. Clark in an unpublished paper, 
“Another Cezanne” , presented at the conference “Cezanne and the Aesthetic”, held at the National 
G allery. London (but under the auspices o f the Tate Gallery), 29th March 1996. A related, although 
distinct, paper which emphasises Cezanne s empiricism, positivism and materialism, and "the powers 
and lim its o f  a practice o f know ledge” , has been published: T.J. C lark, "F reu d 's  C ezanne”, 
R epresen tations  52, Fall 1995. pp.94-122 (citation from p. 115). Clark again returns to the question of 
negation as he draws to a summation: “Nonetheless, if 1 am also proposing that the ultimate interest of
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similar to de Man’s with Gedachtnis\ and, interestingly, returns us to a position not too 
far from Benjamin’s leap to praxis. We also appear to have found some way into 
considering these matters for the practice of ait.
* * *
Literary “form” is the result of the dialectic interplay between the prefigurative 
structure of the foreknowledge and the intent at totality of the interpretative 
process. This dialectic is difficult to grasp. The idea of totality suggests closed 
forms that strive for ordered and consistent systems and have an almost 
irresistible tendency to transform themselves into objective structures. Yet, the 
temporal factor, so persistently forgotten, should remind us that the form is 
never anything but a process on the way to its completion .... Understanding can 
be called complete only when it becomes aware of its own temporal predicament 
and realizes that the horizon within which the totalization can take place is time
i t s e l f .  3 02
The issues here may bring us closer to issues pertinent to the visual arts, except that
within de Man’s texts, the visual image functions as the symbolic to writing’s allegorical
system. The chains of values can be established from this passage:
To the extent that the paradigm for art is thought rather than perception, the sign 
rather than the symbol, writing rather than painting or music, it will also be 
memorization rather than recollection. As such, it belongs indeed to a past 
which, in Proust’s words, could never be recaptured, retrouve.303
Memorisation, de Man says, “ is entirely devoid of images”.304 Although the discussion 
of “images” here cannot be collapsed into an art historian’s sense of an “ image” - just 
like Hegel’s criticism of “picture thoughts” cannot be understood as a critique of
C ezanne's art lies in its happening on the powers and limits of a particular system of representation, 
then presum ably I do not believe that his art lies simply w ith in  that system - im prisoned by it, 
exemplifying it. I should expect the sheer doggedness with which Cezanne tries to exercise the powers 
in question lead him continually to their boundaries and insufficiencies. My argument is that glimpses 
of alternative systems of representation are only thrown up by the most intense and recalcitrant effort to 
make the ones we have finally deliver the goods. It is only in the process of discovering the system ’s 
antinom ies and blank spots - discovering them in practice, I mean - that the first improvised forms of 
contrary imaging come to light. Though in the end these forms are less interesting in their own right - 
they are too approximate, too preliminary for that - than as repoussoir  for the system they still belong 
to. They are what makes that system visible as such" (p.l 16). This argument is tied to a discussion of 
the artificial or mechanical “grating and locking’’, or interruption, of Cezanne’s Bathers (p.l 17).
302. “Form and Intent in the American New Criticism” , op. cit., p.31, p.32, my emphasis.
303. “Sign and Symbol” , op. cit., p.773.
304. Ibid., p.772.
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“pictures” (we must beware, here, of being “bad literal-minded”) - this does,
nevertheless, make it difficult to establish any straightforward “de Manian art
history”,305 0r to utilise the resources in unproblematic ways. Images and sounds,
painting and music, may also be manifestations of thought, de Man suggests, but do not
do so as sensory manifestations.306 Elsewhere, he writes:
... the sign which pertains specifically to language and to rhetoric, marks, in 
Hegel, the passage from sheer inward recollection [Erinnerung] and imagination 
to thought | D enken], which occurs by way of the deliberate forgetting of 
substantial, aesthetic, and pictorial symbols,307
Perception, im agination, representation, recollection, and such are all 
m anifestations of the idea, but it is nevertheless the case that none of them 
necessarily entail its sensory manifestation. Only memorization..., to the extent 
that it implies notation and inscription, is necessarily a sensory and phenomenal 
manifestation; hence the link with inscribed language ....308
One could, of course, adopt the method (allegorical thinking, thinking through 
negativity) while jettisoning the explicit material by, and through, which this method is 
worked out and over. This, after all,i*not too far from how Marx, for one, claimed to be 
indebted to Hegel; and this thesis has also tended to do this - this being a thesis on 
negation, and negation being the classic site over which such appropriation of 
methodology, without all that attends it, is acted out. But one last observation may be in 
order.
Benjamin would seem to offer us a more amenable account of the image, indeed his 
account of the inscribing process is presented as the “synthesis” of writing realised in 
the frozen image. This moment of rigidity, of frozen statuary, can be compared with his 
idea of dialectic at a standstill. But we must also beware of taking Benjamin too literally
305. Note the doubtful title of the session organised by T.J. Clark at the College Arts Association, 
February 1994: “A de Manian Art History?”
306. "The idea... makes its sensory appearance, in Hegel, as the material inscription of names.... the 
synthesis of memory [Geddchtnis] is the only activity of the intellect to occur as sensory manifestation 
of an idea...” (“Sign and Symbol”, op. cit., pp.772-3).
307. De Man cited in Timothy Bahti, op. cit., p.256, my emphasis.
308. "Critical Response II. Reply to Raymond Geuss”, op. cit., p.389.
on the matter of the image. Art historians have often favoured his concept of the 
“dialectical image” in order to introduce dialectics into an account of pictures, and 
especially photography and photomontage. But any exploration of Benjamin’s dialectical 
image suggests that the concept is about as far away from images as is de M an’s 
account: they are in the realm of thought representations, not inscribed ones; and Klee’s 
work may figure  this for Benjamin more than be it. Ironically, in terms of a concrete 
discussion o f  an image through  this material, it is de Man who provides the most 
extended deliberation. It is, then, perhaps appropriate that - via Proust, Marcel, Swann, 




I N egativity does not appeal' as a practice which guarantees meaning or opens 
out a space for free play and fantasy... but, rather, negation appears as an 
absolute and all-encompassing fact, something which once begun is cumulative 
and uncontrollable; a fact which swallows meaning altogether.... On the other 
side of negation is always emptiness... an art in which ambiguity becomes 
infinite, which is on the verge of proposing... an Other which is comfortably 
ineffable, a vacuity, a vagueness, a mere mysticism of sight.1
A considerable pail of the leading German intelligentsia, including Adorno, have 
taken up residence in the ‘Grand Hotel Abyss’ which I described in connection 
with my critique of Schopenhauer as ‘a beautiful hotel, equipped with every 
comfort, on the edge of an abyss, of nothingness, of absurdity. And the daily 
contemplation of the abyss between excellent meals or artistic entertainments, 
can only heighten the enjoyment of the subtle comforts offered’.2
The remark made by Clark, quoted above, on the “ineffable” and “a mere mysticism of 
sight”, raises the problematic terrain to which questions of negativity tend. One must 
wonder whether this “looking the negative in the face” - never mind Cacciari’s 
favouring of “completed nihilism” - is possible without dissolving into what Tafuri 
him self feared would be irrationality.3 Cacciari’s own path involved following 
negativity into theology, and, specifically, into “angelology”.4 Negativity, Agamben 
writes, is “ the original mythogeme of m etaphysics” , and nothingness is the
1 • Clark, “Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art” , op. cit., pp.59-60.
2. Lukacs, “Preface” (1962), The Theory o f  the N ovel, MIT, 1971, p.22.
3. Tafuri, “Introduction: The Historical Project”, The Sphere and the Labyrinth, op. cit., pp. 1-21.
4. See The N ecessary A n g e l, op. cit. Cacciari develops many of his questions from Benjam in’s 
work on Paul Klee’s angels. The issues are also discussed by Agamben, op. cit. S im ilar themes are 
touched on in the major writings on allegory, especially in Fletcher, op. cit.; and Benjamin ends his 
Trauerspiel with the question of the origin of evil and subject and object. Benjamin poses the origin of 
evil as “the theological essence of (he subjective”: “Evil as such... exists only in allegory, and means 
som ething different from what it is. It means precisely the non-existence oi what it presents”. 
Associating this with the melancholic’s subjective view, he goes on to say that "By its allegorical form 
evil as such reveals itself to be a subjective phenomenon” ( Trauerspiel, op. cit., p.233). The promise of 
the knowledge o f both good and evil is paradoxical, for, Benjamin argues, "Knowledge o f  evil... has no 
object” for there is no evil in G od's creation, but only “in man himself": "K now ledge of good, as 
knowledge, as secondary. It ensues from practice. Knowledge of evil - as knowledge this is primary, it 
ensues from contemplation. Knowledge of good and evil is, then, the opposite of all factual knowledge” 
(p.233). Cf. discussion of allegory and symbol in Cacciari, The N ecessary Angel, op. cit., pp.50-53.
“metaphysical question par excellence”.5 However, for Agamben, negativ ity’s 
ungroundedness is what produces mystical speculation, but, he insists, such mysticism 
is not the means to access this region of concerns.
For all its esotericism, however, some familiar themes emerge in works such as 
C acciari’s book on angels. The angel, he argues, “poses the problem  of 
representation” 6 for although “all angels are created in grace”, grace is lost at the point 
where the angel d ecides  and exercises free will.7 Angels, Cacciari believes, are 
equivalent to linguistic signs: both are caught in the contradiction of absolute freedom 
and absolute determination, autonomy and heteronomy.
Persistent questions into interpretation - with their close attention to language and 
representation - tend to this negative ground. This, it seems, is the direction taken by the 
exploration of the question of symbol and allegory, or by “looking the negative in the 
lace”; and it is to be found - or at least implied - in Clark’s consideration of Pollock. Is 
this where the “fundamental questions” and the “ terrain beyond ideology” lie?8 So 
although the concerns of Chapter 3 seem distant from the more explicit emancipatory 
rhetoric of Chapters 1 and 2, there is, I think, a common thread which connects them.
The tenor of most intellectual debates which address - or, more often, touch on - 
negativity, tend to establish a secure division between nihilism and dialectic, across 
which polemics are exchanged. This is a division which I am inclined to think is rather 
less definite, although I also think that there are good reasons for holding on to it. The
5. Agamben, op. cit., p.85, p.3.
6. Cacciari, The N ecessary Angel, op. cit., p.39.
7. Ibid., p.61.
8. A dorno’s concept of mimesis - for him, the last bolt-hole of negation - is also posed as the 
problem ol representation. It is notable that Adorno’s discussion of the subject/object distinction is 
integrated with one on magic and archaic art. These are ontological questions which, it could be claimed, 




difficulties of addressing these debates can be intimated by a quick survey of, for 
example, some of the positions against nihilism from the Left. For some commentators, 
the problem of nihilism can be located with poststructuralist thought, or with 
poststructualism’s sources (such as Nietzsche); and yet others, distinguish between, on 
the one hand, Nietzsche and Heidegger and, on the other, the use that poststructuralist 
philosophers have made of them (for example, Gillian Rose). Some, such as Peter 
Dews, would seek to critique this poststructuralist tendency with the thought of Critical 
Theory. For others, German Critical Theory shares with French poststructuralism a 
“continental” idealism and lack of rigour, which might be counterposed with the Anglo- 
American tradition and, especially with Wittgenstein. Yet, for someone like Stanley 
Rosen, the traditional antipathy of Anglo-American to continental philosophy allows the 
former to be blind to its own nihilism, and, he argues, Wittgenstein is a key figure of 
20c. nihilist thought.9 For yet others, Western Marxism can be seen as a return to the 
Hegelian failings that Marx overcame - idealism and lack of praxis tend to be identified 
as the prime failings. For certain commentators, in contrast, Hegelian philosophy holds 
together what Left Hegelian philosophy tears apart; thus, for Kolakowski, the rejection 
of Hegel’s reconciliation of thought and empirical reality - initiated by the Young 
Hegelians - produced “the theory of an inevitable disharmony”, turning reason into “a 
source of obligation, a standard with which to confront the world”; 10 and treating the 
world’s inertia as something to be countered by spirit’s “destructive function”, its 
function as “ the agent of an eternal dissolution”. 11 And recently, as part of a critical
9. Rosen, op. cit., p.xviii.
10. Kolakowski, op. cit., p.93.
11. Kolakowski, op. cit., p.91. “W hereas H egel’s philosophy of history sought to maintain a 
positive link between the Idea and empirical reality, Bauer and other Hegelians of his school reintroduced 
a radical dualism between the critical mind and the existing universe. In this interpretation, the spirit is 
no more than the agent of an eternal dissolution to which every feature of the empirical world is bound 
to be subjected.... thus (he spirit and the world arc defined negatively by their relation to each other”. 
(pp.91-92) Bruno B auer's sense o f intellectual activity as “purely negative” (p.91; see also McLellan, 
op. cit., p.52. and cf. pp.10-11) is seen by commentators as Fichtean, not Hegelian. Kolakowski, for 
exam ple, tells us that for Bruno Bauer: "the whole o f em pirical reality presented itself to him on 
Fichtean lines as a collection of negatives, a kind of necessary resistance for the spirit to overcome in 
(he course o f its infinite progress” (Kolakowski, op. cit., pp.88-89) After 1840 especially, the Young
icalisi project, Roy Bhaskar values the Young Hegelian critique of Hegel’s restoration 
ol positivity, and emphasises negativity as the processual and transformative aspects of 
the dialectic’s “pulse of freedom”, and its role in human self-emancipation. 12
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Karl Lowith notes that Hegel's fulfillment of spirit [Voll-endung] is also “its final 
end” , ' 3 and argues that Hegel positions his philosophy in such as way as to break 
irretrievably from the Christian logos, making this fulfillment a “reconciliation of 
decay”.14 Agamben manages to follow Hegel’s negative into nihilism. 15 Similarly, 
Gillian Rose compares N ietzsche’s self-completing nihilism (sich vollendenden  
N ihilism us) - which she prefers to translate as “self-perficient” - with Hegel’s sich  
vollbringende SkeptizismusA6 Even Hegel himself suggested that the dialectic “on its 
own” leads to scepticism. 17
Working with the broad-brush distinction between a dialectic with an emphasis on
Hegelians are considered to have allied their sense of negation with F ichte 's notion o f obligation
(Solicit), a moral-practical philosophy which emphasised action, but which proposed a “perpetual
antagonism" between thought and world (p.53). According to Kolakowski, Fichte advocated a “dialectic
of self-cancelling exteriorization'' (p.52), where: “... the obligation of thought towards itself... requires
the ego to create its own counterpart, in which it recognizes itself as its own self-lim itation” (p.52).
Julian Roberts also roots the concept o f  “reflection” here, and describes "the ability of the
transcendental subject to distance itself from the empirical se lf ' (German Philosophy, p.82).
12. R oy  Bhaskar, D ialectic. The Pulse o f  Freedom , Verso, 1993, p.8. B haskar's is a project to 
outline a critical realist dialectic. He distinguishes different forms and aspects of negation and negativity.
13. LOwith, op. cit., p. 10.
14. Hegel cited ibid., p.l 1.
15. Cf. Otto Poggler, "Hegel und die Anfange der Nihilism us-Diskussion”, M an and W orld  3, 
1970, pp. 163-99. Agamben concludes that one must avoid being caught in this as a purely 
metaphysical and logical abyss, but must recognise the connected role of ethics and will (Agamben, op. 
cit., p.86). This question o f will, incidentally, seems to be a perpetual reference point for these debates.
16. In her book D ialectic o f  Nihilism : Poststructuralism  and Law  (Basil Blackwell, Oxford and 
New York, 1984), Gillian Rose discusses Ernst Junger's “Uber die Linie” (1950) as an enquiry into 
whether the world has surpassed Nietzsche’s completed nihilism, and also Heidegger’s response (pp.68- 
71). Heidegger argued that J Unger's "line” - with its subject/object separation - suggests that it is 
possible to distinguish an age of nihilism from one beyond nihilism. Heidegger proposed that “Out of 
the place o f the line originates the origin of the essence of nihilism and its completion”(cited p.69), and 
concluded that projects to cross the line will never challenge its jurisdiction (pp.69). For Heidegger, she 
notes, “This self-perficient nihilism is the event which completes what first occurred by seeing the 
litigious space ol consciousness and its objects as the representing of its own original partitioning, of a 
disowning (Vereignen) which is to be owned" (p.69).
17. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, op. cit., p. 128.
positive resolution, or one which maintains its negative, critical, open quality, it is the 
latter approach, in particular, where insecurities of ground are most pronounced. The 
emphasis on the negative claims an emancipatory impluse, but it also threatens - or 
offers - a plunge into the niliil. Between nihilism and the negative dialectic the ground - 
which is a negative ground, die Alyriinde, or abyss - becomes slippy, and not as secure 
as some would like it to be.
Similar difficulties are returned to in considerations of the unhappy consciousness, 
which, in the Hegelian narrative, follows scepticism, and which, as was noted towards 
the end of Chapter 3, seems to focus the dangerous ground(lessness) between dialectic 
and nihilism. Rosen, for example, criticises the degeneration of the unhappy 
consciousness into superficiality and irony - its loss of consciousness,18 and Kuspit, 
we may recall, refers to the unhappy consciousness as a pseudo-dialectic.19 According 
to Rosen the unhappy consciousness is “the melancholia attendant upon freedom , 
which he qualifies as “freedom in the sense of discontinuity , and by which he means 
n ih ilism .20 Others, it seems, would agree that der B egrifj des unglucklichen  
Bewusstseins already has nihilism inscribed within.21 Bhaskar, in fact, geneialises this 
point, arguing that the core of philosophy is “a veritable citadel of the Unhappy 
Consciousness”,22 “necessarily aporetic”, and characterised by being out of joint with 
reality”.23
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18. Rosen, op. cit, p.235.
19. Kuspit, “The Unhappy Consciousness of Modernism”, op. cit., p.54.
20. Rosen, op. cit.. p.234, p.230. However Rosen advocates a revitalisation of traditional ideals as 
a remedy to nihilism (p.233).
21. Poggler paraphrasing Hermann Wein, Poggler, op. cit., p. 165.
22. Bhaskar, op. cit., p.206.
23. Ibid., p.2. Sim ilarly, there is a good deal ol' disagreement about “Kantian antinom y” , or 
whether Kant did uncouple, for example, aesthetics from ethics. For example, Helga Geyer-Ryan sees 
Kant as the source of the uncoupling and argues for their rapprochement. The force of her argument is 
directed at “the stilling soliloquies of cultural pessimism and nihilism” (F ables o f  D esire, op. cit.. p.5). 
Bernstein, in contrast, argues that the aesthetic in Kant is imbued with ethics (Bernstein, op. cit.).
Quite how to conclude, without getting lost in - and constantly reopening - a host of 
political and philosophical disputes, then, is difficult to say, and we seem to be circling 
in “metaphysical subtleties and theological n i c e t i e s ” . 24 There appears to be a two-way 
movement in the considerations of negation in the texts that I have addressed: firstly, as 
the historical condition of now and beyond now (most focused around the theme of 
aporia, and the unhappy consciousness, interpretation, and mediation); secondly, as the 
ontological condition of representation (especially in considerations of mimesis, 
subject/object splits, the nihil, and silence); and it is probably no accident that these two 
ways circle the distinction of alienation and objectification in the opening chapter. 
Debates often dissolve into which of these ways to privilege, but most of the accounts 
addressed in this thesis have a complex sense of their mutual interaction.
Looking back across the genesis of this project, I have to say that the substance of 
neither my thesis nor my conclusion are what I had originally expected. I had, I 
suppose, anticipated an exploration of a Left Hegelian tradition, and a defence of the 
radical power of the negative in the face of criticisms of its assim ilation and 
recuperation. This seemed a fairly secure position, so it is “surprising” - if one can use 
such a term in the context of a six-year period of work - to find myself, with Adorno, in 
the Grand Hotel Abyss sharing contemplations on the nihil with guests such as Cacciari 
and de Man. If I share Lukacs’ distaste for this residence, it is with a large dose of bad 
faith - and, perhaps, confusion - for I have, nevertheless, allowed myself to partake of 
those “ subtle com forts” while simultaneously addressing the “renunciation of 
cosiness”.25 There are certain advantages to tarrying/dwelling here a while. It is where 
one must go if one is interrogating the concept of negation, the inescapable condition of 
the problem. The advantage is that it is a domain where certain “fundamental questions”
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24. M arx. C a p ita l, v o l.l, op. cit., p.76.
25. This is Benjamin’s description of Baudelaire’s supposed “satanism” (“Central Park” , op. cit., 
p.45).
to do with art or representation emerge, and is, perhaps, why each chapter has found 
itself addressing concepts like mimesis, silence, or the mutations of signs and symbols. 
Nevertheless, it is, I think, an area - possibly a swamp - from which it is difficult to 
escape or step back; in this sense Clark’s remark, that negation is “cumulative and 
uncontrollable”, is accurate. As Tafuri notes: “historical criticism must know how to 
balance on the razor’s edge that separates detachment and participation”. 26 What unites 
the thinkers that I have examined in this thesis - Adorno, Clark, Tafuri, Cacciari, de 
Man, Benjamin - is that they all “balance on the razor’s edge” and this is clearly an 
uncom fortable position. The task of avoiding easy reconciliation, or simple 
affirmations, involves facing up to the demands of the negative. The problem is to 
endure this tortuous position and to hold one's nerve.
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* * *
Already the Great Khan was leafing through his atlas, over the maps of the 
cities that menace in nightmares and maledictions: Enoch, Babylon, Yahooland, 
Butua, Brave New World.
He said: “It is all useless, if the last landing place can only be the infernal city, 
and it is there that, in ever-narrowing circles, the current is drawing us.”
And Polo said: “The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there 
is one, it is what is already here, the inferno where we live every day, that we 
form by being together. There are two ways to escape suffering it. The first is 
easy for many: accept the inferno and become such a part of it that you can no 
longer see it. The second is risky and demands constant vigilance and 
apprehension: seek and learn to recognize who and what, in the midst of the 
inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, give them space.”
(Italo Calvino)27
26. The Sphere and the Labyrinth , op. cit., p. 11.
27. Italo Calvino, Invisible C ities , Harcourt Brace & Company, 1974, pp. 164-5.
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